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English Records of Maratha History
Poona Residency Correspondence

Volume 1

Mahadji Sindhia and
North Indian Affairs

1785-1794

Edited by

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt., C.I.E.,
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English Records of Maratha History

Poona Residency Correspondence

General Editor,—Sir Jadunath Sarkar

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MAHADJI SINDHIA
DIED 12 FEBRUARY 1794

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C. April 15

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.. Warren Hastings assumes charge as Governor of Bengal, holds first Council 28 Apr. [Governor-General of India on 20 Oct. 1774.]
.. Ahmad Shah Durrani dies, Timur Sh. succeeds. |
| 1773 | Aug. 30 | .. Peshwa Narayan Rao murdered, Raghunath Rao succeeds. |
| 1774 | April 23 | .. Battle of Miranpur Katra, death of Hafiz Rahmat Kh. Rohilkhand annexed to Oudh. |
| 1775 | Jan. 25 | .. Shuja-ud-daulah dies, Asafud-daulah succeeds as Nwab Wazir of Oudh. |
| 1781 | Oct. 13 | .. Mahadji Sindhia signs treaty of peace with the English. |
| 1782 | C. Feb. 2
April 6
May 17

Nov. 17
Dec. 7 | .. David Anderson joins Sindhia's camp near Datia as Resident.
.. Najaf Kh. dies.
.. Treaty of Salbai, between the English and the Peshwa, signed, [ratified by Nana Fadnis on Dec. 20].
.. Md. Beg Hamdani murders Pauli and blinds Latafat Ali Kh.
.. Haidar Ali dies, Tipu Sultan succeeds. |
| 1783 | June 29

Sep. 23
Dec. | .. Mahadji interviews Prince Sulaiman Shukoh near Fathpur Sikri.
.. Ismail Beg Hamdani murders Mirza Shafi.
.. David Anderson falls ill, James Anderson begins to officiate as Resident. |
| 1784 | Feb. 5
Feb. 25
March 11
March

April 5
April 14

Oct. 29
Nov. 13
Dec. 4 | .. Major Browne, British agent, has his first audience of Emperor.
.. Rana of Gohad surrenders to Mahadji.
.. English sign treaty of Mangalore with Tipu.
.. David Anderson joins W. Hastings at Lucknow. Leaves for Calcutta on 27 Aug.
.. Afrasiyab Kh. invested as Mir Bakshi.
.. Prince Jahandar Shah (Jawan Bakht) flees from Delhi fort to Lucknow and Benares.
.. Zain-ul-abidin Kh. murders Afrasiyab Kh.
.. Sindhia meets the Emperor near Agra.
.. Mahadji appointed <i>de facto</i> Regent (diwan of <i>Khalsa</i> and <i>tan</i>), and the Peshwa as (nominal) <i>wakil-i-mullaq</i> . But Mahadji publicly invested as Deputy Regent (<i>naib mukhtiar</i>) on May 1, 1785. |
| 1785 | Jan. 21
Feb. 1

March 27 | .. Zabita Kh. Ruhela dies, Ghulam Qadir succeeds.
.. W. Hastings retires from G. G.-ship, John Macpherson succeeds.
.. Agra fort surrenders to Mahadji. |

- 1785 April 19 .. Major Browne takes his *congee* of the Emperor.
May 20 .. C. W. Malet interviews Mahadji near Mathura, and Emperor on 5 June.
Nov. 20 .. Aligarh fort captured by Mahadji.
- 1786 C. Jan. 16 .. Anderson dismisses Khair-ud-din from service.
March 2 .. Anderson leaves Sindhia's camp after rupture.
March 3 .. Malet arrives at Poona; first interview with Peshwa on 7th.
Sep. 12 .. Lord Cornwallis assumes office as G. G., *vice* J. Macpherson.
Oct. 29 .. Anderson's farewell interview with Emperor.
Nov. 28 .. Appa Khande Rao captures Panna, but is soon enveloped by rebels in Bundelkhand.
Dec. 20 .. W. Kirkpatrick at Shikohabad takes charge of Residency with Sindhia, *vice* J. Anderson.
- 1787 Jan. 24 .. Fiascos at Delhi between Kirkpatrick's sepoys and Sindhia's soldiers.
Feb. 4 .. Kirkpatrick has his first audience of Emperor.
C. Feb. 15 .. Mahadji detaches Ambaji Ingle from Delhi to Panipat district.
March 25 .. Khair-ud-din and 2 brothers expelled from Sindhia's camp.
April 19-July 31 .. Mahadji campaigns against Jaipur Rajah near Lalsot. Is deserted by his Hindustani troops and retreats to Alwar and Dig.
Aug. 23 .. Deshmukh and Nizamuddin flee from Delhi.
Aug. 26 .. Ghulam Qadir comes to Delhi and interviews Emperor. He fires on Delhi palace, 7-30 Oct. Receives pardon, 13 Nov.
Sep. 16 .. Ismail Beg defeats Lakhwa Dada, Rayji Patil and Lesteneaux and occupies Agra city; begins siege of Agra fort (prolonged, unsuccessful).
Oct. 15 .. W. Palmer succeeds Kirkpatrick as Resident with Sindhia.
Dec. 15 .. Ismail Beg attacks Sindhia and forces him to retreat to Dholpur.
Dec. 21 .. Prince Jahandar Sh. who had reached Delhi on 8th, is sent to Agra.
Dec. 27 .. Mahadji pays his first visit to Palmer on the Kumari river.
- 1788 Jan. 4 .. Emperor begins march from Delhi to Jaipur, returns to Delhi on 23 March.
March 3 .. Emperor gives *congee* to Jaipur Rajah who had made submission.
March 19 .. Najaf Quli makes submission to Emperor.
April 24 .. Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg severely defeat the troops of Ranjit S. Jat and Mahadji near Bharatpur.
June 17 .. Rana Kh. and De Boigne decisively defeat Ismail Beg near Agra. Ismail flees across the Jamuna.
July 15 .. Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg introduced to Emperor in Delhi palace by Nazir Manzur Ali.
July 31 .. Ghulam Qadir deposes Shah Alam and enthrones Bidar Shah.
Aug. 10 .. Ghulam Qadir blinds Shah Alam and commits atrocities in Delhi.
Sep. 7 .. Abdul Ahad Kh. (Majd-ud-daulah) dies near Fathpur Sikri, in exile.

- 1788 Sep. 28 .. Marathas occupy Old Fort (south of New Delhi), Ghulam Qadir retreats with his troops to east bank of Jamuna, and is pursued by Marathas.
- Oct. 11 .. Rana Khan reenters Delhi palace and rescues Shah Alam.
- Oct. 17 .. *Khutba* read in Shah Alam's name again.
- Nov. 3 .. Ali Bahadur arrives near Mahadji's camp at Mathura, meets M. on 7th.
- Dec. 18 .. Ghulam Qadir is captured; is blinded and killed on 3 March 1789.
- 1789 March 6 .. Palmer's first audience of Shah Alam.
- July .. Mahadji tries to seize Himmat Bahadur who had taken asylum with Ali Bahadur.
- 1790 Jan. .. Bhanga Singh Sikh (of Thaneshwar) kidnaps Lt. Col. Stuart near Anupshahar. Releases him for Rs. 15,000 on 24 Oct. 1791.
- June 1 .. Cornwallis makes treaty with Peshwa, Nizam joins on 4 July, forming the Triple Alliance against Tipu.
- June 20 .. Battle of Patan: De Boigne defeats Ismail Beg and Rajput coalition.
- Sep. 12 .. Battle of Merta: De Boigne crushes Ismail Beg and Rajahs of Jaipur and Jodhpur.
- Nov. 24 .. Rao Rajah Pratap S. (of Alwar) dies.
- 1791 Feb. Ajmir fort surrendered to Sindhia.
- Aug. 7 .. De Boigne is presented to Emperor.
- Dec. 4 .. Appa Khande Rao defeats Ismail Beg, on the way from Narnol to Kanund.
- 1792 Jan. 21 .. Mahadji from Mewar reaches Ujjain, starts on 12 Feb., reaches Poona 11 June, and interviews Peshwa on 22 June.
- Feb. 12 .. De Boigne is married in Delhi to Moti Begam, the adopted daughter of Najaf Quli Kh.'s second wife.
- April 16 .. Sindhia's generals capture Kanund, Ismail Beg issues from it and seeks shelter with Perron. He is confined in Agra fort, c. 15 June.
- June 18 .. Bijay S. Rajah of Jodhpur, dies.
- End of Oct. .. Jivva Dada surprises Tukoji Holkar on the Banas river and drives him away.
- 1793 May 19 .. Timur Shah Durrani dies, Zaman Sh. succeeds.
- June 5 .. Battle of Lakheri: Holkar's army under Dudrenec, Tukoji's son, and Alwar Rajah, defeated by De Boigne, Gopal Bhuu and Jivva Dada.
- Oct. 28 .. Cornwallis leaves India, Sir John Shore succeeds as G. G.
- 1794 Feb. 12 .. Mahadji Sindhia dies near Poona; Daulat Rao Sindhia succeeds.



MAHADJI SINDHIA

MAHADJI SINDHIA AND NORTH INDIAN AFFAIRS

SECTION 1

The Residency of James Anderson, 1784-1786.

1. DAVID ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Camp before Gwalior, 8th May 1783.

The long intended interview betwixt Mirza Shaffee and Sindia is now finally broke off. I have been at some pains to trace the springs and objects of their negotiation, and tho' I doubt not but you will have received the fullest information on this subject from Major Brown, yet, as it may afford you some satisfaction to compare the different lights in which matters are received in the two camps, I shall beg leave to lay before you the result of my enquiries.

Some time ago the authority which Mirza Shaffee had assumed over the affairs of the Court of Dehly stood on very "weak and precarious foundations". A misunderstanding had taken place between him and Mahomad Beg Hamdany by whose assistance he had recovered his authority which had been wrested from him by Latafat and his faction; and their disputes had gone to so great a length that every one imagined they would terminate in open war. He could place little dependance on the dispositions of the rest of the successors of Najaf Khan, all of whom might naturally wish either to establish their independancy or to raise themselves by the fall of their rival. The Jats had openly set his authority at defiance. The Sikhs had actually invaded his territories and had carried their ravages as far as the gates of Dehly. Sindia was in the neighbourhood with a large army, and had long professed an intention of marching to the Capital to settle the affairs of the Emperor, whose servant

he frequently affects to call himself. Some battalions of English troops were in motion and have since advanced as far as Anupshahar. From all these considerations Mirza Shaffee was long anxiously desirous of engaging in a close alliance with Sindia ; and his agent Himmat Bahadur, a man of some personal influence among the Marathas and endowed in an eminent degree with the talents of political intrigue, was indefatigable in his endeavours to effect an interview betwixt them. Nor were Sindia's dispositions at first less favorable for the purpose than those of Mirza Shaffee. His apprehensions were awakened by Mahomad Beg Hamdany, who had engaged in some negotiations for the support of the Rana, and was then lying with a large army at Dholpur on the frontiers of the Gohad district ; an alliance with Mirza Shaffee seemed therefore necessary to Sindia. But in the course of a few weeks a kind of reconciliation took place betwixt Mirza Shaffee and Hamdany, and the latter marched against the Rajah of Jaypore, from whom in imitation of his predecessor Najaf Khan he pretended to claim a tribute. Sindia now found himself secure in respect to Hamdany whose hands were fully employed at a great distance and he no longer wished for an interview with Mirza Shaffee. He put it off from time to time under pretence of the difficulties in which he was involved in his war with the Rana till he quite wearied out the patience of Mirza Shaffee, whose finances were at so low an ebb that he could scarcely keep his army together. The Jat country, which was the immediate scene of his operations, afforded him little prospect of supplies. His presence was become necessary at Dehly to repel the incursions of the Sikhs. (Major Brown had satisfactorily explained to him the intention of the march of the English troops to Anupshahar.) It is probable also that his desire of an interview had given way to apprehensions which he was not at first aware of, as Sindia had latterly talked with little reserve of a claim which he possessed in consequence of a treaty settled betwixt him and the late Najaf Khan about the time of Shah Alam's departure from Allahabad, by which he was entitled to a fourth or *chout* of all Najaf Khan's subsequent conquests,—a claim which owing to the protracted state of his affairs and the great power of Najaf Khan had for some years lain dormant but which he nevertheless considered as still in force. Whatever weight all these considerations may have had on the mind of Mirza Shaffee, it is certain that on receiving a letter from Sindia postponing the interview for a few weeks, he took that occasion to reply with some acrimony that he could wait no longer ; and accordingly he set out towards Dig, from whence it is said that he is to march directly to Dehly.

The interest of the Marathas and those of all the successors of the late Najaf Khan clash so materially that I do not think it probable that any

close or great alliance can take place betwixt them. Besides the difficulties arising from the claims possessed by Sindia in virtue of the treaty which I have already mentioned, the Marathas assert a right of superiority over many of the Hindoo princes who are now dependent on the successors of Najaf Khan, such as the Jats and the Rajah of Jaypore, both of whom the Marathas consider as their tributaries and under their protection. I am however well pleased that no interview has taken place. A connection betwixt Sindia and Mirza Shafsee, tho' it might have had no bad tendency, yet I think it could also have had no good one in regard to the English.

I have for some time past (as I expected) been frequently and importunately solicited to write to you in favour of Chait Sing. Sindia said that he received a letter from him whilst in Bundelcand assuring him that he had no intention or desire of embroiling him with the English, and that all he wanted was his friendly offices and intercession : that on these grounds he had received him into his camp and granted him protection ; and that as every thing else was now fully settled he hoped that he might use his intercession with effect. I persisted in my refusal to write, and Sindia was much embarrassed ; at one time he proposed to write to you himself, at another he resolved to bring Chait Sing suddenly to my tents and throw him on my protection. I repeated all the circumstances which had passed betwixt him and the English Government, of the peculiar favor with which you had treated him both in procuring him the first grants of the zamindary and in your subsequent conduct towards him,—the base ingratitude which he had shewn in return—the danger and actual indignity to which he had exposed your person, the cruelty and inhumanity which had marked and aggravated his rebellion, the proclamation issued by the gentlemen of the Council, the public declaration made by yourself to the principal inhabitants of Benares assembled on the investiture of his successor, the indignation conceived against him by all ranks of men both in India and in Europe. With this knowledge which I possessed of all these facts, I asked with what propriety could I presume to communicate any intercession in favor of a man whose offences were so heinous and unpardonable ? or how could I who had incessantly labored to promote that firm and cordial friendship which subsisted betwixt Sindia and you, concur in his writing to you on a subject of this nature where no good effect could possibly result ? I reminded him of the circumstances which had passed betwixt him and Tafazzal Husen Khan, whilst I remained at Bhandar. I observed that he had already done all that hospitality or even his promise to Chait Sing required. I particularly entreated that he would not take the step which he meditated of bringing Chait Sing to me, as it would draw me personally into a most disagreeable dilemma without the smallest prospect of any consequence favorable to his wishes.

After many messages to and fro, Bhow Bakhshy at length came to me and assured me that Sindia was now fully convinced that the wishes he had formed for Chait Sing were totally impracticable, that otherwise he was well assured that I would not have been at so much pains to discourage them; and that he would now endeavour to provide for Chait Sing in some other way. Bhow Bakhshy ascribed the great importunity which had been shewn on this occasion to the officious intrigue of one of his own servants who had endeavor'd to supplant him in Sindia's favour by flattering him with hopes that he would be more successful than his master to whose remissness he imputed the inefficacy of Sindia's applications on this subject. Whatever truth there may be in this story, I am in hopes that the matter will now be completely dropped.

Bhow Bakhshy informs me that there are private letters in camp from Aurangabad which mention that the troops at Poona are preparing to march into the districts formerly taken from the Marathas by Hyder. Sindia, he says, is in high spirits at the advices which he has received from all quarters in consequence of the ratification of the treaty.

Sindia continues to labor tho' with little effect at the siege of Gwalior: he seems however determined to persevere in his pursuit.

2. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, 20th Feb. 1784.

Since I had last the honor to address you under date the 15th, some circumstances have occurred which seem to threaten a speedy destruction to the affairs of the Rana. Two days ago a body of his sepoys reported to amount to 200 men found means to desert with their arms to Sindia, & they were accompanied by an Italian of the name of Miquel to whom the Rana had entrusted the command of one of his battalions. Soon after a person named Karran, a confidential friend & near relation of the Rana, came to Sindia to treat with him for terms. He proposed, I understand, that the Rana should in a few days have a meeting with Sindia on the plain & surrender Gohad to him on condition of Sindia's permitting him to retire to the Duab & it is said that he had accompanied this proposition with a declaration on his own part that if the Rana hereafter should attempt to practise any evasion, he and the other Chiefs belonging to him would immediately quit him & throw themselves under the protection of Sindia.

In consequence of this event, the whole Camp are now filled with expectations of a speedy period being put to their labours. I find it difficult to form any opinion how far these expectations are likely to be answered. There is every reason to think that if the Rana has really authorized such a proposal to be made in his behalf he is not serious, but there is equal reason to imagine that the clamours of his followers who

feel not the same interest in the prolongation of the contest will at length compel him to submit. Indeed, the present defection is reported to have arisen from a circumstance to which the general character of the Rana gives a colour of probability. On the approach of Col. Chas. Morgan's detachment he contrived to rouse the spirits of his people by a report that the Colonel had orders to assist him. This report continued to diffuse some degree of spirits amongst them until the Col.'s army crossed the Jamna, when a conviction of the deceit which had been practised upon them co-operating with the extreme hardships to which they were exposed & to which they could see no end, sunk them into a despondency that produced the desertion I have mentioned.

None of these circumstances have been communicated to me by Sindia or Bhow Bakhshy, but as they lead to the probability of a speedy reduction of the whole of the Rana's country, I have thought it proper to submit them to you on their general notoriety throughout the Camp.

3. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, 25th Feb. 1784.

The Rana has at length submitted to Sindia. Last night he deputed a confidential person to inform him that agreeable to the promise he had made he would this day meet him on the plain. Sindia accordingly made the necessary preparations, and having at noon sent two of his principal officers to conduct him, he went himself about two o'clock to a short distance from Gohad, where the Rana soon after came on horseback attended by Mr. Sangster & a few horsemen. He delivered a *nazar* & presented a pair of pistols to Sindia, who received them with great respect, putting them to his breast, & after a few commonplace compliments they separated, Sindia returning home & the Rana being conducted to some tents that were pitched on his account in the encampment. It is settled, I understand, that a respite of a few days shall be granted before he is required to make a formal surrender of Gohad, that proper steps may be taken in the interval to prevent the pillage of the place. I do not hear of any conditions that Sindia has entered into regarding him. His intention of granting him a jagir of two or three lacs annually had often it is said been declared to the Rana in case of his surrender, but if as I imagine he has obtained no formal engagement to this effect, he may possibly be considered to have forfeited his right to a claim of this nature in having postponed his submission till compelled to it by necessity. His wishes it is reported are to be put in possession of the fort of Bhoit & part of his ancient territory equal to the above amount.

Some time must necessarily be employed by Sindia in settling this business, so that for these several days I can scarcely hope for any private conference with him from which I might derive any insight into his future

views. As soon however as I may learn anything satisfactory on this head, I shall not fail to give you immediate information. At present the rumours of the Camp point variously to his return to the Deccan, his prosecution of the war against the tributary Hindoo Rajahs particularly those of Bundelcand & his interference in the disputes of Delhi. It is not unlikely that he waits to be guided by circumstances & that of these three schemes which seem to be the most natural objects of his choice he may not positively have determined on any.

Editor's Note.—Warren Hastings had formed a rooted aversion to the Rana of Gohad. As early as 4th November, 1781, in the course of his instructions to David Anderson about the terms to be conceded to Sindhia in making peace between the English and the Maratha Governments, he wrote, "You will of course be attentive to any engagements subsisting between us and other Powers in settling the terms of peace and alliance with the Marathas. I except from this precaution the Rana of Gohad, who has been guilty of the most flagrant breach of faith towards us in every instance. . . . Leave him to settle his own affairs with the Marathas." (Forrest, iii, 823.) On 22nd April, 1784, he repeats the same view in a letter to his Council: "I know the Rana of Gohad to deserve the worst that can be said of his political character. His conduct to our Government has been invariably marked with deception, infidelity, and ingratitude." (Forrest, iii, 1089.) By the fourth article of the Treaty concluded by the English with M. Sindhia (confirmed on 13th October 1781), "the Maharajah (Sindhia) shall agree not to molest or disturb the country of Lokendra Rana Chhatra Singh Bahadur Dilir Jang (of Gohad), nor the fort of Gwalior, which is at present in his possession, so long as the Rana Sahib observes his treaty with the English."

4. WARREN HASTINGS, G. G., TO THE CALCUTTA COUNCIL.

Bhojpur, 7th March 1784.

I have the honor to transmit you two letters which I have received from Mr. James Anderson respecting the subjection of the Rana & his dominions to Mahdajee Sindia.

How far it will prove in its consequences favorable or otherwise to us time alone will discover; but my own opinion inclines me to believe that as long as Mahdajee Sindia lives, every accession of territory obtained by him will be an advantage to this Government, and I cannot but feel pleased at the public & merited punishment which a character marked by such uniform perfidy as that of the Rana has not failed to draw upon itself.

Editor's Note.—W. Hastings's policy towards Mahadji Sindhia can be clearly seen from his letter of 22nd April, 1784, written to the Calcutta Council: "Some time ago Major Brown informed me that Afrasiyab Khan, who has now acquired the actual administration at Delhi, was extremely desirous of engaging, under the name and sanction of Shah Alam, in an alliance with us and the Nawab Wazir. . . . Major Brown entertains strong suspicions of Mahadji Sindhia, who, according to his information, has lately pressed the Chiefs at Delhi to enter into a close connection with him and dissuaded them from forming any alliance with us. . . . Brown remarks that if we do not enter into an alliance with Afrasiyab Khan, that Chief will, from necessity, be compelled to form one with Mahadji Sindhia, who will then be dangerous to the English and their ally the Wazir; that Afrasiyab Khan has represented to him that Sindhia, when he is strengthened with the support of the King's name, will invade the province of Oudh. . . ."

"It has long been imagined that Mahadji Sindhia, as soon as he should have finished his war with the Rana of Gohad, would turn his thoughts towards the affairs of Delhi."

"Much has been said of Sindhia's duplicity and falsehood, and inferences from thence been drawn of his future dangerous designs against the English and their ally the Nawab of Oudh. Sindhia does not at least deserve this character from us. In all his transactions with the English, I believe I might say in all his transactions that have come to our knowledge, he has shown an uncommon degree of steadiness and sincerity." (Forrest, iii, 1087-89.)

5. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G.G.

Sindhia's Camp, 4 cos from Gohad, 29th February, 1784.

Late last night I received a message from Mahajee Sindia that as he had some communication to make to me and Bhow Bakhshy being sick and unable to convey it to me, he requested I would send my Moonshee to him. I accordingly despatched the Munshee immediately, who returned to me soon after & informed me that Sindia, after dwelling for a long time on the many instances of perfidy and ingratitude which he had experienced from the Rana, proceeded then to acquaint him, that the Rana having some days ago offered to submit to him, provided he would spare his life, he had acceded to this condition and even promised to give him a decent subsistence, that on his coming out of Gohad, he had at his request, deputed his confidential friend Rana Khan Bhai, to meet him and give him his hand as a token of his security; and that he had himself received him with the greatest attention. Notwithstanding this circumstance, he declared that the conduct of the Rana since his arrival in camp had been of the most perfidious nature & evinced to him the absolute necessity from a due regard to his own interest of taking such steps as might put it out of his power to act treacherously. In proof of this assertion, he observed that the Rana had at their first meeting agreed to give Sindia possession, on the ensuing day, of one of the gateways of Gohad, into which, a few of his people with a flag were to be admitted, & that altho' the people with the flag had been waiting with the Rana during the whole day, he had nevertheless contrived to amuse them & avoid a compliance; he concluded by observing that as there was nothing he was more solicitous to preserve than the good opinion of the English, and as he was apprehensive lest the subsequent conduct he might be compelled to adopt with respect to the Rana might be represented to me through a false medium, he desired that these circumstances might be explained to me; adding his wish that I would give him my opinion on this matter, for which purpose, as it was then late, he would desire Appa Tanteah, an agent of Bow Baxy to attend me in the morning.

Appajee Tanteah having accordingly come to me this morning, I informed him that I was extremely obliged to Sindia for the communication he had last night been pleased to make to me; and that I considered it as a fresh proof of his friendship to the English. I assured him that our Government having the most perfect confidence in his good faith, would not hastily adopt any opinion to his prejudice; but as they were no way concerned in this affair, being a question that related solely to his own Govt., I did not think myself competent to give any opinion on the conduct he should pursue. I observed to Appa Tanteah however, merely in a private manner from myself, that I hoped Sindia

after giving so public an assurance of safety to the Rana would not hastily adopt any conduct apparently incompatible with it, however justified by circumstances, for these being of a less notorious nature, the uninformed part of the world might draw unfavourable conclusions to the detriment of his fame, which I knew to be his first object, and which indeed would be raised to a high pitch by the moderation he might shew after his success.

Altho' the flagrant breach of faith of which the Rana has been guilty to the English has deservedly removed him from any claim to our support or protection, yet as you were pleased at two different times to empower my brother to offer to Mahajee Sindia the mediation & guarantee of the English Government to facilitate an accommodation between them, I should have been glad to have availed myself of any opening which Sindia might have given me of soliciting the concession of decent terms to the Rana, on the grounds of favour to the English Government. The present occasion did not appear a fit one. Sindia's communication can scarcely be regarded in any other light than an anticipated justification of rigorous measures which he is determined to pursue with respect to him; and in this view of the matter, I thought it would be improper to have risked an application of this nature, when I saw so little likelihood of doing it with success. Possibly however, it is better that matters are likely to take a different turn, for if Sindia, in deference to the inclinations of the English Govt., had exceeded in his concessions to the Rana the point he had himself determined, he would have had a right to have requested our guarantee to the faithful observance of them on the part of the Rana, a circumstance which might have involved many disagreeable consequences hereafter.

After all, I shall be happy to find that I am mistaken in the idea I have formed of Sindia's rigorous intentions with respect to the Rana, but I fear there are many political reasons of a powerful nature which will operate with him to keep the Rana in perpetual confinement. His active and enterprising disposition, joined to the attachment which it may be supposed many of the natives will retain for their ancient chief, must be a perpetual source of disquiet to Sindia in case of the unrestrained liberty of the Rana.

6. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, 2nd March, 1784.

For these some days past Mahajee Sindia has been so much engaged in his negotiations with the Rana of Gohad that I have had no opportunity of conferring personally with him on business. I have made known to him however through his minister Bow Bakhsh your sentiments on the proposed co-operation against Tippoo Sahib, and the instructions on this head, which you have been pleased to give to the Select Committee

at Bombay, and he has expressed himself in a high degree pleased with the attention which has been shewn to his wishes.

I have the honour to inform you that Mahajee Sindia was yesterday put in complete possession of the town of Cohad, the Rana having submitted himself to him on the 25th ultimo on a general assurance of personal safety, and the promise of a suitable maintenance. The various points which at present in consequence of this affair engross the attention of Mahajee Sindia may for some days prevent my having any private conference with him from which I might expect to derive an insight into his future views ; but as soon as I may learn anything satisfactory on this head, I shall not fail to lay it before you, and in the event of his marching to the Deccan, I shall pay due attention to the commands which on that supposition you have been pleased to give me.

7. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 15th Novr. 1784.

Sindia continues to repeat to me the strongest assurances of his fulfilling all his promises in regard to the Prince*, and my hopes grow more sanguine as the time draws nearer. Nothing in his conduct hitherto gives me reason to doubt it. He has on the whole conducted himself with much moderation, and it seems a very general opinion that he will put the King on a much better footing than he has hitherto been. He seems to have made a very equitable division of Hamdany's guns, and he has given proofs that he is [not] swayed by the councils of Himmat Bahadur, as has been reported. He has taken Hamdany into his service, but I know not on what footing.

Sindia's Camp, 16th Novr. 1784.

All these forms got over, the business I hope will soon be finished ; but I find it impossible to hurry Sindia, and every day's experience convinces me that he is the best judge of his time. I have sanguine hopes that every thing will go well and I have not the same uneasiness I before had for the consequences, in case Sindia should object to any thing ; for happen what will, I think his regard for his connexion with the English will ever prevent any serious misunderstanding between us.

Sindia in his negotiations with the King has chiefly employed Appa Candy Row, who is by much the most respectable of all his confidants and who is a warm advocate for the English, and the benefits of a lasting friendship between them and the Marathas. The employment of him upon this occasion has given great offence to Himmat Bahadur, and his disgust on this occasion has been aggravated by many slights which the other, who hates him mortally, has shewn him. Sindia seems to have

* Prince Jahandar Shah Jawan Bakht, who escaped from Delhi fort on 14 April 1784.

connived at these, and it is now pretty evident that he does not intend what was before apprehended by some, to throw the whole power into the hands of Himmatt Bahadur, in the arrangements which he now means to make. What his present views are is the subject of much speculation. He has never given me the most distant hint in regard to them, and I pay very little attention to the opinion of others ; for I know that he has too much wisdom to communicate his councils to any one. This merit he certainly has in the highest degree of hearing indiscriminately the opinions of all and keeping his own concealed till the moment for action arrives, which has given an appearance of mystery to his conduct in many of his transactions, both here and in the Deccan, when, in fact, he was guided only by the common maxims of prudence. In the mean time, it gives me great satisfaction to perceive that there is a very general belief, grounded upon a knowledge of his character, that he will act with generosity towards the King, and I sincerely hope that it may be verified by the event. I must own, that in Sindia's conduct hitherto I see nothing incompatible with this idea ; for although he has shewn a disposition to keep to himself the whole of Hamdany's jageer, yet it will still be abundantly in his power to shew his generosity to the King.

18th November 1784.

Sindia has made no objection to the Prince's being accompanied by the five battalions of the Vizier, which I formerly communicated to him by the Governor's order, and have since Brown's arrival repeated to him.

22nd November 1784.

Yesterday, I was introduced by Sindia to the King, and to-morrow Sindia is to visit Browne. I had a short private conversation with Sindia before he left his tent and urged to him as strongly as I could the necessity for expedition, as the present opportunity was so favourable for accomplishing all the Governor's views with respect to the Prince ; and I observed to him, that such was the confidence both the Governor and the Prince placed in him that I believed the Prince would act out of himself before anything was settled, if he did not make haste. I then explained to him again the troops that were to accompany him ; and as I had heard that he had privately expressed an anxiety at the number that were coming, I endeavoured to draw from him his own sentiments on this point. His answer was as usual ; he declared that as he had undertaken this business for the Governor he would exert himself in the accomplishment of it : that he intended, immediately on my taking leave of the King, to speak privately to his Majesty on the subject, that when he should discover his Majesty's sentiments on the different points of the jageer, the number of troops etc. he would then procure from him a *Shukā* (royal letter) to the Prince to this effect and that he hoped it would be ready to-day or to-morrow. Accordingly he had a *tete d tete* conversation with

the King after my leaving him yesterday, but I have not yet heard the result of it.

Sindia's Camp, 25th Novr. 1784.

Since my address of the 6th instant, I have purposely deferred doing myself the honor of writing you, in the expectation that each succeeding day would have enabled me to have given you some decisive information in regard to the settlement of the Prince's negociation. It is now with extreme concern I inform you, that Sindia has intimated it to be his Majesty's pleasure, that his son should return to the Presence, but to be cautious, on no account whatever to bring any troops with him; and this he has declared to be the free and unbiassed resolution of his Majesty, in which it is not in his power to produce any alteration. In order to enable you to form a proper judgment of this matter, I beg leave to submit to you a detail of all that has passed since his Majesty's arrival in camp.

Immediately after the King's departure from Agra, I received information from Major Browne, that he had prevailed on his Majesty at length to consent to the return of the Prince with the troops appointed to attend him, and that he had accordingly despatched a *Shuka* to him to this effect. I was well pleased with this circumstance, but as I had already communicated to Mahajee Sindia that you had desired Major Browne to suspend the negotiation with the Minister till his arrival, since you had entrusted the entire management of the business to him, that this information, in appearing to contradict the confidence you had expressed in him, might suggest an idea of your diffidence in Sindia, and of a wish to effect the business independent of his assistance. It is true that the assassination of the Minister,* in enabling Major Browne to negotiate immediately with the King, had produced a situation of affairs different from that, on the supposition of which your orders had proceeded; yet as it was evident that any measure we might persuade the King to adopt would prove perfectly nugatory unless taken in concert with Sindia, I thought the necessity for an entire confidence in him operated still stronger than ever. For these reasons I was of opinion, that we ought to make no mention to Sindia of what steps had been taken, in order that as he had promised to effect all your wishes in regard to the Prince it might appear that you had confided in him entirely. These sentiments I communicated to Major Browne on the first day of our meeting, and he agreed with me in the opinion, so far as related to the expediency in the present situation of affairs, of taking no notice of what already had been done, that Sindia might appear to have managed the whole from the beginning.

The King arrived within three miles of the Maratha camp on the 13th instant, and was visited by Sindia the ensuing day. After remaining

* Afrasiyab Khan, Mir Bakhshi, murdered by Zain-ul-abidin Kh. (the brother of the murdered Md. Shafi) on 29 Oct. 1784.

there two days his Majesty marched and pitched his tents close to Sindia's encampment. It was not until the 17th that Sindia entered on business with him, when he had a long private conversation with him upwards of an hour at which no one was present on the part of either. Whatever might have passed at this conversation nothing was mentioned in regard to the Prince, at least Sindia said he had not found an opportunity of entering on the subject, but he continued on my pressing him on this score to assure me that he would settle all the points you had entrusted to him in the manner you wished. On the 21st, the day he presented me to the King, I took an opportunity in his own tent, of urging to him the necessity of expedition. He assured me in reply, that he meant as soon as he had introduced me to the King, to settle this matter in private with his Majesty, and he declared that he had not forgotten the declaration he had before so often made, that his friendship for you had induced him to take the burthen of this business entirely upon himself. I was somewhat uneasy however to perceive, that on my repeating to him the different points which you wished to be effected, although he made himself no objections to any, yet he seemed to rest a great deal on the inclinations of his Majesty and to pay little or no attention to my observation that his Majesty would certainly yield to whatever he might desire.

Sindia had accordingly that evening a private conversation with the King, and the next day he sent me information that in consequence of his intercession with his Majesty, he had agreed to pardon and receive back his son and that he had ordered a *Shuka* to be prepared to this effect, of which he promised to send me a copy as soon as it should be ready. As he made no mention of the King's having agreed to any of the other essential points, I took notice of this circumstance to his agent, and as I was anxious to send you immediate information on this head, I begged he would procure a more full explanation from Sindia. The next day he returned with a message equally equivocal and told me, that some delay had happened in writing out the *Shuka*, but that he hoped to have it in his power to send me a copy of it for certain on the ensuing [day]. This strange conduct, concurring with the reports that were now very generally spread of Sindia's having expressed an aversion to the troops accompanying the Prince, led me to form very unfavourable suspicions in my own mind, and in the evening Major Browne actually informed me that he had received intelligence on which he could with certainty rely, that Sindia had strongly recommended it to the King to prevent his son from bringing any troops along with him and had prevailed on his Majesty to give orders that this caution should be inserted in the *Shuka* to him.

Having now little reason to doubt the unfair dealing of Sindia on this occasion, I thought it necessary to take some steps to bring him to a clear explanation. Accordingly, I sent yesterday morn for his agent, and after expostulating with him freely on the strange, mysterious, and

dilatory conduct of Sindia, so unbecoming the confidence you had placed in him, I desired him to procure for me a clear answer in regard to what had been settled with his Majesty. This had the desired effect. He returned a few hours afterwards, and informed me on the part of Sindia, that his Majesty had objections to the return of his son with troops and did therefore intend to prohibit him from bringing any. I could not help expressing to him plainly my sense of this intimation of his Majesty's pleasure at a juncture like the present, when it was so much in Sindia's power to effect any point with his Majesty that he should declare to be his own wish, and I was sure you would ascribe it to a want of exertion in him, which would carry a very bad appearance after the reliance you had been induced to place on him, and the consequent promises he had himself made to you. This led into a long discussion, in which the agent, altho' he positively asserted the obstacle to the troops to flow entirely from the disposition of the King, and in proof of it said it was Sindia's wish that Major Browne should sound his Majesty on this subject; yet he proceeded to vindicate it by such arguments and observations as had evidently been suggested to him by Sindia: "He considered it as very extraordinary that after entrusting the management of this matter entirely to Sindia, after the declarations you had made of your confidence in him, you should nevertheless evince the contrary by insisting on his being accompanied by a body of troops. It was obvious that this measure would never prove agreeable to the King, to whom it carried so prejudicial an appearance." Our intentions, he doubted not, were pure, and that we had no other view in it than to afford a shew of protection to the Prince, to secure his future safety; but why did we not entrust this as well as the negotiation to Sindia, whose army was now present, and who of course had so much the means of ensuring it? The purpose would be equally well answered if our confidence in Sindia was sincere, and all the bad appearances of aiding the return of a fugitive son to the court of his father would be avoided. On the other hand, if, (as I had explained to him) the Vizier had a right to send those troops to the Presence in nature of his office, it surely could not be meant on any other supposition than that of being agreeable to the King; but at all events the sending of them with the Prince was improper, as it gave a different appearance to the measure, from what the intention of it really was.

To all this I replied, that the proposal which he made of Major Browne's discovering the King's sentiments was not a fair one, since not being in possession of such an army as Sindia commanded, he had not the same means of negotiating as he had; and that you had no other motive in sending the troops than the preservation of the Prince's honor and safety and to aid Sindia's negotiation, which indeed carried its own proof along with it, for if your intentions had been otherwise, you would have sent a force adequate to the purpose. This, I observed, ought to be a sufficient proof with Sindia of your perfect confidence in him; and I begged of

him to consider, that if he put a stop to the Prince's return at present by so unbecoming a diffidence in you, he would infallibly lose an opportunity, not only of acquiring the credit and honor of establishing the Prince at the court of his father, but also of strengthening and securing his own objects by connecting them together in such a manner as would have secured [him] from the danger of events to which the absence of the King's eldest son must perpetually expose them. If the attendance of the troops on the Prince did anywise interfere with his plans, I doubted not but that if he would explain himself clearly, you would remedy this as far as was consistent with reason and propriety ; but if he chose to obstruct the business entirely on this account, I was certain that you would hereafter take other means of effecting it than through his agency.

The agent, having communicated to Sindia what I had said, returned to me to-day, and informed me on his behalf, that as I appeared to doubt the objection of his Majesty to the coming of the troops to flow from his real sentiments, he supposed it to proceed from a circumstance with which he was not unacquainted, namely, that his Majesty had before written to his son to proceed with the troops : Of this his Majesty had himself informed him, and had explained it to him to have arisen from an apprehension he entertained of the designs of his ministers ; but as this reason operated no longer, and as he was now perfectly pleased with his situation, he was positively determined to prohibit the advance of the troops. He expressed great concern at my belief of the objection arising from him, assured me he repeated nothing but the genuine sentiments of the King, and declared that as he considered your army and his as the same, he was indifferent by which it was effected.

Having laid before you this detail, I beg leave to submit it to you as my own opinion, that Sindia's aversion to this measure arises less from any diffidence of your intentions, than from an apprehension of the prejudicial consequences to himself which would probably result from it. The situation in which his good fortune has now placed him has certainly opened very extensive views to him ; and whatever these may be, it is evident from all his proceedings hitherto that the gradual undermining of the Musalman power by dispersing their chiefs, and establishing his own influence in the principal offices of the Empire, is the mode by which he expects to effect them. In this he has already in a great degree succeeded, more however by a concurrence of fortunate events than by any great exertions of his own. The Musalman chiefs though thus dispersed and deprived of their power, want nothing but a head to enable them yet to assert their own independancy ; and this would be immediately upheld to them in the person of the Prince at the head of a body of troops, and under the immediate protection of the English : Sindia, therefore, without any diffidence of the English, has every reason, from the position of affairs, to dread his return under such circumstances, lest it should undo all the

effects of his labor, after he had brought them so near a conclusion. He has therefore probably put a stop to the whole at present in the hopes of its producing a delay sufficient to enable him to accomplish his schemes in the interval.

The particular views of Sindia at present are variously reported, but his councils are too secretly kept to be known for certain to any one. It is imagined, and is indeed very probable, that he has principally at heart the possession of the treasures and effects of the deceased Ameer-ul-Omrah [Afrasiyab Khan] in the fort of Aly-garh; but that he is extremely embarrassed how to effect this point. The office of Ameer-ul-Omrah, it is said, has been offered to him by the King and declined by him from the dignity of it being incompatible with the obedience he owes to the Peshwa. If however it should facilitate the attainment of his other objects, I do not think it unlikely but that he may yet accept of it.

8. WARREN HASTINGS, G. G., TO JAMES ANDERSON.

Fort William, 10th December 1784.

I have seen a letter from you to your brother dated the 24th ultimo, and think it necessary to communicate to you my sentiments upon the subject of it. I am not sorry to find that the objections to the Prince's being accompanied by a body of the Vizier's troops have originated on the side of Sindia. If this point had been agreed to by the King and him, we should on our side have been under some difficulty about carrying the measure into execution; for if the troops that were destined to attend the Prince should have had occasion to march beyond the boundaries of the Vizier's dominions, an equal force must necessarily have been raised to supply their place, and this would have created an additional expence which his Excellency's finances could not at present easily admit of. If this point therefore is not positively settled, I desire that you will recede from it: all that I think absolutely necessary is, that the Prince shall be attended by my Body-guard. This is a force too small to be an object of jealousy to Mahajec Sindia; nor is it to be imputed to any diffidence in him, that I must insist on it, since if he, in contradiction to the tenor of all his former conduct, were capable of entertaining sinister intentions, the presence of 7 or 800 sepoys would be no defence against them. But he must be sensible that his own affairs will not permit him long to continue in the neighbourhood of Dehly. He has himself frequently indicated an intention of returning soon to the Dekan; and whenever that event shall take place, those scenes of assassination and treachery which have for sometime past been so frequent among the Musalman Chiefs, may again be renewed and the only effectual security which the Prince can possibly have against them will be in the appearance of support from the English, and in the presence of a body of troops, inadequate indeed to the purpose

of open war, but sufficient to resist the sudden attacks of treachery. Besides, I am desirous,—and Sindia ought to be more so, that in every thing which relates to the return of the Prince to his father's Court, the English and Maratha Governments should appear firmly and cordially united. The management of the negociation is left entire to Sindia, and it is necessary that the Prince should be escorted by a guard from us to shew the neighbouring Powers that we participate in those measures which Sindia may settle.

After all, the Prince himself must determine. He alone can be the judge in matters where either his safety or his honor are concerned. All that I can do is to advise ; and in doing this I must strongly dissuade him from leaving the Vizier's dominions except under the following circumstances. First, that he receives an invitation from his father with the concurrence of Mahajee Sindia ; and second, that he is allowed to carry the Body-guard with him for his protection.

I desire you will explain these sentiments to Mahajee Sindia. He will I hope perceive that in the plans which I have formed on this occasion the safety and honor of the Prince, who has cast himself on our protection, are the first objects of my consideration, that I wish to conduct them in such a manner that instead of furnishing cause for jealousy, they may prove an additional cement to the friendship and union of this Government and Mahajee Sindia himself ; and that nothing is further from my mind than any idea of promoting the interests of the Prince at the expence of those of his father, or in opposition to his inclinations.

9. JAMES ANDERSON TO WARREN HASTINGS, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, 2nd December 1784.

In my address of the 26th ultimo I had the honor to inform you of the communication which Sindia had made to me of his Majesty's resolutions in regard to the Prince. As the King has himself since confirmed this in person to Major Browne and as Sindia, by the extraordinary power which he has persuaded his Majesty to confer on the Peshwa, has effectually secured the permanency of his interest at this Court, there is now no room left to hope for the attainment of any concessions for the Prince, by negotiation, beyond his pardon and re-establishment at the Court on the footing of the other princes. I have already submitted it to you as my opinion, that Sindia's conduct on this occasion has proceeded from an apprehension of the prejudicial consequences which the Prince's return under the shew of the English protection, would unavoidably occasion to his own views, and in this I have further reason to be confirmed by the reports which very generally prevail in this camp of the extensive plans which the Prince has formed in his mind since he first received the intelligence of the assassination of the Ameer-ul-Omrah, and of the

confident expectations he has expressed of your immediately returning from Calcutta to co-operate with the Vizier in establishing him with power at his father's court. If this report has reached the ear of Sindia, as from its currency I have reason to think it may, it must have greatly increased his apprehensions from the return of the Prince; and as his views are not now restricted to particular temporary schemes, but the general interest of his own Government at this Court, I confess I see little probability of any change of his sentiments on this point.

As Major Browne, who was yesterday present when the *khilat* of Vakcel-ul-Mutlak was given to Sindia on behalf of the Peshwa, will have written to you on this subject, I forbear to submit to you the circumstances. In the meantime I beg leave to inform you, that as Sindia afterwards received the congratulations of all his officers, I thought it proper, (as indisposition prevented me from going in person) to notify to him by a message my satisfaction at this signal mark of honor and power conferred on the friend and ally of the Company, and expressed my hope that I should be able to congratulate him in person on his receiving the *khilat* of Neabat (deputy-ship) to the Peshwa, with which he is to be invested in two or three days: Sindia took this extremely well, and in return made many professions of the inviolable friendship of himself and his nation to the Company.

The army on the 30th ultimo made a march for six cos towards Jaypore, and to-morrow it is to march nearly as far in the same course. It is however in general believed that Sindia has no serious intentions of proceeding at present to that place, but that he has been induced to go thus far in the hopes of bringing the Rajah to a speedy compliance with his terms, and that if, after halting some days at the next ground, he should continue to refuse, he will then detach Ambajee against him and return himself towards Muttra, to pursue his measures for securing the treasures and effects of the deceased Ameer-ul-Omrah. This appears to be probable; but Sindia keeps his councils so secret and acts so entirely from himself, though he listens to the opinions and advice of many, that the world are often deceived in judging of his intentions from appearances. This has been signally instanced of late in the case of Himmat Bahadur, whom, from the strong apparent connexion between them, it was generally believed he intended to have established in a high situation of power with the King. But since the arrival of his Majesty, Sindia has in a manner entirely excluded him. He has himself had two long private conversations with the King, at which no one was present on the part of either, and on all other occasions he has employed Appa Khandy Row, to whom he has entrusted all his negotiations with the King.

I have thought it necessary to mention this circumstance to you, because a report, I know, has very generally prevailed that Sindia was much under the influence of this man, who is known to be hostilely

inclined to the English and their ally the Vizier. But Sindia, whatever attention he may have paid him whilst he employed him as an agent, was certainly never under his guidance ; and he has now sufficiently shewn his opinion of him, in discarding him at a period like the present ; more especially, as Appa Khandy Row, whom he has substituted in his place, is his inveterate enemy. A perfect contrast indeed subsists between them, for the character of Appa is as generally respected as the other is detested, and he is warmly attached to the English.

10. JAMES ANDERSON TO GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

1st February 1785.

In a former address I did myself the honor to inform you that the first object of Mahajee Sindia at present was the possession of the fort of Agra, for which purpose he had set on foot a negotiation with Shujadil Khan, the governor of it. The management of this he had intrusted to Himmat Bahadur, who persuaded him that Shujadil Khan being a dependant of his would acquiesce in whatever he might propose. The event however proved the contrary, Shujadil Khan rejected with disdain every overture of Himmat Bahadur in whom he placed not the smallest confidence ; but perceiving that it was in vain for him singly to oppose the power of Sindia, he sent two days ago proposals to Appa Candy Row and offered on condition of his pledging himself for the faithful performance of them on the part of Sindia to surrender the fort to him. These proposals, which related chiefly to the settlement of a provision for the son of Afrasiab Khan and for himself, were immediately acceded to by Sindia, and Rajee Patel a relation of his has been deputed to receive charge of the fort.

This circumstance has I believe in a great degree undeceived Sindia in regard to the advantages he had promised to himself from his connection with Himmat Bahadur, and it serves to throw light upon a conversation which passed a few days ago between him and my Molavee on the subject of this man having some time ago made an application to Sindia, at the desire of his Excellency the Vizier for a restitution of the jageer of Karim Qooly Khan the son of Muneer-ud-Dowlah which had been taken from him, on account of his attachment to Hamdany. He gave me a promise to this effect, but having afterwards at the instigation of Himmat Bahadur shewn an inclination to recede, I desired my Molavy to expostulate with him freely on this occasion. Sindia acknowledged that he had in this matter been swayed by the advice of Himmat Bahadur, and that as he had particular reason for not offending him he wished I would agree to an accommodation of this affair by prevailing on Karim Qooly Khan to relinquish the jageer, and that he would provide for him some other way. He then entered into a long enumeration of the difficulties of his situation and of the necessity he was under of availing himself of this man's assistance, who had possessed himself of a complete knowledge of affairs

here ; he had instructed all his confidential servants to make themselves masters of the business here as speedily as possible, and to insinuate pretty plainly that his connection with him should cease from the moment he could do without him. The system he said was followed by the English and they could not blame him for adopting a similar one. In the meantime he desired my Molavy to assure me that he was himself perfectly acquainted with the character of this man and that I need have no apprehensions of the countenance he found it necessary to shew him proving in the least prejudicial to his connection with us. As a proof of his sincerity he immediately ordered a sanad to be prepared confirming the former jagcer to Karim Qooly Khan instead of a new one, which in conformity to the request of Himmat Bahadur he had before wished to give him.

This departure of Sindia from his usual caution on occasions of this kind, joined to the circumstance of Himmat Bahadur's failure in so capital a negotiation which he had himself solicited, convinces me that his fall must be rapid. I cannot help expressing my satisfaction at the prospect of this event, for altho' my confidence in the wisdom and firmness of Sindia led me to regard this connection with more indifference than otherwise I should have done, yet the bad appearance which it carried gave some reason to apprehend that it might ultimately be attended with disagreeable consequences.

The death of Zabita Khan [on 21st January 1785] it is imagined will hasten the march of Sindia with the King to Delhy, and indeed after the surrender of the fort of Agra, which must take place in a few days, he can have no motive for remaining longer here ; he has lately dismissed the vakeels from the Sikhs with presents to their Chiefs, and I understand he has offered to take 5,000 of them into his service.

11. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp near Agra, 23rd March 1785.

I have had the honor to receive your letter under date the 1st instant, and beg leave to assure you that as soon as Major Browne leaves Camp, I shall not fail to pay an implicit obedience to your commands in the execution of the additional charge you have, in that event, been pleased to commit to me.

Mahajee Sindia since his arrival at this place has been busily employed in the siege of it but apparently with little success hitherto. The strength of the fort is such as might long enable it to resist the more warlike operations of Sindia, but it seems doubtful whether it be sufficiently stocked with provisions, and there is great reason to suspect the countenance and the fidelity of the garrison to their governor, whose cause is disclaimed by the King and whose own importance in the State has sunk with the death of his brother-in-law the late Amir-ul-Omrah.

As he has already however ventured to withstand the power of Sindia, he may be led from despair to continue his resistance to the utmost of his ability, and Sindia, foreseeing the probability of a long delay, is now taking means to detach a part of his army against Aly-garh instead of marching thither in person, as he had before intended on the supposition of his meeting with no impediment here.

The management of his affairs at the Capital has been intrusted to Ambajee and it is his wish to divert if possible the incursions of the Sikhs by taking some of their chiefs into his service. In this object he has as yet had no success, and nothing seems to have prevented an open rupture between them but the discord that prevails amongst the Sikh Chiefs. In the meantime their mutual objects seem so much to interfere as renders it little likely they should ever unite, and an opposition from the Sikhs may possibly detach several of the Musalman chiefs whom necessity has compelled to submit to the power of Sindia.

Hitherto the measures of Sindia in this quarter, have involved him in much additional expence without yielding him any substantial advantages in return. He has not yet ventured to seize on the jageers of the Mogul chiefs, and as the greatest part of the country from the system pursued by Najaf Khan and his successors has been parcelled out amongst them, Sindia without a resumption of them can never derive any benefit from his situation here. He was lately induced, and probably as a preparative to a more general measure of this kind, to take possession of the jageers of the Princes, with a promise to pay them an equivalent in money, but this step was so violently resented by the King that Sindia was forced to recede from it. In the meantime the Mogul chiefs have had sufficient cause of alarm on this head, and it is suspected that some of the principal amongst them have entered into a secret confederacy with the Sikhs for an eventual junction with them, in case of the resumption of their jageers.

Mahajee Sindia has ordered Bow Backsy to remain at Lucknow, that he may use his endeavours to prevail on the Prince to return to his father ; and from the tenor of some letters he has lately received from him as well as from the Prince himself, he entertains very confident hopes of success in this point.

The departure of the late Governor-General [on 7th February 1785] for Europe, had afforded some grounds of expectation to Chait Sing and his partizans, for his re-establishment at Benares. Mirza Rahim Beg and Madow Row Dewan, two of Sindia's confidential ministers who have chiefly shared in the spoils of his broken fortune, held several consultations on this occasion in conjunction with Himmat Bahadur, and they so far prevailed on Sindia as to induce him to desire his agent to sound me by proposing several questions in regard to the powers you possessed of altering the arrangements of the late Governor-General and whether it was probable that you would pursue the same system. He went no

farther, and I have great reason to think that he will not renew the subject. Indeed, it is with extreme satisfaction I inform you that Sindia has steadfastly adhered to the assurances he gave me of preventing Chait Sing's introduction to the King. In all public concerns in which the whole of the chiefs have attended and presented their *nazars* at Court, he has taken particular care that Chait Sing should be kept back, and I have a firm conviction he will continue to adhere to his promise on this occasion with the same firmness, notwithstanding any attempts that may be made to persuade him to the contrary.

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12. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

3rd April 1785.

The Fort of Agra surrendered on the 27th ultimo, and the King immediately afterwards conferred the Subahdary of the Province on his second son the Prince Akbar Shah, and the Deputyship on Ladoji Deshmukh, Sindia's son-in-law. In the meantime Sindia has appointed Rayjee Patel a relation of his own to the Government of the fort on the part of his son-in-law, and having taken other measures for the settlement of the Province, it is his intention to march from hence with the King tomorrow towards Delhi. This resolution Sindia professes to have adopted in compliance with the wishes of the King, but it is probable that he has been in a great degree induced to it from the critical situation of his affairs at the Capital under Ambajee owing to the opposition of the Sikhs. All his efforts to attach them to his interest seemed to have had but little effect, and he now professes his intention of exerting the whole of his force against them, until he has compelled them to relinquish the tribute under the name of *Rukhi* which they have of late years imposed on the Imperial territories. In the meantime, as he has informed me of his intention to halt some time at Muttra, it is likely that he intends to avail himself of that interval to conclude the negociation with Jehangeer Khan, the Kelladar of Aly-garh, for the delivery of the fort to him, and tho' he affects to consider this matter as already settled, it may possibly contribute to retard considerably his arrival at the Capital.

I have the honor to lay before you an extract from a letter of last night received from Colonel Sir John Cumming. I thought it necessary to inform Sindia of the subject of it so far as related to the deputation of the Pandit, and he denied having given any authority for it. He had heard, he said, of the circumstance and he understood that it was without the knowledge of Ambajee, who when he was informed of it had so far disapproved of it as to desire Bappoo Malhar to dismiss the Pandit from his service. How far Sindia's declaration of his not having authorised it is to be relied on, I will not pretend to say, but it seems very evident that he had no such views from it as Sir John suspects, for besides that he has

shewn much jealousy of our participation in his measures here, he is sufficiently informed, if he had really stood in need of our assistance, of the proper mode to apply for it ; indeed, I cannot help submitting it to you as my opinion that whether this measure originated from Sindia or Ambajee, it must have been intended as an expedient either to discover the real object of Sir John's march, or under the shew of a negotiation subsisting between him and Ambajee to have impressed the Kelladar of Aly-garh with an apprehension of its being our intention to co-operate with the Marathas against him. In regard to the representation which Sir John suggests to me the propriety of making on the subject of Sindia's increasing power, I have thought it proper to avoid any measure of this kind until I may be honored with your commands on the occasion.

Some days ago I received from Sir John Cummings proposals on the part of the Kelladar of Aly-garh for an accommodation with Sindia, which he wished to be settled through the English. I omitted to lay this circumstance before you at the proper time, because Sir John considered it entirely as a private matter, and the almost immediate rejection of it by Sindia rendered a knowledge of it of little consequence to you. As Sir John however now informs me that he has communicated the particulars to the Governor-Genl., I think it necessary to observe to you that in my communication to Sindia on this occasion I had no other object than that of convincing him that we were not carrying on any clandestine negotiation with his adversaries. It was not however my wish to have interfered in the settlement of a matter in which the English interests were not immediately concerned, because, without any prospect of substantial advantage from it, I foresaw the possibility of much future evil in the embarrassments and difficulties which it might create in case of the infraction of the terms by either of the parties. This line of conduct I shall continue to pursue on every similar occasion in which I may have no specific instructions from you.

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13. COL. SIR JOHN CUMMING TO JAMES ANDERSON.

Anupshahar, 30th March 1785.

The dangerous and ambitious views of the Marathas have manifested themselves clearly since my arrival here, particularly lately, a person sent down by Malhar Bapoo and Ambajee, and as their letters say fully authorised from them, arrived here a few days ago. They declare that he is authorized to enter into engagements on their part and that they will stand bound by them. His business was to engage me to take a part in the reduction of the chain of forts along this frontier, and to offer me large sums if I would join in the business. I objected that I believed they did not act in this business by the orders of the Patel. At first the Bramin hesitated, but judging my reluctance to accept such a price as

was offered, he declared that they had full authority, observing that without Sindia's orders none of them could take such a step. I have sent back the messenger with a letter to Malhar in which I tell him, that if they can convince me they act by Sindia's orders, I may then see the proposal in a different light. He says he will bring me a letter under the Patel's seal. In the meantime I have written fully to the Govr.-Genl. on the subject, and informed him of the proposals I sent the Patel through you relative to Aly-garh and the family of Afrasiab. I foresee the utmost danger to the Vizier's country if Sindia is permitted to go on and acquire all these forts which hang on the frontiers of his dominions. You know the Marathas have claims on a great part of the Doab from a cession made by Sujah-ud-Dowlah in 1765, and I am afraid these claims will be revived. In the meantime, having no authority from the Board, all I can offer is my private opinion, that if you could suggest in such terms as you think proper to the Patel, that his taking possession of all these forts cannot but alarm both the Board and the Vizier, and that no State can tamely sit down and see such ambitious steps taken by a neighbouring Power, however great their friendship for that Power may be, perhaps this might be some check till orders can arrive from Calcutta.

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14. ENCLOSURE IN COLONEL SIR JOHN CUMMING'S LETTER.

Dated the 14th May 1785.

No. 1.

From Goordat Sing and Man Sing to Colonel Cumming.

Patcel makes this negotiation and engagement with us that being united together we should attack the country of the English gentlemen and of the Nawab Vizier, and that before upon the same advice we had plundered Chandausi &c. As the Nawab Vizier is our neighbour and you gentlemen are men of truth and are steadfast to your engagements and this stranger having become strong in this country will injure the whole world, if you gentlemen should be desirous of friendship, the Chiefs of the Khalsa are not separated from you, they wish for mutual connection. We also are ready from our hearts and souls; we will settle all their engagements conformably to your advice, and 30,000 horses belonging to us have crossed from Manjha,—Know them also to be united with you,—In the end he will be alarmed. Whatever may be your opinion write it thro' Shewa Sing, who is going to your presence: from his discourse you will learn all particulars and rely on their truth.

No. 2.

From Banga Sing Bahadur, Goordat Sing, Baksh Sing Bahadur
and Joda Sing to Colonel Cumming.

At this time between us and Pateel Saheb a negotiation of friendship is in hand. He is desirous that uniting us to himself he should raise

commotions on the other side of the Ganges. We before also entirely from his advice marched to that quarter and destroyed Chandausi. We from this idea that perhaps he was trying to unite us for the attack of Alygarh and that when he should have done his own business he would deceive us, answered him that it should not happen that after the business of Aligarh he should deceive us. Pateel Saheb positively asserts that his friendship is not for the business of Aly-garh, that the removal of the gentlemen is the most important object of his mind, because the gentlemen are both his and our enemies and will one day make war; that the remedying of that beforehand is adviseable. We therefore write from our friendship that if the gentlemen's pleasure should be inclined to this point, we are ready from our hearts and souls. We have no connection with these strangers. By the blessing of God great advantages are obtained by mutual union. This stranger will be soon expelled. You have the option from our friendship. We have given this information.

No. 3.

Copy of a letter from Sir John Cumming to the Sikh Chiefs,
dated 13th May.

I have received your several letters and I understand all the contents which gave me the greatest pleasure. As to what you write respecting friendship and union, the case is this, that the custom of the English is to maintain friendship with every person and especially with the Powers of this Country with whom friendship is particularly desired. It is proper that this system should be supported between us, but this shall be the proof of your friendship that you should make no disturbance in the country of the Nawab Vizier and no quarrel with the English, and thus to eternity friendship and union will remain between us. I hope that you will constantly write the particulars of that quarter.

15. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G.G.

Sindhia's Camp, Mathura, 16th May 1785.

I have now the honor to transmit to you a copy which I have received from Mahajee Sindia of his definitive treaty with the Sikhs.

In my address of the 10th instant I laid before you some circumstances from which it appeared extremely probable that the Sikhs have themselves no serious intentions of adhering to this treaty, and there is reason to suspect that Sindia entertains some apprehensions on this score, as he has detained the Sikh Chief Durgah Sing, much against his inclination, in Camp until the seal and signature of all the Sikh Chiefs of that confederacy shall be affixed to a copy of the treaty which he has for that purpose transmitted to them. The Nabob Najaf Quli Khan and the Macheri-wala have by Sindia's desire left Delhy with a few attendants and are now on their way to this Camp. Mahomad Beg Hamdany has also been ordered to proceed himself to Camp without delay, leaving his

troops at their present stations to the southward of Gwalior, where they have lately been employed in the reduction of some forts, and it is said that a similar summons has been sent to Appa Khandy Row who was lately deputed on an expedition against Bundelcand. These measures concurring with the intelligence that has been lately received of the hostile intentions of Tipoo, have given rise to an opinion that Sindia means to concert a general plan for the management of affairs at this quarter previous to his departure for the Deccan. As all conclusions drawn from appearances with regard to the future schemes of a man who conducts them with such wonderful secrecy and address ought to be received with great caution, and as similar reports of his intention to return to his own country have so often been disproved by the event, I cannot pretend to say what weight is due to this opinion. It is certain however that the expenses into which his interference here has involved him, added to the small prospect there is of his ever deriving any solid advantages from it, are such as might fully justify a dereliction of his pursuits in this quarter, even if no such reasons for it operated as those assigned in the probable invasion of Tipoo. The summoning of Najaf Quli Khan at this juncture to Camp seems strongly to indicate that he has himself no serious intentions of proceeding to Delhy; and when the usual caution of his conduct is considered, I own I think it not unlikely that he may wish to recross the Chambal before the swelling of that river may preclude the possibility of his retreat, in case, he should be reduced to that extremity from any commotion arising out of the present unsettled system of affairs.

The Keladar of Alygarh has lately opened a negotiation with Sindia, who I understand has consented to his retaining possession of the fort on condition of his payment of a large sum of money. I shall be extremely glad if this matter can be accommodated between them without the necessity of my using any arguments or endeavours with Sindia on the occasion; because the objects of your wishes in excluding the Marathas from possessions on the Vizier's frontier will be equally well answered by it, and Sindia can have no claim upon us hereafter in case of any failure of Jehangeer Khan in the fulfilment of the terms.

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15A. SINDHIA'S TREATY WITH THE SIKHS.

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The Chiefs of the Khalsa with a force of 5,000 horse being united in connection with the Sarcar with the victorious army, shall receive allowances and a jagir of 10 lacs of rupees according to the following particulars.

Of this jagir $7\frac{1}{2}$ lacs are in the neighbourhood of Karnal and $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs from the country of the Sarcar, and they shall attend in union, and besides their allowances and jageer the Sarcar shall have authority over the whole

dependancy of Karnal and the country without interference, and if in the authority of the dependances the authority [? income] should be less than this engagement, something shall instead thereof be granted from the Sarcar. In case the army of the said Chiefs should be summoned to the Sarcar before they have authority and possession in the jageer, half of a rupee shall be paid from the Sarcar for each horseman after they be recorded, and after possession and full authority no claim of pay for the Sepoys shall be attended to for supporting themselves on the jageer. And considering their union to be finer than a hair, let them employ themselves in the obedience to orders, and let them prevent their people from taking the *Rakhi* in the Circuit of the royal Palace and in the possessions of the Sarcar, and by no means let any disagreement remain in future. I am in friendship with the Chiefs of the English Company and with the Nawab Vizier; let there never be any injury offered to their country. In this engagement God is between us, so no deviation shall ever happen.

16. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Mathura, 26 May, 1785.

In a former address I acquainted you of the near approach of Mr. Malet and I have now the honour to inform you that he arrived here on the 17th instant. On the 20th I had the pleasure to introduce him to Madji Sindia, who came near a mile out of his tents to meet him; and on the 21st he returned his visit.

During the time that Mr. Malet sat at Sindia's Durbar, nothing, as is usual on these occasions, passed but mere commonplace expressions of friendship and regard. After he took his leave I remained behind and had a long private conversation with him on the subject of his own intended deputation to Poona. He repeated all the apprehension he had before stated of the many evils he foresaw as the inevitable effect of the employment of two channels of negotiation at the same Court. And he felt great uneasiness at the diminution of our confidence in him, which this change of our system must now everywhere proclaim. His chief anxiety however on this score proceeded from an apprehension lest it should ultimately affect our connexion with the Peshwa, as he was sure that the machinations of many of his enemies who had little the true interest of their own State at heart, would not be wanting to this effect.

In reply, I said everything in my power to convince Sindia that we had no intentions in this arrangement prejudicial to him, and as he had warned us of the probable attempts that his enemies would in consequence of it make, he might rest assured that we would cautiously guard against the effects of them. But as he seemed, for his greater security, to wish that he could have some assurances of this kind from you, I ventured to

propose to him that if he would state all his apprehensions from this appointment in a letter to the Governor-General, he might expect such assurances in reply as would effectually remove them. And in that event I trusted that he would have no objections to Mr. Malet's immediate departure to Poona. At first he appeared to acquiesce in this proposal, but he afterwards observed that there would be a necessity for his writing to Poona and receiving an answer from thence before Mr. Malet could with propriety proceed. I objected to this on the principle of its being unnecessary; as the Government at Poona, considering the friendship that now subsists between the Company and them, could not possibly object to the deputation of Mr. Malet; and I was aware from past experience of the great length of time that must necessarily elapse before an answer could be received from that quarter. Sindia observed that if Mr. Malet had proceeded directly to Poona he would certainly have been received with all due respect and attention, but he had some reason to fear lest his enemies at Poona, irritated at the superior attention shewn to him in the instance of Mr. Malet's having first proceeded to his Camp, should manifest their sense of it by a deficiency of respect to Mr. Malet; and as the blame of this would be entirely ascribed to him he could not think of acquiescing in his departure until he should receive satisfactory assurances of the contrary. Perceiving this to be evidently a pretext for gaining time, and being well assured that however the Poona Government might be displeased at this extraordinary attention to Sindia, they would nevertheless in the present situation of affairs be extremely glad of the residency of an English Minister with them, I ventured to declare to him that if he would agree to Mr. Malet's proceeding immediately after the receipt of a letter from Calcutta, he might rest assured that if any demur should be afterwards made at Poona in regard to his suitable reception it would be entirely ascribed to the Government there and not to him. Sindia not expecting an answer of this kind seemed embarrassed what reply he should make, which his Dewan Madho Row perceiving suggested to him the propriety of deferring to give a final answer on this subject until he should have consulted with the Peshwa's Vakeel who had that morning received letters from Poona, a knowledge of which might perhaps serve to guide his determination. Sindia eagerly laid hold of this expedient for delay, and tho' I continued for some time to urge him to come to a final decision, yet he persisted in the necessity of deferring it until he should have seen the Peshwa's Vakeel.

Yesterday morning I had another personal conference with Sindia on this subject, in which after running over the same arguments that had been used on the former day he at length assented to the proposal I had before made to him and a draught of the proposed letter was prepared in the Durbar. This letter, I have done myself the honor of forwarding by this opportunity to the Governor-General and I beg leave to inform you that the expectations I have held out to Sindia in regard to the reply are

merely assurances that the deputation of Mr. Malet to Poona is not intended to prejudice our connection with him, and that as he has stated the evils he apprehends from it, the utmost caution will be used to guard against them.

As there is no point in which Sindia has been more tenacious than that of excluding our connection with the Poona Durbar, and as it is not easy to ascribe this jealousy to any other motive than the high value he sets on our friendship, I trust the Hon'ble Board will forgive the length I have gone in order to reconcile him to it.

After the discussion of this point Sindia introduced his uneasiness at the vicinity of Col. Cumming's detachment to Alygarh and the constant intercourse maintained by Jehangeer Khan with him, which had begotten a general belief of a secret connection subsisting between him and the English; and he complained of the hardship he suffered in being prevented by the circumstances from attacking the place, whilst his inactivity here was in the meantime attended with so great an expence. I assured him that the stationing of Col. Cumming's detachment on the frontier was merely intended as a necessary arrangement for the security of the Vizier's dominions and had no relation whatever to his intended operations against Alygarh or any other place in this quarter, and that altho' we could not help the artifices of Jehangeer Khan in working on the popular opinion, yet he might rest assured that we would enter into no negotiations with him hostile to his interest. He then asked of me whether in case he sent troops against Alygarh we would oppose them or not, and on my answering that we certainly would not, he proceeded to enquire of me whether if after his investing the fort, he should take means by preventing all ingress and egress to and from the place to cut off all communication between Jehangeer Khan and us, we would be offended with this conduct. To this I replied that in such case we could have no reasonable cause of complaint against him.

Sindia, being satisfied in regard to these points, now mentioned some apprehensions he entertained of Jehangeer Khan's intention to fly with his property into the Vizier's country; and in that event he expressed a confident hope that the property would be restored to him; for as to his person he was perfectly indifferent about it. I observed that I could not speak positively to this point, because the Vizier would on such occasion be guided by his own judgement. He affected to betray some surprise at this answer and observed that as by an additional article of the treaty between the Company and the Maratha Government, in which the Vizier, tho' not specifically, was yet as an ally of the English virtually included, it was agreed that the fugitives from either party should be delivered up by the other, he considered that the Vizier was in this case bound to restore the property. I admitted that the force of this article virtually extended to the Vizier; but I did not believe that this agreement applied to the case

in question since Jehangeer Khan was a subject of the King and not of the Maratha Government. Sindia at first attempted to support his argument on the principle of the King's territories & his being the same from the powers that were devolved upon him ; but feeling the weakness of this ground he abandoned it, and rested his opinion of the necessity we were under of acting in the same manner towards the King from the friendship that subsisted between us. I observed that where two Powers were at friendship with each other they were not nevertheless actually bound to deliver up the fugitives from each other, unless there existed between them a specific agreement to that effect, that the King's ministers had always refused to deliver up Samroo, a notorious offender & deserter from the service of the Company ; that he himself had given protection to a rebel from our Government at a time when friendship subsisted between us, but as the agreement alluded to had not then taken place & as he had declared that in his reception of him he was actuated by no other views than that of merely affording him an asylum, we had never therefore objected to it. Sindia permitted the subject to drop without making any particular reply ; but as I have reason to think that he has not abandoned his pretensions, & as there is a possibility that some case may soon occur in which he may be induced to renew them, I beg to be honored with your commands in regard to the particular answer I am under such circumstances to make to him.

In the course of this conversation, which tho' it greatly interested Sindia was yet carried on with much good humour, I took an opportunity of sounding him in regard to his permitting Jehangeer Khan to retain the fort of Aligarh, but he discovered on this occasion so much jealousy that I thought it best to relinquish the attempt, & declare that he was at liberty to act as he pleased, having been induced to propose it merely for the furtherance of his interests. The truth is I believe Sindia would be well pleased to confirm Jehangeer Khan in the possession of the fort, on condition of securing a large portion of the treasure. But a negotiation for the surrender of treasure is not easily accomplished and this difficulty would have been greatly increased if Sindia had assented to my proposal, by the encouragement it would have held forth to the Killadar of the support of the English. In this view the refusal of Sindia is little to be regretted ; because in case of the failure of the negotiation as is probable, the uninformed part of the world might have conceived that we had first espoused the cause of a man, & afterwards from motives of fear or the like abandoned him to the resentment of Sindia.

Najaf Quli Khan arrived here some days ago, & two formal visits have already passed betwixt him & Sindia. The rumour with respect to the cause of his journey which I submitted to you in my address of the 16th seems now to have subsided, & the real object of it has not yet transpired.

Himmat Bahadur has been obliged to yield some of his possessions to Sindia, & they are again on an apparently intimate footing. The recall of Hamdany to Camp has, it is said, been countermanded by his influence.

17. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Mathura, 25th July 1785.

In consequence of the King's repeated importunities, Mahajee Sindia has at length acquiesced in his proceeding to the Capital, and all the necessary preparations having been made for the journey, his Majesty will set out tomorrow, accompanied by a few of Sindia's troops. Sindia has promised to join him at the end of the rains, provided no impediment should arise from the siege of Alygarh which he is in hope of finishing before that time. If he should be disappointed in this expectation the King is in that case to return to Camp : but from the vigorous manner in which his detachments have begun their operations against Alygarh, joined to the defection of part of the Kiladar's forces, there is a great likelihood that this business may not long prove an obstacle to his intention of proceeding to Delhy, where his presence has become necessary, as well for the settlement of the country immediately about it, as the adopting of such measures in regard to the Sikhs as may prevent their further encroachments. The treaty he some time ago concluded with them is not likely to produce this effect ; and it is probable that this business together with the enforcing of payment of the balances due from the Rajah of Jaypore, which he has much at heart and the prosecution of which it is said he means to entrust to Najaf Quli Khan and the Macheriwala will furnish sufficient employment for the ensuing season.

The last accounts from Poona mention that matters are still in the same unsettled situation with regard to Tippoo. The distracted state of the Poona Government renders them at present little capable of prosecuting an offensive war against him ; otherwise I believe they are as much disposed to it, as his conduct has furnished them with just cause for it.

Bhow Backsy's letters to Mahajee Sindia have at different times given him very confident hopes of his success in prevailing on the Prince to return to the Presence. In particular his last letters speak very positively on this head, and Sindia has in consequence been induced to remit him a sum of money to defray the necessary expences on this occasion. Sindia has not himself mentioned to me anything on this subject. Indeed, it seems to be his wish to effect this point, if possible, entirely independent of any interference of ours, which, with that jealousy very natural to the weaker Power, he is afraid, if admitted in one point might be extended to many others.

18. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp near Shergarh, 24th November 1785.*

My last address was under date the 5th instant. Agreeable to the information I had thus the honor to lay before you, Mahajee Sindia marched on the ensuing day with a small party of his forces, & on the 10th he met his Majesty at Hodal. I attended Sindia on his first visit of ceremony to the King & had every reason to be pleased both with the behaviour of his Majesty & of Sindia on this occasion. The king remained six days longer at Hodal to celebrate some holidays & then proceeded to this encampment.

Three days ago Mahajee Sindia received intelligence of the surrender of Alygarh. The terms granted to Jehangeer Khan are, that he shall retain possession of all his private property & that a particular jagir in the district of Koil, of about 50,000 Rs. annually, shall be granted to him. He is not however to have the possession of any fort, & it is likewise stipulated that he shall repair to Camp to give an account of all the property belonging to the late Ameer-ul-Omrah.

Sindhia's present intentions are to remain some days longer in this encampment to wait the arrival of Jehangeer Khan & to take means to secure the treasure and valuable effects in Alygarh. He was then to proceed to Faridabad, at the distance of ten *cos* from Dehly & there remain until he has restored the neighbouring country to order.

19. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Shergarh, 8th December 1785.

I have herewith the honor to enclose a letter from Mahajee Sindia to the Governor-General containing an application for a body of troops to be furnished from Bombay to act on the defensive against Tippoo on the terms he has explained. This proposal he has been induced to make in consequence of the suggestion I had formerly made to him, as mentioned in my address of the 6th October, and it seems strongly to confirm the intelligence within this few days past received from Poona of the certainty of war between Tippoo on the one side and the Peshwa and Nizam Aly on the other and of the great preparations that are making by all parties for the prosecution of it. Mahajee Sindia, considering the peace which has been established between the Company and Tippoo and the general pacific system which the English Government is disposed to maintain in Hindostan, is not probably very sanguine in his hopes of success in this application; but I have taken care to assure him that, although you might not deem it expedient to take a part in the disputes of your allies wherein no immediate cause of offence was given to the English Government, yet that you would neither consider it as consistent with your friendship nor your interest to suffer them to be oppressed by any other Power.

* *Shergarh*, 20 miles north of Mathura, and on the south of a bend in the Jamuna river.

Mahajee Sindia seems as yet undetermined in regard to his next movement from hence, and in this state of suspense he may remain some time longer at this place; his treaty with the Sikhs has had no effect and their troops are now actually opposed to his. To overawe them and at the same time to take measures for the settlement of the country near the Capital, it was his intention to have marched to Faredabad within a few cos of Dehly; but he seems afraid lest any movement to that quarter should prejudice his negotiations with the Rajah of Jaypoor. Possibly he may not himself proceed in person on any expedition, but remain in some central situation near this to direct and superintend his various operations. Dig is the most likely place, and there are many circumstances which indicate his intention of cantoning there.

Since the reduction of Aly-garh, almost the whole of the troops employed on that service have been recalled and part of them detached against the Sikhs and part sent to reinforce the detachment against Raghogarh. He has likewise ordered 23 pieces of cannon, chiefly field pieces, to be brought from thence to Camp, which are probably the only serviceable ones of upwards of 100 pieces said to have been mounted in the place. It is probable that he has been much disappointed in his expectations of treasure. At least I have heard no reports of any having been found; and the silence of public fame on an occasion of this kind may be received as a convincing proof, as it is a matter which does not easily admit of concealment and would most likely have been exaggerated on the other extreme if there had been any grounds for it.

20. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Shergarh, 14th December 1785.

. Having had occasion today to make a visit to Mahajee Sindia, to introduce to him a Vakeel lately arrived in Camp from the Prince at Lucknow, he took an opportunity after the ceremony of his reception to enter into a long conversation with me in private on the subject of his late application to you in behalf of the Maratha Government, for an aid of troops from Bombay to act on the defensive against Tippoo. He observed that in his letter to you which I had the honor to transnit on the 11th instant, he had fully explained to you his wishes on this head, but that he was extremely desirous I should repeat them to you from him, and he requested of me to assure you that in his solicitation of aid his object was merely the favourable effect which might be expected from so public a proclamation of our friendship, and not the employment of it in any act of hostility which might involve us in war with Tippoo. It was a singular circumstance he said that, whilst we were so strongly connected by friendship and alliance with their Government, they should yet be attacked by Tippoo and the French, two Powers that were at present

also our friends, and he thought that under such circumstances the English Government was bound by their common friendship to interfere by writing letters to Tippoo and the French in the manner he had already proposed.

My answer to Sindia, without giving him much ground for success in his present application, was however calculated to keep him from despair. I assured him that the English Government, if they were cautious in their political conduct and avoided any hasty measures which might involve them in a war, were yet equally firm in their friendship, and the safety of their allies whenever it might be seriously endangered would always be considered by them as a concern of their own. I took an opportunity afterwards of enquiring of him if he had received any answer to his letter to Poona regarding Mr. Malet's deputation. He replied in the negative and expressed some surprise at it, as he assured me that he had written to Nana several months ago about it. I then suggested to him my opinion that this deputation, were it to take place at present, might have a very favourable effect upon the state of their affairs, in the idea it must everywhere impress of the friendship and union that subsisted between us. Sindia eagerly embraced this opinion and proposed immediately writing to Nana to acquaint him that, although he had received no answer from him regarding the deputation of Mr. Malet, yet on the supposition that he could have no objections to it, he now informed him that Mr. Malet would set out immediately for Poona, and that he hoped hereafter to settle the point of an aid of troops from Bombay as he was now exerting himself on this occasion. I begged of him to suspend the execution of this plan, until I might communicate the intention of it to you and receive your orders, because although you had formerly been desirous of setting on foot this deputation, yet I know not whether you might not have come to some new resolution, in the idea which he had himself given you reason to entertain of its being contrary to his inclinations. Sindia said he would delay accordingly, but begged I would lose no time in informing you of his wishes. He appeared now to be as desirous of the execution of this measure as he had ever before been averse from it; and I have reason to believe that if you should not deem it convenient to accede to his other request he will be well satisfied with your compliance with his wishes in this point.

20A. FROM SINDIA TO GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Received at Calcutta, 27th December 1785.

As by the blessing of God thro' my great exertions the particulars of friendship and intimacy between the Sarcar of the Peishwa and the English Company's Government have been in such manner confirmed and strengthened that the pen is unequal to the description of a part thereof, and the Chiefs of neighbouring countries have from this connection been

stung with the thorns of enmity and enmity in their hearts, I rely upon the goodness of God that the system of unanimity may daily increase and the enmity and envy of all our enemies may be destroyed. Therefore I entertain at all times this idea that whatever may be addition to friendship may be executed by both sides, and whatever may most exalt the standard of friendship may be done, and whatever may be thought advisable for both parties may be mutually communicated. Now whatever is necessary for the goodwill of both parties I give you information thereof ;—as Tippoo having stepped his foot beyond his own limits like an ant which gets wings, and having conceived lofty ideas, has advanced towards the county of Srimant Peshwa. Altho' the victorious forces have been appointed from the Sarcar for the punishment and destruction of this deluded man, and I confidently hope that he will be soon properly punished, yet I for the confirmation of mutual friendship am desirous that some English battalions should by your orders be stationed from the Island of Bombay for the protection of Srimant Peshwa's country and the punishment of the enemies who have thoughts against that country, and I engage that as long as the army shall remain in that country whatever monthly pay they receive from the Company's sarcar during the time of marching and of war they shall receive regularly from the sarcar of the Peshwa, and this army shall never go beyond the boundaries of the Peshwa's country. But whenever it may be your will that they should unite in the war and that a share of the conquered country should be appropriated to the English Company's Government, on this point whatever may be your advice communicate it quickly. And also, as it is written in the treaty that we must not make friendship with any nation of Europeans, at this time the French make requests of friendship and alliance with Srimant Peshwa's sarcar, accordingly they received a peremptory denial. Now perhaps they have intentions to write to Tippoo and send their army in opposition to the army of the Sarcar. As between Tippoo and the English also friendship and peace has been made, it is necessary that you should write to Tippoo that he must never unite to himself to the French army, or write to the French Chiefs that they must not unite with Tippoo. In case of their union it will be necessary that you should unite with the Peshwa and send your army to oppose them. And you will be always firm and fixed in the experience of friendship, and the mutual attention to unanimity will become an example and a proverb in the world. Therefore, I write from foresight ; Mr. Anderson will represent fully. I hope that I may be soon favored with an explicit answer to this letter.

21. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Shergarh, 19th December 1785.

In a former address I had the honor to inform you that it was a particular article in the agreement settled with Jehangeer Khan, that he

should first repair to Sindia's Camp and thence proceed to Mursan to take possession of the small territory assigned him. This article plainly indicated the intention of Sindia to exact as much as possible from him whenever he should have him fairly in his possession, and this I was in hopes, he might have effected, by working on the fears of Jehangeer Khan without the necessity however of any open violation of the faith which he had pledged to him. I am sorry however to inform you that, without any regard to the solemn engagement by which he had bound himself to protect him, he thought proper two days ago to put him under confinement, and he has since sent orders for the imprisonment of all his family. As Sindia had no pretext for this proceeding in any [im-]propriety of conduct on the part of Jehangeer Khan subsequent to the agreement, he was obliged to have recourse to his Majesty, who gave him positive orders to imprison Jehangeer Khan on pretence of his concealment of some jewels of his Majesty, which having been entrusted to Najaf Khan had been given in charge by him to Afrasiab Khan and so deposited in the fort of Alygarh.

I am extremely sorry for this unjustifiable transaction of Sindia, for altho' the English Government have no particular interest in it, yet they have a general interest in the reputation and credit of their ally which cannot fail to be much effected by this affair of his. He seems himself to be sensible, for he directed Bhow Backshy to draw from me my opinion on this subject. In answer to the language which he in consequence held to me, I observed that as it was a matter in which I was not concerned I had not made any enquiries into it, but that having heard from all quarters of the solemn oath under which Sindia had received him, I could not help being surprised at his having been imprisoned so soon after it, more especially as I had not heard of any satisfactory reason assigned for it. He then entered into a long, but lame and defective vindication of his master, which was so perplexed that I shall not attempt to repeat it. The real truth is that independent of the hopes of plunder which must always weigh with a Maratha, Sindia was not only advised but pressed by his chief confidants to take this step. Their motives for this were neither to benefit themselves or their master, but merely to resent an indignity they thought they had suffered. On the arrival of Jahangir Khan in camp it was a grand object of competition amongst them to obtain the management of a negotiation which promised to yield such advantage, but Sindia resisted all their solicitations and continued it in the hands of Rayjee Patel, with whose conduct in the siege of Alygarh he had expressed himself highly satisfied. This, the others and particularly Ambajec, seemed to consider as a triumph gained over them by Rayjee Patel; and with a view to humble him, more than from any other idea, they laboured by every means in their power, till at length they effected the imprisonment of Jehangeer Khan. I am sensible that this explanation will go but little to the vindication of Sindia, but I am strongly inclined to think that if he

had used his own judgment he would have acted differently, and it is possible that he may have yet cause to repent so precipitate a conduct from the effects which it may produce on the Mogul Chiefs and others of his dependants.

Yesterday there was a good deal of rejoicing celebrated in Camp, on account of a victory gained by Appa Khandy Row in Bundelcand which has put him in possession of the City of Jarna-Parna.* This was a most unexpected stroke of good fortune, for Appa had before been involved in such distress that Sindia had lately sent him the most positive orders to conclude a treaty upon any terms he could procure and return with his detachment to Gwalior, as it was utterly impossible for him to afford him any reinforcement. Sindia seems now inclined to pursue his success and as he affects to entertain apprehensions lest the Rajah of Bundelcand should attempt to fly either to the territories of the Vizier or the Company, he sent me a message yesterday, requesting that in such event he might not be protected. My answer was that as he would be regarded not as a fugitive subject of Sindia, but as an unfortunate Chief, he would most certainly in that light be protected, whether he fled to the Vizier's or the Company's dominions. I have some reason to suspect that Sindia's object in proposing this question was rather to sound how we stood affected to his more extensive prosecution of the war in Bundelcand than from any real apprehensions of the event alluded to. This event may yet be considered as extremely improbable, for Appa's affair which has been blown into importance has been merely an extrication from difficulty and not any decisive success. I do not imagine that Sindia's present situation would admit of his affording so large a division of his troops as would be requisite for the total reduction of so extensive and inaccessible a country and I should be extremely sorry to see just grounds for the apprehension of such an event. For, though I have never been uneasy on account of the extension of the Maratha power in this quarter where there are so many jarring interests which must involve them in perpetual embarrassments, yet the situation of the Bundelcand country is so very different, as might give just grounds for alarm to the Company in case of its total subjection to the Maratha Government.

22. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp Shergarh, 21st Dec. 1785.

I beg leave to inform you that the report, which I submitted to you in my address of the 16th regarding the intentions of Timur Shah to march into Hindostan, has within these few days gained a very general belief in this quarter, in so much that I am informed several of the merchants at

* *Parna*, the capital of a small State in Bundelkhand, spelt as *Parna* in Marathi (Parasnisi, G. P., ii: letter 189).

Delhy, have made preparations to quit it. I still think that such an event is extremely improbable, both because of the great difficulties which must arise to the execution of this plan from the established power of the Sikhs in Lahore, with whom it is necessary he should first either fight or make peace ; and because the reduction of Kashmir is a much more probable cause of his preparations than so inadequate and fruitless an object as that which the reports here, heightened by the fears of the people, have assigned for it. I have thought it necessary however to inform you of the prevalence of this belief, more especially as it is not entirely confined to the vulgar but seems to have had some effect upon Sindia himself. At least it has been a good deal the subject of conversation at his Durbar for these some days past, and he has particularly enjoined Dhar Row his general to the northward to use every means in his power to procure authentic information on this head. A circumstance however has happened in Camp to-day which has given Sindia much more real uneasiness than what he has suffered from the apprehension of so remote an event. This morning about 3 o'clock he received some intelligence which induced him to send immediately for Rana Khan Bhai, Ambajee and others of his confidants. He did not appear in his Durbar during the whole day, and he is reported to have shewn the strongest symptoms of vexation and ill humour to such of his Chiefs as had access to him ; a circumstance the more extraordinary as equanimity is a virtue that of all others he possesses in the most eminent degree. At first the occasion of this was said to have been the intelligence of the escape of Afrasiab Khan's Begam from the fort of Mursan ; but I have since heard that it was the escape of her confidential servant with the valuable jewels which the family are said to have been in possession of. Your intelligence from Lucknow may perhaps have already fully informed you on this subject. * * *

I paid a visit yesterday to Ambajee who shewed me some late newspapers from Poona of about 25 days' date, by which it appears that amidst great preparations for war negotiations of peace were going on and that Tippoo was labouring all his power to prevent Nana from his intended interview with the Nizam.

23. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Shergarh, 31st Dec. 1785.

I had last the honour to address you on the 21st instant. The report which I then submitted to you of the escape of Afrasiab Khan's Begam or of her principal manager proved to be without foundation ; and Sindia having now possessed himself of all their property intends to release Jehangeer Khan and the whole family, and to make some suitable provisions for them. I have not been able to obtain any satisfactory account of the probable amount of the jewels he has seized, but there is

great reason to suspect that it is not very great, as it has fallen infinitely short of his expectations, and he has betrayed the most evident symptoms of great disappointment. The articles which he has given to the King, do not, I am informed, amount to more than 12,000 Rupees.

The intention of Timur Shah to march towards Dehly is now almost universally believed in this quarter. It occupies the whole of the conversation in Camp. Some circumstances tending to corroborate this belief have occurred since my last address. Humayun Shah, the son of Timur Shah, according to the latest intelligence from Lahore, crossed the Attock near Hasan Abdal on the 13th of this month with about 20,000 men, and was immediately joined by Faiz Talb Khan and Karim Beg, the principal Chiefs near the Attock, with 10,000 horse. They have been ordered to halt there, until joined by the King, who has declared his intention to march from Peshawar towards Hasan Abdal on the 16th of this month. These movements and preparations may equally indicate his intentions against Kashmir as Hindostan, but the period of the year, so extremely unfavourable for an expedition to the former place on account of the excessive cold of the winters there, has induced a more general suspicion of the latter being his object, more especially as this is the particular time which his father always chose for his invasions of Hindostan, as it enabled him to arrive before the gathering of the wheat crop. Sindia is certainly a good deal alarmed on this account, tho' he affects to treat it extremely lightly.

By the latest newspapers from Poona, Nana and Hari Pant Farkia took a formal leave of the Peshwa on the 10th, and having then taken the *Patka* or the grand standard they proceeded to join the army. Holkar, it is said, is to command the advanced divisions of the army along with Fath-yab Jang, one of Nizam Aly's generals, another division of the army is to be stationed 20 *cos* in the rear of that under the command of the Nizam's son and Hari Pant Farkia, and the grand army under the Nizam and Nana to be at the distance of 20 *cos* from the centre divisions.

24. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp, Shergarh, 2nd Jany. 1786.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 7th ultimo, and in obedience to your commands I have communicated to Mahajee Sindia through his minister Bow Backsy such parts of your instructions to Mr. Malet, as regard the preservation of the peace and friendship, already established between the Company and the Maratha Government, and the attention which you have enjoined him on all occasions to pay to Mahajee Sindia from the particular relation in which he stands to both Governments. I have likewise given him a full explanation of the contents of the Governor-General's letters to the Peshwa and his minister Nana Farnavasee

Mahajee Sindia has expressed himself extremely well pleased with Mr. Malet's appointment, and he has informed me that Nana, in a letter which he has within these few days been received from him, has also intimated his wish that Mr. Malet might proceed as soon as possible to Poona. I have herewith the honor to enclose you a copy of a letter which he has written to Mr. Malet accompanying letters to the Peshwa and Nana Farnavees, all of which I have this day forwarded to Mr. Malet at Bombay. He has likewise requested of me to communicate his wish to Mr. Malet that, tho' you may not have desired him to give any assurances of an aid of troops, yet that in case of the question being proposed to him he may give Nana such an answer as may still give him room to hope for it. I have accordingly in my letter of this date to Mr. Malet communicated this desire of Mahajee Sindia that he may conform to it so far as he shall deem consistent with the spirit of his instructions.

Mahajee Sindia, in consequence of late letters from Nana on the subject of Monsieur Montigné's overtures to the Government at Poona, has been induced to address another letter on this subject to the Governor-General, which I have herewith the honor to transmit. It contains all the particulars which he has communicated to me and, though the object of it be to obtain your sanction to their availing themselves of the offers of the French to their own benefit and the distress of their enemy, yet I have every reason to think that this request is entirely dictated by the despair of assistance from the English, and that you may rely, at least so far as depends on Mahajee Sindia, on a stop being put to this connection in case you should think it proper to give him such assurances as may satisfy him of their being eventually no losers by the instance of their friendship to the English in their rejection of the overtures of the French. Sindia is sufficiently informed of the different motives which at present actuate the conduct of the English and the French in Hindostan, and as the advantages he actually enjoys from the friendship of the English and expects to derive from the continuance of it are not limited to his foreign pursuits, but extend to the support of his power in his own State, it is reasonable to suppose that he is sensible how much the stability of his own power may be affected by the establishment of a French connexion at Poona. Nana, from the difference of his situation, may have other views, but his dread of the superior power of Sindia will probably for ever restrain him from entering into any important measures in opposition of his inclinations. I cannot help suspecting however that he may not have fully communicated to Mahajee Sindia the circumstances of the French intrigues; and on this account I foresee the difficulty that must arise in any particular answer being given to Mahajee Sindia until the receipt of advices from Mr. Malet, after his arrival at Poona.

The army is to march from this place to-morrow towards the Jaypore country. It is not however, I believe, Sindia's intention to proceed so far, but merely to try what effect an approach towards that country may

produce in bringing the Rajah to terms. His own finances are at present extremely embarrassed, and he finds great difficulty in satisfying his troops. The plunder of Alygarh, which he appears to have seized in a most unjustifiable manner from the family of the deceased Afrasiab Khan, has yielded him little or no specie, and the jewels he has got, whatever may be their value, have fallen infinitely short of his expectation. In other respects he has derived no advantages from his pursuits in this quarter, and it is evident from the nature of them that a long time must necessarily elapse before he can realise his prospects. The unsettled state of the country about Delhy, joined to the depredations of the Sikhs, and the large portion of the King's territories held in jageer by the Mogul sardars, which, though it has long been in his object, he has not yet ventured to resume, have hitherto occasioned his expenses to exceed his revenue. These untoward circumstances of his situation are at present increased by a report, now very generally believed in this quarter, of the intended march of Timur Shah Abdaly into Hindostan, which has already thrown the City of Delhy into the utmost consternation.

When this report was first spread there was reason to believe that the preparations of Abdaly on which it was founded were intended against Kashmir, the governor of which province had lately revolted and assumed the sovereignty of it in his own name. But later accounts say that he has submitted and obtained his pardon, and that Timur Shah nevertheless still continues his preparations. His son Humayun Shah is reported to have crossed the Attock at the head of 20,000 cavalry, and the King was preparing to leave Peshawar to join him. Mahajee Sindia affects to treat this report lightly, but it has evidently made a very serious impression on him, and he waits only for some authentic intelligence to dispatch his guns and heavy baggage to Gwalior.

25. COPY OF A LETTER FROM SINDIA TO MR. MALET.

Received at Calcutta, 15th January 1786.

One month before this Mr. James Anderson, having advised and consulted with me on the subject of your departure to Bombay, convinced my friendly mind of your great qualities and virtues. As I am from the heart employed for the increase of the friendship between the English Company and Srimant Peshwa, I consider this business to be entirely proper and right. At this time from the information of that gentleman I learn that the Nawab Governor-General has sent you to Bombay and has written letters of friendship to Srimant Peshwa and Nana Sahib requesting permission for you to go into that country, and has given you orders that whatever may be the occurrences of that place you should give me information thereof through the said gentleman and should effect all proposed matters with my advice and concurrence. God be praised that consistently with the mutual friendship where hearts

have entrance into hearts, the advice and determination of the Nawab Governor-General and of myself have been the same. On this subject whatever was proper I have written to Srimant Peshwa and Nana Sahib, and in future also I will frequently write in my private letters. Whatever may be due from friendship, it is incumbent on you also that considering me whether present or absent to be the same in the friendship of the English Company, you should after the permission of Srimant Peshwa and Nana Sahib go to that country with health and satisfaction, and always make me acquainted thro' Mr. Anderson with the situation of affairs and events their, whatever you may think proper which will be cause of freshness to the mutual friendship.

26. FROM SINDIA TO GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Received at Calcutta, 15th Jan. 1786.

I formerly learnt from a letter of Nana Sahib that Mr. Montigny had spoken to this effect. Tippoo Sahib is soliciting union for himself with us, if the Sarcar of the Peshwa Sahib should take us into his own alliance it is well; otherwise we becoming the allies of Tippoo will come in hostility against the Peshwa Sahib. Therefore, Nana Sahib answered that the Sarcar of the Peshwa had no desire of friendship with any European nation except the English. Accordingly upon having these news, I from my good wishes troubled you that in support of the duties of friendship you should write to Tippoo or to the French Chiefs that they should refrain from the alliance of another, and in case of the French joining with Tippoo it would be necessary for an English army to unite with the troops of the Peshwa Sahib. Conversations also on this subject were had with Mr. Anderson, from whose writings full particulars must have been learnt. At this time repeated letters of Nana Sahib to this purport are arrived, and he has even written to me that as the friendship of the Sarcar of the Peshwa Sahib and the English Company had obtained existence and strength through me and I always write the particulars of the English firmness to friendship, now is the time of experiment that the Sarcar of the Peshwa Sahib solely for the satisfaction of the English Chiefs had not admitted the alliances of the French, perhaps they would become the allies of Tippoo, in which case it would be necessary that an English army for opposition to them should join the troops of the Peshwa Sahib. Therefore, what consistently with the friendship and unanimity comes into my affectionate mind is this that the Sarcar of the Peshwa Sahib has lately, to maintain the friendship and regard of the English gentlemen, shewn no politeness to the French, and they from that reason are commencing enmity and opposition, the recompensing this action of the French is incumbent and necessary on the English gentlemen, who are celebrated all over the world for supporting the conditions of friendship and the duties of affection, and should it be your will, out of consideration to the

forwarding of business, having restrained the French from the alliance of Tippoo, place them in the Sarcar of the Peshwa Sahib or the Nabae Nizam Aly Khan Bahadur on a system of service. In case of approbation to this matter, having written a letter from yourself to Srimant Peshwa Bahadur containing particulars of friendship and permission to keep this few hundred French, send it to me that I may forward it from hence to Poona.

On the subject of Mr. Malet's departure towards Poona, Mr. Anderson one month before this took my advice and consent, and having convinced me of the particulars of the strength of friendship and pure affection which are desired in your heart, he made this matter proper and advisable according to the marks of unanimity and friendship. It will have been fully learnt from the writings of that gentleman. I have now been informed by the communication of that gentleman that you have despatched Mr. Malet towards Bombay and have written letters of friendship to Srimant Peshwa and Nana Sahib, containing a request of permission for that gentleman to go to Poona, and have positively instructed Mr. Malet that he should give me information thro' Mr. Anderson of all circumstances there and should transact business there with my advice. The knowledge of this matter is full of gladness and joy, and is cause of strength to the edifice of friendship. I also, on the subject of honours and respect to Mr. Malet, have written to Srimant Peshwa and Nana Sahib. You will be fully informed by the letters of Mr. Anderson.

27. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindiah's Camp near Dig, 12th Jan. 1786.

I do myself the honour of forwarding to you the translation of an extract of intelligence which I have received from Mr. Boddam's agent at Poona, and which is dated the twenty-fourth November. I thought it necessary to take notice of the circumstances it contains to Mahajee Sindia, who immediately sent his minister Bhow Backsy to me with the strong assurances that he never would suffer Nana to enter into any such connexion with the French as could be deemed a violation of the treaty with the English, and he expressed a desire that I would be perfectly at ease on the score of the present Resident, for besides that he knew Nana was only amusing the French to intimidate Tippoo, he was certain that the Peshwa would as soon yield Poona to the French as he would the fort of Revadanda.

I wait with the utmost anxiety to hear of Mr. Malet's arrival at Poona, as until then I despaired of being able to obtain any satisfactory information of the state of affairs in that quarter.

* * * * *

Monsieur Montigny,* the French Vakeel at Poona, after having been shewn very great attention by Nana, set out for Goa to meet a General [Vicomte de Souillac] from Pondichery; he received from the Peshwa at his departure a *khilat*, *sarpech*, and *jigha*, and the like from Nana and Hari Pandit; such marks of attention had never been shown him before. Nana supplied him with horsemen, chobdars, silver sticks and other necessaries for his journey. He also sent along with him for the General a horse and some fine cloths. Monsieur Montigny promised that he would bring the French to join the Peshwa.

Nana has received intelligence that Tippoo agreed to give forty *lacs* (40,00,000) of Rupees for the assistance of the French, which they accepted and that he had got them to his side.

If the French join the Marathas, the Peshwa has agreed to give them a share of the country their joint forces may take from Tippoo, and one of his sea ports near Bombay, such as Revadanda; the expense also of their troops will be given.

A letter from Monsieur Montigny has been received from Goa, mentioning that the General was not there on the ninth of Moharram [12 Nov. 1785], but that he expected him daily.

28. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp at Dig, 18th Jan. 1786.

In my address of the sixth instant, I informed you of the affair betwixt Sindia and Himmat Bahadur. The accommodation such as it was which had then taken place, it was evident, could not last long; and they have accordingly for these some days past manifested so open and avowed intentions of hostility towards each as threatened every moment to have produced some decisive consequences. Appearances at present however are much against Himmat Bahadur. He has been compelled to deliver up the greatest part of his country, particularly the districts of Feerozabad and others in the Doab, of which Sindia has already sent amils to take possession. He has likewise sent a message to Himmat Bahadur, desiring him to quit his encampment, but the other justly suspecting, from some dispositions which have been made, an intention to seize him, has refused to comply. A few days more must determine his fate, and as he possesses no reputation himself for personal courage, and as his troops are already beginning to forsake him, there is reason to think that he must fall under the superior power of Sindia. I have heard that he has sent earnest solicitations to the Vizier for protection, but if he should be encouraged to expect it, it may not be in his power to avail himself of it.

*Francois Emanuel Dehaies, Chevalier de Montigny (b. 1743, d. 1819), was for some time Governor of Chandernagar.

29. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Dig, 15th Feb. 1786.

I have the honor to inform you that the army will march from hence to-morrow five cos to the westward towards the territories of the Rajah of Jaypore. Sindia's intention, according to public fame, is to proceed by slow marches with the King as far as Ballaherry,* a fort in the Jaypore country which is about twenty-five cos distant from hence and not much further from the Rajah's capital. There he intends to halt with the main army, whilst his detachments are employed in the reduction of the country. I think it not improbable, however, that we may make a long halt after the first or the second day's march from hence, as Sindia seems unwilling to proceed to any great distance from Dig until he can see a little more clearly in what manner the pursuits in which he is now engaged are likely to terminate. At present they are of a doubtful nature and promise to be attended with more difficulty than he has hitherto experienced.

The Government of Jaypore, from the incapacity of the Rajah, has long been in a weak and distracted condition, yet from a clear experience of the insidious nature of Sindia's conduct, they seem determined to avoid the snares he has laid for them to hasten their own ruin in the proposal he has made for an amicable settlement on condition of their payment of a large sum of money, and to resist him to the utmost of their power. The neighbouring Rajpoot Chiefs to the westward, from a conviction of the danger to which they must be exposed in case of the subjection of the Jaypore Rajah, have promised in case of matters proceeding to extremities to furnish him openly with aid. These circumstances, so unfavourable to Sindia's views, are increased by some suspicious circumstances of late in the conduct of his ally, the Macheri Rajah. This chief, who has a considerable reputation for courage and abilities, was formerly dewan to the father of the present Rajah of Jaypore, and on his death he seized the opportunity to possess himself of one-half of his country, which he has ever since maintained in opposition to all the efforts that have been made against him. On Sindia's coming in to this country he thought it prudent to join him, but he has hitherto made no sacrifice to him, and appearances have not been wanting of late to make it probable that he is suspicious of Sindia and by no means heartily inclined to forward the service entrusted to him in conjunction with Najaf Quli Khan and the other Jageerdars of reducing the Jaypore Rajah.

Sindia certainly feels all these embarrassments, and as he has hitherto been successful in all his schemes by the mere use of policy and cunning he seems still inclined to persevere in this system and to avoid as much as possible to trust anything to the uncertain issue of a battle. Thus circumstanced, it is probable he will himself keep aloof and lie in wait

* 16 miles due east of the Bandikui Railway Station, and on the south bank of the Banganza.

to improve with his usual address and abilities the events that may fall out under his own officers and auxiliaries at a distance. Much must of course depend upon chance ; and on this account, I find it in vain to attempt to withdraw the curtain of futurity and to look forward with any certainty to the probable event of his operations of this season.

Colonel Harper has transmitted to me a copy of the Vizier's answer on the subject of Sindia's battalions, in which his Excellency declares his final resolutions to make no restitution either of men or arms. Sindia, although he expressed himself dissatisfied at the Vizier's conduct in the marks of honour which he conferred on the commandant of the battalion, which he seemed to consider as a marked insult to him, has not however since renewed the subject, and unless he makes enquiries of me, I shall not of myself communicate to him the Vizier's answer. I am afraid however that whether Sindia renews this subject or not, he will shew his remembrance of it in case of any opportunity to retaliate on the Vizier. With a view to avert a probable consequence of so disagreeable a nature hereafter, I was induced to state my sentiments on this head very fully to Colonel Harper in hopes that if he could not prevail on the Vizier to make any restitution, he would at least exert his endeavours to prevent his entertainment of the men in his service.

Colonel Harper however is of opinion that the Vizier is perfectly justified in what he has done. I must confess that to me, his Excellency's claim appears to be in the highest degree obsolete, when it is considered that ten years have now nearly elapsed, since the battalions first deserted from him, that it has since been under four different Governments, and that the Vizier never made any formal claim of it from Sindia. I suppose, I might with safety add, that probably not a third of the men or arms are the same with those which were in it when it first deserted.

I suspect that in this affair his Excellency has been guided less by a tenacious adherence to his right than a wish to gratify his dislike to Sindia. When it is considered how much his nominal consequence in the Empire has been affected by the superior powers obtained by Sindia, it is certainly very natural for him to be dissatisfied with Sindia, and although it may not be in our power to establish a cordial union between them, yet as the consequences of this dislike may ultimately affect us, we ought, I think to use every means in our power to prevent him from any unnecessary manifestation of it, and to endeavour, if we cannot effect the reality, at least to establish the appearances of a good understanding between them, which aided by the peculiar circumstances of the times, may answer the same end. Sindia's conduct, it must be owned, has of late been very unworthy and unbecoming in his management here, but it threatens in the end to be attended with prejudicial consequences to himself ; and at all events as it does not in any degree relate to us, we have no occasion to take notice of it. This observation, I have thought it necessary to make

to you, because I have reason to believe you may have heard many clamours of this nature, as if we were concerned in the bad faith of our ally where it did not relate to us or our friends, whilst at the same time it must be confessed, that near as his pursuits here have brought him to the territories of our ally, he has hitherto managed with such caution as to avoid giving any cause of complaint. This argues a strong disposition in him to preserve our friendship, which is evidently his interest at present, and which, as it most probably will be so far ever after, I hope it may be in our power to effect such a disposition towards him in our ally as may ensure the continuance of it.

I beg pardon for having trespassed on your indulgence in thus freely submitting to you my own opinions. I have thought it necessary however to make known to you my sentiments, that you may have an opportunity of correcting whatever may appear to you improper in them.

The affair between Sindia and Himmat Bahadur is not yet adjusted. Sindia has offered, in case he will retire to a small fort he possesses, named *Mote* and situated between Gwalior and Kalpi, that he will give him an establishment of three or four lacs annually; but as neither party has any confidence in the other, I think it scarcely possible that they will be able to terminate this matter amicably. In the newspaper of to-day it is mentioned that Himmat Bahadur's brother Umrao-gir with his forces has gone over to Almas. If this should be authentic, which I must doubt until I hear it from some more certain channel, I fear it will add to the jealousy and disagreement between Sindia and the Vizier.

30. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp at Khooshalgarh, 25th February 1786.

-I have herewith the honor to lay before you the translation of an extract of intelligence which I have just received from Mr. Boddam's agent at Poona.

Since I had the honor to address you under the twenty-second instant, Sindia has changed his plan of proceeding to Secandra, and has resolved to march to Lalsot, a place about fifteen cos to the south-east of Jaynagar, and not very far from the strong fort of Rantambhore. We expect to arrive there after two more marches, that is in four days, for every march on account of the encumbered state of the army requires the succession of a halting day, and it is probable that we shall make a considerable halt there.

The situation of the Rajah of Jaypore seems now very desperate, and there is every reason to believe that Sindia's views are not now limited to the exaction of tribute from him, but to the entire possession of his country. He has no army in the field, and the forces under the command of Sindia's auxiliary the Macheri Rajah and the Mozul Chief Najaf Ouli Khan

are now advanced very near his capital. Sindia it is true is not without suspicion of some secret intrigues carrying on between these chiefs and the Rajah, but he trusts to his usual address and cunning to defeat them. He seems determined to avoid any measures that may be attended with risk, and with this view it is probable that instead of attempting the siege of Jaynagar, he will proceed leisurely to possess himself of the inferior forts, in the expectation that the Capital, deprived of its resources, may fall of itself. This system, so contrary to the rules of war established amongst European nations, he practised with great success in the reductions of Gwalior and Gohad; and on the present occasion, as his object is less difficult and his power much greater, he may reasonably expect an equally favourable issue.

31. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 13 kos from Jaipur, 2nd March 1786.

It is with extreme concern, I feel myself under the necessity of laying before you a transaction of a disagreeable nature which has lately happened between me and Madajee Sindia and which has compelled me to determine to withdraw from his camp, until he shall afford me the satisfaction I have required of him.

In submitting to you an account of the circumstances which have produced this disagreement, I shall have occasion to advert to some incidents, apparently of a trivial nature, but I trust for your pardon in the importance of their effects, and in the necessity I feel myself under to furnish you with complete matter to enable you to form your judgment of the propriety of my proceedings in a point of such eventual importance.

Having received information about the middle of January of some secret intrigues, which were carrying on between Sindia's Chiefs and two of my confidential servants Molavy Khair-ud-din and Salih-ud-din Khan, whom I had employed as my agents at the Durbar of the King and Madajee Sindia, I thought it proper to dismiss them both from my service. My confidence in them being shaken, I was sensible it would have been imprudent in me to have retained them any longer in my employment; but as I had no actual proof of their guilt at that time and as Molavy Khair-ud-din, besides an attachment to me of a long standing, had before rendered me essential service, I was induced on this account as well as from a consideration of its being apparently more creditable to myself, to part with them on easy terms. I permitted them to have access to me as usual during the interval of their dismissal and the time settled for their departure to Allahabad, and as I had formerly notified to his Majesty and Sindia my dismissal of them I did not think it of sufficient consequence to object to their attending these Durbars in a private capacity. I had

soon reason to repent of this moderation, and discovered that they availed themselves of my indulgence to purposes prejudicial to my interests, and I saw with astonishment that Sindia himself received them with a more distinguished attention than ever, and that some of his Chiefs, particularly Ambajee who had received them under his immediate protection, espoused their cause in a manner that bore a very unfavourable appearance to me. From this period I put an entire stop to their communication with me, and the high opinion I have ever entertained of the judgment and good sense of Sindia gave me a perfect confidence that on perceiving my displeasure with their conduct, he would immediately withhold his countenance from them. In this I was disappointed, and as he continued his attention to them I found it necessary to give him a hint on this subject. This he did not regard, and we were in consequence led into a protracted correspondence of which I have herewith the honor to lay before you a copy. During this period I progressively received intelligence of a very extraordinary complexion, confirmed by many circumstances which actually fell under my own observation, of a very disagreeable nature, but such as it is requisite I should particularly detail to you, from the great influence that they had on my conduct. The failure of Bhow Backsy in his attempt to allure the Prince to Camp of which he had held out the most confident expectations to Sindia, together with some other circumstances of his conduct in his management at Broach, has greatly diminished his influence with Sindia, and his only support of late appears to have been deprived from his being employed in negotiations with the English. On his return from Lucknow, Ambajee who is his enemy, with a view to his entire discredit, wished to deprive him of this trust, and to this end he entered into an intrigue with these agents of mine to obtain their assistance towards the accomplishment of his object of gradually drawing the negotiation into his own hands. The dismissal of these men from my service happening critically to disappoint his expectations, gave him great offence, and Bow Backsy, on whom his suspicion first fell, was obliged by the most abject submission not only to him but to them to take means to clear himself of having taken any part in it. Ambajee, either from motives of resentment or because these men had actually imposed on him in making him believe that they had sufficient influence to effect their point of prevailing on the Prince to return to Court, which he knew to be a great object with his master, resolved not only to protect them, but to obtain a more distinguished attention to them from Sindia than ever. Accordingly, they now not only went every day to the Durbar, but were admitted to long and frequent private conferences with him. Molavy Khair-ud-din proceeded to Allahabad on the fifteenth February, leaving Salih-ud-din and two others of his brothers in camp, under the immediate protection of Ambajee. Prior to his departure, he had a long private conversation with Sindia, of which the object was said to be, his aiding and assisting the views of the latter with regard to the Prince.

I cannot warrant the authenticity of this intelligence, but the subsequent conduct of Sindia evinces clearly that either this or some other object of a clandestine nature was in his view, which rendered it highly necessary I should put a stop to it. It is with reluctance I proceed to a relation of some circumstances that will set this necessity in a stronger point of view. From the time of Molavy Khair-ud-din's dismissal to the present day, Bhow Backsy has only paid me two visits, and both these were preceded by visits he made to the Molavy. An agent of his, Appajee Tantiah, who was stationed with me for the purpose of facilitating a number of little points that daily occurred, was withdrawn and has since, I understand, been sent almost every day with a message either on the part of Mahajee Sindia or Bhow Backsy to the Molavy, and since his departure to his brothers. I had some little points depending with Sindia at the time of the Molavy's dismissal such as, although not immediately relating to the interests of the Company, I thought it necessary to engage in, as Sindia's compliance tended to strengthen his connection with the Vizier. These, although Sindia had before personally expressed his assent to, I now could not accomplish; and I am sorry to add that the people to whom the business related, discovering the cause of my failure, made their application with success through the persons who has opposed me.

These and other circumstances of an equally injurious nature, which at present I forbear to add, will, I trust, convince your Honourable Board, that in a situation so discreditable, and so peculiarly hurtful to my own feelings, I have yet suppressed every passion of my own, and have laboured with a studied moderation of temper to prevent the extremity to which matters have unfortunately proceeded. I was sensible that this affair in its first form appeared to be of a private nature, and I was determined that no concern of my own should ever involve the interests of the Honourable Company. In this resolution I persevered as long as I could with propriety, but the unaccountable complexion which this matter afterwards assumed, as is evident from the circumstances I have laid before you, compelled me from a necessary attention to your interests to regard it in a different light. At the same time I beg leave to assure you that, considering the facts I have submitted to you as highly discreditable to myself, I have rather softened than aggravated them, and on this principle I resisted as long as consistently I could a belief of them. But my disbelief of them could not prevent their notoriety and popular credit, and astonished and perplexed as I was to account for the cause, I felt at length too sensibly the effect to admit the doubt of their existence.

In regard to my correspondence with Sindia, the gross evasion which he has practised throughout is too plain to require any observations upon it. The declaration he has made of his Majesty's having signified to him his pleasure on this occasion, I have the justest reason to suspect both because the King did in his own handwriting express to me in

approbation of the dismissal of my agent with him, and because he declared these sentiments openly in his Durbar. I perceived however the snare which Sindia had placed for me, and I cautiously avoided going into it, and I pretended to doubt the truth of his assertion. He would have rested the whole upon it, and declared if I could obtain his Majesty's consent, he would immediately banish the whole of them from his camp. I should then in vain have attempted to have obtained from his Majesty an acknowledgment of his real sentiments.

It is worthy of remark that Sindia increased his attention to these people in proportion as I manifested my anxiety on the subject of it. The day on which he received my fourth letter, he had occasion to depute Ambajee to Rajgarh [23 m. south of Alwar], who before his departure presented to him these three brothers, to each of whom he gave his hand as a pledge of his protection. On the succeeding day he sent for them, and after openly giving them assurances of protection, he publicly ordered them a thousand Rupees out of his treasury on account of a trifling robbery which had been committed upon them.

On the receipt of my fifth letter yesterday morning, he returned me a verbal answer that he would send Bhow Backsy to me to-day. Accordingly Bhow Backsy came to me this morning and informed me that Sindia was lost in astonishment to know the cause of my uneasiness and anxiety in a matter which appeared to him so trivial. I replied that I had already in the course of my correspondence fully expressed the cause of my uneasiness; and that I was equally astonished that Sindia, in an affair that so intimately concerned the preservation of our friendship, should refuse to make a sacrifice which he himself considered in so insignificant a light. He sat with me near two hours, but nothing further of moment passed between us, and, as on his going away, I declared to him my resolution of quitting the camp tomorrow morning in case Sindia did not give me the satisfaction I required, he said he hoped to be successful in this point; but he has not since come to me or sent me any intimation of Sindia's resolution.

Such are the circumstances which have determined me to quit Sindia's camp. Tomorrow morning I shall proceed by slow marches to Agra, which is seventy cos distant from hence, and there either remain until I receive your commands, or proceed further as circumstances may hereafter determine.

Suspicious as the conduct of Sindia is, the present state of his affairs is not such as to admit of his harbouring any immediate inimical designs against us. The present undertaking will furnish him with sufficient employment for this season; at all events my departure from his camp will not, I am convinced, be the occasion of precipitating a rupture, whatever may be its effects in retarding it. On this subject however I shall do myself the honor of addressing you more fully in a day or two.

I have determined to quit the camp without any formal notification to the King. I know that from the influence of Sindia the effect of a previous intimation to his Majesty would be a positive order for me to stay, and as my resolution is taken, I have thought it more respectful to him to go without his leave than in express contradiction to his commands. I will however send him a proper *arzi* after my arrival at the first stage.

32. GABRIEL HARPER TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Lucknow, 17 March 1786.

The Gosain Chief Himmat Bahadur who has some time been in disgrace with Sindia, taking the advantage of the absence of the latter for the purpose of settling with the Jaypore Rajah, has suddenly crossed the Jamna with the intention of taking refuge with the Vizier, near whose frontier he is arrived, and has addressed an *arzi* for leave to present himself at Lucknow: he is followed by a considerable body of troops from the Maratha service, who have however strict orders not to pursue him beyond the line of the Vizier's frontier, or to take any hostile measure if he should have accomplished his retreat beyond the Maratha districts. His brother Umrao-gir has on the other hand defeated the Maratha detachment which had entered his jageer; but as it is not possible he can maintain himself against the force that will be sent against him, he intends crossing the Ganges to take refuge in Rohilcand. The Vizier has with my advice given orders that Himmat Bahadur shall not advance towards Lucknow, and instructions are despatched to the Vizier's posts on the *ghats* of the Ganges not to suffer Umrao-gir to pass the river lest it should draw on hostilities with the Marathas, the idea of which is very prevalent since the departure of Lieutenant Anderson from Sindia's camp. It was currently reported there that the settlement between the Jaypoor Rajah and the Maratha was completed, but I am happy to inform you it is not yet done, nor do I conceive Sindia will relinquish the accomplishment of it for the present, on any account, so that whatever other projects may engage his attention they must give way to this material business with the Jaypoor Rajah, who will doubtless procrastinate it, to see the consequences of Mr. Anderson's quitting the camp, and the more recent flight of one Gosain brother and success of the other. I hope to be honored with your instructions how to regulate the Vizier's conduct with respect to these Chiefs, and I think you will see the necessity of sending immediate orders.

The advance of the season will I think effectually prevent Timur Shah taking any measures for passing beyond his present situation at Peshawar. The reduction of the province of Kashmir to his authority seems to have been his principal aim, and having accomplished that he will probably remain where he is. A thousand rumours have prevailed of his intentions

of advancing to Delhi, but as I judged them to have little or no foundation I have seldom written you on the subject.

33. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, March 15th 1786.

I arrived here early this morning. I have been received with particular marks of attention by the Governor of the town, who came out to a considerable distance to meet me and attended me to my place of residence. I have written a few lines to Sindia, acquainting him of my arrival and of the civilities that have been shewn me, and I have expressed my hope of soon having it in my power to thank him in person.

I learn from the public news-papers that my departure from camp has made a deeper impression on Sindia than I wished it to have made, and that he ascribes it to a deeper cause than that assigned for it. In a word, he seems extremely apprehensive of its being the prelude to an intended rupture with him, and under the impression he seems inclined to desist from his plan of a total subjection of the Jaypore country and to come to a composition with the Rajah for the arrears of tribute in order that he may be ready to return to Dig or Agra, in case of our motions rendering it necessary. I am confident however that all his apprehensions will vanish on his finding that I have no serious intentions of proceeding further than Agra; and I have the most sanguine expectations that this unpromising affair will yet be accommodated in such a manner as to leave no impression on the minds of either party. I am more and more convinced that Sindia's affairs will never admit of his being the aggressor in any contest with us, and tho' on the present occasion he may feel some uneasiness at the obstruction which it has occasioned to his views, yet every consideration of this kind will yield to a sense of interest which must dictate to him the expediency of preserving our connection as long as possible. Considering the matter in this light, it may perhaps eventually prove serviceable to the interests of the Company. There is only one circumstance which may possibly prove prejudicial, I mean the flight of Himmat Bahadur from Mutt'a to the borders of the Vizier's country,—an event which certainly must have happened sooner or later, but which I fear will be attributed to my disagreement with Sindia. All that can now be done to prevent such an idea is to prove in the most unequivocal manner by our subsequent conduct, that we have not countenanced this step. With this view, I was induced to address Colonel Harper on the subject yesterday, and I beg leave to enclose you an extract of my letter which I hope will meet with your approbation. I have now reason to think that all the circumstances mentioned in it are not strictly true, and in particular that the hostilities were committed by his brother and not by him. The reasons however for adopting the line of conduct, I have pointed out, are

still equally strong, and I hope Colonel Harper will be able to prevail on the Vizier to act accordingly. I have been however very sorry to learn since my arrival here that he is now two or three cos beyond the boundary and in the Vizier's dominions.

In the Poona news-paper of the 21st February Mr. Malet's arrival there that day is mentioned.

34. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, 10 April 1786.

The newspapers from Sindia's Camp mention his having concluded a vague settlement with the Rajah of Jaypore, but that neither party will begin to take any steps in the performance of it from their mutual distrust of each other. Some farther delay may take place on this account, but there is every probability that Sindia will return before the commencement of the rains and fix his cantonments at Dig or at Muttra. He will in this case be compelled to leave a considerable detachment in the Jaypoor country to enforce the terms of the agreement, and this expedition so far from answering the views of Sindia is likely to add greatly to his future difficulties, by sowing the seeds of perpetual hostility between him and the Jaypoor and other Rajahs to the westward.

35. LETTER FROM SINDHIA TO G. G., ENCLOSED IN ANDERSON'S LETTER OF 7th APRIL 1786.

* * * *

I have conformably to your directions written fully to Srimant Bahadur and Nana Sahib the particulars of Mr. Malet's arrival at Poona, and that you write to the Governor of Bombay on the subject of assistance and aid to the armies of Srimant Bahadur, that when troops may be wanted and necessary they should make it known to Mr. Malet who resides there on the part of the English Company.

By God's grace that gentleman will act in obedience to your orders. Whatever answer may come, complete information thereof shall be given to you. Many declarations of friendship and unanimity which on the 25th December, which is a fortunate day as being the nativity of Jesus Christ, you made to my servant Bhagwant Rao and to Bissambar Pandit and Chaman Lal, my said servant wrote them to Sadaseo Row Bhow with the intentions of your noble mind. They have been shewn to me in the original, and the greatest pleasure was acquired. In truth such is the duty of un on and unanimity. By the blessing of God an explicit answer shall be communicated to the said servant, and it will be fully known to you from his writing. What was written with the pen of kindness that you had heard of new events and occurrences towards Lahore and Carnatic Balaghat, the case of it is this, that a person named Azad Khan the

subahdar of Cashmeer having deviated from the system of allegiance and duty had stepped his foot into the chain of rebellion and opposition.

36. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

24th April 1786.

I have been favored with the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant and shall do myself the honor of addressing you particularly on the subject of it in a day or two, when I hope to be able to form some fixed opinion with respect to the probable issue of Sindia's present expectations. The settlement said to have been concluded between him and the Rajah of Jaypore, seems to have been attended with no effect, and at present it appears very uncertain whether he will persevere in his original intentions of attempting a complete conquest of the Jaypore dominion or rest satisfied with a tribute, and return before the rains to Dig. I am rather inclined to adopt the latter opinion.

37. JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G., TO JAMES ANDERSON.

Calcutta, 4th April 1786.

The letters with which you have regularly favored me since the commencement of your misunderstanding with Sindia and those you have addressed to the Board, form a chain of clear information. From the whole of this information two points are equally clear and demonstrated, first, that our connection with Sindia has served him as a cover to carry forward his extensive projects of political aggrandizements on the ground of his new powers of Minister for the Mogul. Secondly, that tho' it may not be Sindia's immediate design to break with this Government and tho' his ultimate interest may require a different management, still that it cannot be prudent for us to remain the medium of Sindia's usurpations. It would follow that where even slight occasions offer themselves for marking to him our sense of his views and situation, we ought to avail ourselves of those occasions to make him sensible that we are aware of his designs and that we possess the power of checking them.

If I am right in drawing these conclusions from the information you have laid before us and from the intelligence we receive from other quarters, it becomes a question of some delicacy to determine the line you ought to follow with Sindia, should he come to Agra to meet you, or should you think it proper to rejoin him wherever he may be.

I have all along taken it for granted that it would be proper, were you to withdraw ultimately from Sindia's Camp, that you should have another interview with him, if it was only to preserve appearances and to leave upon his mind the necessary impressions. I have accordingly in my conversations with Sindia's vakil told him that you had some matters to communicate to Sindia from me, which regarded his own interests, and which I could alone trust to you, knowing you to be Sindia's most attached friend amongst the English. I added that the only circumstance that gave me uneasiness in the misunderstanding that had happened was, that I found Sindia listened to the advice of Chiefs who were not so friendly to the English as Bow Bakhshi and others were known to be, and that though I had every dependance on Sindia's good understanding and his steadiness to his friendship to the English, still the moment he listened to those who were not the original friends of our union he was not perhaps his own friend. How could we then remain certain that he was ours? His Vakil here is a Benares Pandit, and a friend to Bhow Boxy, and until lately he never heard from Sindia directly but thro' the medium of the Bow.

Sindia's interference in Bundelcand and Bagelcand have certainly been very suspicious, and his connection with Chait Sing makes such interference a matter of greater suspicion. His regular and gradual progress from the reduction of Gwalior and Gohad to the establishment of his influence at Bundelcand, so near Benares, and at Aligarh near the Vizier's limits, and his more open movements to the reduction of Jainagar and the Rajpoot provinces, have nearly completed his dominion. These great advances to dangerous power, joined to the insolence which he has testified in resisting your wishes on points which he avows to be trivial, mark the present crisis as the fit moment for coming to an explanation with him. That explanation may take place in this way, either by telling him that he comes too near and grows too great, or by listening seriously to the appeals made to us from every quarter by the Chiefs he is subduing. The near approach of the rainy season is favorable to either of these explanations with Sindia, and the applications which I have recently received from every quarter where Sindia either has established or wishes to establish his power, give us a fair opportunity of coming to an indirect explanation with him, even on the liberal ground of friendship and sincerity towards him as an ally.

On taking the subject in another view, shall we avoid any explanation and remain apparently passive, while actually from our non-interference we are the encouragers and promoters of his conquests? Can there be danger in speaking or acting decidedly, and is the chance of Sindia's falling by his own operations and weight greater than that of his becoming troublesome to us or a dangerous neighbour, if we silently and tacitly permit the progress of his operations?

38. JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G., TO JAMES ANDERSON.

Calcutta, 15th May 1786.

I have received yours of the 30th April. You already know my ideas ; you possess full powers and are left as you ought to be to your own discretion. The advices by the *Talbot* make no change in our system. The Company, as you will be informed, approve highly of your reasoning of Sindia's situation, as I do fully of your reasoning on the Broach business.

Bhow Backsy is with you by this time. I waited for his visit to you to reply to his letter.

It will be a great object to get Sindia to desist from universal conquest around him. I should not like to act with any double policy towards Sindia ; yet our present connection with him forms the means to his independence and perhaps to our own future misfortunes, which will depend on your next interview with him and the resolutions he may adopt. I wish they may be to retire towards his own dominions and leave the independent Rajahs unextinguished : not that we can benefit by any connection with them so much as they are a check against his projects of Mogul dominion and conquest.

I wish to have some account of the real situation of the Mogul Chiefs and the different Rajahs who are supposed hostile to Sindia. What is the situation of the Begam [Khadija Sultan], Najaf Khan's sister ? She is, I believe, a prisoner in Agra.

39. JAMES ANDERSON TO COLONEL GABRIEL HARPER, LUCKNOW.

Agra, 5th May 1786.

I had last the pleasure to address you under date the 25th ultimo ; since then I have received another letter from Bow Baxy regarding Himmat Bahadur and Umrao-gir. He informs me that Devajee Gola, the officer and commander of the party sent against the latter, had, upon his flying to Kasganj, desisted, agreeable to the express orders of Sindia, from any further pursuit of him ; yet that he had written to the amil there, requiring that he might be delivered up to him ; and that if necessary he would come and receive him in any shape or form the amil might prescribe.

Bhow Baxy concludes his letter by saying that a Devajee Gola had communicated all these circumstances to Sindia ; but that he deferred sending him an answer till he might hear from me. I have been particularly brief in my answer to Bow Baxy in the expectation of soon seeing him, when we may discuss the matter in person ; but I have thought it proper to observe to him, that as this is an affair which relates solely to the Vizier and Sindia, I think it equally improper and useless that the subordinate officers of either party should of themselves take any steps

in it, as they ought to be guided entirely by the orders of their masters. In the meantime, as I foresee that this subject will be immediately introduced by Bhow Baksy on his arrival here, I wish as early as possible to be favoured by you with a communication of such particulars as may serve to guide my conduct on this occasion. My own sentiments I will freely own to you are these : I do not wish that H. Bahadur or his brother should remain in the territories of the Vizier or the Company, because I know of no advantages that are to be expected from the services of either, and their residence there must be attended with a perpetual jealousy to Sindia, which as far as is consistent with credit it were better to avoid. The delivery of him to Sindia however is a matter not to be thought of, and if there be no other asylum left for him than the territories of the Vizier or the Company, and the compelling him to quit them should be the means of throwing him into the hands of Sindia, I must confess that rather than occasion this consequence, which would everywhere impress the most unfavourable ideas of our power and spirit, I think we had better run all the risks I have stated from the protection of him. This might be done in such a manner as to give as little offence as possible, by prohibiting him from any access to the Vizier, and by allotting a place of residence for him as far to the eastward of the Vizier's dominions as possible. Independent of the expediency of this conduct, I know not whether it might not be justified on the plea of right, as Himmat Bahadur cannot strictly speaking be considered as a servant of Sindia ; and admitting that he were, he seems to have relinquished the service in a manner that can scarcely warrant his being considered as a traitor. I did formerly on my first arrival at this place communicate to you my opinion on this subject somewhat different from the present, but besides that the circumstances on which I grounded it were not authentic, I never had the most distant idea of the propriety of delivering him up to Sindia, or of making any other concession, which in its effects should be deemed equivalent to it.

40. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, May 6th, 1786.

Since I had last the honor to address you, I have received letters from Bhow Baksy in which he informs me of his having actually left the camp to join me at Agra and expresses his hope of soon seeing me.

From some private intelligence however which I have this day received, I learn that there is yet a probability of five or six days further delay from the sudden death of one of his Chiefs, whose mourning it is necessary he should celebrate. From this circumstance, joined to the natural laziness of his character and the continual embarrassment and difficulties he is under, I think it probable that the greatest part of this month may have elapsed before his arrival here.

Bhow Baksy in his letter is very particular on the subject of Himmat Bahadur and his brother. I beg leave to refer to the accompanying copy of a private letter which I yesterday addressed to Colonel Harper, for a knowledge of the circumstances and of my sentiments upon them. Sindia ought to be satisfied with our assurances, that we will never encourage, nor indeed permit Himmat Bahadur to make any hostile attempts against him, whilst we have the power of preventing it. He seems to expect however that we should deliver him up to him. He has no right to make this demand; and even if he had, I should scarcely think that it were expedient to yield it to him, considering the effect it would have in cutting off every hope from other quarters of any assistance from us, and in the consequent aid it might afford to the progress of Sindia.

Bhow Baksy has also informed me that Isaacs and Lyon, the two Jew merchants who made their escape about nine months ago from Lucknow with the property of other merchants, have arrived in camp and that Sindia has consigned them to the care of one of his Chiefs until he hears from me regarding them. I have avoided any particular reply to this and other part of Bhow Baksy's letter, on the principle of my expecting soon to have an opportunity of talking with him in person. In the meantime as I had before received information that Sindia had first consigned over these men to Bhow Baksy with directions to deliver them up to me, and had after their being some days in custody retaken them from him, I have reason to think that he means to be guided in this matter by our conduct with respect to Himmat Bahadur.

As I understand that all specie in their possession when they were seized at Burhanpore was delivered over to the gomashtha of Gopal Das, the detention of their persons could not otherwise be considered as an object of any consequence than as it would mark the indecent conduct of our ally, since the cases of Himmat Bahadur and these are so different in their nature as never could justify him in bringing them into a parallel.

41. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, May 12th, 1786.

In the letter which you did me the honor to address me under date the 4th ultimo you have fully explained to me your ideas of Sindia's views and the consequent line of conduct which you think ought to be adopted to counteract the bad effects which they appear to threaten towards us. I beg leave to assure you that on my return to camp I shall not fail to regulate my conduct entirely by my knowledge of your sentiments and wishes, and act, on every occasion, as far as circumstances will admit, in conformity to them. In the meantime from a reliance on that indulgence which I have uniformly experienced from you, I will take the liberty to lay before you in an unconnected manner such opinions as have occurred to myself upon this subject.

It must undoubtedly be admitted that Sindia has derived many essential benefits from his connexion with us in the prosecution of his conquests ; nor would he perhaps, without its aid, have been able to have secured himself in the possession of his ministerial powers, which under the colour of a legal authority have enabled him to carry into effect many of his ambitious designs.

Considering however the situation of affairs at the commencement of his undertaking, I am willing to believe that there can be no cause for regret in the system that has been pursued. We have derived many solid advantages from the pacification it has enabled us to maintain, and though it cannot be inferred with certainty that a contrary system would have involved us in a war, yet considering the inflamed disposition of our ally the Vizier against Sindia and the insidious reports which were at that time every where spread and believed, it is probable that in case of dissolving the intimacy of our concerns with Sindia, as a check upon his progress, we might have found it extremely difficult to have stopt at that precise point, and had we in consequence been unavoidably led to take part in the affairs of the King, we might have found it still more difficult to have stop't at the precise point of the completion of our wishes. We might have obstructed Sindia's progress, but from the weak state of the Mogul Government, which could not have subsisted without the continuance of our support, and indeed from a variety of other circumstances, it is probable that we might have been involved in a scene of trouble from which with all the advantages we might have obtained in its commencement we might have found it very difficult to have disengaged ourselves. At that period too there was reason to think that Sindia might have failed in the extensive pursuit in which he was engaged, and this opinion, though it may not, in the present state of affairs be likely to prove true, yet it certainly was not ill-founded at the time.

The difficulties he had to encounter were various and pressed upon him from such different quarters that nothing short of the admirable cunning and management he has employed could have enabled him to overcome them. He has gradually proceeded step by step, and whilst every new acquisition as well from its own value as from its diminishing the numbers of his difficulties has added greatly to his power, he has contrived that the very sacrifices he has been obliged to make in the pursuit of them should be ultimately advantageous to him by using on all occasions the services of the Mogul troops whose power it is so much his interest to break.

The progress which he has made by a steady adherence to those arts, has given a new turn to affairs and promises different events from those which might have been at first expected. The opinions which I submitted to you at a more early stage of his progress of his falling by the weight of his own operations, or at least of his being involved in a perpetual struggle

of difficulties by them ; and though I do not believe that he has ever meditated any hostile designs against us and am convinced that it will never be his interest, yet when we consider the violent ambition with which he is actuated and the natural effects of that passion, I am sensible that our security in this respect is much less than I was formerly inclined to consider it.

It becomes therefore an important question to determine, whether, considering the advantage we derive from peace, it may be advisable to trust to the degree of chance that yet remains, or whether with the risk of precipitating a rupture, we ought to take some steps that might promise to check him effectually in his career, and to prevent in time that overgrown power, which not from any premeditated design in Sindia but from the natural progress of affairs, might ultimately prove so troublesome to us. If you should be of the latter opinion I will freely own to you that I fear the expedients you have suggested would not of themselves answer the end. As far as I can judge from the knowledge I have of Sindia's character I should have hopes in the course of a free explanation with him to prevail upon him by any arguments I could use to return to Ujjain or proceed to Delhi, or in any other shape to desist from his plan of general conquest. On such an occasion I might expect to receive from him the strongest assurances of his fixed and unalterable disposition of friendship towards the English, but unless he saw that we were taking some more effectual means to enforce our wishes it would probably have no influence upon his conduct. The encouragement we might afford to the vakils of the Rajaht or Chiefs whom he is now reducing, might be the cause of more serious alarm to him, yet unless he saw it accompanied by some other steps, it would probably incline him rather to hasten than remit in his pursuit, that he might anticipate us in any scheme of opposition to them, which from these circumstances he might naturally be led to think that we had formed. But I must confess that I can devise no expedient better calculated to answer the end, excepting such as are in a much greater degree likely to involve us in hostilities. The expediency of adopting these must depend entirely on future events ; and from this consideration I must beg leave, in order to enable you to form a determination upon this point, to lay before you a short sketch of the nature and probable consequences of Sindia's pursuits.

Although there is great reason to suppose that Sindia on the commencement of his present expedition against Jypore, had in view the complete conquest of that country, yet I am now rather inclined to think that he will rest contented for the present with as large a contribution as he can raise and return with his army before the rains to Dig or to Muttra. This point however being uncertain, I will proceed on both suppositions to state the probable consequences.

Supposing then that Sindia should persevere in his present expedition against Jypore according to his original plan, I must confess that on the whole I think the chance of his success in the complete reduction of that country is in his favour. If it is true that he may expect to meet with more difficulty in this object than he has as yet experienced, not only from the natural bravery of the Rajpoots exerted in defence of their ancient possessions but also from the secret opposition of several of his allies whose fate seems to hang upon that of this Rajah, yet when we consider the art and management he has hitherto so successfully practised on similar occasions, there is reason to think that he would in the end overcome these difficulties.

The conquest of this country would be attended with a considerable accession of power by Sindia, not less from the additional territory it would bring him than from the important consequences it would probably produce. The reduction of his friend the Macheri Rajah would undoubtedly be his next object. This Rajah is a man of ability, but in such a situation it would be very difficult for him to resist the weight of power that would be brought against him, and his fate would probably involve that of the remaining chiefs of any consequence amongst the Moguls that now remain.

These are I think the likely consequences of the reduction, and it must be admitted that they are such as our interest is in some degree concerned to prevent. The existence of this power, as it must be in a perpetual state of jealousy of Sindia, would operate in our favour as a check upon him on one quarter. It is possible that he might afterwards, be induced to extend his conquest further to the westward against the Rajahs of Marwar and Odeypore, but he would have less inducement to this from the great tracts of sandy country which begin there, a circumstance which joined to the great distance from the scene of action would free him from any apprehensions on that quarter in case of his being involved with us, and which might perhaps incline him to fix on Jypore as the limit of his conquests to the westward. The other consequences which I have stated as probable results of this event would be equally unfavourable to us, as in relieving Sindia from some of his most capital embarrassments, they would tend to fix him in that point of power which might render peace extremely precarious.

All these circumstances seem to mark Sindia's expedition against Jypore as a kind of crisis of his power which it behoves us to watch with a greater degree of jealousy than we have hitherto found it necessary to shew. Yet, except by compulsive measures, I know not how we could possibly interfere to prevent it, since as I have already observed, I am convinced Sindia would not yield to any request or remonstrance on this head

If the preservation of this State should be deemed an object of such importance as to warrant our taking steps to secure it at any risk, it is undoubtedly in the power of your Government to check Sindia effectually in this pursuit at any stage of his progress. Were I to be furnished with instructions to watch narrowly the progress of Sindia, and whenever it might appear to me that the Rajah's situation was desperate and that it would be imprudent any longer to risk a delay to require of Sindia in a peremptory manner to desist from any further operations against him, on the principle of his being the ancient ally of the vizier whom we were consequently bound to protect from destruction, or on any other plea you might suggest to me; and in case of Sindia's refusal to comply not only to quit his camp but also to dispatch immediate orders to Colonel Blair to march the Brigade to Etawa, with particular injunction however not to proceed further until he might receive instructions from you, nor to take any steps of a hostile nature in repulse of any attack or invasion that might be made;—I believe I may pronounce with certainty that Sindia would then be obliged to abandon this pursuit, however near he might have before been to its final accomplishment.

Permit me to observe to you that I have ventured to suggest to you this measure not from my own opinion of its expediency, but merely as the only one short of the actual commencement of hostilities which appears to me calculated at once to give us the full benefit of the chances in our favour from delay, and to answer most effectually the end of saving Jypore from destruction, in case you should deem this an object of sufficient importance to warrant such a measure.

Though I have proposed to avoid the commencement of hostilities on our part, and though there is a possibility that under the increased difficulties which this measure would occasion to Sindia it might be for his interest to hearken to an accommodation; yet I am equally aware that with all the precautions we might use in the execution of this measure, we might nevertheless be precipitated into hostilities, and that Sindia on such an occasion might be influenced by other feelings than a sense of justice and interest. I know also that there is no certainty in political reasonings and that in the voluminous chapter of accidents, events very different from those I have predicted as probable, may possibly take place. We have, at all events a great security in the certain knowledge we possess that Sindia's dread of our power is infinitely greater than our apprehensions are of him. I am warranted in believing that he never has as yet entertained any hostile designs against us, because the course of events has clearly shewn that the grounds of this opinion were not just. We have seen that instead of being under the implicit guidance of Himmat Bahadur, whose hostility to the English and the Vizier was open and avowed, he was in fact only using him as an agent for very different purposes, and that all his negotiations with the Mogul Chiefs previous to

his leaving Gwalior were with a very different view than that of a conjunction against us, which was then so confidently asserted. I cannot pretend to say how long he may continue in these sentiments; but I am sure it will never be his interest to follow a different line of conduct; indeed, I am much more apprehensive of Sindia's being precipitated into a rupture with us from motives of fear and jealousy than from any sense of superiority or views of advantage.

I am strongly inclined to think that if it were possible to inspire him with a complete confidence of us and set his mind perfectly at ease on our quarter, he would be tempted to continue for ever the prosecution of the unbounded range of pursuits that are presented to him from other quarters. The reduction of Lahore is an object that he has frequently talked of; and Bhow Backsy, about a month before my departure from Camp, observed that Sindia meant if possible to engage our assistance in this pursuit; but that the time was not yet come for proposing it. To many I am sensible that such a proposal would appear to be a blind for covering other designs, but surely the reduction of Lahore, wild and extravagant as it may seem, is infinitely less so than any attempt he may be supposed to meditate against us.

In these observations which I have taken the liberty to submit to you, I have proceeded entirely on the supposition of Sindia's persevering in the reduction of Jaypore. If however notwithstanding his present shew of vigour, he should hearken to an accommodation and return before the rains to Dig, we should in that case have less cause of jealousy. To strengthen and secure his new acquisitions will for some time employ him, and the first he may take with this view will probably be the resumption of the jaidads from the Mogul jagirdars and their entire dismissal from his service. He has long meditated this step from a desire of improving his finances, but he has been made very sensible of late and particularly on the occasion of his misunderstanding with me that if ever he should be involved in any great difficulty, such as a rupture with us, these troops would immediately desert and co-operate against him. He is therefore gradually taking measures to get rid of them, and whenever his affairs will admit he will probably proceed more boldly. It were certainly to be wished that these jagirdars could be continued, but as this is a matter in which we could have no plea for interference, I think it would be better to let the measure take its course.

A variety of other difficulties might start up to engage Sindia's attention but as it is impossible to look forward to them with such certainty as to enable us to lay down any fixed plan with regard to them, it may perhaps be most advisable to continue in our present system of maintaining peace as long as Sindia's conduct will admit of our doing it with propriety; and in other respects to be guided by circumstances as they may fall out. This system we may pursue with the greater safety, when we reflect on the

strong natural defences of our own and our ally's dominions, and the constant state of military preparations which we maintain on our frontiers. Whether Sindia remains at Jypore or returns to Dig, we have many chances in our favour, and in either case we have a certainty if we choose of preserving peace, at least for another season ; and this is perhaps as much as any state can in general boast.

In the course of these observations, I have forbore to make any mention of the King. The truth is, the disposition of His Majesty is extremely weak as to render him incapable of relief. The state of thralldom in which he was kept by his own ministers was as great as that in which he was held by Sindia, and he seems to be perfectly unfit to move in any other sphere. In some respects, and particularly in regard to regular advances of cash, he has less reason to complain of Sindia than he has of his own chiefs, yet he is now heartily tired of him, as he used always to be with his former ministers wherever they maintained their sway for any length of time.

He often exclaims with violence against Sindia to his own people, and sometimes in his presence he ventures to upbraid him. Having lately received an *arzi* from the Nabab of Arcot, in which he made very honourable mention of the conduct of the English to him in the restitution of his country, he could not help expatiating on this circumstance in such terms to Sindia as conveyed the strongest implied reproaches for the difference of his conduct towards himself, and which Sindia could not help feeling as such. Such however is his weakness, that if you were desirous of encouraging this disposition in him of looking to us for relief from his present thralldom, a variety of means might be found of conveying to and fro communications on this head unknown to Sindia, yet I am convinced that he would soon defeat the purpose of it by boasting of it either in his first fretful moment with him, or in the fulness of his heart at the prospect of relief. An able minister might supply this defect in the King's character, but since the death of Najaf Khan, there has been more of that description, and since that period his affairs have been going rapidly to ruin. What effect our interference in his support might have had cannot easily be determined ; but there is a great reason to think that we might have excited the jealousy of other powers who would not easily have entered into the purity of our motives. Our interference would have been ascribed to our ambition, and however uneasy the native Powers may be at the exorbitant progress of any one amongst themselves, they must still be supposed to behold with more uneasiness any attempts which might carry this appearance, made by the English, who must be considered as the natural enemies of the whole.

These sentiments I have expressed with reluctance. The situation of the King must excite pity in every feeling breast, and as we are supposed to owe to his generosity the possessions we hold in Hindustan, it cannot

but be considered as a noble act to attempt to relieve him in his present distressed situation. To many also who consider the matter in a superficial view, it may seem to be no less easy than it is noble and generous. These sentiments however are romantic, and if attempted to be carried into execution, would certainly induce many of the consequences I have stated. I am aware that the period may soon arrive in which we may be called upon to take a part in the affairs here, from considerations which our credit will not suffer us to overlook.

I allude to the death of the King, which, situated as we are with respect to the Prince, would probably compel us to depart from that neutral system which we have hitherto maintained. The longer this event may be delayed the better, because we must greatly increase our means in the interval, and the circumstances under which we may be compelled to act hereafter can scarcely be more unfavourable than they are at present.

I beg pardon for the length of this address, and for the freedom with which I have ventured to submit to you my sentiments. In many instances they may not meet with your approbation, but I trust that your indulgence will be extended to all of them.

42. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, May 19th, 1786.

Although a month has now nearly elapsed, since Bhow Backsy began his march from Camp to this place, yet he has ever since remained stationary at the first stage. As I have had repeated experience of the natural slowness of his disposition, and as indeed I know on this occasion, that the assigned cause for this delay in the necessity he has been under of performing some mourning ceremonies was real, I have never been in the smallest degree inclined to impute his conduct to other motives. In the meantime, as he had fixed on the 13th past for the day on which he was to have prosecuted his journey in good earnest, I have been a good deal surprised to find that he has since that date, been in camp and had a long private conversation with Sindia. I have reason to believe that Sindia purposely recalled him to give him some new instructions, in consequence of a letter which he has intercepted from the Rajah of Jypore to Dowlat Ram his minister, who has lately gone privately to Lucknow.

In this letter the Rajah particularly desires to be informed whether or not there is any room to hope for assistance, that he may shape his conduct accordingly ; and I think it probable that Sindia on the strength of this, may have instructed Bhow Backsy to demand from me an explanation of our intentions on this head. As it is probable that at least fifteen days will yet elapse before the arrival of Bhow Backsy, I am in hopes that I may be in the meantime honoured with some instructions which may guide my conduct on this occasion. My own opinion, in the mean time is that

we are always bound [not] to come to any explanation with Sindia upon the actions or sayings of any other than of ourselves or our ally.

Unconnected as we are with the Rajah of Jypore, it may not perhaps be expedient for us to support him against Sindia ; but it might be equally inexpedient to give Sindia such an indirect aid in this pursuit as he must necessarily derive from any positive declaration of forbearance which we might give him.

Sindia has now taken his station at the distance of about fourteen cos from Jaypore, and I now think it probable that he will canton there during the rains and prosecute his views to the utter destruction of the Rajah. It is not, I believe, his intention to risk any action or even to besiege the capital, but employ himself gradually in cutting off the Rajah's resources and trusting his destruction to the sure effect of time.

43. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, 29th May 1786.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 15th instant, and agreeable to your desire I now do myself the pleasure of sending you a copy of it (*sic.*).

Bhow Backsy arrived here this morning, and immediately afterwards made me a visit of near an hour. He expressed much satisfaction at our meeting again ; but nothing of a private nature, according to the general custom observed in first visits, passed between us. He promised to be with me to-morrow morning and until then I defer forming any resolution with respect to the particular period of my departure from hence.

In the course of conversation, Bhow Backsy mentioned that according to the last advices he had received from camp the negotiation with the Rajah of Jaypore was in the most favourable train, and that Sindia being now perfectly at ease on this score, was preparing to return with his army to canton during the rains, whilst the King was to proceed to Delhy. The common intelligence from camp is of a different complexion. In particular, in the news-papers of yesterday it was mentioned that Sindia was extremely disappointed in his hopes and began to feel himself considerably embarrassed. Instead of intimidating the Rajpoots by his late marches, it is said that they have been in consequence led to increase in their preparations : it is mentioned that he felt much uneasiness from the apparent union betwixt the Macheri Rajah and Najaf Quli Khan, and at the jealousy and suspicion which they manifested of him in the distance at which they encamped from him.

44. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sikandra, 12th June 1786.

I beg leave to inform you that Bhow Backsy having arrived at Agra on the 29th ultimo and delivered me a letter from Sindia strongly expressing

his desire to see me, I have this day set out from Agra to rejoin the army. I expect to reach the army nearly about the time of its arrival at Dig, which is four days' march from hence. It does not seem certain whether Sindia will canton during the rains at Dig or resume his former station at Muttra, and it will probably depend entirely on the part His Majesty may take of remaining with the army or of proceeding to Delhi. Sindia is extremely desirous of preventing the latter, and as there are no suitable accommodations for him at Muttra, he means to use all his endeavours to prevail upon him to continue during the rains in the palace at Dig. Besides his reluctance to suffer the King to go to any distance from him, it is believed that he means to attempt during the rains the reduction of the neighbouring fort of Bharatpur, to which the presence of His Majesty may perhaps contribute. This fort is in the possession of Ranjeet Sing; and with a small territory of three or four lacs of Rupees annually, it forms the whole of the present dominions of that once formidable Power the Jats. Suraj Mal, the father of the present Rajah, was supposed to have been possessed of great treasure, and as nothing was discovered after his death, Sindia has probably some hopes of obtaining the possession of it.

I have this day done myself the honor of transmitting to you duplicate of Mr. Malet's letter to you under date the 7th ultimo, which was left open for my perusal. I have been particularly careful in my conversations with Bhow Backsy to explain to him the limited nature of the assistance you are willing to grant the Peshwa, and he has assured me that Sindia is particularly apprised of it. It is probable that the reports of the different Vakeels after their conversation with the Governor-General may have been exaggerated with a view of enhancing the merits of their own services, but the requisition of Nana to the Government of Bombay, after the receipt of the Governor-General's letter, which is expressed in terms that can admit of no misconception, can be ascribed only to his excessive earnestness for assistance in an undertaking which at present wears no very favourable aspect.

45. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Dig, 22nd June 1786.

In my address of the 19th instant I did myself the honor of informing you of the train in which my intended interview with Sindia was, and of the reasons for the delay which had happened. Bhow Baksy returned to me the next day, and acquainted me that as the ensuing day was an unfortunate one, it was necessary to postpone my entry into the Camp until the 22nd, when Sindia proposed coming out to a considerable distance to meet me, and thus accompany me to the King's Durbar. Accordingly, this morning early Mahajee Sindia, attended by most of his principal Chiefs, met me at a cos distance from his tents, where we alighted from our elephants. I embraced and afterwards proceeded to the King's

Durbar. His Majesty expressed himself highly displeased at my having quitted the Camp, and then after declaring his satisfaction at my return, informed me that he intended proceeding to-morrow to Delhy to remain there during the rains, and he desired that until his return at the commencement of the fair season, I would remain with Mahajee Sindia. This speech his Majesty had probably been tutored to make.

Sindia means to pay me the first visit and I expect to see him tomorrow or next day. We shall not probably remain more than two days here as Sindia has already sent off his artillery to Muttra where he means to canton during the rains.

In a former address I intimated to you my suspicion that Sindia meant to detain the two Jew merchants Issacs and Lyon until he should obtain some satisfaction of his expectations in regard to Himmat Bahadur. In this however I have been mistaken as they were both delivered over to me yesterday, and I shall lose no time in sending them to Lucknow. All their money and jewels were taken from them at Burhanpore, and their clothes and other articles of smaller value left with them. The valuables taken at Burhanpore were to have been consigned to Gopal Das's agent at Nagpoor, but from some cause or other they are still kept there in deposit. There is however every reason to believe that they will all be faithfully restored. I have got a small package from them containing jewels, according to their account of very considerable value, which they said they found means to conceal. I sealed them with one of their seals in the presence of Messrs. Kinloch and Stewart, and in that state I shall keep them until I receive instructions from Lucknow.

46. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Dig, June 25th, 1786.

I had last the honor to address you on the 22nd. Next day Sindia accompanied the King on his journey to the distance of some cos, and yesterday having had occasion to take a survey of the fort, his visit to me was postponed till this evening, when he came accompanied by most of his principal Chiefs. To-morrow the army is to march towards Muttra where it will arrive on the 28th, and until then I shall have no opportunity of returning Sindia's visit.

I learn from private information that Sindia has been made very uneasy by the intelligence he has received of Dowlat Ram the Jaypoor Minister having left Lucknow with an intention of proceeding's to Calcutta. This circumstance, joined to the continuance of Himmat Bahadur in the Vazier's dominions, which, notwithstanding the little encouragement that has been shewn him, he knows from the intriguing nature of his disposition must ever be fraught with danger to himself, has tended greatly to alarm him and induced him to hold a private conversation with his ministers on the occasion. No intimation on this subject however has been made to me, notwithstanding that Bhow Baksy has been with me every day

for this some time past, and although if he should communicate his apprehensions, I shall not fail to use every means in my power to remove them, yet I must confess I am not sorry for the existence of them. I wish to avoid every real and just cause of suspicion or apprehension to Sindia ; but whilst we attempt by an excessive delicacy of conduct towards him to inspire him with a perfect confidence in our good intentions, it is not in his nature to resist the temptation it affords him of applying it to the advancement of his own schemes by the false construction which he labours to give it. I am now entirely confident that we may adopt a middle line with perfect safety, as it is not likely in the present train of his affairs, that he should be the aggressor in any contest with us, unless he should act in a more absurd manner than from the general tenor of his conduct we are warranted to suppose. We have proofs that he is fully aware of the danger. The effects which followed my departure in the general consternation it occasioned, were of too unequivocal a nature to admit of any doubt ; but since my return I have heard a variety of strange accounts in confirmation of them. The situation of his affairs which contributed to aid these effects at that time, can scarcely be considered as more favourable at present. All the terms of his agreement with the Rajah of Jaypoor, excepting the payment of two or three lacs of rupees, which was chiefly made in goods, remain yet to be fulfilled ; and there is every reason to believe, if not to induce an absolute certainty, that the Rajputs have no intentions of performing them. They feel themselves animated by the check they have already given him, more especially as it is the first he has yet received ; and they see and openly declare, the absurdity of exhausting their resources in the idle idea of pacifying a man who has so clearly evinced his intention to destroy them and who, to facilitate this purpose keeps in his camp a pretender to the raj, ready to use as a handle whenever his own affairs will admit of it. In the event which may of course be expected, Sindia must feel himself at the commencement of the next dry season-called upon to enforce his demands, and tho' his apprehensions from our quarter and consequent anxiety for the safety of his possessions in the Duab, may deter him from undertaking an expedition to such a distance in person, yet it is evident that whether he goes himself or commits the charge to another, we have no reason under such circumstances to entertain the smallest apprehension.

Amidst the various difficulties with which Sindia has to encounter, there is none which he seems to feel more sensibly than the small revenue he derives from these provinces ; and on this account he has long anxiously wished to resume the jageers from the Mogul Chiefs, a measure which it is thought he means certainly to carry into execution or at least to attempt during the rains ; his plan, it is said, is to order them all to proceed and join the army of the Peshwa, and on the ground of their refusal, which he is aware must be the inevitable consequence, to resume their jageers. The whole of their amount on a large calculation is

supposed to be about 60 lacs of rupees, but from the great depopulation which has lately taken place in this country they are in possession of almost the only productive parts of it. It is no wonder therefore that Sindia should have so strong a desire of stripping them of these possessions, tho' I do not think it likely that he will be completely successful, and it is probable that he will be obliged to content himself with the resumption of the inferior ones. The principal amongst them are Najaf Quli Khan, Badil Beg Khan, Qasim Jan, and Allahyar Khan ; but the first in point of power is infinitely superior to the others. In his jageer, which is situated to the westward of Delhy, is the strong fort of Kanaud, which Sindia from a conviction of the difficulty of gaining it by force, has frequently attempted to win from him by threats and promises, which have hitherto been exerted to no purpose. He is famous for his courage, but so much addicted to the use of opium and of inebriating liquors, as to be totally unfit for any great exertions.

47. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Muttra, 3rd July 1786.

In my letter under date the 12th ultimo I acquainted you that I had that day left Agra with Bhow Baxy to join the army. I have now the honour to inform you that on the 22nd I reached Dig, where the army had arrived two days before. Mahajee Sindia met me at the distance of a cos from the Camp, from whence we proceeded together to the King's Durbar.

48. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp at Muttra, 3rd July 1786.

Agreeably to the information I submitted to you in my address of yesterday, I paid a visit to Sindia to-day and sat with him near two hours. The meeting was a public one, and as he shewed no desire of speaking in private, I did not think it proper to push it. He was in other respects in excellent humour, and at my request he entertained me with a specimen of his sporting which he performed with admirable dexterity.

Sindia's only care at present seems to be how he shall squeeze money. After working for these several months past by various modes on the fears of Jehangeer Khan, and the other unfortunate Mogul Chiefs whom he imprisoned last January, he has at length sent them from Camp, with orders to carry them to Gwalior. It is however imagined that he yet means to reserve this extremity for some time longer, and that if the terror of it does not operate, as he expects, to induce them to make some disclosure of their treasures, they will be kept for some time in the fort of Agra. Sindia seems to have suffered a great disappointment. He had received exaggerated accounts of the jewels and treasure of the Musalman

Chiefs, and he had in consequence formed the most flattering prospects, which have hitherto proved almost entirely delusive.

49. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Muttra, 25th July 1786.

I returned from Agra to camp on the 19th, and a few days afterwards I had an interview with Sindia, at which nothing however of a very particular nature passed. Sindia seems as much as ever inclined to maintain and preserve his friendship with us, but he is, I have reason to believe, under considerable anxiety and uneasiness from an idea that our disposition is not equally favourable to him. The residence of Himmatt Bahadur near his frontiers, supported by a strict and intimate connection with Almas, the negotiation said to be in train between the Vazier and the Jaypore Vakils now at Lucknow, and reports which have been spread in consequence of the late military arrangements of a great increase in our forces and particularly of Europeans, have all of them contributed to alarm him, and to raise a greater degree of jealousy of us than he has hitherto shewn. Various additional daks have been laid, and every intelligence he receives is a matter of much speculation to him and his ministers.

These circumstances I know only from report. He has never mentioned them to me himself, and as Bhow Backsy, who is frequently with me, has never alluded to them in any of his conversation, I have thought it advisable to take no notice of them, as an officiousness on my part in a matter of this nature might tend rather to confirm than remove his suspicions. To say the truth, I am not very sorry for their existence ; as they are probably more the effect of the general untoward state of his affairs than of any particular causes with respect to us. I have myself no scruple in saying that I think Sindia's present situation is more unpromising than ever. No plunder has been left unseized, tho' his acquisitions of this kind seem to have fallen infinitely short of his expectations. The regular revenues of the country are by no means adequate to his expenses, being encumbered with jageers to the Mogul Chiefs, which from an apprehension of exciting fresh commotions he has not yet ventured to resume. He knows that the minds of all of them are already estranged from him ; and that the smallest spark might blow their discontent into a flame. Even his own people begin to murmur against him, such as are employed on any business of profit are sure in the end to be squeezed ; nor are his most confidential servants exempted from this. And it is in vain to resist his demands, as the encouragement he gives to informers enables him not only to proportion his demands to the ability of the person but also to render useless any attempts which might be made to a concealment of the profits.

In the situation Sindia feels the necessity of making some new attempt, tho' he is aware of the increased difficulties under which he must undertake

it. His force is not such as to render it prudent in him to encounter opposition, and his insidious designs are now everywhere too well known to admit of his practising those arts by which, without any exertion of force, he has hitherto found means to accomplish his objects. He is aware also that from several circumstances which have happened he cannot any longer either deceive the other Powers with respect to the nature of his friendship with us or presume himself too far on our forbearance. Indeed, I am perfectly convinced that however imprudent his conduct may occasionally have been with respect to us, he has nevertheless in all his plans proceeded entirely on the confidence of the continuance of our friendship, and that this was never more an object to him than it is at present. If he can rely upon it, I think it probable that he will in the ensuing fair season make another attempt against Jaypore. The Rajah seems to expect it and is busily employed in forming alliance with neighbouring Rajputs.

I have been thus particular in submitting to you my sentiments of Sindia's situation, because, altho' I do not believe that he has yet ever harboured any other than pacific intentions towards us, yet I am sensible that we must look to our security in this respect more in the circumstances of his situation than in the disposition of his mind. If I have any fears with regard to the peace, they arise chiefly from our connection with Himmat Bahadur. I formerly submitted to you my sentiments of the impropriety of suffering him to remain in the Vizier's dominions, and these were adopted by the Board. The Vizier however has suffered him to remain. I am now inclined to think it proper; since a refusal of protection must have been in effect a delivery of him to Sindia, as excepting the Vizier or the Company I know no other State which could have protected him against the power of Sindia. In granting him protection however I think the mode least injurious to Sindia should have been adopted, and that some place ought to have been allotted for his residence as far distant as possible from Sindia's territories. In his present situation he has it in his power to carry on many intrigues prejudicial to Sindia; and I believe he is not idle on the occasion. In particular, I have heard that in consequence of a disposition in the Begam, the sister of Najaf Khan, at Agra to fly to the Vizier's dominions he has of late been negotiating with her on this head and using every means in his power to prevail on her to execute her intentions. When such personages fly to the Vizier they must be protected; but as without being of any real advantage to him, they must naturally occasion an increase of jealousy between him and Sindia, he ought not to wish for their coming. At any rate the evil must be much increased, if Himmat Bahadur should in reality or even in supposition be instrumental in promoting such a step. The high confidence which once apparently subsisted between him and Sindia is now converted into the bitterest degree of hatred; and as Sindia knows from experience how much he has to dread from an exercise of his

intriguing talents against him, he cannot but be in the highest degree uneasy at the residence of such a man under the protection and encouragement of the Vizier so near his frontiers. For these reasons I cannot help suggesting to you my own opinion of the expediency of endeavouring to prevail on the Vizier to assign a place for his residence at Fyzabad or anywhere else to the westward [? eastward].

Some days ago I was informed by my servants that a chobdar, sent by Chait Sing wished to speak with me. I refused him admittance on the score of its being impossible that his master could have any business with me ; upon which he sent in a message that he only came to enquire after my health, and that it was his master's wish, he might be permitted to do so every day. As Chait Sing had never before taken any open steps towards the establishment of an intercourse or the appearance of one between us, I was a good deal surprised on this occasion ; but I learn that he has of late expressed more than common discontent and even declared his intention of throwing himself upon the mercy of the Vizier. If he really meditates such an intention, Sindia will be able to divert him from it by holding forth hopes on which he has so long continued to feed him,—possibly it is as much for the interest of the Company that he should continue with Sindia as fly to the Vizier, as in that latter event the hopes and fears of the people at Benares regarding his restoration, which have for some time been entirely allayed, might again be roused.

50. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Muttra, 29th July 1786.

I have frequently received intelligence of Sindia's having been recalled by the Peshwa ; but to-day it is reported in Camp that besides the recall of himself separate letters to this effect have been sent to all the Peshwa's Chiefs now with Sindia and particularly to Bapu Eetal Row and Kishen Pawar. These are the principal Chiefs amongst them, and as they long have been disgusted with Sindia and have wished above all things to return to the Deccan,—Sindia, if this intelligence be true, must now find it very difficult to contrive means to retain them any longer—their departure would be of less consequence in point of the diminution of strength it would occasion than in its probable effects of increasing the discontent of his own army and of raising the spirit of his enemies. In the Poona newspapers of to-day it is mentioned that Tippoo's troops have at length made themselves master of the capital town and fort of Adoni, in consequence of the swelling of the rivers having prevented the confederates from sending relief to the garrison, and the whole hopes of the Maratha State it is said are placed at present in Tuojee Holkar, who from having been once the most intimate friend is now the most bitter enemy of Sindia.

51. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Muttra, 6th August 1786.

I had last the honor to address you under date the 29th ultimo. Bhow Baxy did not return to me till some days afterwards, and then instead of a long letter from Nana to Sindia, as he had mentioned, he brought me only the copy of Nana's last letter to you. He informed me that Sindia also intended to address you on the same subject and that he would bring me a draft of the letter, but I have not since seen him; possibly Sindia has not time to turn his attention to this subject in the more pressing exigency of his own immediate concerns; there is now every reason to believe the truth of the report which I submitted to you in my last of the Peshwa's recall not only of Sindia but of such of the independent jageerdars as are now with him. Kishan Pawar has in consequence taken his leave and set out for the Deccan, leaving however the greatest part of his troops under the command of his son. His departure cannot fail of being prejudicial to Sindia; and it was not without much uneasiness that he yielded to the necessity of it. He is now employed in exerting all his endeavours to prevent Bapoo Eetal from taking a similar step; but I believe he has little reason to expect success. The whole of the Peshwa's troops that are with him are in the highest degree discontented, as they have suffered considerable hardships in forwarding his objects, whilst the whole of the profit has centered in himself and his immediate confidants, who possess little or no weight in the Maratha Government in comparison of several of their Chiefs. Sindia in this situation has taken care to render the discontent general by squeezing all of his own Chiefs, who have amassed any money, and excepting Rana Khan Bhai, the nature of whose connection I have already explained to you, I scarcely think there is one who is not estranged from him. As to his battalions or forces which he has occasionally raised since he left his own country, they are never regularly paid, but in times such as the present when their services are not immediately wanted, they are entirely neglected. Their discontent however is of much less consequence than that of the others; they have often mutinied and gone off in large bodies; but as excepting the French Battalion, so-called from its being under the command of a French officer, they have none of them any discipline, Sindia feels little or no inconveniency from their desertion, as he is easily able to supply their loss immediately with others.

Such are the internal difficulties of Sindia's situation, and his external ones are at present more numerous and more serious than they have heretofore been at any period. All the zamindars and petty Rajahs of the countries he has subjected are now most completely discontented with him and ready to give their aid to any opposition that may be raised up against him. From the neighbouring quarters he has nothing to expect

but resistance. The confederacy between the Jaypore and the Jodhpore Rajahs and the assemblage of their forces is now open and avowed. Most of the Sikh Chiefs with whom he had entered into an alliance have been induced from the failure of his promises to prefer their old course of plundering. Ghulam Qadir Khan, the son of Zabita Khan, who had hitherto maintained a show of obedience to Sindia, has now ventured to act more independently. He has lately imprisoned his mother and his uncle Afzal Khan, and seized their effects and treasures, amounting to a considerable sum. Sindia who had probably an eye to the future acquisition of the treasure, was extremely displeased on the first intelligence of it and seemed inclined to have openly marked his disapprobation of it by conferring some particular marks of attention on the sons of Afzal Khan who have fled to him for redress ; but on considering the matter he chose rather to confine himself to the simple protection of them. He was probably unwilling to take a step which might drive Ghulam Qadir into a connection with the Sikhs, which it is thought he meditates.

Amidst all these difficulties Sindia seems extremely anxious for the return of the King, and he has already been consulting his astrologers about fixing a fortunate day for his Majesty's departure from Delhi.

52. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp at Muttra, 10th August 1786.

In my address of the 6th instant I informed you of Sindia's anxiety for the return of the King, and I understand that some day early in next month is fixed for his departure from Delhi.

The state of Sindia's affairs naturally accounts for his anxiety for the possession of the King in his Camp ; but I have heard that he has likewise some views of extorting from this unfortunate monarch the treasure which it is reported he has secretly amassed. This idea it is said has been suggested to him by Shah Nizam-ud-Din, an infamous wretch whom he has always employed as his agent with the King, and who is entirely directed by his will in every thing.

This intelligence has not been communicated to me in such a manner as to enable me to warrant its authenticity, yet I must confess that it does not appear to me altogether void of probability. It is a very common idea that the King is in possession of considerable hidden treasure, and tho' I have never thought that this opinion was well formed, yet the general prevalency of it is sufficient grounds for Sindia to proceed upon. It may also be observed that altho' such a step would tend generally to shake the foundation of Sindia's power in this quarter, yet all his conduct hitherto has been guided by a short-sighted policy which has led him eagerly to embrace every prospect of immediate advantage without any regard to the distant consequences. At present his affairs wear so gloomy

an aspect as makes him less anxious than ever about remote consequences and more determined to seize at any hazard whatever immediate advantages may lay in his power. After all however, I can only say that this event is possible, but as such, considering the consequences which would most probably result from it, I have thought it necessary to lay it before you. From the character of the King it is little likely that he would voluntarily yield to a request from Sindia, nor is it likely that the latter would be restrained by any scruples of delicacy from proceeding to extremities if he should find it absolutely necessary. He might threaten, in case of an obstinate refusal, to set him and his children aside and proclaim as King some other of the numerous race of princes now confined at Delhi, and if this did not succeed he might perhaps proceed to the actual execution of it. I hope, indeed I believe, that this event is not likely to happen, as in such case the maintenance of a neutrality on our part might neither be deemed creditable nor safe.

53. EXTRACT OF A LETTER TO Mr. J. A. POW FROM Mr. de BOIGNE.

Dated Camp near Kalinjar, 3rd July 1786.

For some months past I was in a very good hope of our marching before the rainy weather towards you. But as the Devil will have it, no appearance is now to be entertained as the rivers are everywhere immensely swelled and the *mamlats* (tribute money) not finished with any of the Rajahs, it appears that their panic has now left them, having had time enough to make themselves perfectly well acquainted with the generalship and abilities as well as courage of my great Chief Appa, of whom the troops are very much tired as no pay is to be got from him. The few lacs which have been already paid on account of the *mamlats* have been packed by the great shraf Aba Naik and the troops are starving. Mr. Taylor's troops have been, for 8 or ten days, very mutinous for their pay; however, a little money has pacified them for the present, but I am much afraid that many other mutinies will soon take place. For my part, as long as I shall be able to keep my troops from doing any such thing, I will do it and exert all my power, and shall not leave myself with a *penny*, as several times I have done already to prevent a mutiny, wishing to leave Appa with honor and satisfaction, which I beg also to be soon, as nothing but danger, loss, empty words is to be expected from him. Good God! What a kind of man void of every principle of humanity, a miser and mean to excess. I have not had the pleasure yet to see a man quitting his service without total ruin; the danger is frightful.

54. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Agra, August 23, 1786.

I had last the honor to address you on the 10th inst. Mahajee Sindia having soon after left his Camp and retired to Bindraban for the

celebration of some Hindoo holidays, I took that opportunity of proceeding for a few days to this place. I had acquainted Bhow Backsy of my intentions the day before my departure, and I was a good deal surprised afterwards to learn from the newspapers and other channels that Sindia had expressed great uneasiness and apprehension on this account. I had in consequence held two or three private conversations with Bhow Backsy. He has of late in a variety of instances manifested an uncommon degree of solicitude and alarm with respect to our motions, and he has held many private conferences with Bhow Backsy and others of his confidants on this subject, yet not the most distant intimation of his apprehensions has ever been made to me. It is observable also that he has cautiously avoided ever since my return to Camp to enter into any private or particular conversation with me, but confined himself to general professions of friendship and other commonplace topics. From an expectation that a private conference might possibly lead to some useful explanations, I did several times express a wish for it to Bhow Backsy, but am finding that it was always on some pretence or other evaded. I thought it prudent on my part to avoid the appearance of any further solicitude about it. I could not account for Sindia's conduct or any other supposition than that under the influence of jealousy and alarm he foresaw no other probable result from a private conference with me than the confirmation of his fears into a certainty, and that he vainly imagined he might at least protract the evil hour by avoiding it.

For my own part, however unpleasant I may feel this state of diffidence, yet I cannot help considering the present situation of affairs as in every respect favourable. From an experience of the past I am perfectly convinced that we shall never be able by simple negotiation to limit Sindia in his pursuits of conquests, and I am equally convinced that we shall never be able to establish such a cordiality or confidence between us as might enable us to rely on his faithful performance of any concessions he might offer to make to the Prince, on condition of his return from Lucknow to the Presence. In this situation of affairs, considering that there is no other alternative than force, you may perhaps deem it prudent to continue in our present system of neutrality and allowing all the hazard of suffering Sindia to proceed in his career of ambition. From all appearances at present it promises to be a safe system, and [we may] at least expect timely warning of our danger.

With respect to the general state of affairs, there is little or no alteration since my last account of them. Every day produces something new from some quarter or another; but besides that these occurrences have little weight in the general scale, they sometimes induce consequences very different from what their appearances seemed to indicate as probable. At present the only intelligence of any consequence I have heard is the intention of Sindia to pay a visit to this place, which I have reason to believe will very shortly take place. As he had formerly remained several

days after the capture of the place within a few miles of it without either visiting the city or the fort, some motive different from curiosity may now be supposed to prompt him in this journey. His apprehension may perhaps have suggested to him the necessity of examining the state of the works of the fort and of taking measures to strengthen them, and it is not unlikely that he wishes to have some private conversation with Majd-ud-daulah who is confined in it, in the expectation perhaps of drawing from him some useful discoveries. I have likewise heard, but I do not think it likely, that he means to visit Aligarh.

55. GOVERNOR GENERAL TO BHAU BAKHSHI.

Calcutta, 31 August 1786.

I have had the pleasure to receive your two last letters mentioning your journey to Akbarabad and your return to Sindia's Camp with Mr. Anderson and his interviews with the King and the Maharajah, and the confirmation which our friendship had received thereby.

The sickness at heart, which you mentioned and referred me for full particulars of it to the verbal representations of Bhagwant Row, I have thoroughly understood from him, and he has also fully described all the labours of friendship and attachment which you have from the first performed in the Company's interests and the adjustments which have upon this occasion taken place thro' your exertions. How indeed could it be otherwise? For when you employ yourself in the offices of attachment, they must certainly produce increase and strength to the mutual friendship, nor can there by any doubt that the intrigues of ill-intentioned persons will never succeed but will in the end be defeated and brought to shame, for the connection between us is so close and intimate that no attempts of such evil-designed men can injure it. In the same view I also study to promote the reputation and interests of the Maharajah and to spread your good name, and you may rest assured that in return for the duties of friendship and attachment which you have performed to the Company your interests are firmly rooted in my mind. I am much pleased at the information of Mr. Anderson's interview with Sindia thro' you and with his Majesty thro' Sindia. To the rest I refer you to your Vakeel.

56. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACPHERSON, G. G.

Sindia's Camp at Muttra, 10th September 1786.

In my address of the twenty-eighth ultimo from Agra I did myself the honor to inform you of Sindia's intention to visit Agra. Two days ago he came to the resolution of setting out to-day, but he has since changed his mind, and this object is for the present suspended, if not entirely relinquished. Bhow Baksy yesterday acquainted me by his desire, that

he would not at any rate go before the Dasara. The only reason assigned for this sudden change is the consternation into which Sindia was yesterday thrown by the blowing up of some powder in his magazine; upwards of a hundred people perished by this accident; but such a loss would neither have been felt or regarded by Sindia, had it not been for the inauspicious omen which an accident of this nature is supposed to portend, and which in the present instance has been greatly heightened by the critical occurrence of it on the day on which Shah Mansur [of Bir] his tutelary saint died. The anniversary of this day he is accustomed to celebrate with various circumstances of superstitious mourning, and nothing it is thought could have been so unfortunate as the critical coincidence of two such events. Superstitious observances in such men as Sindia are more commonly ascribed to policy than belief, yet, in this particular I am inclined to believe his sincerity, and it is wonderful to observe the effect which such an incident seems to have had on the whole camp. Sindia has not been successful in his endeavours to enforce the payment of the sums due by the Rajah of Jaypore from the late treaty, and that Chief is now openly engaged in measures to resist him. This circumstance, joined to the suspicious conduct of the Macheri Rajah, has alarmed Sindia extremely, and he seems anxious to impress a belief of his determination to undertake another expedition in person against that quarter this season. I am extremely doubtful however how far he is sincere in this, as his success must be very uncertain and he seems unwilling to put anything to the risk. A considerable part of the season may perhaps pass away in suspense in the hopes of being able to effect, by his intrigues, some favourable circumstances which may enable him to undertake the expedition with a fairer prospect of success, or perhaps he may attempt the accomplishment of some inferior objects in the meantime. At present he appears extremely anxious to reduce Ghulam Qadir Khan, the son of Zabita Khan, and with this view he has ordered a considerable body of his troops to remain in the Doab although they have finished the task for which they were originally detached. He has been attempting to incite the Sikhs against him, but in this purpose it is said he has been anticipated by a previous confederacy into which he has entered with them. It is not unlikely that after his meeting with the King about the middle of next month between this place and Delhi, he may halt there a considerable time to wait the issue of measures against this Chief, and possibly in case of their failure he may himself be induced to cross over into the Doab. In my address of the twenty-eighth ultimo I informed you of the report which then prevailed which still exists of his intention to proceed from Agra to Aligarh; unlikely as this design it is now thought may have some reference to his view to facilitate Ghulam Qadir Khan.

In the fluctuating state of ^{light to com} his quarter, I am sensible how precarious and uncertain any ^{tates of prud} design must necessarily be, but on the present occasion I have thought ^{design of feel} to submit to you my opinion

of the probable course of events, as relating to circumstances of which it is material, we should have an early knowledge. The crossing over of Sindia into the Doab would be attended with much alarm in the Vizier's dominions and the object of it, though not immediately relating to us, is yet of such a nature as it might materially interest us to prevent. Ghulam Qadir is now the only independent Musalman Chief that remains in this quarter, and though his resources are small, his revenues being estimated only at about twenty lacs annually, yet the high family from which he is descended, and the reputation he has already acquired for courage and ability, are circumstances which may render him hereafter a very formidable opponent to the Hindoo Power in this quarter. In case of Sindia's attacking him in person, I am convinced that it would easily be in our power to save him without any direct interference in their quarrel. A simple movement of our troops to the most northern part of the Vizier's dominions would effectually stop Sindia in his pursuit, and this step, instead of endangering the peace would probably contribute to its security in the effect it would have upon Sindia's affairs. Our security in Sindia ought ever, I am convinced, to be placed more in the nature of his situation than in his disposition. However uneasy he might be from any movements of ours which might tend to thwart his progress, yet so long as these were confined within our own territories he could not in such a situation of affairs as the present, venture to commence hostilities against us, without a certain sacrifice of his late acquisitions. Sindia indeed is sensible of this, and as he has been under the most dreadful alarm ever since the flight of Himmatt Bahadur about our designs, he seems extremely anxious to advance his objects as far as possible before he may be involved with us.

In this situation of affairs it is evidently our interest to omit no means in our power consistent with honour and good faith to prevent the progress of Sindia. Happily there are many circumstances which render our success in this respect extremely probable. Sindia, from his restless ambition and other circumstances in his conduct, is now in such a dilemma as to preclude the possibility of peace with his neighbours. His power can never be considered as secure whilst the Rajputs retain their independancy or the Mogul Chiefs their jageers. The accomplishment of these must be attended with difficulty, which, in this case, would be greatly increased by the alarm he has conceived with regard to our intentions. This latter circumstance must be considered as extremely fortunate, for by aiding the effects we have it in our power at any time to check him in his career.

57. JAMES ANDERSON TO JOHN MACKINTOSH, G. G.

at Muzaffargarh, 11th September 1786.

I wrote yesterday to the Governor the present afternoon after I was attacked with a pretty smart fit of fever which yesterday acquainted me a good deal. I lose on

time however to communicate to you some intelligence of importance which I received last night in a letter from Asghar Aly Khan, my agent with the King. He acquaints me that the King, having found an opportunity of speaking to him privately in the absence of Shah Nizam-ud-din and Deshmookh Row, entered into a long conversation about the English. He understood he said that a new Governor [Lord Cornwallis] was now expected, but that he should have no hopes of any advantage to himself from it, that as all of the gentlemen who had formerly assisted him at Allahabad had gone home and never again returned, and as the succeeding Governors had all of them neglected him, he now considered the coming of a new Governor as a matter of perfect indifference, yet he had he said a sincere friendship for the English, and he was sorry to perceive that they were no less inattentive to their own interests than to his. He could assure them that the Peshwa was now meditating an attack upon them, that Tippoo (to use his own words) was whetting the teeth of desire, and that Timur Shah was determined to invade them this season. As to another person, he had come to the firm resolution of crossing over into the Doab, and that he himself in this respect was helpless and, though much against his inclination, would be obliged to accompany him. All he could do was to give us early intelligence to put us as soon as possible on our guard. Much of the above intelligence is so wild and extravagant and so flatly contradicted by the present face of affairs in Hindostan, that it is unnecessary for me to enter into any reasoning in support of my disbelief of it. Yet I will own to you that the last part of it has made some impression upon me. I have already mentioned to the Governor the report of Sindia's intention to proceed shortly to Aligarh, and I did also hear that it was probable he might desire the King to meet him there. Now, altho' the evident absurdity of the first part of the intelligence, and indeed the obvious motive of the King to set us at variance with Sindia, which runs through the whole, ought to destroy the credit of the rest, yet, as it receives a colour of probability from its concurrence with the report I have mentioned, it may not be altogether proper to neglect it, and I shall therefore freely state to you my sentiments upon the subject of it. As Sindia's affairs are in a very untoward state at present, and as there is nothing he seems to dread more than a rupture with us, I cannot think it likely that under such circumstances he would himself by appearing so near our frontiers with the King, and without leaving any natural barrier between us, hazard the ruinous consequences to himself which might ensue from it. At the same time, as he is extremely anxious to enforce some payments from Ghulam Qadir Khan, it is not unlikely that he may have himself given rise to the report, in order to facilitate these views. This is the most probable view in which we ought to consider the matter, but, as Sindia has not always followed the dictates of prudence, and as he has sometimes taken steps with the seeming design of feeling our pulse, or of impressing

a belief on the other Powers of our dread of his power, I think we ought to be prepared for the worst. If Sindia should carry the King into the Doab, although the primary object of such a measure would probably be the reduction of Ghulam Qadir Khan, yet as it must ultimately affect us, and as in the meantime it could not otherwise be considered than as a bravado towards us, I am clearly of opinion that some steps ought to be taken to counteract the effect of it. A simple movement of our troops within our own territories would in all probability completely answer the end, and although the event which may render this necessary is uncertain, yet it may be proper to put matters in such a train, that in case of its happening no time might be lost in applying the remedy. The power of moving the troops ought always to be lodged with the Resident at Lucknow, but he might be instructed by the Board to put them in motion in case I should represent to him the necessity of it, and the Board might empower me to make this representation in case Sindia should cross with his army.

I am sensible that a measure of this nature will require much deliberation, and though it may seem clearly expedient to me, in the limited view in which I am capable of beholding it, yet that it may appear otherwise to the Board who are obliged to take in a variety of other considerations before they can resolve on its expediency. It is not, however, the less incumbent upon me to state fully my reasons in favour of it and to obviate any objections which may occur to me as likely to be made against it. In addition to what I have already advanced, I am inclined to look upon the present conjuncture as extremely favourable and indeed such as ought not to be lost. As the Peshwa is at present engaged in a war with Tippoo, there is no probability of his deriving any assistance from that quarter, and although his operations in this quarter seem to have been viewed with so much jealousy at Poona, yet if the Peshwa were at liberty I know not how far we ought to trust to this. Although the Marathas are very much divided amongst themselves, yet we have had experience, that in any common danger they are all Marathas, and perhaps, however jealous they may be of Sindia they would not, if they had the power to prevent it, suffer him to be deprived of all his dominions. In such an emergency their jealousy would cease with the occasion, and they would then view the danger as a common one. There is another consideration which ought to have a good deal of weight. Sindia by the inordinate ambition he has manifested has alarmed his neighbours in such a degree and has, in other instances, so totally destroyed their faith in him, that it is not in his power, if he should choose it, to be at peace with them. Their existence in any shape seems incompatible with his safety, and there is nothing more evident than that the longer their fate may be protracted the more difficult will the task of reducing them become. Sindia has the show but not the reality of force, and all his success hitherto has been owing to a critical concurrence of fortunate events aided by his own

cunning and intrigue. In such a state the least serious opposition is usually fatal. It gives the opposite party time to recover from their panic, and teaches them that their danger was more imaginary than real. Sindia by abandoning his expedition last year against Jaypore, after he had fairly manifested his intention to reduce it, and even proclaimed a new Rajah, has hurt his cause essentially. He has given the Rajputs time to recover from their alarm and to enter into such confederacies as will probably secure them in future against any attempt he may make against them. Indeed, I am convinced that this year is likely to be the crisis of his fortune. If we can only contrive to prevent his making any further progress this season, his difficulties will become almost unsurmountable.

Before I conclude it may not be unnecessary to remark that the movement of the troops at Fathgarh will be perfectly sufficient. This measure is not likely to produce a battle, and if it should, I will venture to say, that one brigade will be more than a match for all the force that Sindia could muster against it. Sindia is but too sensible of this, and I fear that in case of a rupture he will never give us an opportunity of trying.

58. JAMES ANDERSON TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 6th Oct. 1786.

Mahajee Sindia made a short march from this place today on his return to Muttra; but as it is his intention to visit some religious temples on his way, his arrival will be protracted for some days. On this account it is my intention to remain a few days more at this place, unless, as I have some reason to expect, I should be honoured in the meantime with the receipt of your Lordship's letters to him and the King, in which case I shall proceed immediately to deliver them. His journey to this place, as far as a judgment can be formed from appearance, has had no other object than a particular inspection of the works of the fort.

59. JAMES ANDERSON TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

13th November 1786.

Having thus submitted to your Lordship the substance of my conversation this morning with Sindia, I will now beg leave to lay before you a summary and connected account of Sindia's late transactions and of the present state of affairs in this quarter.

Since the establishment of Sindia in his ministerial powers under the King, the inordinate ambition he has displayed in the pursuit of objects of an uncertain tendency has given rise to a very general alarm throughout Hindostan. Even the Vizier and his ministers have not been able to behold without jealousy and alarm the progress of a Power which, however strongly connected with their ally the English, had often before from the

mere impulse of ambition proved hostile to them, and which besides many obsolete claims of their own had obtained from the possession of the King's person the means of asserting in his name whatever demands they chose. Under this impression of fear and perhaps of indignation against Sindia for the virtual extinction of his authority in the Empire, the Vizier and indeed almost all of his principal subjects were inclined to view the progress of Sindia through a false medium. All his proceedings in this quarter, whether in the great power he had assumed or in the reduction of forts, were considered merely as subservient to more important measures he meditated against the dominions of the Vizier in the first instance, and afterwards against those of the Company.

These apprehensions, however natural they were to the Vizier in his relative situation towards Sindia's, were certainly without any just grounds. From a contemplation of all Sindia's past conduct, as well in the affair of Talegaon as in the settlement of the general peace, it appeared evident that he had early foreseen the necessity of conciliating the friendship of the English, as the basis of all his future schemes. It is probable that his views at first were merely to secure himself in the fluctuating state of his own Government ; but that very soon after his marching from Poona to the northward, he began to entertain those views of ambition, on which he has since so successfully entered. At least it is certain that he entertained these intentions before the general peace had been concluded, for, in consequence of his having virtually relinquished all the claims of his Government and himself upon the Vizier by including him in the treaty as our ally, he seemed to consider that for this sacrifice on his part we had tacitly agreed on our part never to interfere with him or his Government in the prosecution of their claims upon the King and other Powers.

In this situation of affairs, in which the continuance of our friendship was of such evident utility to Sindia and in which he himself had shewn so just a sense of it, there was little reason to apprehend that he would hastily forfeit it by any act of his own. It was natural to suppose that the same wisdom which had dictated to him the expediency of establishing a firm connection with us as a foundation for his future schemes, would equally after the accomplishment of them influence his conduct in the continuance of it as the surest means of securing them. We had besides many other chances in our favour. His situation, all powerful as he appeared to be, was yet pregnant with difficulties, and there was great reason to suppose that he might fail in the firm establishment of that overgrown power on which only our fears could be reasonably placed. At any rate, it was evident that a long period must have elapsed before that event could possibly have taken place, and the Company from the preservation of peace during that interval must have derived such solid advantages as would have more than counterbalanced any additional power he might in the meantime have acquired. All these considerations seemed fully to justify our observance of a neutrality in regard to Sindia's schemes in this quarter,

notwithstanding the alarm which they had everywhere occasioned and the dangerous consequences which they were supposed to portend to the Vizier and the Company. The event, so far as relates to the preservation of peace for the past and the upholding of a fair prospect of it for the future, has justified the system that has been pursued. I am sorry however to observe that the behaviour of Mahajee Sindia has been, in many respects, very unsuitable to the delicacy of our conduct towards him. In some instances he has presumed too much on the moderation of our conduct ; and in all his transactions with the other Powers he has laboured to interpret the delicacy of our behaviour towards him into a complete submission to his power. In short, it has become evident that whatever reliance we may have formerly placed on his dispositions must now be totally transferred to the circumstances of his situation. These I shall now endeavour to explain to your Lordship in as short a compass as possible.

It is not easy to convey an adequate idea of the ruinous state of the provinces of Agra and Delhy, the only part of Hindustan now even nominally subject to the King. A famine, which, a few years ago had raged for two successive seasons, completed the ruin of which the foundation had been before laid in the various struggles among the Musalman Chiefs for power and in the loose system of Government which had for a long time prevailed. The excessive indolence of the King's minister Najaf Khan had induced him to parcel out the whole country in jageers to the different Mogul Chiefs for the maintenance of troops and for almost every other purpose of Government. In this situation Sindia found the country, when by the use of cunning and intrigue and by a fortunate concurrence of circumstances rather than by any extraordinary exertions of his own, he acquired under the title of *Vakeel-ul-Mutlak*, or absolute minister, the dominion of these provinces. To enable him to derive the full advantage of his acquisition, it was necessary he should resume the whole of the Mogul jageerdars and take the management of them into his own hands. Sindia felt this necessity in its full force and he gave early symptoms of his intention to resume them, but from the various difficulties of his situation he has never been able fully to execute this design ; some of them he found means to confiscate on pretence of treason, but it is supposed that those who still remain are in possession of revenue of about seventy lakhs of Rupees annually. Of these, some are of considerable note in the possession of forts, and all of them from a sense of the precariousness of their situation are confederated together and ready to avail themselves of any opportunity that may offer of shaking off their dependence on Sindia. He is himself perfectly aware of this disposition, and sensible that in case of his being involved in any serious difficulties hereafter he must expect the opposition instead of the assistance of this part of his army ; yet he is afraid in the present crisis of his affairs to attempt their dismissal, lest he should thereby increase the strength of his foreign enemies, or lest, in case of their resistance, the secret sparks of

discontent which are now every where lurking against him should be blown into a flame.

In regard to his general management and conduct since the acquisition of his Mogul powers, it has been in every respect short-sighted and impolitic. In all his measures he seems to have been actuated by the mere prospect of present advantage without the smallest regard to distant consequences. Instead of attempting to conciliate the minds of his new subjects he has excited very general dissatisfaction amongst them by various acts of treachery, cruelty and rapacity. He has besides contrived to disgust most of his own immediate officers; such of them as have been entrusted with the management of any particular town or district have always in the end, on pretence of their injustice or extortions, fallen victims to his avarice. This system has even been extended to his more domestic concerns. His Dewan, his Baxi and all the other officers of his Government are regularly squeezed; and none of them, whatever credit or confidence they may have formerly possessed with him, dare make the smallest resistance without being exposed to certain ruin and disgrace. This conduct has greatly contributed to affect Sindia's internal situation, and his foreign difficulties are such as may long render his power precarious and uncertain. After possessing himself of the person of the King, the acquisition of the principal forts followed almost immediately as a natural consequence. But as these possessions from the causes I have already recited, were inadequate to his expectations of profit, he determined to extend his conquests to other quarters. A considerable expedition under the command of Appa Candy Row was set on foot against Bundelcand; and he himself along with the King marched against Jaypore. The former expedition from the distractive state of the Bundelcand country promised to have been attended with complete success and suggested considerable alarm, lest by the total conquest of that State the barrier should be destroyed which subsisted betwixt us and the Marathas on that quarter. Matters however have since taken a different turn, and that expedition, tho' not unattended with pecuniary advantages, is now likely to terminate without any acquisition of territory. Sindia's own expedition was not on the whole successful. His first intention was evidently to have possessed himself completely of the country, but afterwards partly from some jealousy of his own allies and partly from some apprehensions he entertained of our designs in consequence of a recent disagreement which had happened betwixt him and me, he was compelled to abandon his original views and to come to an accommodation with the Rajah. A kind of agreement was settled between them, of which however the terms were in a great measure nugatory; for altho' some immediate payments of money were stipulated yet the principal sums were referred to a future period; and it was foreseen, as has since happened, that the Rajah had no serious intentions of fulfilling them. Sindia has expressed great indignation on

this score and has declared his instruction of proceeding against him in person immediately after his junction with the King. He has had indeed certain experience that nothing decisive is to be expected from any number of troops he may detach unless headed by himself. There is nevertheless great reason to suspect his sincerity in this declaration, for besides being apprehensive of giving strength to his embarrassments from other quarters by a distant movement in person, he has great cause to be diffident of the event of the measure. To the confidence which the Rajah of Jaypore has acquired from the resistance of his attack last year, he has added a real accession of strength, the Rajah of Jodhpore, a powerful Rajput Chief to the westward, who has already sent him a considerable reinforcement of cavalry. From these circumstances it seems probable that Sindia will be inclined rather to protract matters than attempt any decisive measures this season, in the expectation of removing in the meantime many inferior obstacles which may enable him to make his attack with greater probability of success. It is impossible however that he can ever establish a cordial friendship with these Rajahs, as they are in every respect his natural enemies, whether we consider him as a subject of the Maratha Empire commissioned to extend their conquests, or as an ambitious chieftain separately struggling for the establishment of his own power. Their independent existence must ever be incompatible with his safety, and his designs against them, tho' they may be suspended, can never be entirely relinquished. To the northward Sindia's difficulties arise chiefly from the Sikhs whom he has in vain attempted to attach to his interest. This body of plunderers obstruct the collection of his revenues to the northward of Dehly, but further than this he seems to have nothing serious to apprehend from them. The Sikhs in Lahore and Multan form altogether a very respectable Power ; but as they consist of a variety of independent chiefs unconnected together by any confederacy or other principle of union, they are prevented by a necessity of watching the motives of each other from attempting to extend their conquests. The Sikh Chiefs immediately to the northward of Dehly, are totally unconnected with these, and are in fact nothing more than a number of petty plunderers. Their sole object is to lay waste and destroy, and they possess no means or resources by which they might attempt any permanent conquest.

But besides the Sikhs, Sindia has of late been much alarmed in that quarter from the progress of Ghulam Qadir Khan, who has adopted several rigorous measures for the defence of his country. He is the son of Zabita Khan, a Mogul Chief of considerable note and of a high family, and he possesses a considerable tract of country, to the N. E. of Dehly. On the death of the father near two years ago it was generally expected that this country would have fallen into the hands of Sindia. The various other objects however which at that time engrossed his attention prevented him from immediately prosecuting that pursuit, and he contented himself

with taking some steps to secure the interest of the brothers of the deceased Nabob, which as they had the management of the country in their hands he expected would enable him to secure this acquisition at any time hereafter. In this however he has been disappointed. Ghulam Qadir Khan, by the imprisonment of these men and by some other vigorous measures which he has lately taken, has occasioned him much alarm and uneasiness. At first he seemed inclined to have sent immediately a detachment against him and to have prepared to have followed it in person, but he seems to have been deterred from it by the advice of some of his counsellors, who explained to him the imprudence of increasing his difficulties at this crisis and that it were better to wait quietly the occurrence of favorable circumstances.

From this detail your Lordship will perceive that Sindia's situation is yet in some degree precarious ; and that at all events much time must necessarily elapse before he can realize his prospects. He has undoubtedly many advantages in his cunning and intrigue and in his persevering management which he often uses successfully to supply the want of real power and other defects in his situation ; but on the other hand, he is frequently prompted by his avarice to act with little policy or foresight. From this latter circumstance I was for some time inclined to think that his views in this quarter were rather of a temporary than permanent nature. It is indeed most likely that the expectation of treasure was at first his principal object in this undertaking, but that his views opened and enlarged themselves with the favorable events which afterwards fell out. It seems now almost as certain as any political point can be, that his object is by connecting his own provinces of Malwa and Ajmer with those of Agra and Dehly to erect an independent Empire of his own and to shake off all subjection to the Peshwa. The steps he is now gradually taking of extirpating all the hereditary zamindars and, agreeably to the system pursued in his own country, substituting amils in their room, is a clear proof of this intention ; and if he should afterwards be successful in his attempts against the neighbouring Rajahs it is not likely that in such case he would be restrained by any scruples from violently extinguishing the power of the King.

These views of Sindia will possibly be considered as eventually alarming to the interests of the Company ; but I must own that in the present aspect of affairs I cannot see any very serious grounds of apprehension ; and none such as with a view to guard against them could warrant a departure from our present system of peace and neutrality. An attention to the balance of power, however necessary and salutary it may be in Europe, is infinitely less so in this country from the extreme difference in the political system. Few or none of the States in this country have any fixed constitution in themselves and depend entirely for their support and management on the personal abilities of the Chief, who is exposed during his lifetime to perpetual hazard and risk and whose death seldom

fails to bring destruction on the fabric of power he may have before reared. Sindia may possibly fail in the execution of his schemes, and if at any rate they should succeed, they must be rendered infinitely less dangerous to us from that ambition with which he is actuated in throwing off his dependence upon the Poona Government. Considering the jealousy which he must excite in his own State and in the minds of other Powers, it would still be his interest perhaps as much as ever to maintain his friendship with us. As to any obligations it may be imagined we may be under of supporting the King against the encroachments of the Marathas or other Powers, there can be none but what arise from generosity and a sense of gratitude for the favours which we are supposed to owe him, and and these sentiments, however noble they may appear, are yet in the present case wild and romantic. The power of the House of Timur for near a century past has been falling rapidly to decay and is now advanced so far as to be irretrievable. Its fate like that of all other great monarchies seems to be determined, and no exertions whatever could now restore it to any degree of vigour. The present King from the weakness of his mind is incapable of relief, and if ever we should interfere in his cause, we should afterwards in all probability with a sacrifice of our credit be obliged to abandon him to others or to continue his support at a hazard and expense which could not fail to involve us in a scene of indefinite trouble and difficulty.

After all, however, the dangerous ambition which Sindia has displayed and the abuse of which in several instances he has been guilty of, the delicacy of our behaviour towards him renders it extremely necessary that we should watch him narrowly, and that we should endeavour as far as possible to prevent his deriving any aid either directly or indirectly in his pursuits from his connection with us. On some occasions perhaps it may be necessary for us to check him in his progress, where we may have favourable opportunity of doing it without the actual commission of hostilities against him. These however must depend so much on future contingencies that it is impossible beforehand to lay down any certain plan with regard to these. The measures of Sindia and other circumstances in the situation of affairs must suggest the propriety of them; and of these I shall always endeavour to convey to your Lordship the earliest possible information. At present I will only observe that I think it probable that Sindia will suffer this season to pass away without undertaking any expedition in person. In a few days he means to march to Shergarh, a place about three cos to the northward of this, and there wait the arrival of his Majesty. He will then probably proceed to Dig, the most central place in his dominions, from whence he may most easily superintend and direct his various pursuits. It is also near the strong fort of Bharatpur, now the only place belonging to the Jats, which he is extremely anxious of getting into his possession. There was lately some reason to believe that he might perhaps cross over with his army

into the Doab, but it seems now less probable than ever. He is preparing however to send a considerable detachment across under the command of Ambajee to watch the motions of the Sikhs and to overawe Ghulam Qadir Khan. Ambajee, from the ill-treatment he had already received, has for some time past resisted the earnest entreaties of Sindia to undertake this command, but as he can have no other resource than in Sindia's service he will in the end, I suppose, be brought to a compliance.

Report will probably have conveyed to your Lordship the intention which Timur Shah the King of Qandahar is said to have meditated for some time past of an invasion of Hindostan. A report of this kind was very prevalent last season and has been lately revived though with less force than before. There is, however, every reason to doubt the probability of this event. Timur Shah, whose character, I understand, in point of abilities scarcely rises to mediocrity, has been involved almost ever since the death of his father in intestine commotions. And by all accounts his country is yet far from being restored to order. The plunder of Dehly is no longer an object, and any permanent possession of the country is out of the question, as he knows from the experience of his father's former invasion that it is impossible to prevail on his northern troops to remain more than one season in Hindostan. Admitting however that these or other motives should induce him to undertake such an expedition, the difficulties he would have to encounter on the way are such as he might never be able to surmount. The Sikhs, who dispossessed his father of the province of Lahore which had been formally ceded to him by the King of Hindostan and where he had for some time fixed his residence, are his natural enemies, and it is scarcely possible to suppose that they would ever peaceably consent to his passing through their dominions. It would become necessary first to reduce them, and this would be no easy task, altho' if his affairs should ever admit of his engaging in distant pursuits it is much more likely to become his object than an invasion of Hindostan.

Before I conclude this address, it may not be improper to say something of Chait Sing and the nature of his connection with Sindia. All the promises which Sindia made of never suffering him to appear at his Durbar either on public or private occasions during the presence of the English Resident and of his never being presented to the King, have been faithfully adhered to. In other respects he has affected to pay him considerable attention; but there is every reason to believe that in this, so far as relates to us he has been actuated by no improper motive. The truth is, Chait Sing ever since his arrival in Camp has been merely a subject of prey to Sindia and his greedy dependants, and now that little or nothing is left to him, he finds that all their promises and professions have been vain and delusive. On this account he has of late expressed much dissatisfaction and has some times talked of quitting the Camp. On these occasions, Sindia has always taken means to soothe him with a number

of hopes and assurances; and on these grounds reports have been constantly propagated and believed in our provinces, of its being his intention to aid Chait Sing in his reestablishment at Benares. Intelligence of this kind has been at times conveyed to me from various channels, but I have thought it prudent not only to avoid any mention of the subject to Sindia, but even to slight and disregard it entirely. I am willing to believe that by this means a difficulty has been avoided which by a different line of conduct might have been unnecessarily created. Chait Sing is now completely fallen, and none has a more contemptible opinion of him than Sindia. He knows that he is incapable even of being used as an instrument, and if ever he should dare to make an attempt on the province of Benares, it would be for himself and not for Chait Sing.

60. JAMES ANDERSON TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindhia's camp, 18th November 1786.

In my address of the 13th instant, I did myself the honor of informing you of Sindia's intention to march the next day. From some superstitious cause, however, he did not move till yesterday, and to-day he has made another march to Sheigarh, where he will probably remain for some time. I have been prevented from accompanying him from the extreme illness of Lieutenant Kinloch, which renders him incapable of being moved.

Bhow Baksy came to me this morning, with a message from Mahajee Sindia, for a knowledge of which, and my answer, I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the accompanying copy of my letter on the subject to Lieutenant-Colonel Harper. I have thought it necessary to give some encouragement to Sindia on the occasion, because his request not being for any positive assistance, but merely for protection in distress, a compliance with it could not justly give offence to others, whilst a refusal under such circumstances might appear incompatible with the strict rules of friendship. Bhow Baksy himself expatiated very fully on this subject and urged many reasons in favour of a compliance. He observed that a refusal to a request of this nature could proceed from no other motive than jealousy and suspicion, the manifestation of which on any occasion was unworthy amongst friends, and in a particular manner with respect to Sindia, who had suffered our troops, with the utmost readiness, to march through the whole of his dominions, and at any rate he thought that, where so strong a friendship existed, every opportunity of conferring an obligation ought to be greedily embraced.

These observations of Bhow Baksy are undoubtedly just in themselves, but as the distress of Sindia's troops is the effect of offensive, and not defensive operations, they cannot altogether be considered as applicable to the present case. Still however, they appear entitled to some weight.

I shall be happy to find, that His Excellency may comply with the request.

Bhow Baksy informed me that he had given a particular explanation to Sindia, of my answer to his letter, in regard to Himmat Bahadur, [and] that he had expressed himself perfectly satisfied with it.

61. JAMES ANDERSON TO GABRIEL HARPER.

18th November 1786.

This morning Bhow Baxy paid me a visit and delivered me a message from Madajee Sindia to the following effect. That Appa Khandy Row, the Chief whom he had deputed against Bundelcand, having settled matters with the Rajahs of that country, had in consequence received from them several hostages as a security for the fulfilment of their agreements, that in confidence of this accommodation he had dispatched the greatest part of his troops towards Jhansi, whilst he himself remained near Parna* with a small body of horse not exceeding two thousand to wait the final execution of the treaty, that the Rajahs had taken advantage of this circumstance by suddenly assembling all their forces to the amount of twenty thousand and demanding from him a restitution of the hostages, notwithstanding the terms of their agreement were yet unfulfilled; that in this situation there was great reason to apprehend that Appa would be necessitated to comply; and that as the most likely mode of avoiding this evil was by Appa's crossing the Jamna with his party somewhere in the province of Kora, and marching a few days by the banks of the river till he might recross with safety into Sindia's dominions, he begged of me to give him permission to this effect, and he assured me that in such case he would be answerable for the orderly behaviour of the troops during the few days they might remain in the Vizier's country; and that if I would depute any of my Moonshis he would give orders to Appa to put himself under his guidance.

I observed in reply that it was not in my power to give the permission he required, but I promised to write to you on the subject that you might represent it to the Vizier; and I must request that in case he should acquiesce orders may be immediately sent to the amil of that district to suffer Appa to cross in case he should apply for leave to do so. There may perhaps be particular reasons unknown to me which may operate with the Vizier to prevent his compliance, but I must own that considering the matter in a general view I can see no objections against it, or rather indeed I am inclined to think that it may be expedient to comply with it. It will be conferring an obligation on Sindia by the Vizier, and I own I am anxious on all occasions to promote a conciliating and accommodating spirit between two chiefs whose mutual interests so much require it. The only

/ * Parna, chief town of a petty State in Bundelkhand, spelt as Parna in some Marathi records.

reason which occurs to me as likely to be started against it is the circumstance of the hostages, and though I do not think it entitled to much weight yet, if it should form an insuperable objection with the Vizier, I hope that in such case you will agree with me in the expediency of prevailing on the Vizier to suffer Appa to cross provided he comes unaccompanied with the hostages.

62. JAMES ANDERSON TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindhia's Camp Shergarh, 27th November 1786.

I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter of the 15th instant, and from the intelligence which you have been pleased to give me of the probable period of Captain Kirkpatrick's departure, I am not without hopes that I may yet be enabled to wait his arrival in Camp. I am extremely desirous of introducing him in person to Mahajee Sindia, but should I be unavoidably disappointed in this wish, I shall not quit the Camp, till I have settled with Sindia the ceremonial of his reception in a proper and suitable manner, and I shall certainly take my measures so as to have a meeting with him on the road, that I may converse with him in a free, and unreserved manner upon every point in regard to the business of this station, which it may be useful for him to know. At the same time, I shall not neglect to commit to writing such memorandums of intelligence, and observations of my own, as may appear to me any way calculated to give him an insight into the nature of the business. I have written to Captain Kirkpatrick, to acquaint him of my intention to protract my departure from Camp till the middle of next month, in the expectation of his arrival before that period, and to express my hope, that in case of a disappointment in this respect we may contrive to have a meeting on the road.

Since I had last the honor to address your Lordship, intelligence has been received of Appa Khandy having effected his escape with the Bundelcand hostages to Gwalior; Sindia I am informed has expressed some displeasure on this account, as he had been taking means by an assemblage of all the forces under the several Rajahs and zamindars of that neighbourhood, not only to have extricated his general, but to have endeavoured to have maintained his footing in that country. In this latter expectation he has been completely disappointed, nor can he have any reasonable hopes of realizing it hereafter, as the circumstances which favoured his first impression on that quarter, in the distracted state of this country and in the excessive dread of his power, are now materially changed. The advantage he has gained by the hostages, seems nearly counterbalanced by the capture on the part of the enemy of several of his Chiefs and in particular of a brother of Appa Khandy Row. In other respects, his affairs wear a very unpromising aspect. One of his battalions has received a defeat, near Rantambhor in the Jaypore country,

and its guns taken by the enemy. This matter however has occasioned him much less uneasiness, than the daily intelligence he receives from that quarter, of dangerous intrigues and confederacies that are carried on between some of the Mogul jageerdars and the Macheri Rajah his principal auxiliary. These circumstances have made him extremely desirous of again securing the person of His Majesty in Camp, and he is now seriously taking measures to effect it. The King however is prepared to interpose such delays from his domestic concerns and some religious pleas as will yet probably protract his departure near a month.

63. JAMES ANDERSON TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, Shergarh, 30th November, 1786.

I have herewith the honor to lay before you an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Harper, together with a copy of my answer, in which I have been so full, and particular that I shall not intrude upon your Lordship's time with any further observations upon the affair to which it relates. I had afterwards some conversation with Sindia regarding my own motions. He was polite enough to express great regret at my intended departure, and lamented that it should take place after having established a friendship with him, which had been of such service in facilitating the business between us. I replied that it had undoubtedly been my endeavour, in which I flattered myself I had succeeded, to establish a perpetual friendship with him, but that in regard to the business nothing whatever was to be imputed to this source, as I was not at liberty to act, or think for myself in anything, but was obliged on all occasions to conform my conduct to the wishes and instructions of Government. How then, said he, did you obtain for me this letter from the Vizier, in regard to Appa Candy Row. Adhering to the principle you mentioned, you ought not, of yourself, to have taken any steps in the matter, until you had first represented the affair to Government, and received their instructions upon it. I assured him, that in this, I had only acted in conformity to a general point of my instructions, which the friendship of the English Government had induced them to give me of acting and promoting his wishes in every point that consisted with reason and propriety. We had some further conversation on this subject, during which, Sindia betrayed many signs of a very anxious desire for the preservation of our friendship, and he appeared perfectly satisfied on my assuring him, that this was equally the desire of your Lordship, and that I would answer for the same system being in every respect followed by Captain Kirkpatrick.

I thought it necessary to propose to Sindia the difficulty I was under with respect to taking leave of His Majesty. The time I had allotted for my stay, would scarcely admit of it, and as I was under some

apprehensions, lest I should give offence to His Majesty, by going away without previously waiting upon him, I wished entirely to be guided by his advice. He said that it was certainly proper if possible, to take leave of His Majesty, but that he could not determine upon this point, as he was as yet uncertain, with regard to his own motions. He was not sure, he said, whether from the necessity of his affairs, he should not find it necessary, to march immediately to Ballaharry, without waiting for His Majesty, and that in this event it would be difficult for me to take leave of His Majesty. He promised to let me know thro' Bhow Baksy, as soon as this matter was determined, and he assured me, that whatever might be the event, he would take care to reconcile it to His Majesty.

Balla-harry is about fifty cos to the westward of this, and about thirty cos from Jaypore. As the difficulty of his Majesty's junction would be greatly increased in case of Sindia's proceeding thither alone, not less by the distance than the wild state of the country which intervenes, I am inclined to think that he will rather wait his Majesty's arrival; but his resolutions are so undetermined that it is impossible to speak with certainty on this point.

64. GABRIEL HARPER TO JAMES ANDERSON.

Lucknow, 25th November, 1786.

I have been honored by your letter of the 18th instant, and it is with much satisfaction I enclose on you an order from the Vizier to admit Appa Canda Row across the Jamna without any restriction regarding the hostages; but to prevent any improper conduct in the Maratha Chief, it has been thought expedient by the Vizier as well as myself, that an English battalion of sepoys should attend the motions of the Maratha, for which purpose I enclose a letter from the Vizier to Colonel Blair, Commanding at Cawnpore, with an address from myself covering it. They are both open for your perusal and you will be pleased to make use of them as you see expedient and will in the event of Appa Khanda Row's actually approaching the Jamna, acquaint Colonel Blair at what period and *ghat* he will probably cross.

I have no doubt but you will for the reasons you have mentioned paint in strong colours to Sindia this instance of friendship in the Vizier, and the circumstance of the English troops being ordered to attend Appa Canda Row can be, by the turn you will be able to give it, multiplied to an increase of the obligation.

SECTION 2

*The Residency of William Kirkpatrick
(20th December, 1786—15th October, 1787).*

65. JAMES ANDERSON TO CAP. W. KIRKPATRICK.

Sindhia's Camp, Shergarh, December 5th, 1786.

Dear Sir,

The Right Honourable the Governor-General having acquainted me of his having appointed you to succeed me in this station, I beg leave to offer you my congratulations upon it and to express to you the entire satisfaction which I have received upon this occasion. Altho' I have great reason to apprehend that it may not be in my power to wait your arrival in this Camp, yet I am in hopes that we may meet on the road in order that we may have an opportunity of conversing in a free and unreserved manner, and you may rest assured that I shall be happy to convey to you every information. In the meantime, to guard against accident as much as possible, I shall endeavour in this letter to communicate to you in an unconnected manner various details with my own opinions upon them, in the hope that a knowledge of them may prove of service to you hereafter.

I will not trouble you with any particular detail of the present political situation of affairs in this quarter. On that head I beg to refer you generally to my letter to Lord Cornwallis under date the nineteenth October, which contains not only a general statement of affairs but my own private opinions upon them. I shall only observe that I am more and more convinced of the wisdom of our present neutral system in this quarter, as the experience of every day serves but to confirm me in the opinion of the impossibility of Sindia's ever disentangling himself from his present embarrassment so as to render him in any degree dangerous to us ; at any

rate it ought to be considered that our progress in the acquisition of strength and power from the opportunities which the peace affords of liquidating our debts, tho' less ostensible than that of Sindia, is perhaps in every prospect more solid and substantial. The least attention will shew that our alliance and connection is founded on mutual interest and expectancy, and as there is every reason to believe that from the present aspect of affairs the general causes which render it so will long continue to operate, it may justly be expected that it will permanently subsist. I am aware nevertheless that our present connection is liable to interruption from various causes, and from none more particularly than the general odium which attends it in the minds of the Vizier and all his subjects and even of many of our own nation. Much will be communicated to you of the cruelty and perfidy of Sindia, and every new accession of power, however unimportant when considered in the general scale, will yet be eagerly caught at and adduced as a proof of the necessity of putting a timely and seasonable stop to his progress. It cannot be denied that he has been in a variety of instances cruel and perfidious. On many of these occasions he may perhaps appear to have benefited himself, and of course to have acted with policy, but I believe it will be found that their general effect has been highly prejudicial to his affairs. In a political view, we have of consequence (*sic*) no reason to be uneasy at them, and still less have we any positive right to complain of them as they do not in any shape relate to us. Sindia, altho' in the eagerness of ambition he may have committed many imprudences with respect to us, has never actually been guilty of a breach of faith, but has on the contrary in the course of our connection given several instances of uncommon liberality.

In regard to the second point, I mean the earnest desire of checking Sindia, which is betrayed on every little success he may obtain, I need say but little. When a general system is deliberately adopted after a mature consideration of circumstances, we ought to persevere and not weakly suffer ourselves to be diverted from it by every new event that may occur. The most dangerous consequences were predicted from Sindia's conquest of Aligarh, yet a complete year has now elapsed since that event took place, and as far as a judgment can be formed from the experience of that period there is no likelihood of any of them being fulfilled. I cannot indeed see any good reason why Sindia should not be on one side a neighbour to the Vizier as well as any other Chief. If his formidable power should be started as an objection, although from my own opinion of the situation I do not consider it as a valid one, yet admitting it to be so, I do not know whether it may not be counterbalanced by some advantages with which it is attended. The petty Chiefs who were before his neighbours, having comparatively nothing at stake, were certainly less scrupulous in their

conduct, their insignificance screened them from any serious attack from the Vizier, and they were more readily led to promote sedition on his borders, and to commit various other predatory acts to which they were tempted by their situation of neighbourhood. Sindia however being in a different situation has shewn an uncommon degree of caution, and as the motives which dictated to him the propriety of his conduct will in all probability continue to subsist, it is not likely that he will ever deviate from so salutary a system.

I have been inadvertently led into a much longer discussion than I intended and much longer than I ought to have made it, since the question being in some degree of a speculative nature my opinion cannot be entitled to more weight than that of any other individual, and your own judgment must determine your opinion; but as I have often had occasion to revolve this subject in my mind, I have thought a particular exposition of my sentiments might not be disagreeable to you.

One of the principal difficulties I have uniformly had to encounter in the management of this business is that of guarding against false reports and misrepresentations which are but too apt to influence the politics of India. I have been so often staggered with reports propagated in regard to Sindia that I do not wonder at the effect which counter ones have had upon him, and indeed I must do him the justice to say that on the whole his conduct has been sufficiently firm. From the frequency of them at one time Sindia and I found it necessary to come to an agreement to communicate to each other all such reports as might have a tendency to affect our friendship, that by an early explanation we might otherwise have made (*sic in orig.*). On this head I have found him sufficiently [sensible], but still I thought it prudent to trouble him very seldom with representations of this kind, which however well received they might be, have yet an insensible effect in creating jealousy and mistrust. In a situation like this where something new almost every day occurs, I have found no principle so absolutely necessary for the guidance of my conduct as that of never yielding to first impressions. It has been my endeavour invariably to adhere to this rule, and I believe I may safely say I have never deviated from it without having had afterwards occasion to repent of it.

You will have frequent applications to you from Sindia and Bhow Baxy for passports to pilgrims and for various recommendations of particular persons to the Residents at Lucknow and Benares and to the English Chiefs at different stations. It was thought necessary, during the infancy of our connection with Sindia, both by my brother and myself to indulge him in this respect to an extent subsequent experience has convinced me to have been imprudent. Exemptions to pilgrims in particular were so liberally granted that the Marathas began to look upon

them rather as a fixed right than as an indulgence. As soon as I perceived this effect, I did not fail to make a representation of it to the Governor-General, accompanied with my own opinion of the propriety of withholding them indiscriminately in future. A resolution to this effect was accordingly adopted by Government and it has had the most salutary consequences. At first it occasioned much murmur and discontent amongst many of the Maratha Chiefs, but I really believe that Sindia himself is well pleased with it, as he was before subject to a great deal of vexation and trouble from the complaints of many of the Chiefs, and in particular those from Poona, that they had not been indulged according to their claims and expectations. And as every one is now on a footing [of equality], he is exempted both from the solicitation and complaints. All that is now required for the pilgrims is a passport according to the form of which I have left you a copy, and on some occasions such as when the Chiefs are of note I have thought it prudent to yield to their solicitations of granting them besides passports, particular letters of recommendation to the Residents at Lucknow and Benares and the Collector at Gaya and also a *harkara* [courier] to accompany them.

In regard to requests for letters of recommendation on other matters, the solicitations on this head have been so frequent that I have been obliged to use my own judgment and discretion in the compliance. Whenever Sindia or Bhow Baxy in his name have requested me to solicit an exemption of duties from the Vizier for elephants, horses or cloths which he declared to have been commissioned for his own use, I have never refused to comply. In regard to requests for my recommendation of particular claims I have been always guided by the nature of them. If they related either to a Maratha or to some immediate servant of Sindia and appeared from the statement of them which was given to me to be in themselves reasonable, I had no scruple of recommending them. But if they related to any subject of the Vizier or of the Company with regard to whose concerns Sindia could have no motives for interference, or if the claims themselves were obsolete or ill founded, I thought it better to refuse them plainly on these grounds than to afford them so much countenance as that of a bare recommendation of them. It is probable that requests of this latter kind seldom came from Sindia, but were merely taken up by Bhow Baxy as a job. The officers in a Maratha Government are so stinted in their allowance from their Chiefs that they are in a manner compelled to seek for every source of emolument for themselves. From a sense of this necessity on the part of Bhow Baxy, I have ever been desirous of accommodating him, provided I could in any degree reconcile this principle with reason and propriety.

There is one point which both from its importance and its frequent occurrence I must beg leave to recommend in particular to your attention. I allude to the case of fugitives from the territories of each other, on which

subject, before I communicate to you my own sentiments, it is necessary I should inform you of some particular circumstances.

After the ratification of the general peace Nana Farnavees expressed a wish to Sindia to procure an explanation of the 11th Article of the Treaty, as also to settle an agreement relative to the mutual restitution of fugitives from the territories of each other. My brother, in consequence of instructions to this effect from the Board, settled these points with Mahajee Sindia in the form of two additional articles to the treaty, of which he soon after received a ratification from the Governor-General and Council. By some means or other a ratification was never received from Poona, and of consequence no exchange has ever been made. The ratified copy by the Honourable Board having been delivered to me by my brother on his departure, has ever since remained in my possession and I now beg leave to deliver it to your charge.

From this explanation you will perceive that in strict propriety the supplementary treaty cannot be said to be binding upon us, but as one article contains only an explanation of what was before the real meaning and intention of Government, and as the other seems to be founded on mutual expediency, I have never been willing to admit of its resistance* both with respect to us and the Vizier. The latter, it is true, is not specifically mentioned in the Treaty, but he may be considered as virtually included in it, since both Sindia and the Vizier through my brother and Mr. Bristow did express their acquiescence in it. The situation of Sindia's affairs is however so materially changed since the settlement of this business that it is no easy matter to fix the precise line of its operation. In point of strictness it ought to operate only with respect to fugitives from Sindia's ancient dominions or in regard to such of his servants in this country as are Marathas. Were this interpretation however to be rigidly adopted it would certainly bear hard upon Sindia, and he is entitled to some consideration beyond the strict letter of the obligation from his merits on similar occasions. His behaviour in the case of Isaacs and Lyon is not I suppose unknown to you, and he has never refused to deliver up to me European deserters. On one occasion some were suffered to escape by the artifice of a French officer, but, as I have since been certainly informed, without any authority from or connivance on the part of Sindia. My own general sentiments on this point are that when any Musalman Chief Rajah or zamindar out of the dominions of Sindia and who has never regularly taken service with him, or entered into any formal contract or engagement with him in regard to his possessions, may be forced to seek protection with us, it ought to be granted to him, and no regard whatever paid to any claims of Sindia either on the grounds of the fugitive's being a tributary of the Maratha Empire or of his being a servant of the King, which are vague and general pleas that may be used on every

* *Sic in orig.* Probably *resolution*, which means, in Law, abrogation.

possible occasion. But whenever any person who may have agreed to receive pay from him, whether in his capacity of minister to the King or of a Maratha Chief, or any *amil* that may have entered into an engagement with him for some particular district, whether in his ancient dominions or those of the King of which he has assumed the management, shall elope and seek protection from us, I think that in such case it ought not to be granted. It is impossible however in a point of this kind to lay down any general rule for the comprehension of every possible case. Reason and propriety with regard to the common customs of nations on similar occasions, and sometimes perhaps a consideration of the particular state of affairs, will be your best guides. After all, however, the determination of the point must ultimately rest with the Vizier, and my object in this particular explanation of my sentiments has been merely to shew you in what instances I have chose to support Sindia's claims by a recommendation of my own and in what instances I thought it proper totally to reject them.

From this detail you will perceive that our present system in this respect is somewhat loose and irregular; and from this conviction I was induced some time ago at the request of Sindia to suggest to Colonel Harper the idea of a treaty between Sindia and His Excellency relative to the mutual restitution of fugitives from the territories of each other, but I was convinced from his answer of what I did before suspect that insurmountable difficulties would oppose the completion of this scheme, in the necessity which it would induce of a direct acknowledgment on the part of the Vizier of Sindia's title of *Vukeel-ul-Mutlak*. There is reason to believe that he would never consent to this, and it is perhaps better to avoid bringing the subject into discussion. Indeed, I know not whether in other respects it is not better that the present system should be suffered to remain as it is. Were a formal treaty to be settled, we should be under the necessity of adhering to it literally, and we could not then without a more imminent hazard of affecting the peace make use of the same latitude we sometimes find it expedient to do at present. Our present system tho' loose is an accommodating one, and whilst an English Resident continues with Sindia the want of a formal treaty in regard to matters of this kind will never be felt.

There is one claim of the Vizier upon Sindia apparently of some importance which remains as yet unadjusted, and as I have every reason to believe that it will be early pressed upon you from the Court of Lucknow, I think it necessary not only to give an explanation of the circumstances but also my own particular sentiments upon it.

In the month of February or March one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five, an account appeared in the Persian newspapers that Ambajee had plundered the house of Meer Jaffar, the superintendent of the houses and lands of Shujah-ud-Dowlah's mother at Delhy of considerable sums

said to have belonged to her, and also that he had thrown him and his family into confinement. I did imagine that in consequence of this intelligence some instructions would have been immediately sent from Lucknow either to Major Browne or myself to remonstrate on this occasion and to insist on the most ample satisfactions being given. In this expectation I thought it prudent to avoid taking any steps on the newspaper intelligence, but it was not until upwards of a month afterwards that I heard from Major Palmer on the subject, and his letter instead of being written by desire of the Vizier was at the request of Husain Raza Khan, who also wrote me a letter upon the subject. I lost no time however in applying to Sindia in consequence, but he denied in the most strenuous manner that the money belonged to the Vizier and gave a full explanation of the particulars. Ambajee, it seems, having procured information from one of the servants of Meer Jafar that his master had received a very considerable sum in deposit from Majd-ud-daulah which he had buried in pots under ground, transmitted this intelligence to Sindhia who represented it to His Majesty. The King immediately gave orders that it should be seized and appropriated to his use, which [Sindia] had no scruple in enforcing, for whatever doubt might be entertained with respect to the veracity of the servant, the concealed mode in which the money was kept was to him a convincing proof that it would not be the property of the Vizier. Accordingly, the whole amounting to about sixty or seventy thousand rupees was seized and chiefly applied to the payment of Samroo's Corps. Sindia declared that all these circumstances could be fully proven by witnesses, and he was now more and more convinced that the money was not the Vizier's, as in that case he certainly would not have suffered such a time to elapse without taking notice of it, and at any rate he thought it probable that the Vizier would have written himself either to him or to me. He agreed however at my request to give orders for the immediate releasement of Meer Jafar, and his son was called to Camp that I might ascertain from him the truth of the matter.

Some time after I received a letter on this subject from the Vizier, but it was not transmitted to me by the English Resident but by Latif Aly Khan, the superintendent of his buildings at Delhy; this man, being in a similar situation to Meer Jafar, was justly apprehensive that if this outrage should be suffered to pass unnoticed he might fall the next victim to the avarice of Sindia. This letter of the Vizier may therefore be ascribed rather to the exertion of his influence than to any great concern he himself took in the matter. I thought it necessary nevertheless to show it to Sindia, as it tended completely to destroy the force of one of his arguments. Sindia was induced in consequence to write a long letter to the Vizier on the subject, to which, as I have left a copy of it with you, I beg leave to refer you.

After so many delays having been suffered to take place in this business and after the cold and indifferent manner in which it was at last taken up by the Vizier, I must own I had scarce any hopes of success, more especially as there was great reason to believe that the money, tho' not as Sindia asserted a deposit of Majd-ud-daulah, did not however belong to the Begam, but was merely the property of her servant Meer Jafar. This circumstance I did strongly suspect at the time, and I have since been confirmed in my opinion by information on which I can confidently rely. Nevertheless, the Begam at the earnest entreaty of her servant was induced at a still later period to claim this money as her own, and she accordingly wrote a letter to this effect to Sindia, which was transmitted to me by Colonel Harper accompanied by one from himself. I presented them to Sindia, and having again urged him on the subject, I at length obtained from him a promise of his making good the amount to the Begam, but as he declared most solemnly that as he had authorized the seizure of the money on the idea of its being a deposit of Majd-ud-daulah and as the restitution of it might suggest to others the idea of acknowledged guilt on his part, he wished rather to make good the amount to the Begam by a present of other goods of a similar value, and at any rate he begged a delay until he might send at Delhy for the people who had misinformed Ambajee, that by an examination of them in my presence he might at least have the satisfaction of proving his innocence. To this I assented, and the people were accordingly sent for, but a very few days before their arrival I was obliged from a disagreement with Sindia to quit his Camp and proceed to Agra. On my return about four months afterwards I found that these people had left the Camp, that Meer Jafar had died, and that his son who had been stationed in Camp for the management of this negotiation had gone to Delhy. All these circumstances were made the pretext for delay and afterwards continued as such to the present time.

Having thus given you a complete statement of this matter and of the negotiation relative to it, I cannot help giving it you as my opinion that as there appears very little hope of success on the object of it and as the renewal of it might prove only the source of vexation and trouble, it were much more prudent to abandon it entirely. I am perfectly convinced that our relinquishment now of this affair need not occasion any fears lest Sindia should be thereby emboldened to commit any similar outrage in future, and that consideration only could form an adequate motive for our prosecution of a matter under such accumulated circumstances of difficulty as that in question. All the circumstances relative to the mode of receiving the information and of the concealment of the treasure are I believe literally true, and tho' Sindia may not as he asserts have believed the treasure to have been a deposit of Majd-ud-daulah, yet he did not certainly believe it to have been the property of the Begam.

Nevertheless, I am convinced that, if the claim had at first been properly asserted by the Vizier, he would have yielded to it, but the loose manner in which it was taken up after so long an interval of delay made an impression which no exertions of mine could afterwards efface.

In regard to the general management of the business I have usually conducted it thro' Bhow Baxy, whom Sindia has appointed his minister for the affairs of the English. He is often wild and extravagant in his argument and reasoning, but is possessed of a considerable share of penetration and quickness of conception, and I believe he may be considered as a warm advocate for the connection with the English.

The principal objection against him, is his insuperable laziness and indolence, which is become proverbial in the Durbar and which often retards the business. This evil my brother felt so forcibly after his arrival in Camp, when expedition was of the greatest moment to us, that he did every thing in his power but without success to establish a direct and separate communication with Sindia, whose own good sense is perhaps superior to that of any of his ministers. Sindia never will talk of any business but in the presence of four or five of his confidential servants, and even then if the subject started be new to him he cautiously refrains from any discussion upon it and refers his answers to some future day that he may in the meantime take the opinion of his Council upon it. By this means he is sure not to commit himself hastily, and by never talking on any subject until it has been matured and brought to some point by the previous management of his ministers, he avoids every kind of heat and altercation, which, tho' it often happens between Bhow Baxy and me without producing any ill consequences, might neither be safe nor proper with Mahajee Sindia.

The ministers of Sindia independant of Bhow Baxy who were chiefly present in all private conversations for the first two or three years after my arrival in Camp, were Rana Khan Bhai, Mirza Rahim Beg, Appa Chitnavees and Madho Row Dewan. Rana Khan Bhai, for a more particular knowledge of whose character I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the fifth of June One thousand seven hundred and eighty-six to the Governor General, is still in the same situation. Mirza Rahim Beg, having been appointed *amil* of Dig, is now less frequently at the Durbar; Appa Chitnavees, for this year past, has been on a pilgrimage to Gaya, and his place is now supplied by his brother Bapoo Sahib, a young man who seems to be rising in the confidence of Sindia. The Dewan has been for these some months past in confinement, and his place is not as yet regularly supplied by any other. Sometimes Ambajec is present at our private conversations, but being considered merely as an executive officer he never takes any part in them.

These are principally the men whom Sindia consults in political affairs. There are others who from their offices have considerable influence at the Durbar, and amongst these Naubat Ray may be considered as the principal. He has the management of all Sindia's *daks* and intelligence, he is pay-master of his battalions, and besides being himself a considerable renter he has the superintendence of almost the whole of his new acquired revenues. The rise of this man is curious and marks strongly the character and policy of Sindia. He was originally a *mutasaddi* in the service of the Rana of Gohad, and having been several times deputed with overtures to Sindia he became known by that means to the different officers of the Durbar. After the surrender of the Rana he was hired as a clerk by Dattaji, a man who from a menial station in Sindia's service had risen to several high offices, and in particular to that of Pay-master of his Infantry, a situation in which he had found means to amass a large fortune. Sindia, soon after his first interview with the King, being pressed for money applied to Dattaji for the loan of a lac of Rupees, but was refused on pretence of his not being possessed of so much. Naubat Ray, either by desire of Sindia or of his own accord, carried privately to him an account of all Dattaji's acquisitions and of the places where he had deposited them, by which means he was enabled to secure about seven lacs of Rupees. Dattaji on this was degraded and sent to Gwalior, where he has ever since remained, and Naubat Ray appointed to his office. Since that time he has been rising in Sindia's favour and is now principally trusted with the management and superintendence of the revenue, to the great envy and mortification of all Sindia's old servants. If the uniform example of the fate of others in such a situation could have any effect upon men in the pursuit of wealth, they would have no great cause for envy. Madho Ray the Dewan is now in a similar situation to Dattaji, and Sindia seems only to delay conferring the office on another until he can settle a good price for it. Ambajee was lately in disgrace and forced to refund six lacs of Rupees, but being strongly connected with Rana Khan Bhai, he has been again restored to favour and is now on his former footing at the Durbar.

I have already generally given you the character of Bhow Baxy, and it is not necessary I should say anything in this subject regarding any of the others of Sindia's ministers excepting Ambajee, who once paid me a separate visit which I returned. I have never had any kind of intercourse with them further than meeting them at the Durbar or when they accompanied Sindia on his visits to me. I have cautiously avoided not only the reality but even the appearance of intrigue, from a perfect conviction in my own mind that the advantages to be expected from it are in the highest degree precarious and can never be put in competition with its probable evil of sowing jealousy in the mind of Sindia. In this country I am confident that such a conduct can never be adopted

either with prudence or safety by an English minister. With all the address and management we may employ, the natives are yet superior to us in this respect, and they possess advantages in free and unreserved communications with each other from which, as foreigners, we must ever in some degree be excluded. At the same time I am convinced that in this situation such a conduct can never be necessary. Sincerity, candour and disinterestedness will always prove superior to the low cunning and intrigue of the natives, and however opposite these virtues may be to the general character of the Marathas, I have reason to believe that the good effects of them are not entirely lost upon them.

I have had many proposals from the different Vakeels in Camp for the establishment of a private intercourse with them, but excepting in one instance I have had none from any of Sindia's officers. The overture I allude to came from Khandy Row, an officer high in the confidence of Madajee Sindia, and is of so very particular a nature as renders it necessary to give you some account of it.

The paternal dominions of Sindia are divided into four or five large collections, and the principal of these is held by Appa Khandy Row. He is the amil of a country extending from the Jamna to the Narbada, and as since the reduction of Gohad and Gwalior these districts together with the Government of the fort have been consigned to him, it is supposed the annual rent for which he is accountable is beyond eighty lacs of Rupees. When Sindia first marched into this country he accompanied him, and besides being honoured with a most particular share of his confidence, he appointed him *Khansaman* to his Majesty, and under that name he entrusted to him chiefly the management of the affairs of that Durbar. Afterwards when the disturbed state of Bundelcand opened a fair prospect for the invasion of that country, Sindia determined to employ him in that expedition. An interval however of three or four months passed away in making the necessary preparations, and during that time Appa betrayed an uncommon anxiety to cultivate a close friendship with me. After the exchange of visits he took an opportunity in a private conversation with me to express his wish of entering into a close connection with the English and Vizier; the charge of all that part of Sindia's country, he said which bordered on the Vizier's dominions being entrusted to him, he thought it for their mutual benefit that a direct intercourse should subsist between them; and as his districts might be invaded when Sindia might be at a great distance, he expressed a strong desire to obtain my assistance in bringing about a defensive treaty between them by which they might be mutually obliged to assist each other on certain conditions with troops in case of an invasion of their respective territories. I could not give him any satisfactory assurances on this head, and at any rate I told him that on such a treaty should be thought expedient, it must be concluded directly with Sindia, but that the only objection he could have against this might

he obviated by its being stipulated as an article that the troops should be furnished on his requisition. This, however, I found was not by any means to his liking. Nothing would satisfy him but a treaty in which he himself would be a principal, and as he found from my answers that there was not the least reason to expect success in it, he limited his endeavours to the establishment of a close and intimate connection between himself and the Vizier and the English Government. I had no objections to the proposals he made me of forwarding his letters to the Governor-General and the Resident at Lucknow, accompanied with recommendations of my own, provided however I might be previously assured that it was agreeable to Sindia. He affirmed that in all this business he had proceeded entirely by Sindia's desire, and to remove my doubts he promised either to procure a letter to me from Sindia to this effect or verbal assurances from him the first time I went to the Durbar. The latter mode was agreed upon, but I was a good deal surprised to find that, altho' for some time afterwards I gave him regular information before I went to the Durbar, yet he neither according to his promise appeared himself, nor was the subject ever mentioned to me by Sindia. The doubts which now arose in my mind were soon afterwards increased by the new arguments which were urged by Appa to induce my acquiescence. The friendship between the English and Sindia, he said, was firm and secure, yet as every thing was liable to accidents it might perhaps soon be changed into [a quarrel], and in that case he said both parties would find the benefit of his friendship, for he declared that if ever such an event should take place he would stand between us until he had brought about a reconciliation. My answer was that the English had the most perfect confidence in Sindia's friendship, and at any rate they never admitted of doubts and jealousies, as in every extremity they had a most perfect confidence in their own means. This coolness on my part put an end to the negotiation.

I have been a good deal perplexed in my own mind to account for these overtures from Appa Khandy Row. At one time I was inclined to suspect that it might have been an expedient of Sindia to sound the sincerity of the English.

I am now rather inclined to believe that Appa had some interested views of his own. It is not easy to suppose him sincere in his last declaration, because the risks from it must have been greater than would have been prudent, for any Chief in possession of such solid advantages as he is, to have incurred. But it is not unlikely that he may have proposed to himself many advantages from a separate friendship with the English, rather in the security it would have afforded him in the event of his incurring Sindia's displeasure, or in the prospect of advantage it held out to him in case of his death. This last event was generally expected at that time from some foolish prophecies which prevailed then in Camp, and stories of people employed to assassinate him, and it is foreseen that happen when

it will it must give rise to great confusion from his having no son either by birth or adoption. In such an event none of the competitors would have fairer hopes of success than Appa Khandy Row from his advantages in the possession of a large tract of country together with the fort of Gwalior.

After this account it may not be improper to add that Appa Khandy Row, having been guilty of some mismanagement in this expedition against Bundelcand, has fallen greatly under the displeasure of Sindia, who has on this account and for some failure in his payments already deprived him of his collection of the Gohad district; and it is imagined that on his return to Camp he will still more severely feel the effects of his resentment. He is by much the most respectable character I have seen amongst the Marathas, and Sindia will act with policy [? folly] in sacrificing him.

All that I have hitherto said applies to Sindia in his capacity of *Vakeel-ul-Mutlak* or absolute Minister of the King. In his character of a Maratha Chief and guarantee of the treaty, we have little or no business with him. Altho' it first gave occasion to our connection with him, the treaty of peace having been long since carried into effect in all its articles and the benefit of it being now equally felt by both parties, there is every reason to think it will prove solid and lasting. Some little obstacles may occasionally occur, such as the seizure of our ships that may be driven from distress upon their coasts, an evil which from the lawless nature of the piratical Chiefs who inhabit them seems unavoidable. But these and such like matters will always be settled by the Resident at Poona without requiring the interposition of Mahajee Sindia.

The copy which I leave you of Mr. Malet's instructions will shew you in what points and in what manner we are directed to correspond with each other. Hitherto, as no very material negotiations have been carried on between us and the Courts at which we respectively reside, our correspondence has been chiefly confined to communications of the operations of each in their foreign wars and pursuits. Of late, however, Mr. Malet's correspondence has principally related to some intrigues of the French and his consequent suspicions of the Nana's sincerity. I thought it necessary to mention the matter to Sindia, who flatly denied his knowledge of it, and in this respect I am inclined to give him entire credit. I know for certain that amongst the other advantages which he reaps from his connection with the English is that of occasionally holding it *in terrorem* against his enemies at Poona, and as the establishment of a French connection there would deprive him of this advantage, it is not likely that he himself should contribute to that effect. Nana has also denied having entered into any connection with them, and with this I think we may rest perfectly satisfied. He would I doubt not be very glad in the present war with Tippoo to obtain actual assistance from them or to divert them from Tippoo, but it is absurd to suppose that with his knowledge of European ambition and of theirs in particular he should

ever consent to their terms of ceding to them a harbour or seaport town in the Maratha dominions. Mr. Malet's suspicions, independent of some slight appearances, are built on secret intelligence, in which I must confess I have in general no faith. At every Durbar in Hindostan the furnishing of it has become a fixed trade, and I have in general observed that the agents employed in it suit their intelligence in some shape or other to the disposition of their constituents. Wherever they perceive a particular solicitude on any point, they are sure to increase it by a pretended discovery of their own of some circumstances in confirmation of it, for, as negative information never appears to give so much satisfaction to an anxious mind as positive intelligence, they are induced on this account, even when they are perfectly assured that the matter has in reality no existence, to frame some circumstances regarding it. There may be instances in which secret intelligence has proved of use, but I believe that it is not infrequently calculated to mislead, so that the safest mode is to avoid it entirely. There is scarcely any thing kept secret in the Courts of Indostan, and a minister on the spot in the possession of the common channels of information who weighs every circumstance in the general scale of probability is never likely to be materially deceived.

There is at present one very material point in dependence with the Court of Poona, to which, as Sindia is considerably interested in the event, I must beg leave to call your attention. I refer you for a knowledge of the particulars to the Right Honourable the Governor-General's letter to me under date the sixteenth October. The event of Mr. Malet's determination must now be soon known to you, and I have little doubt that it will prove a delivery of his Lordship's letter to the Peshwa. In this case Sindia may affect to be displeased and to consider our neutrality as inconsistent with the friendship that subsists between us. But any remonstrances of this kind must be urged with a bad grace by one, who, tho' a member of the State, is himself guilty of such egregious neglect and inattention towards it in the hour of danger.

After the execution of the treaty of peace I had little occasion for correspondence with the Council at Bombay further than what arose from some disputed points in regard to our privileges of trade at Broach, and as these have since been definitively settled in a treaty between the Honourable Company and Sindia of which I have left you a copy, the correspondence has of late in a great measure ceased. As there is however some times occasion to forward letters to and from them and the Governor-General and Council, and as this channel of correspondence is always safe and at some seasons the most expeditious, I continue to maintain the communication as usual by the regular despatch of *qasids* to the Chief of Surat. There is likewise a probability that although all our privileges at Broach are fixed by a formal treaty, differences may nevertheless occur with regard to them. There has never been a good understanding between

the English Resident at Broach and the *amils* there, and iniquitous as the proceedings of the latter may have been I must say that I think the former has often been precipitate in his resentments on occasions when it would have been no less prudent than proper to have made some allowances for the different manners and customs of the Marathas. In this disposition disputes may still arise, but I am convinced that they will always be easily settled on your representation of them to Sindia. In the meantime, I beg leave to refer you for a more particular knowledge of my sentiments upon this point to a copy which I have left you of my letter to the Governor-General under date the second of May. Let me also add before I quit this subject, that there is a looseness which pervades every part of Sindia's Government and which is sometimes the occasion of a disobedience of his orders by his own immediate officers. This seems to be the unavoidable effect of that venality and corruption which his short-sighted avarice leads him to connive at and encourage throughout every part of his Government. In cases of this kind, however, it is easy to discover where the fault lies, and in justice to Sindia I must observe that, although in some petty matters I have met with obstructions after the issue of his orders, yet I have in the end always obtained redress on a proper representation to him; nor do I believe that on these occasions he had ever any intention to deceive.

To you, who are intimately acquainted with the languages and customs of the East, it is unnecessary for me to say any thing in regard to the striking difference of character between the Musalmen and Marathas; but as your personal acquaintance has hitherto I believe been in a manner entirely confined to the former, it may not be improper to remark to you that in an early period of my residence in this Camp I could not help thinking that Sindia was sometimes guilty of petty neglects and inattention towards me, which as experience has since taught me were to be ascribed only to the difference of the Maratha modes and customs from those of the Musalmans to which I had been accustomed. In all our personal meetings he has uniformly shewn the utmost affability, care and good humour, but he has sometimes appeared to be deficient in the minutæ of attention, such as in frequent messages and enquiries and other little intercourses of civility which are so rigidly practised by the politer Musalmans. In addition to the cause I have mentioned, something may perhaps be ascribed to the indolence of Bhow Baxy, to whom Sindia trusts entirely for a proper care and management in these matters. But I have on several occasions experienced such proofs of Sindia's extraordinary attention towards me, as to convince me that whatever appearances may have happened to the contrary were to be ascribed to any other cause than that of a studied neglect or inattention.

In this situation, as you will easily conceive, I have little or no business with the King further than occasional visits during his residence in Camp

or attending him during the marches, which seems to be all he requires and which is practised without any occasion of jealousy to Sindia, as he is at all times so surrounded by his people as to preclude the possibility of talking to him in private. His Majesty indeed has never shewn any great desire of making any private communications to me. He had I believe early imbibed an opinion which may never since have left him that I was a zealous advocate for Sindia, and under this idea he may have thought it dangerous to make any secret proposals to me. Perhaps it may be owing to the same cause that he has never once in my presence, to the best of my recollection, made mention of his son the prince Jahandar Shah. I have every reason however to believe that whatever his former indignation and displeasure may have been on account of his elopement, he is now perfectly satisfied that his continuance with us is the strongest pledge he can have for his own safety and that of his family in general. My own sentiments upon this matter are these : I was at first inclined to consider the Prince's elopement as very unfortunate for the interests of the Company, because I did imagine that, in the jealousy to which it would give rise in the other Powers of Hindostan and in other causes, it must in all probability have speedily involved us in a war. Under this apprehension I was extremely solicitous for a favourable issue to the negotiation which Sindia undertook to manage with His Majesty for his return to Court. I have since been inclined to consider the failure of this negotiation as extremely fortunate, for had it taken effect, I am convinced that the ambition of Sindia with so tempting an object in his power would have led him to violate the articles of it, and in that case I know not how we would have avoided a war with him consistently with our credit and honour. As matters stand at present, there is no cause for an apprehension of this nature. This lapse of near three years since the elopement without its being followed by any of those consequences that were expected, has lulled the jealousy of the natives in general and even in some degree of Sindia, and tho' it is true that events in the course of nature may call upon us to take an active part in his favor, yet in the voluminous chapter of accidents we may also look for events that might render his residence with us extremely favourable. At any rate the advantages we now derive from the possession of his person in its operating as a powerful check upon the ambition of Sindia are such as we ought carefully to preserve by not suffering him on any account whatever to indulge any capricious wishes he may form of leaving us and seeking some new asylum.

I have occasion to deliver every month to His Majesty on behalf of the Vizier the sum of eighteen hundred rupees *khasa* money, for which I have an assignment on the *amil* of Rohilcand, who supplies me on the whole pretty regularly. The last payment made to his Majesty was for the month of Zihijj, since which period I have had no receipts of cash from

the *amil*. I have also an order for the receipt of four hundred and four gold mohars yearly to deliver as *nazars* on behalf of the Vizier at the four principal festivals celebrated by his Majesty. The last *nazar* I presented on behalf of the Vizier was for the *Id-ul-qurban*. There will be occasion for your presenting two more *nazars* in the months of February and March next, for the festivals of His Majesty's accession and the new year ; for these the *amil* is responsible, as well as for the *khasa* money since the month of Zihijj, and it will be necessary I suppose that you should apply to Colonel Harper for an order to the *amil* to make the regular payments to you from these periods in future. His Majesty always on these occasions acknowledges under his own hand the particular sums received whether for the *khasa* or the *nazars*, and I also receive a receipt under the seal of his minister Shah Nizam-ud-din.

66. CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 24th December 1786.

My last address under date the twenty-second instant informed your Lordship of my arrival at this place. I at the same time apprized your Lordship of my intention to forward for your consideration some observations I had made on the perusal of Mr. Anderson's letter to me and which I had communicated to that gentleman in an interview at Shikohabad. I have now accordingly the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a copy of those remarks with the view of obtaining from your Lordship such instructions as an examination of them and Mr. Anderson's opinions may suggest as expedient. They go to your Lordship exactly in the form and words in which I delivered them to Mr. Anderson. I could have extended them to a more considerable length and thrown them into a more regular and connected shape, but as I presented them to Mr. Anderson and now submit them to your Lordship for the sole purpose of exhibiting certain opinions that might be either right or wrong, being in a great measure speculative (and might therefore be either corrected or confirmed by a riper judgment than my own), I considered it as sufficient to convey my ideas in a brief and loose manner and sought only to render them intelligible.

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that my preparations for proceeding to Camp being nearly completed, I am hopeful that I shall be able to leave this place tomorrow and to arrive at my station, (provided the army should not in the interim advance) by the twenty-ninth instant.

I conceive it proper to inform your Lordship that a letter from Rajah Chait Sing was yesterday put into my hands as I was passing through the town. As it had no seal, I asked the bearer from whom he had received it, and though it is probable that he had been otherwise instructed he did not hesitate to acquaint me, upon which I returned it to him unopened.

I trust that this proceeding will secure me from any further attempt of this nature, and that it will also have the effect of convincing his partisans that I do not mean to depart from the line of conduct invariably observed towards him by my predecessors in office.

Some loose remarks on Mr. Anderson's letter to Captain Kirkpatrick under date 5th December 1786.

Extracts.

Remarks.

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| <p>1. And every new accession of power, however unimportant when considered in the general scale, will yet be eagerly caught at and adduced as a proof of the necessity of putting a timely and seasonable stop to his progress, etc.</p> <p>2. The most dangerous consequences were predicted from Sindia's conquest of Aligarh, yet a complete year has now elapsed since that event took place, and as far as a judgment can be found from the experience of that period, there is no likelihood of any of them being fulfilled. I cannot indeed see any good reason why Sindia should not be on one side a neighbour to the Vizier as well as any other Chief.</p> | <p>1 and 2. I agree in the main on this point with Mr. Anderson. I freely own however a wish that the Vizier had a better frontier to the westward than he has at present.</p> <p>If Sindia's possessions were bounded to the eastward by the Jamna I think he would be as good a neighbour as His Excellency could have. In this case I should view his progress in every other quarter with great indifference.</p> <p>Besides the defence that a river constitutes against an enemy, it is admirably calculated for the prevention of disputes concerning limits and other petty differences of a similar nature that often set two powerful neighbours by the ears, especially if either of them happens to stand much upon the honour of his Government; and though this sort of jealousy because it too frequently leads to serious evils ought to be tempered with great wisdom and moderation, yet perhaps its suggestions should not always be disregarded by a people whose power is in a considerable measure upheld by opinion.</p> |
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Extracts.

Remarks.

Disputes of the kind here referred to are less likely to occur between neighbours one of whom only is powerful. When they happen, however, they may always be settled without hazarding the peace subsisting between the parties.

For these reasons I confess I would rather see that part of the Doab at present possessed by Sindia in any other hands than his. If the Vizier had somewhat more of it than he has, his frontier would be better than it now is. I have not a wish for the extension of his dominions that has not their security and general tranquillity for its object.

The improvement however of the Vizier's western frontier is a matter at this time totally out of the question. Sindia must not be disturbed by us in what he has obtained, nor do I think it our business to check him either directly or indirectly while his operations are confined to the countries westward of the Jamna or so long as he does not seek to extend his power in the Doab.

In the latter event, however, I freely own that I should wish him to be checked; might it be hoped that this would be effected by any means short of an open rupture?

I would not nevertheless do it at the expense of an absolute war, since this would be running into a certain and immediate danger in order to shun a presumptive and distant one.

Extracts.

Remarks.

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| <p>3. I found it necessary to come to an agreement to communicate to each other all such reports as might have a tendency to affect our friendship, etc.</p> | <p>3. This rule of conduct is both honorable and wise and is what I shall pay great attention to, always observing however the sort of caution recommended by Mr. Anderson.</p> |
| <p>4. There is one point which both from its importance and its frequent occurrence I must beg leave to recommend in particular to your attention. I allude to the case of the fugitives from the territories of each other &c.</p> | <p>4. I will freely own that Sindia's pretensions on this head, the point being unsettled by treaty, appear to me to be much weakened on account of the protection he has afforded Rajah Chait Sing. Were it not for this circumstance I should be inclined to disapprove of the conduct of the Vizier's Government in affording an asylum to the Gosain Himmat Bahadur. I think with Mr. A. that, whilst an English Resident continues with Sindia, the want of a formal treaty with regard to these matters will never be felt, and that the present system though loose is an accommodating one. Indeed, it appears to me that it would be difficult to form a treaty for the regulation of this point that would not either at first or in the end occasion the question respecting Chait Sing to be agitated.</p> |
| <p>5. There is one claim of the Vizier upon Sindia apparently of some importance, &c.</p> | <p>5. The point has already, as Mr. A. supposed, been warmly pressed upon me, as well as another respecting Zain-ul-abidin Khan, brother of the late Meerza Shafi, which I conceived had also been recommended to the management of Mr. Anderson. It occurred to me at Lucknow that the very friendly disposition which the Vizier had manifested towards Sindia, whether of his</p> |

Extracts.

Remarks.

own free will or at our instance, is immaterial in the present case, in a matter so highly interesting to that Chief as the safety of Appa Khande Rao and his party, gave the Vizier an irresistible claim on the good offices of the Maratha, not only in the instance before us, but on every future occasion at all consistent with reason. Both the reputation and interest of Sindia appeared to be at stake in the fate of Apa Khande, and yet the Vizier, contrary to his inclination and perhaps in his own opinion contrary also to his political interests, concurred in a measure calculated to promote the credit and advantage of Sindia in a very eminent degree. After an act of this kind on the part of His Excellency, to fail in any application on his behalf that should be at all reasonable, would, I am afraid, be liable to incur very great dishonour. In this view of the matter my determination was to suspend my final judgment till I could have the benefit of Mr. A's communication, and at all events I was resolved after so striking an example of good neighbourhood in the conduct of the Vizier not to touch with Sindia upon the two points mentioned to me at Lucknow without the approbation and instructions of Lord Cornwallis.

6. I have cautiously avoided not only the reality but the appearance of intrigue, etc.
6. All that Mr. Anderson has said on this subject appears to me to be exceedingly well-judged. The natives of

Extracts.

Remarks.

Hindustan are such adepts in intrigue and the sort of address necessary in transactions of that nature, that they will always leave us behind them when we attempt to practice these arts. Sincerity, candour and disinterestedness are certainly the best weapons with which low cunning and design, when these enter into great affairs, can be attacked. One of the ablest statesmen that ever was, has laid this down amongst his maxims of policy.

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| <p>7. I have had many proposals from the different Vakeels in Camp for the establishment, etc.</p> | <p>7. <i>Memorandum.</i>
To ask Mr. Anderson in which manner he has been used to receive these overtures.</p> |
| <p>8. Mr. Malet's suspicions independent of some slight appearances are built on secret intelligence, in which I confess I have in general no faith, etc.</p> | <p>8. Mr. Anderson does not perhaps hold secret intelligence in lower estimation than it generally deserves. Although however verbal communications of this sort seldom merit attention, and might perhaps as Mr. Anderson says be more prudently avoided entirely, yet when a paper seemingly original or a copy of one apparently well authenticated is secretly produced, it would no doubt be right to give it some consideration if the matter it contained appeared sufficiently important. For the rest I am of opinion with Mr. A that a minister on the spot in possession of the common channels of information who weighs every circumstance in the general scale of probability, is never likely to be materially deceived.</p> |

Extracts.	Remarks.
9. In this event Sindia may affect to be displeased and to consider our neutrality as inconsistent with the friendship that subsists between us, etc.	9. I very well recollect telling Lord Cornwallis that if it fell to my lot to communicate this business to Sindia or to vindicate the measure alluded to, I should not feel the least difficulty or embarrassment on the occasion. His Lordship judged in the same manner, observing that Mr. Malet would have to encounter the only unpleasant circumstances that could possibly arise from the affair.

67. A PAPER OF MEMORANDUM (PERSIAN) RECEIVED FROM MAHAJEE SINDIA

1. Since the firm establishment of peace between the Company and the Peshwa numbers of people from the south and other quarters have been induced on account of the friendship which subsists between the two Governments to go on pilgrimages to Allahabad, Benares and Gaya. It is hoped that the indulgences which have been established in their favour may be continued.

2. As the boundaries of the Vizier in the Doab and other places join the boundaries of my country, let not any sahuکار or zamindar who may fly from these provinces be protected.

3. If the Rajahs or petty Chiefs of this quarter should from motives of sedition and treachery enter into a correspondence with the English Government or that of the Nabob Vizier, let not their proposals be attended to, and let no correspondence be maintained with them.

4. Peace and friendship are now established between the English and the Peshwa. If either of these Governments should want the assistance of the other, let it be granted, the Peshwa to pay for the English battalions at the rate which they are paid in the field by the Company, and the English to pay for the Maratha horsemen at the rate which they are paid by the Peshwa in the field.

68. EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK.

Calcutta, 24th January 1787.

In my letter to Mr. Anderson under date the twenty-seventh September I thought it necessary in consequence of his representation and the appearance which affairs then wore, to furnish him with precise instructions for his conduct in the event of Sindia's passing with his army into the Doab.

Having reconsidered this subject and adverted to some particulars which were not then before me, I am induced to qualify these orders with the following explanation.

As I entertain the most perfect conviction that Sindia's general situation is such as will long render it his interest to maintain a friendship with us, I acknowledge myself unwilling to adopt any measures that might precipitate a misunderstanding between us by suggesting an unfavorable idea of our intentions. Sindia is already in possession of the greatest part of the Doab which borders upon the Vizier's dominions, and it therefore seems less necessary to attempt checking his progress now in other parts of it where the Ganges intervenes as a boundary between them. For these reasons I am inclined to think that it will be more advisable to refrain from any interference with Sindia or oppose him in his views of conquest in the Doab, as long as he refrains from any attempt against the possessions of our ally the Vizier, and I direct accordingly that you suspend the communications of any orders to Colonel Harper for the movement of our troops in the Vizier's dominions, unless it should appear to you that Sindia is making hostile preparations against the possessions of the Nabob Asaf-ud-daulah, and then only in case those preparations should appear to you of such a nature as not to admit of a previous application to this Government for instructions.

It is possible that Sindia may cross over into the Doab merely with a view of inspecting his forts, as he did lately with regard to Agra. In this case I do not think any remonstrance as prescribed in my letter to Mr. Anderson should be made to him. The remonstrance I am indeed inclined to think should be suspended entirely, except in the event of any disputes between his troops and the subjects of the Vizier in consequence of his approaching the possessions of our ally. Such disputes may easily be conceived to arise in the event supposed without any hostile intentions on his part; of this however if they should happen you are best qualified to judge, and you will then address him in such terms of explanation or remonstrance as the occasion may indicate. If my opinion of the necessity of his connection with this Government is well founded, a good-humoured explanation will be sufficient without proceeding to the language of a direct remonstrance, which you are however empowered to make if his conduct should appear to you to intend any insult to this Government or to our ally the Vizier.

Mr. Anderson was, I find, furnished with positive orders to demand and take his leave of Mahajee Sindia in case he should introduce Chait Sing to the King. The circumstances which induced the necessity of such rigid injunctions are now changed, and I think it necessary to release you entirely from these orders. The protection originally granted by Sindia to Chait Sing took place before we entered into any treaty with him, and nothing can render Chait Sing of consequence but the anxiety we may

manifest regarding him. It seems therefore advisable to treat with perfect indifference any attention which may be shewn to him. All that it is now necessary to exact is that he shall never be suffered to appear either on public or private occasions at the King's or Mahajee Sindia's Durbar in your presence.

I have read with attention the observations in Mr. Anderson's letter to you under date the fifth December on the subject of fugitives from the Vizier's or Sindia's dominions, and I agree generally in opinion with him. Notwithstanding the want of a formal treaty on this head, it appears absolutely necessary for the maintenance of friendship and good understanding between these Powers that none of the fugitives under the description mentioned by Mr. Anderson be protected by the Vizier. I do not wish on any occasion to subject His Excellency the Vizier to the mortification of surrendering any person to Sindia, and to avoid this necessity I shall take measures to prevent His Excellency from receiving any such fugitives into his protection. I shall at the same time expect in every instance the same conduct from Sindia, and if on any occasion after receiving into his protection any fugitives he should wish before the delivery of them to you to stipulate their pardon, I leave it to your discretion to give him in my name such assurances or not according to your own judgment of the case.

I have written to Colonel Harper to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any intercourse between the Vizier and Himmatt Bahadur, and on no account whatever to suffer him to proceed to Lucknow. I cannot now object to his being allowed an asylum in the Vizier's country, but you may assure Sindia that I will never allow such attention or countenance to be shewn to him as might operate to the prejudice of the present good understanding between him and the Vizier.

I desire that you will avoid any application to Sindia regarding the Begam's claim for the plunder of Meer Jafar. However just this claim may be, it ought to have been urged at the proper period, and I am unwilling, by renewing a matter of so old a date and at least of so uncertain a nature, to suggest ideas to Sindia of my indisposition towards him.

Enclosed I transmit you a letter for Mahajee Sindia, and by the copy that accompanies it for your information you will perceive that I have referred him to you for an answer to those points which he submitted to me through Mr. Anderson and of which I herewith send you a copy. [No. 67.] In regard to the first you may assure him that he will find me in every respect inclined to shew him the same attention as my predecessors, and that I will carefully support every regulation made by them which has for its object the increase of our friendship. The explanation of my sentiments with regard to fugitives which I have already given, will

enable you to satisfy him on the second head ; and in regard to the third point it will be sufficient to give him general assurances that in every instance we will strictly adhere to that honour and good faith which ought ever to subsist between two nations connected by treaties as we are. The fourth point must not receive the smallest encouragement, and I wish you plainly to tell him that the same principles of honour and good faith which determine us to maintain inviolate our friendship and connection with his nation will ever influence our conduct with regard to other Powers, and we cannot therefore enter into a plan which has a tendency to violate the faith of treaties and to embroil us with them.

69. LORD CORNWALLIS TO SINDIA.

26th January 1787.

I have the pleasure to inform you of the arrival of Mr. James Anderson in Calcutta, and he has made me very happy by communicating to me the news of your health. He has also laid before me a memorandum of the several matters which you charged him to represent to me. It is always my wish to attend to the request of my friends, and I have considered what Mr. Anderson has represented on your part with great attention. My directions have been sent to Captain Kirkpatrick on each article. He will explain to you very particularly what I have written, and as all my views are directed to strengthen the friendship subsisting between us, I have no doubt that you will think what I have written perfectly consistent with the intentions as well as just and reasonable. I hope you will continue to make me happy by frequent communications of your welfare, for which I am always anxious.

70. W. KIRKPATRICK TO CHARLES WARRE MALET, RESIDENT AT POONA.

Sindhia's Camp near Hodal, 10th January 1787.

On the 20th ultimo I had the pleasure of addressing you from Shikohabad advising you of my having on that day received charge from Mr. Anderson of the office of Resident at the Durbar of Mahajee Sindia.

On the 22nd following, your dispatch of the 24th of November to Mr. Anderson's address was delivered to me at Agra and the enclosures for Lord Cornwallis and the Supreme Council forwarded without delay.

Sindhia having subsequent to Mr. Anderson's departure from Camp moved from the neighbourhood of Kaman into Mewat, apparently with the intention of settling that district and getting the fortress of Kishnagarh (possessed by a Moghul Sardar named Morad Beg Khan) into his hands, my journey to the army was on this account necessarily prolonged beyond the time I had calculated on. Accordingly I did not reach my

station till the 5th instant, on which day I received another dispatch from you under date the 15th November. The letters which accompanied it I immediately transmitted to Calcutta.

On the day following my arrival in Camp, I received your dispatch under date the 8th of December. After I had acquainted myself with the contents of your several letters, I forwarded them to their address : but am sorry to inform you that they had hardly got beyond the skirts of the camp before they fell into the hands of a party of Mewatis. Luckily, however, I had taken copies of the two most important, namely those under date the 30th of November and 8th of December, by which means I was enabled to supply their loss, which I did without delay.

Enclosed are answers to your two letters addressed to Mahajee Sindia and to Bhow Bakhshi.

Although it is no less my wish than my duty to keep you fully and regularly informed of the transactions in this quarter, yet I assure myself that my recent arrival at this station will prevent you from expecting to receive from me by the present conveyance, either a very particular detail of past affairs or very exact statement of Sindia's designs at this time. Having got possession of Kishna-garh it appears now to be his intention to proceed between the hills of Mewat into the neighbourhood of Dehli, near which city he will probably take up some convenient post for the purpose of checking the inroads of the Sikhs, who have this season committed considerable depredations in the Doab and other districts adjacent to the Capital. It is, indeed, confidently rumoured that this is not the sole object of his movement towards Dehli. Most people here are of opinion that he intends to reduce Ghulam Qadir Khan, the son of Zabita Khan, the Saharanpoor Chief, and indeed I myself somewhat incline to this opinion. Should this prove to be the case I mean to act conformably to the instructions transmitted to Mr. Anderson by Lord Cornwallis under date the 2nd of September, of the nature of which you have been already advised by Mr. Anderson. Whether or not the proposed expostulation would in this case produce the desired effect must of course be a matter of doubt, but I confess I am inclined to think that it would.

As I was not without very good reasons for thinking that Sindia had been apprized of your important communication to Nana on the 29th of November between Mr. Anderson's departure from and my arrival in Camp, I determined that it was unnecessary for me to be the first to start the subject. Whether he be acquainted with the matter or not, however, I am of opinion that no inconvenience can result from my silence on the occasion. I can excuse it sufficiently whenever it may be necessary to do so, while if he continues to take no notice of the business several inferences will then be deducible from such a conduct that may furnish us with a better clue to his designs than perhaps we possess at present.

I have great pleasure in advising you of Bhow Bakhshée's appointment to the government of Ferozabad, Saadabad and some other districts in the Doab that unite with the territories of the Vizier. It is not unreasonable to hope that this measure of Sindia's may be highly conducive to the preservation of harmony and good neighbourhood between our two allies : since a moderation is nowhere more necessary towards the maintenance of peace between two great Powers jealous of each other than in such a situation as Bhow Bakhshée was yesterday appointed to fill.

Along with some Gazettes and Chronicles I have the pleasure to send you a few Persian newspapers which perhaps may be acceptable to you. Should they prove so, I will continue to forward them to you in a regular and connected series by every opportunity. [*These akhbarats are preserved in Poona.*]

71. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp near Rhedaspoor, 25th January 1787.

I had last the honor of addressing you under the 20th instant, when I informed your Lordship of an expedition then preparing to be set on foot by Mahajee Sindia, under the conduct of Ambajee. The previous arrangements necessary to the movement of this commander have hitherto detained him here, and will probably delay his march a few days longer. It is not easy, prior to his departure, to ascertain with exactness what force is to be detached with him. But I have some reason to believe, that it will not be short of fifteen thousand men, inclusive of five or six battalions of infantry. His train I understand is to consist of 20 field pieces, and eight heavy guns. He will be reinforced on his arrival in the neighbourhood of Panipat, by the troops at present there, amounting to between two and three thousand horse, and Samroo's corps, to which there is said to be a very respectable artillery attached. I have some grounds, however, for suspecting that it is the wish of Sindia to break this corps, and that Ambajee will be instructed to this effect : but as the commanders of it are on their guard against such a design, it is not likely that they will put it in his power to execute it. For this reason I am inclined to think, that the object of Ambajee's expedition will not be much advanced by the services of this body of men.

In respect to this object I continue to be of my former opinion, altho', I confess, that it is not built upon any better evidence or reasoning, than what results from the combining of various appearances and circumstances that cannot well be accounted for without ascribing to Sindia a design of annexing Saharanpur and its dependencies to his other possessions. Another week or two, however, will perhaps set this matter in as clear and certain a light as can be wished, since Sindia having consented to my employing an intelligencer with Ambajee, I may reckon upon receivin^g

such information of this commander's motions and transactions as shall be sufficiently exact, for enabling me to penetrate into the real end of his destination,—my obtaining early satisfaction on this head depending, however, on the steadiness of Sindia's councils and resolutions, which are liable to be changed by a variety of probable incidents. Your Lordship will perceive not only that a considerable period may yet elapse, before Ambajee so far enters upon the execution of his design as to render the true object of it no longer doubtful, but that even this last may either be totally departed from, or be materially altered and modified, according as the present situation and views of its projector continue permanent, or fluctuate with circumstances.

I have laid too much stress on the uncertainty in which all reasoning, regarding the issue of any scheme or enterprize engaged in by Sindia, must be ever involved, to the end that your Lordship may not, in the event of Ambajee's keeping to the westward of the Jamna, be induced, either to think the opinion I entertain in respect to the object of his march erroneous, or to ascribe such a change of measures totally to the expedient which I have judged it right to adopt in the present conjuncture, and for a knowledge of which I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the enclosed copy of a letter that I have this day dispatched to Colonel Harper. Much good, supposing my conjecture in regard to this destination of Ambajee to be just, may be produced by this expedient and I trust it cannot do any harm; yet candour requires of me to acknowledge that the same effect might arise from the precarious nature of Sindia's situation and the unsettled system of his political conduct, altho' we were to remain totally inactive and unconcerned on the occasion.

Not chusing, however, to rely entirely on a contingency of this sort, and thinking that the bare rumour of a movement of our troops, accompanied by some slight appearances of military preparation, might possibly preclude the necessity of any further operations for the purpose of diverting the attention of Sindia from the reduction of Saharanpur, I determined on addressing Colonel Harper, to the effect which your Lordship will see, on perusal of the enclosed, and if I should judge it necessary, on following up this measure by desiring of Colonel Harper to transmit orders to Colonels Blair and Knudson to hold their respective Brigades in readiness to move.

I am hopeful that either one or both of these expedients, should no other impediment be opposed by the course of events to the designs of Sindia against Saharanpur, will have the effect of keeping Ambajee altogether out of the Doab. But should this proceeding answer no other end than that of occasioning some delay in the execution of this new scheme of conquest, one of my views in it will be accomplished, as in this interval I shall have the satisfaction of learning your Lordship's sentiments, in regard to the expediency of an open interposition on our part, for the

purpose of preserving Saharanpur and its dependencies in the hands of their present possessor.

I trust your Lordship will see no cause to disapprove of the measure which I have hazarded. It can furnish no just ground of complaint to Sindia, however it may perplex and distress him. It promises to have the effect of at least checking him in the present ambitious pursuit which I ascribe to him, and it in no shape engages Government either to remonstrate openly against the reduction of Ghulam Qadir Khan or to take any further steps for the protection of that chieftain. We shall have advanced to no point where it will not be in our power to stop, without the least diminution of our credit, since nothing would be easier, were it deemed proper to remain entirely inactive on the occasion, than to assign such reasons for the preparations commenced, or even for a movement of the troops, as would at the same time perfectly satisfy Sindia, and cover the real considerations which had suggested the expediency of the measure.

I have been thus early in adopting my present resolution, to the end, that should Sindia think it prudent to yield, the impression which it is designed to make on him, he may have an opportunity of doing so with as little mortification and loss of credit as possible, both of which he would suffer in a high degree, were he obliged to relinquish the enterprize against Saharanpur, after having openly embarked in it. For the same reason, I have judged it right to avoid requiring of him an explanation of his intentions in detaching of Ambajee. Since, if he were to disclose these to us, he might afterwards deem his honor too openly concerned in the pursuit of his object to recede, and rather hazard the consequences than allow us and the world to believe that he had been compelled by a fear of our resentment to relinquish his design.

Sindia having obtained His Majesty's permission for me to proceed to Delhi, for the purpose of being presented at Court, and of delivering your Lordship's letter, I shall set out thither to-morrow. I intend that my absence from camp, shall be as short as possible; both because Sindia is desirous of my speedy return, and because I think it may be proper to be with him when the rumour of my [our] preparations shall reach him.

Bhow Backshee, having visited me to-day principally for the purpose of informing me that his master wished me to perform my journey to Delhi as quickly as possible and lose no time in returning to camp, gave me to understand, that the army would shortly move from that quarter. I am led to give the greater credit to the communication of the Bhow, from knowing that Sindia has for a long while past been tampering with the Rajah of Jodhpore, and endeavouring to detach him from the interest of the Jaynagar Chief, and from having learned yesterday, that the agents employed by him in the business had not only apprized him of the successful determination of their negotiation, but also conveyed to him the most positive assurance of his obtaining an easy possession of Jaynagar if he

would seize the favorable occasion at present offered by the dissensions raging there, and a misunderstanding that had recently taken place between the Rajah and his confederate of Jodhpoor. Sindia being of a distrustful temper will not probably yield to these suggestions; yet I think it likely enough that he will turn back to Dig. and from thence regulate his farther progress towards Jaynagar by the future advices he may receive from that quarter.

72. W. KIRKPATRICK TO COLONEL G. HARPER.

Sindia's Camp near Rhedaspore, 25th January 1787.

The preparations making by Sindia, joined to some other appearances and circumstances, giving me reason to believe that the reduction of Ghulam Qadir Khan is resolved on, and that Ambajee is to be employed on this service, I think right to apprize you thus early that, conformably to what I conceive to be the spirit of Lord Cornwallis's instruction to Mr. Anderson under date the 27th September last, it is exceeding probable that I may have occasion ere long to transmit a requisition to you for a movement of the troops at Cawnpoor and Fathgarh with the view of drawing off the attention of Sindia from this new scheme of conquest.

I could therefore wish you to be prepared as much as possible for this application, without immediately transmitting orders of readiness to Colonels Blair and Knudson, which may be deferred till you hear from me again. In the interim, however, it will promote my purpose considerably, and perhaps preclude the necessity of further operations if you will be so good as to write to those officers privately that the movement of their corps may be suddenly required. As much appearance of military preparation will probably follow this communication, which I would have generally diffused throughout both stations. I am not without hopes that the rumours to which it would give rise would alone have the effect of preventing Ambajee from passing into the Doab.

The success of these measures depending in a great measure on the concealment of the quarter from whence they originate, permit me to request that you endeavour to involve this point in as much mysterious obscurity as possible.

73. EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Calcutta, 6th Feb. 1787.

I have just received your letter of the 25th enclosing a copy of one to Colonel Harper. I wrote to you on the 20th ultimo to desire you not to take any steps in consequence of my instructions to Mr. Anderson of the 27th September, and you will since have seen by my letter of the 24th January that we are determined to take no part whatever in favour of

Ghulam Qadir Khan. I have directed Colonel Harper to put an end to all rumours of the movement of our troops.

74. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Delhi, 7th February 1787.

I had this morning the honour to receive your letter of the 24th ultimo with its several enclosures. To the commands conveyed to me in it, your Lordship may rely on my paying the most exact attention.

I have dispatched a copy of your letter to Sindia's address to Bhow Bakhshree, whom I have informed of my intention to proceed ere long to Camp for the purpose of presenting the original to his master, and of imparting to him your Lordship's resolutions and sentiments on the points communicated by Mr. Anderson to your Lordship on his part.

Shah Nizari-ud-din and Rajah Deshmukh having proceeded to camp, it is probable I may postpone my departure from hence, till their return. The Shah, fearful of my having an interview with the King in his absence, attempted to obtain a promise from me that I would not offer to take my leave till his return. As I did not think it necessary either to accede to or reject this proposal, I am at liberty to act as I may judge proper. Should Sindia press my departure, I shall conclude that I may wait on His Majesty for the purpose of being dismissed, without giving offence to him; yet it is not improbable but his distrust may lead him to desire me to wait the return of his agents to Court.

Ambajee was presented to the King on the afternoon of the 4th. He still continues encamped a few miles to the northward of the City.

75. CALCUTTA COUNCIL TO CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Calcutta, 26th February 1787.

We transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter which we have written to the Resident at Poona and extract of a dispatch from the Secret Committee of the Hon'ble Court of Directors under date the 22nd September last, which is referred to in it. The instructions which are contained in these papers are necessary for your own information and will enable you to describe to Mahajee Sindia the line of conduct which has been laid down for our guidance and which we are determined inviolably to adhere to.

The orders sent to Mr. Malet in regard to the information to be given to the Poona Durbar of our intentions in the event of the French taking part in the present disputes between the Marathas and Tippoo Sultan, must be the subject of a communication from you to Mahajee Sindia when a proper opportunity (not sought for) shall offer of conversing with him on this subject.

76. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Delhi, 4th February 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 2nd instant, when I informed your Lordship that my presentation to the king, which had been fixed for that day, was delayed on account of a point of form. This however, having been in the end adjusted to my satisfaction (although, as I have reason to believe, not without a reference to Camp), I was this morning introduced to His Majesty, who received me in the customary manner. After I had delivered your Lordship's and the prince Jahandar Shah's letters to the King's address, and the forms of my reception were over, His Majesty, desiring me to approach him, made a short but set speech to me, the purport of which was, that Sindia having with his royal approbation determined to proceed towards Jaynagar, it was His Majesty's pleasure that I should forthwith receive my dismissal and accompany Shah Nizam-ud-din and Rajah Deshmukh to Camp, whither they were directed to repair immediately. Having been previously apprized of the resolution taken by the agents of Sindia at this Court, to make my presentation and dismissal the business of one hour, and also aware of their design in so irregular a proceeding, I at once saw the necessity of defeating it, and accordingly made the following reply, which I accompanied by proper protestations of attachment and respect. I began by observing to His Majesty, that were he to dismiss me so suddenly as was proposed, such a step, being altogether unusual, and not induced by any sufficient urgency, could bear no other construction in the eyes of the world than that, having incurred his royal displeasure, he was impatient for my departure. To this I added that, as such a conclusion would be highly mortifying to my personal feelings as well as discreditable to the Government I served, I entertained a confident hope that rather than hazard appearances which might [destroy] the good understanding subsisting at present between all parties, His Majesty would allow me to attend him till I could be dismissed with honour to my employers and myself. The king made no answer to this address, with which however, I can assure your Lordship, he was by no means ill-pleased. It was otherwise I believe with Shah Nizam-ud-din, who hastily remarking that what I had said should be considered, proposed that I should for the present, take my leave. I accordingly immediately retired.

The motive of Sindia in thus pressing my abrupt dismissal is of a two-fold nature. In the first place, had I submitted to so unworthy a treatment, his general object in subjecting the English Resident at his Durbar to humiliating situations would have been considerably promoted. For an explanation of this singular system, I have already besought your Lordship's patience, but you may depend upon being furnished with one ere long. In the second place, having found it necessary to summon his principal creatures at this Court to Camp, his natural jealousy and

distrust suggested to him that were I to remain here behind them, His Majesty, when freed from the restraint which their presence always imposes on him, might engage me into what Sindia well knows to be his real views and wishes. A suspicion of this unjust kind being,—after the strong and repeated assurances of a sincere disposition to cultivate his good will and to deserve his confidence which I have given to Bhow Bakshee,—not only injurious to me, but in some sort affronting to our Government, I have judged it necessary so far from giving way to it, openly to resist the intended effect. With this view, though I shall of course encourage no overtures from the King towards a secret communication, yet I purpose delaying my departure from hence, beyond the period I had voluntarily fixed for it in my own mind. A conduct of this kind if steadily followed for a little while and duly tempered, will I trust, produce a happy alteration in the present system pursued by Sindia in respect to us. If I should be disappointed in this expectation, I will fairly confess my ill success to your Lordship, and at the same time unreservedly state to you what I shall then believe to be the only remedy for the evil in question.

Ambajee is expected here this afternoon. The same persons who were deputed from hence to meet me, went out this morning to receive and conduct him hither.

77. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Safdar Jang's tomb near Delhi, 17th February 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 7th instant, when I acknowledged my receipt of your Lordship's commands to me of the twenty-fourth ultimo, duplicate of which duly reached me.

The preparations of march which have been lately making at Cawnpore and Fathgarh, aided by the incidental movement of the Fourth Battalion of Europeans from the former to the latter station, have had the effect of rendering Sindia somewhat uneasy as to our object in them. As these appearances, however, will by this time probably have ceased, the fears produced by them will ere long subside, but as, independent of all external circumstances, he has for a considerable while past viewed, and will ever continue to view us, with a distrust that seems constitutional in him,—the most we shall obtain credit for on this occasion will be for a resolution not to break with him immediately. To inspire him with such a confidence in the sincerity of our friendship, as shall not be liable to be shaken even by the slightest circumstances, is not, I am afraid, practicable by any means reconcileable with the dignity and interests of your Lordship's Government

No notice having been taken to me, either of the rumour of our military preparations, or of Sindia's disquietude regarding them, I have of course observed a strict silence on the subject. Should the matter be broken to me, I shall be able to place it in such a light as will be sufficiently calculated to dissipate the apprehensions to which it has given rise, without being obliged to affirm anything untrue or offensive.

Sindia having expressed much impatience for my return to Camp, I propose proceeding thither as soon as I shall have properly accommodated certain points that have arisen in consequence of an affray that happened a few days ago, between some of my peoples, and a party of Marathas in the town.

Ambajee has halted at a place about eight cos to the northward of Delhi, where I understand he is directed to remain till further orders.

78. EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK.

Calcutta, 1st March 1787.

I have seen both your last letters to Mr. Shore, and you will have been informed by him that, although I was exceedingly sorry to hear that a coldness subsisted between you and Sindia, yet, from your statement of his behaviour to you, I approved in general of the line of conduct which you intend to pursue.

Mr. Shore will also have told you that in future, it will in every respect be most proper to address yourself on all such subjects directly to me, and I hope that you will put no restraint in communicating your sentiments with perfect openness and freedom, but it will be regular that they shall also be laid before the Board, that they may appear upon record as explanations of the motives that have influenced your public conduct and mine.

You are sufficiently acquainted with the real situation of this Government and with the line I am determined to pursue respecting the politics of India, to render it unnecessary for me to enlarge much upon either of these points.

It is conformable to our interests here, as well as to the wishes of the Government at Home to avoid altercation and war, whilst it is possible to do it without loss of reputation, and it is my earnest desire to impress all the Princes of Hindoostan with a conviction of my sincerity, when I declare that my inclination is to live with them upon terms of amity and good neighbourhood and that I am firmly resolved to abstain from doing them any kind of injury, unless I am driven to it by provocation on their part.

You will therefore easily conceive that it would have given me particular satisfaction if circumstances had admitted of your living on a footing of friendship and good humour with Sindia, for although the late discussions

between you or the consequences of them may not lead to an immediate breach, it may be naturally apprehended that they will tend to dispose him to evoke (? look) upon several of our late transactions with a more than usual jealousy ; and perhaps induce him to adopt views, and to think of other connections, which however ruinous they may prove in their consequences to himself, may likewise occasion very serious distress and inconvenience to us.

I am likewise obliged in candour to admit that in combining such circumstances as our intrigues with the Sikhs, etc., our declaration at Poona and the rumours at Cawnpore and Fathgarh with the late complaints from you as our Resident in his Camp, a mind less prone to suspicion than his might be justified in believing that we have deliberately resolved on measures of an offensive or hostile nature.

Having no such designs, it becomes extremely desirable to avoid the embarrassment that might follow the belief or imputation of them. It is however incumbent upon us to take no step in endeavoring to remove those impressions, which can be construed to proceed from fear, and thereby contribute to feed his vanity or to encourage his ambition.

I shall have pleasure in hearing that he has become more accommodating, and that you have been induced to return to his camp before you receive this letter. In that case you will have communicated the answers to the four propositions which he sent by Mr. Anderson. But should the execution of that instruction have been delayed, I wish you to waive other considerations and to repair to him for that avowed purpose ; because I have already informed his Vakeel, that you are in possession of my orders on that subject. If Sindia has, in breach of his promise, received Mr. Anderson's two servants that were formerly dismissed from his Camp, it will be proper to repeat, either to himself or to Bhow Baxy, what has been already stated on that head, and if in consequence of that representation, they are not again dismissed, and should any other reasons which may have occasioned your absence not be removed, you will withdraw from his Camp. I must however desire that upon this occasion you will use the utmost caution in your expressions ; they must be chosen so as rather to convey your regret at his want of complacency, than to imply any intention of resentment beyond the act of your absenting yourself from him.

Your good sense will immediately point out to you the substance and intention of this dispatch. It is to explain to you that I wish to avoid a public breach with Sindia, and therefore should he, from any motives whatever, continue the slights and inattentions of which you complain, I expect from your prudence that, in expressing or shewing your sense of them, you will treat them as much as possible as matters of personal offence only ; that this Government may not be committed to go farther from punctilio than may be judged expedient from consideration of interest.

The internal state of our own affairs and the importance of a character of moderation sufficiently require an attention to all the cautions that I have directed. I am also called upon to recollect that as the Government at Home and nation at large are far from being as sensible as we are of Sindia's weakness, and at present consider him as a valuable ally, a rupture or even a declared coldness with him would occasion serious and inconvenient apprehensions among them.

Should the cases exist which authorize you to quit his camp, you will in the first instance go towards, but not further than Agra,—and by giving me the earliest notice of your determination you will probably receive instructions in time for your future conduct. But before and during that interval you must be particularly careful to avoid all communication with any person whatever which could give Sindia the smallest ground to suspect or to accuse you of intriguing with his enemies against him.

I can hardly foresee any circumstances likely to arise that will oblige you to take more decisive measures, than I have already supposed. If however you should find it necessary to go further, my desire still is, that without concealing your own displeasure, you will avoid threatening him with the resentment of Government, and by a letter in guarded terms attribute your departure to a desire to meet Mrs. Kirkpatrick, or to any other cause that may at the time appear most ostensible and plausible.

If matters should unluckily arrive at that crisis, we shall consider with great deliberation whether it will be more proper, after obtaining every necessary apology and satisfaction for the causes that may have occasioned it, to send you back or some other person in your room to that station. At present I am not prepared in my own mind to decline willingly having a Resident with Sindia from this Government.

79. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Safdar Jang's tomb, near Delhi, 21st February 1787.

My last address to your Lordship was under date the seventeenth instant. On the day following, I had the honour to receive your Lordship's commands of the 6th ultimo.

I have now the honour to transmit your Lordship, under a separate cover, some dispatches from Mr. Malet which I received yesterday evening. Their latest date is the nineteenth of January.

The stay of Shah Nizam-ud-din and Deshmukh in Camp has exceeded the term prescribed by the King and engaged for by Sindia. This has arisen principally, I believe, from the difficulty which the latter either really finds, or pretends to find, in providing funds for even a partial discharge of His Majesty's pecuniary claims on him, without which both

the Shah and Deshmukh have plainly declared that their return to Court will be but of little avail towards the accomplishment of the objects that Sindia has chiefly at heart. The most material of these is said to be the possession of the Citadel of Delhi, which being garrisoned by his troops would effectually shut up almost every avenue to the Royal person, which could then be approached only by his own creatures, or with their consent ; at present the Citadel is guarded by the dependants of the Nabob Nazir (the Chief of the King's eunuchs), between whom and Sindia there subsists no good understanding.

Shah Nizam-ud-din took with him from His Majesty an honorary dress for Sindia, who has, however, hitherto declined receiving it. His view in this extraordinary behaviour is pretty generally understood to be the intimidating of the King, and by that means inducing him to a more ready compliance with his wishes than His Majesty has yet been disposed to manifest.

My departure for Camp continues to be prevented by the slowness of the Maratha agent here in settling the affair which I hinted at, in my last address to your Lordship ; and I have reason to think that he waits the orders of his principal on the occasion.

My latest accounts from Camp lead me to conclude that Sindia's alarm on account of the preparations at our frontier military stations is blown over.

Ambaji has prosecuted his march, and is, according to my intelligence, to reach Panipat today ; none of the tributary or Sikh Chiefs have yet given him certain assurances of joining him.

80. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Safdar Jang's tomb, near Delhi, 24th February 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the twenty-first instant, with some dispatches from Mr. Malet. I have now the pleasure to transmit you under a separate cover, four Leyden Gazettes, which I received last night from Mr. Ramsay, who charged me to forward them to your Lordship, with his most respectful compliments. That gentleman informs me that the *Panther* snow arrived at Bombay from Bussora towards the end of January, and that Captain Capper, who is charged with the Order of the Garter for your Lordship, came thither on her, and was to proceed immediately on one of the Company's vessels to Calcutta.

Having reason to expect, that the affair which has lately detained me here will be settled in a day or two as much to my satisfaction as is necessary to insist on, I purpose returning to Camp as speedily as possible. Should the celebration of His Majesty's accession to the Throne be fixed for an early day, I think it will be proper for me to defer my

departure for the purpose of offering him my compliments on the occasion in person. Though should I wait here, however, with this view, it will make but the difference of a few days in my arrival at Camp.

Sindia arrayed himself on the twenty-second instant (with the customary forms) in the honorary dress with which Shah Nizam-ud-din had been charged for him; on the same day his *pesk khima* or 'Front set of tents,' was dispatched a few miles on the road towards Dig, to which place it is probable he will ere long proceed, with the view of intimidating the Rajah of Jainagar, who has of late appeared to manifest a resolution of resisting the encroachments of the Maratha Chief. This change in the disposition and councils of the Rajah is to be attributed to the suggestions of Dowlat Ram, who, about a month ago, was reinstated in his office and restored to his influence at this Court, which he had been obliged to quit by the intrigues of a party in the interest of Sindia.

Ambajee is arrived at Panipat, but has not yet been joined by any of the Sikh Chiefs on whom Sindia reckons for assistance in the prosecution of his designs in that quarter.

81. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Safdar Jang's tomb, near Delhi, 28th February 1787.

My last address to you was under date the twenty-fourth instant, when I addressed your Lordship of my having at that time some reason to expect a speedy settlement of the affair which has latterly occasioned my detention here. In this hope however, I am sorry to be obliged to say that, I have been disappointed,—the principal Maratha agent at this Court having hitherto evaded the performance of his repeated promises to me on this occasion.

My letters from Camp to-day inform me that Shah Nizam-ud-din and Deshmukh were dismissed last night by Sindia, and that they were to depart this morning on their return to Delhi, where they are accordingly expected to arrive, either (—each) to make Sindia a present of a lac of Rupees. [The Shah] has been very successful in regard to his own personal affairs, having obtained a considerable addition to the jagir he possessed previous to his late visit to Camp. He has not however managed so well for the King; having procured, it is said, little more than two lacs of Rupees on His Majesty's account, although the royal household are above five months in arrears.

There are three persons about the King's person whom Sindia suspecting to be disaffected to him is desirous of ruining. These are the Nabab Nazir, Rajah Dayaram, and Maulvi Ataullah whose jagirs he is bent upon sequestrating. The Shah has undertaken to reconcile his Majesty to this measure, which however repugnant it may be to his inclinations, he will most probably be obliged to acquiesce in.

Ambajee has advanced about ten cos beyond Panipat and was, according to my latest accounts, encamped upon the banks of the Jamna at the distance of eighteen cos from Ghausgarh, which is the principal fortress in the possession of Ghulam Qadir Khan. Here he was in expectation of being speedily joined by Baghel Singh a Sikh Chief of some note among those who occupy the country lying between Panipat and Sarhind. After the junction of Baghel Sing there is a great probability of his crossing the Jamna and proceeding directly against Ghulam Qadir Khan, unless he should be able to prevail upon him to consent to an interview, which I understand he is labouring to bring about. In the event of Ambajee's commencing hostilities against this Chief, I am of opinion that the latter can make but a faint opposition. His troops are far from being numerous, and being but ill paid are far from being well affected to him. He has a faction to struggle with, excited against him by his grand-uncle Afzal Khan; and besides, altho' so embarrassed, his country is just now overrun by a body of Sikhs whom he lately very unwisely provoked by an act of hostility that brought him little or no advantage. Thus circumstanced, Ambajee who is a very active officer would hardly find any difficulty in reducing him, were he to enter upon this enterprize immediately.

At Panipat Ambajee was joined by the corps raised by Samroo and at present commanded by a son of his who bears the Muhamadan name of Zafar-yab Khan. This young man is represented to be entirely under the direction of his mother, who has the reputation of being a woman of great knowledge and prudence. Though he accompanies Ambajee at present, yet he takes every possible precaution for guarding against any treacherous design that that commander may have formed. He knows himself to be suspected by Sindia, and this is sufficient to render him distrustful of that Chief's general. With these dispositions, it is not likely that he will render any considerable services to Ambajee, yet as he possesses jagirs to a large amount which are in a great measure at the mercy of Sindia he will not, it may be reasonably presumed, precipitately engage in any open act of contumacy.

Sindia was to move today a few miles towards Dig, which is in the direction of Jaynagar. His late accounts from that quarter, stating that the Rajah was making great preparations for action and that troops were constantly joining him from Jodhpoor, having given him no little uneasiness. The season being so far advanced however, it does not appear likely to me that he will engage seriously in this expedition just now. The utmost he will probably do, till next year, will be the making a few marches and the reinforcing of Rajjee Patel, his present commander on that service.

P.S.—Since closing my letter I have received documents from Ambajee's Camp informing me of that commander's having had an

interview with Baghel Singh, Doorga Singh and two other Sikh Chiefs on the 26th instant. They appear to have brought with them only about one thousand horses, but expect to be joined shortly by considerable reinforcements.

82. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Safdar Jang's tomb, near Delhi, 10th March 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 28th ultimo, since which period little alteration and none of a material nature has taken place in the affairs of this quarter. Sindia has advanced to Dighaut [22 m. south of Ballahgarh] in view of intimidating the Rajpoot confederates and of confirming the Mogul Chiefs employed under Rayjee Patel in their obedience to that Commander, who has for some time past appeared very distrustful of their intentions. What specific grounds he may have for his suspicions I know not ; but it is certain that these Chiefs having abundant reason to be dissatisfied with Sindia, are not unlikely to be disaffected to the service they are engaged in. Deprived mostly of the jageers which they had long enjoyed under their former masters, distressed in their pecuniary circumstances owing to their being like the rest of Sindia's troops exceedingly ill paid, and influenced by a violent antipathy which they bear towards the Marathas,—their disposition to join the enemies of the latter can hardly be doubted. The counsels of the Rajpoot Confederacy, however, being rather unsteady, its strength not being very considerable, and its reputation for good faith not standing much higher than that of their neighbours,—it is not probable that these Chiefs will hastily enter into engagements with it. There are it is true some events that might have the effect of precipitating them into such a connection, and among the most likely of these I reckon the immoderate distrust of Sindia, which rising to a certain height not unusual with him leaves no safety for its object but in open defection. Should this or any other cause drive the Moguls into the arms of the Confederates, the affairs of Sindia in the Jaypoor quarter would, I take it, go near to be irretrievably ruined ; since as long as there subsisted a good understanding between the Rajpoot and fugitive chiefs, even the presence of the Maratha himself would avail but little towards their restoration. At present I do not believe that Sindia purposes proceeding to the support of Rayjee Patel beyond Dig. His solicitude for the issue of the expedition under Amhjee rendering him desirous of keeping as near this commander as possible, I am led to think that nothing but Rayjee's being very hard pressed by the Rajpoots will induce him to quit his present station, and that the better to obviate such a necessity it is not unlikely but he may instruct this general to temporise with the enemy and amuse them with negotiations till the ensuing winter, when he may expect to be better able to pursue his designs against them than he is at this time. Indeed, the season is now too far

advanced to admit of his effecting anything important prior to the commencement of the rains, during which it is pretty certain he will never venture to canton in the Jaypoor country.

Ambajee continues encamped on the western bank of the Jamna. In my last I had the honor of informing your Lordship that he had been joined by Baghel Sing. The ostensible cause of his inactivity since that period is the festival of the *Hooly*, to celebrate which he pretends to have halted so long. I have some reason however for believing that he waits the result of certain negotiations which he is carrying on with the Sikh Chiefs at present in the Doab thro' the mediation of Baghel Sing. The object of Ambajee is to prevail with those Chiefs to repair to his standard, or failing therein, to engage them to reject the overtures to an accommodation which Ghulam Qadir Khan, sensible of his danger from the Maratha Commander, has lately been obliged to make them. If he succeeds in either point, the Pathan will be entirely at his mercy, but if on the contrary a jealousy of Ambajee and a desire of preserving their present interest in Sahibzadon (through which they have always found it easy to carry their depredations into Meerat and the neighbourhood of Dehlee) should induce them to support Ghulam Qadir Khan, the latter will be able to make such a resistance in the event of his being attacked as may protract his reduction for another year.

Shah Nizam-ud-din has not hitherto been able, I understand, to remove the King's objections either to the resumption or the reduction of the jagheers belonging to the Nabab Nazir and other persons in the favor or confidence of His Majesty. As he stands pledged however to Sindia for carrying this measure and as the King can make no effectual resistance to it, there can be little doubt of his accomplishing it. Shah Nizam-ud-din not long since supported himself by begging in the city where he now rules. He raised himself to his present situation by address, and he will not suddenly lose his power if it can be secured to him either by cunning or by knavery.

I wish I could inform your Lordship of my being at liberty to return to Camp. Sindia however not having yet offered me the least satisfaction for what has passed, I think it incumbent on me to maintain the point

83. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Ko-i, 16th March 1787.

On the 11th instant I did myself the honor of acknowledging my receipt of your letter of the 1st and of submitting to your Lordship, in a loose manner, such thoughts as occurred to my mind on the first perusal of it. I have since considered it with the utmost attention, and made myself, I trust, thoroughly acquainted with the general spirit and object of the observations and instructions contained in it.

This object is doubtlessly, as your Lordship has stated it, of the most desirable and important nature, and two of the considerations urged by your Lordship in proof of the expediency of our pursuing it, by continuing to maintain as long as possible a close and amicable intercourse with Mahajee Sindia, are particularly forcible. It is certain that, till of late "neither the real situation of this Chief, nor the principles which should regulate our connection with him, have been probably understood even in this country. Hence, it must be confessed, that were a rupture or an avowed coldness to take place between him and the Government, such a circumstance might be productive of much serious apprehension and inconvenience at Home, which no explanation of its causes, however reasonable or calculated to reconcile people to the event might be able to remove so speedily as the public interests might require". It must likewise be acknowledged, that a continuance of the misunderstanding which has hitherto unhappily subsisted between Sindia and me, when combined and co-operating with other fears and suspicions, which are constantly excited in his mind by the most frivolous circumstances, and which the most guarded conduct on our part can never prevent, would have a tendency to increase the natural jealousy and distrust with which he views all our proceedings. That our personal differences, however, should produce such an effect as this, is owing entirely to the peculiarity of his character. A man of more delicacy and ingenuousness would discover the cause of my dissatisfaction in his own extraordinary behaviour, and attribute it solely to this, instead of tracing it to a predetermined design of breaking with him. Whether he is really insensible of the impropriety of his carriage towards me, or whether he only affects to be so, in order to cover his disinclination to depart from a system that he has long pursued with success, I will not pretend to determine. It is certain, however, that the opposition which I have made to his unwarrantable schemes, has furnished such men as make their court to him by feeding his distrust, with a pretext for imputing unfriendly intentions to us. Not aware of my having penetrated the real view of Sindia in his recent treatment of me, or of my resolution to frustrate it, undiscerning persons, and even Sindia himself (who, I will assure your Lordship, is more distinguished for cunning than sagacity) may, (when other incidents happen to favor their suspicion) be induced to trace my conduct to this false source, and to consider my displeasure as assumed merely for the purpose of concealing our true disposition and object. Wild and irrational as such a conjecture must on various accounts be allowed to be, yet my knowledge of the people among whom I reside, obliges me to confess, that even the most shrewd and observing of them frequently form conclusions no less extravagant.

Under an impression of this sort, to which your Lordship has very justly supposed Sindia capable of yielding, it is certainly possible for him to be induced to think of forming new connexions, with the view of strengthening

himself against a future rupture with our Government ; and although when I consider the numerous difficulties opposed, by the peculiarity of his political situation, to his engaging in any alliance calculated to inspire him with much confidence, I do not think such an event altogether likely ; yet I will readily own that the bare possibility of it, gives it a claim to the most serious regard, and makes it necessary for us to exert the greatest practicable care in guarding against what would unquestionably be, in the present posture of our affairs, an evil of the first political magnitude, since I am thoroughly convinced that should Sindia ever be brought to believe himself able to resist us, there would be little else requisite for tempting him to attack us.

Powerful, however, my Lord, as I have allowed both these considerations to be, I am obliged candidly to say that they can, at most only, increase the desire I have always had to maintain a friendly and good humoured intercourse with Sindia. They cannot remove the difficulties raised against the accomplishment of your Lordship's views and my own wishes, by the unhappy character of that Chief, who is not to be cured of his distrust but by an unworthy submission to his humour ; and who cannot be made to treat us with ordinary respect or attention, but by a conduct unavoidably tending to augment that distrust. Reduced to this unpleasant alternative, I could not hesitate in determining on the line which it became me to pursue ; and my choice having received the approbation of your Lordship, I have now no other cause for regret or concern, but what arises from the entire conviction I entertain of my inability to effect the ultimate object of your Lordship's instructions, which, though perfectly reasonable as well as desirable, must nevertheless remain unattainable, as long as Sindia continues to think and act by us as he does at present. In time he may possibly be brought to hold a juster sense both of himself and of us ; when it may be practicable to live with him on an honourable footing of political friendship, without being obliged to engage in ill-humoured discussions with him, or to pursue measures any way calculated to excite his jealousy or distrust. Before so considerable a revolution, however, can be produced in the mind and manners of Sindia, much, I am afraid, must be done as well as said, of a nature that cannot fail both to displease and to alarm him. My conduct has certainly had the effect of raising each of the sentiments in him ; although it is as certain that it ought not to have occasioned either the one or the other, since I have never lost sight of the respect due from me to his station, and since I have on several occasions pointedly discouraged the advances of his domestic as well as foreign enemies. My sole claim on him has been for such a return of respect and attention as I judged due to my situation, and essential to the honour and interests of your Lordship's Government. The sole aim of my action ever since I took charge of my office has been to reconcile my duty to your Lordship with the conciliation of Sindia's

mind. In this pursuit I have hitherto, I grieve to say, been totally unsuccessful; and I perceive the task to be so arduous, as to make it necessary for me to own that, without hazarding many of those embarrassing and unpleasant circumstances so justly disliked by your Lordship as involving political consequences of a very serious nature, I do not conceive it possible to work such a change in the conduct and views of the Maratha Chief, as is requisite towards rendering my future residence with him either useful or honourable.

Were your Lordship as well satisfied as to this truth as I have ventured to declare myself to be, you would perhaps hesitate but little in choosing between the two expedients which would in this case constitute the only alternative to which Government could have recourse. The question would then be compressed into this single consideration: *viz.* whether the fears and distrust of Sindia would be more likely to be raised, and consequently the peace subsisting between us be more likely to be disturbed, by the total revocation of the deputation to his Durbar, or by as long a perseverance as might be requisite in the strong line of conduct that I have marked out for my pursuit. It is fair, in this place, to observe, that the former measure, besides the alarm which it might excite in the mind of Sindia, would subject us, in the negotiation of certain matters of inferior moment, to some inconvenience: and that the latter, besides the effect intended to be produced by it, would be liable to occasion other impressions never designed, but which no prudence, without degenerating into a dangerous sort of complaisance, could altogether guard against.

It will no doubt be perceived by your Lordship, that I have here assumed rather more than it might be proper in your Lordship to grant, on an occasion of such importance, without the most mature deliberation and the most entire persuasion of the accuracy of my statements and the justness of my opinions. For, notwithstanding it should be admitted that Sindia entertains the systematic design imputed to him, both by my predecessor and myself; and although it be granted that his peculiar character and frame of mind may render it exceedingly difficult to inspire him at once with entire confidence in our good faith, and with more just and honourable views in respect to us, yet it may not be so readily allowed, that this end is altogether unattainable. Nor would I, permit me to assure your Lordship, however I may eventually be interested in the question, wish so important a conclusion to be hastily drawn. Desirable as it certainly is, in the present posture of our affairs, that we should preserve such an understanding with Sindia as, without being injurious in any shape to our honor or interests, may be calculated to prevent him from precipitating himself into new and dangerous connexions, for the purpose of guarding against our future ambition or resentment, I would much rather, that the failure of my endeavours to accomplish so essential an object, should prove to have proceeded from my want either of address or of temper than that

the pursuit should turn out to be utterly fruitless. Willing as I am, however, that the former should appear to be the case, and forward as a sense of duty would make me in declaring it to be so, were I conscious of any particular defects that disqualified me for the task, I should be neither just to myself, nor faithful to the interests of the Government I serve, if, through a mistaken diffidence, I concealed from your Lordship my real and deliberate opinions on the point under consideration. These, my Lord, to state them summarily and candidly are : First, that Sindia, being the slave of an incurable jealousy and distrust, and a man entirely unacquainted with these liberal and generous principles of policy which, since the commencement of our connection, have invariably actuated our conduct toward him, has been betrayed by the narrowness of his mind, co-operating with the vanity produced by success, into a persuasion that our unremitting attention and moderation in respect to him have proceeded firmly from the necessity of our affairs. Secondly, that presuming on this *necessitas*, he has availed himself in the most unfair manner, of our conciliatory and accommodating dispositions, by falsely construing every instance of them (at all capable of such an interpretation,) into a dread of his power; and lastly, that experiencing on some late occasions, a greater resistance to his insidious designs and a firmer assertion of the honour of our Government, than would, perhaps, have been proper at an earlier period, or before gentler remedies had been ineffectually tried,—he is led by the same grossness of sentiment which renders him incapable of comprehending the true motives of our solicitude to please him, to impute every seeming deviation from, or diminution of, our usual complacency and forbearance, to a favourable alteration in the state of our affairs, and a consequent adoption of other measures, and of other views.

Such my Lord, being the idea which I have formed of the character and policy of Sindia, I need hardly add, that I should have but little hopes of matters being much mended by a change of Residents. A more facile and accommodating behaviour than I have judged it prudent to practise towards him, would undoubtedly better please him, and of course, have the effect of producing a greater appearance of harmony and good understanding between us. But besides the evils which I have elsewhere shewn an over-a-ted complaisance liable to produce, it is much to be apprehended, that were I, after an open disagreement with Sindia, to be succeeded by another person, the confidence and arrogance of this Chief might rise to such a height as would, in their natural effects, render the task of my successor far more arduous than even mine. Were it not for this fear, and did I not sincerely believe that, in order to correct the manner and opinions of Sindia, (as far as these regard us), there is a necessity for acting by him occasionally as froward children are sometimes treated, I should have concurred, without hesitation, in the possible expediency

of such a measure in the event of my being obliged to quit his Camp. Indeed, although there is no situation however difficult or unpleasant which I should not be proud to fill under your Lordship's administration, yet it is not to be conceived, that I should be backward in relinquishing an employment of great embarrassment and delicacy if I could thereby better advance the purposes of your Lordship's Government, than by continuing in it. I have presumed to offer this observation with the view of impressing your Lordship the more strongly with a belief, that if I were to feel any reluctance in resigning my present charge to another person, it would arise solely from a principle of zeal and solicitude for the interest and honour of my employer, however mistaken that principle might be in its application or object. On this head I will trouble your Lordship no further, than by observing that, as I am persuaded the measure in question will not be adopted but on the most mature deliberation, so I shall most cheerfully submit to it, whatever my doubts of its success may be.

The freedom with which I have expressed myself in the course of the present address will, I trust, satisfy your Lordship, that if I have omitted communicating to you some opinions and facts which it would have been proper in me to have laid before you, this omission has not proceeded from my feeling any restraint or difficulty in such a task or from my entertaining any doubts of your Lordship's indulgence. My backwardness in stating to your Lordship such points as some of those which I have discussed in the course of my correspondence with Mr. Shore, has proceeded from a two-fold consideration, having been partly occasioned by an unwillingness to appear singular or novel in my opinions, and partly from a desire of confining the disclosure of unpleasant circumstances as much as possible, while I had a hope of being able to remove them without the direct knowledge, or the open interference of Government. This sort of reserve, however, not appearing expedient to your Lordship, and being otherwise, it would seem, liable to objection, I shall in future be directed, as to the form and manner of my communications, by your late instructions; and shall accordingly, also, in conformity to the spirit of these, throw together as speedily as possible, all the material parts of my several letters to Mr. Shore, and address the whole to your Lordship, to the end that my opinions, such as they are, may if necessary be entered on the public records.

I lost no time after my receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 1st instant in applying to the King for my audience of leave. Having obtained my dismissal (as I had the honor of informing you under date the 15th instant) on the 13th, I quitted Delhi the following day, with the avowed intention of returning to Camp. In my address of the 11th instant I intimated to your Lordship, that I should reluctantly appear at the Durbar of Sindia, as he had declined affording me the least satisfaction on

the point that had latterly induced me to delay my departure from Delhi. On better consideration, however, of your Lordship's late instructions to me, I conceived it to be my duty no longer to defer my return to Camp ; but to pursue exactly the line therein prescribed to me. Being accordingly advanced within two days' journey of the army, I shall ere long be enabled to acquaint your Lordship with the dispositions of Sindia towards me, and shall be inexpressibly happy should these be calculated to make my continuance in Camp reconcilable with my duty. In all events your Lordship may confidently rely on my proceeding with the utmost caution : not only in our personal discussions, but in every other particular adverted to in your instructions to me, I never under any circumstances, permit me to assure your Lordship, proposed taking so strong a measure as the formally quitting of Sindia's Camp : and as to the threatening him on any occasion with the resentment of our Government or even insinuating any thing capable of such a construction, I persuade myself that your Lordship does not think it possible for me to be guilty of so outrageous and unwarrantable a conduct. In respect to correspondences or connexions liable to excite the distrust of Sindia, it will be sufficient, I beg your Lordship to believe, if I continue to act as guardedly as I have hitherto done. To be more circumspect than I have hitherto been on this head is, I think, impossible ; yet it certainly is not so that Sindia should be easily made to suspect me of intriguing with his enemies.

84. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Barsana, 17th March 1787.

Notwithstanding that there are several circumstances which concur to render it unlikely that Sindia will embark this season in a personal expedition against Jaynagar, yet as such an event is by no means impossible, I think the present conjecture a proper one for submitting to your Lordship's consideration a few observations relative to the political effect produced generally by the attendance of an English Resident on Sindia in his enterprizes against these Powers whose reduction is necessary to the advancement of his ambitious designs. This point has principally engaged my attention on account of its being closely connected with the strict observance of that system of neutrality wisely determined to be pursued by Government in respect to the disputes of the Hindostan Chiefs, and for this reason I am persuaded also that your Lordship will readily excuse my freedom in offering my opinions on so interesting a subject, whether they should happen to coincide with your own or not.

That the attendance of the English Resident is highly useful to Sindia in the prosecution of his ambitious schemes is a fact which I believe has been long pretty generally admitted and was lately placed in a very strong

light by the King, who did not scruple to observe in public Court "upon the advantage which would result from its being known that the English minister was advancing with the army towards Jaynagar". Hence, it would seem as if the appointment of a Resident at the Durbar of this Chief were less calculated for the service of our own Government than for the advancement of his views ; although it is certain that it can be no more for our interest to promote the success of these than it would be reconcileable perhaps either with true policy or good faith to check or oppose them.

It must be allowed that in Europe a Prince very rarely if ever derives any essential advantage from being accompanied in his military expeditions by the ambassadors of those States with whom he is in alliance, and that there may even in this country be many situations wherein an Indian Chief could draw little or no benefit from being attended in his wars by an English minister. My reasoning in the present case is by no means of a general nature, and I offer it as applicable only to the particular circumstances of Mahajee Sindia.

Surrounded as he is by various tributary and independent Chiefs whom either his capacity or ambition has rendered hostile to him, it is not to be wondered at that he should endeavor to impress both of these with a belief that we not only approve of his views but are also ready at his call openly to assist him in the achievement of them. On a former occasion, indeed, I have stated on very good grounds that he often pushes this imposture even further ; but it will be sufficient in the present case if we suppose him solicitous to inculcate a general persuasion among his enemies of our determination to afford him military aid whenever he may stand in need of it ; and if your Lordship will turn to Mr. Anderson's letter of the 30th November last to Colonel Harper (copy of which was transmitted to you by the former gentleman), you will be satisfied I think that he is not likely to neglect any opportunity calculated to convey an idea of this sort. What I here particularly refer your Lordship to is the artifice attempted to be practised by Sindia on the occasion of Apa Khande Rao's proposed retreat into the Doab, but which was very properly defeated by my predecessor, who saw its pernicious tendency in its full extent. The design here attributed to Sindia appears still clearer in the declaration of the King as stated above. This was throwing the veil aside and plainly acknowledging the purpose to which my attendance on the army was intended to be converted.

That Sindia has had considerable success in his endeavours to inculcate this false notion is, I am afraid, too true. As for the methods pursued by him in order to accomplish this end, a perfect insight into these can only be afforded by a knowledge of his negotiations and correspondences. Such however is the particular propensity of the natives of this country (above all other people) to yield to the slightest appearances, so apt are

they to exaggerate and misconceive, and so little are they able to account for the attendance of an English minister upon Sindia in the foreign expeditions of this chief (a thing rather new) from any other principle than that of one being engaged in his views, that tho' he were to take no pains to establish this opinion, I believe it would nevertheless obtain under the peculiar circumstances of our connexion, viewed as they are thro' a medium of ignorance and prejudice. So far however from trusting solely to the operation of these causes, I am persuaded that Sindia labors to spread this erroneous notion by every artifice that a bold and persevering cunning can suggest.

My conduct for some time past, whatever effect it may have produced in the mind of Sindia, can hardly have failed I think to frustrate in some degree this unfair and dangerous design. I confess I should have been better pleased to have had no occasion to contribute to the defeat, but having been forced into the measures which I have latterly pursued by the behaviour of Sindia and of his officers, it was a great encouragement and satisfaction to me to consider that by persevering in the line I had been obliged to take, I should in some measure open the eyes of the world in respect to the true value of our connexion with this Chief, without furnishing him with any *reasonable* cause of offence. To accomplish effectually however a point so desirable I am of opinion that it is expedient for us to avail ourselves of the particular situation of Sindia at this juncture. The present posture of his affairs in the Jaynagar quarter not appearing to be quite satisfactory to him, it is not impossible but he may determine on proceeding thither in person this season.

The object is certainly the entire reduction of that country, nor do I think that in a political view we are at all interested in the issue of the expedition. At the same time it would seem proper that we should not in any degree or by any means whatsoever aid him in the accomplishment of this design, or even suffer it to be thought that we favoured it. If a due regard to the honor and dignity of our Government calls upon us to repel the idea, endeavored to be inculcated by Sindia, of our being *entirely subject to his power*; so, in order to obtain credit with the people of Hindostan for those principles of political justice and of perfect neutrality by which we have wisely resolved to regulate our conduct in respect to the interest of its Chiefs, it perhaps behoves us carefully to avoid every measure that may in any sort appear to proceed from a different system or be even susceptible of a different construction.

Of this kind however would, I am of opinion, be the attendance of the English Resident upon Sindia in his projected expedition against Jaynagar. The purpose which he would make it answer is rendered abundantly clear by the King's declaration, by his own solicitude for my accompanying him, and by the facility with which he would be able to make it believed (by men under the influence of fear and not distinguished for much

sagacity or penetration) that we countenanced the enterprize. Now, as an effect of this sort could not be at all creditable to our Government, as it would in no shape be beneficial to us as it would be incompatible with the impression which we wish to be produced by our present guarded system of policy, and as Sindia certainly has not any claim upon us for a concurrence in his wishes upon a point of so delicate a nature, I have no hesitation in offering to your Lordship as my humble opinion that I ought not to attend him, either in his expedition against Jaynagar or on any other enterprize that may have the reduction of any of the neighbouring Chiefs for its object.

The proposition which I have here with so much freedom submitted to your Lordship appears liable to two objections: The first is that my retiring from Camp in such a conjuncture might have the effect of increasing Sindia's usual and natural distrust of our intentions; and the second is that my absence during such a period might occasion obstructions and delays in the transaction of the business connected with my employment. What weight these considerations may deserve it rests with your Lordship to determine. In respect to the former of them my own idea is that there would be no necessity for avowing the real cause of my declining to attend him, since I might excuse myself on various plausible and sufficient grounds; and in regard to the latter I can safely affirm that very little if any inconvenience of the sort referred to would result from my absence. The ordinary business seldom requires personal conferences, and matters of importance are rather less likely to occur between us while he is engaged in a distant expedition than at any other season. Indeed, My Lord, I have for some time past been inclined to think that our affairs at this Durbar would, in general, be most advantageously managed by a person in the character of an envoy who might be occasionally deputed to him for the purpose. To awe the distrustful temper of Sindia or to improve the friendship subsisting between him and our Government is so far, I believe, from being in the power of any Resident that the contrary effects are rather to be apprehended from that office, so long as it may be necessary for us to oppose the success of a design, which has for its object the inculcating of an idea "that the English are completely subject to the power of Sindia." For the rest I am persuaded that we shall for a long time find this Chief a very quiet neighbour, and being in the interim but little interested in his transactions with other Powers, it would not be difficult to obtain as constant and as accurate information of his proceedings and situation as might be requisite or useful.

In my address of yesterday I acquainted your Lordship that I was within two days' journey of the army. Understanding since however the Sindia has advanced a few cos from his station near Dig, it will probably be the day after tomorrow before I reach Camp. I have written

to Bhow Bakshee, signifying a wish that he would give me the meeting between this place and the army. I have two reasons for being desirous that he should comply with his proposal. One is, because circumstanced as I am just now with regard to Sindia, such a mark of attention is in some measure particularly necessary to my reappearance at his Durbar; and the other is because I should like to have a conference with the Bhow previous to my interview with his master, in order to explain certain points which it might be useful for the latter to understand rightly before we meet. I have put my request however to Bhow Bakshee solely on the latter footing, and whether he should acquiesce in it or not, I purpose proceeding to Camp without loss of time.

85. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

8 miles south-west of Balari, 22nd March 1787.

My last address to you was under date the 17th instant.

Sindia having marched every day since his departure from Dig, I have hitherto been unable to join him. I this morning reached the ground occupied yesterday by the army, which has advanced to-day about five cos. Sindia not having yet quitted his tents when I arrived here, sent a message to me by Bhow Bakshee, the purport of which was a request that I would join his Camp immediately. This not being practicable, but with greater inconvenience to my people than the occasion seemed to require, I sent for answer, that I should hardly be able to overtake the army till it halted. As this, according to Bhow Bakshee, is to be the case tomorrow, I expect to have an interview with Sindia on the twenty-fourth at furthest.

I have had written these two or three days as many letters from this Chief, earnestly pressing my speedy junction, mentioning the present necessity which urges his hasty march towards Jaynagar, and insinuating the propriety of my presence on an occasion in which, as we are firmly bound together in friendship, we are equally interested with himself. I have noticed these particulars to your Lordship because they will serve to illustrate in some degree the arguments set forth in my last letter of the 11th instant touching the political effect produced by my attendance on Sindia in such expeditions, as the one in which he is at present engaged.

In a former address I intimated it to be my opinion that nothing but Rayjee Pateel's being very hard pressed by the Rajpoots, would induce Sindia to undertake this season the personal direction of his affairs in the Jaynagar quarter. It would now seem that Rayjee has been reduced to very great straits by the confederates, and common rumour makes his situation very alarming indeed. Although however I believe the current reports to be much exaggerated, certain it is, that that Commander has

for some time past daily urged his master to advance speedily to his support,—Sindia's letters to myself acknowledging as much. In consequence of these repeated instances [? insistence] of Rayjee, the army has now approached within 20 *cos* of Jaynagar. Rayjee himself is encamped about 5 *cos* from that city, so that the two divisions of the Maratha forces will probably join in three or four days more.

86. EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK.

Calcutta, 28th March 1787.

I received your letter of the 10th, and of the 15th accompanied with Mr. Malct's dispatches.

I will own that on account of a variety of circumstances, I have considered it as extremely unlucky that you found occasion to prolong your stay for so considerable a time in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and it therefore gave me very great pleasure to learn by your last letter, that you were on your way back to your station with Sindia. Within the last few days I have received a letter of complaint against you from Sindia, a copy of which, with that of Sindia's letter to his Vakeel, containing the instructions to which he alludes, I now enclose.

Those complaints being expressed in very general terms, and not having specified any particulars of importance except that of your having requested leave of the King to erect a building on the Taj Mahal, I cannot at present form any opinion of them, nor have I any inclination to do so, until I can receive your answer.

Sindia cannot be ignorant of many intrigues that met with more countenance than I approve of from this quarter; and your long residence about Delhi may have contributed to increase his jealousy of this Government.

In that temper, he will naturally have been inclined to exaggerate any supposed ground of complaint, or to have too readily believed reports for which no cause has been given.

From your being so perfectly well acquainted with Sindia's relative situation with the King, I am fully persuaded that you have furnished no ground for the complaint of your having made the request that he mentions, to His Majesty; because independent of all their ideas about the sanctity of the place, it would have been obvious to you, that an attempt in our Resident to obtain any point or favour from the King, through any channel but Sindia's, could have been considered by him in no other light than that of a premeditated insult from his Government.

I enclose a copy of the answer that I have written to Sindia and of the paper which I gave to Sindia's Vakeel to be transmitted to his master.

87. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, near Manpoor, 23rd March 1787.*

I had yesterday the honour of addressing you from near Balaheri.

Permit me to acquaint your Lordship, that the army having halted to-day, I reached camp this morning and shall pay Sindia a visit in the afternoon.

88. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, near Daosa, 24th March 1787.

In my letter of yesterday, I had the honour of informing you that I was to visit Sindia in the afternoon. This I accordingly did, when in a long conference I communicated to him your Lordship's answer to his four written propositions ; and supported their propriety with the arguments furnished for that purpose by your Lordship, and others with which I had prepared myself for the occasion. I will tomorrow detail the material parts of our conference for the greater satisfaction of your Lordship ; having been prevented from doing this as yet by the movement of the army.

89. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 25th March 1787.

I proceed conformably to the promise contained in my letter of yesterday, to state to your Lordship what passed of a material nature, between Mahajee [and myself at the conference] we held on the 23rd instant.

After your Lordship's letter had been read to him, I desired that a Persian copy of the propositions which had been transmitted by him to your Lordship through Mr. Anderson might be produced. This being accordingly done, my Maulvi, pursuant to my directions, recited the several articles separately in the Hindostan language, reading after each of them, in the same dialect, the following answers which I had previously caused him to commit to paper.

To the first proposition my reply was, that the Maharajah (Sindia) might rely on his experiencing during your Lordship's administration, the same attentions which had been shewn to him by your predecessors ; and that he might also be assured of your invariably studying to preserve and strengthen every regulation of theirs that was calculated to increase the friendship subsisting between him and our Government.

* *Balari* is 16 m. due west, *Manpoor* is 8 m. south-east, *Sikandra* is 6 m. due south, and *Daosa* is 18 m. south-west of Bandikui railway junction.

To his second proposition my answer was, that whenever persons in his pay or *amil*s, and others bound to him by specific engagements, might elope and seek an asylum either in the Vizier's or the Company's territories, your Lordship would certainly not allow of their being protected. That in respect to fugitives of other descriptions, your Lordship would be governed by the nature of the case that might occur. That you would, on all such occasions act conformably to justice, reason and established usage, without losing regard to whatever might conduce to the increase of the friendship and good understanding subsisting between him and our nation ; and that your Lordship would, in return, look for the same conduct from him in respect to fugitives from the Vizier's and Company's provinces.

I added to this communication an assurance that he might confidently rely on your Lordship's never suffering such favor or protection to be extended to the Gosain as should be liable, in their effects, to disturb the friendship subsisting between him (the Maharajah) and the Vizier.

To his third proposition I answered generally, that he might depend on our Government's never departing on any occasion from the good faith which ought always to subsist between two States, mutually bound by treaties.

To the fourth proposition I replied plainly, that our Government could not possibly concur in a measure that tended to embroil us, while unprovoked, with other Powers, and to betray us into a violation of the faith of treaties, since it behoved us to act by others on the same principles of truth and good faith, which had hitherto influenced, and would always continue to influence, our conduct towards the Maratha nation.

Sindia observing on this answer, that in having submitted the preceding proposal to your Lordship's consideration, he had only meant to revive, under the auspices of your Lordship, a negotiation which, before your arrival, had been nearly brought to a conclusion, I thought the occasion required of me to inform him, that the negotiation alluded to by him was entirely at an end. The manner in which he received the communication sufficiently proved that it was not news to him.

Having expected that this matter would come into discussion in the course of our conference, I had prepared Persian notes of those arguments which had appeared to my judgment, after due deliberation, best calculated to reconcile him to the measure in question, and to his disappointment in consequence of it. From these notes my Moulvi stated to him in *Hindoo* [= Urdu] the following observations, of which I promised that, if he (the Maharajah) would weigh them with due and dispassionate attention I was satisfied they would produce in his mind a thorough conviction of the propriety of the resolutions which had been latterly taken by our Government. I confess however, that the utmost I expected to gain from my reasonings on the subject was the impressing him with a full persuasion

that the change of measures or policy which I was to defend, had not been induced by any diminution of our friendship for the Maratha State.

I began with observing that as the last treaty which had been concluded between the Maratha and English nations, did not require either of the contracting parties to afford military assistance to the other, under any conditions whatsoever, it followed that both were at liberty to act in this respect, as considerations of policy or the circumstances of the times should render expedient.

My second observation was that although it must be allowed that such a negotiation for military aid as he (the Maharajah) had alluded to, had been for some time in train, it was nevertheless to be recollected that no positive or final engagements had been entered into by our Government on this occasion.

In the third place I remarked that, if the matter was viewed in a just light, it would abundantly appear, that our Government in declining to afford the aid which had been negotiated for, had thereby instead of incurring the reproach of faithlessness, given an indisputable proof of strict adherence to their engagements, since a treaty of peace and friendship subsisting between Tippoo Sultan and the English, it was evident that to have assisted in a war against him would have been to have violated that treaty.

Fourthly, I observed that, your Lordship, having on your arrival in this country, found the negotiation in question incompatible with the instructions you had received at Home, had been necessarily obliged to break it off; and that you had accordingly lost no time in doing so.

My fifth observation was, that it was not singly the earnest desire of your Lordship to preserve our faith inviolate, with all those Chiefs between whom and the Company there subsisted treaties, but that this was a law and rule of conduct prescribed by the general voice of the English nation, as well as by our King, and by the Company, and that therefore your Lordship had as little power as inclination to depart from a system established by such authority.

Sixthly, I observed that without a break of faith on the part of those Chiefs, between whom and the Company treaties subsist, and so long as neither the rights and safety of the Company or of their allies should be endangered, nor their honour be affected,—it was no less the firm resolution of your Lordship, than it was your duty, to avoid engaging in the disputes of the Hindostan Powers with one another.

Seventhly, I remarked that your Lordship entertained the most sanguine hopes that such a principle of policy, so far from giving offence to any Chief whatsoever, would have the effect of inspiring all with confidence in the honour of our Government since it furnished an unequivocal argument in favor of our justice and good faith, which certainly might

have been reasonably brought in question and suspected, had we taken part with the Marathas in their present war against Tippoo. It was true, I continued, that we had heretofore been engaged in hostilities with Tippoo; but then these having been succeeded by a treaty of peace and friendship, to recommence them without provocation would clearly be to violate our faith. Our conduct therefore, I added, bearing in this respect the strongest testimony to the sincerity of our declarations and to our character for honour and good faith, we had reason to expect that no doubts on this score would be entertained by any Chief or State whatsoever.

Eightly, I observed that your Lordship being inspired with sentiments of high esteem and regard for the Peshwa, for him (Sindia) and for the Chiefs of the Maratha State in general, and wishing for nothing more anxiously than for the continuance and increase of the friendship subsisting between them and our Government—it certainly had given you great concern to be obliged to commence your administration with a measure which might seem to proceed from a less amicable source. The regard due to treaties, however, and the orders of your King and country (which were necessarily of superior weight with you to every other consideration) had put it out of your power to take any other line. But after all, I repeated, the considerations which had dictated the measure in question being undoubtedly of a just and laudable nature, I was assured that when they came to be fairly examined, they would instead of exciting dissatisfaction or distrust, ensure to our Government universal approbation and confidence.

In the ninth place, I observed that when your Lordship considered the reputation of the Maratha nation in general and of several of its Chiefs in particular, for courage and military talents, you could hardly bring yourself to think that they required any foreign assistance in their present contest with Tippoo Sultan. I judged it fair in this place to avail myself of the advantage which they had (as industriously reported by themselves) obtained since the commencement of the war, such as the capture of Badami and other places, and therefore added that their success hitherto served to confirm us in the persuasion that they could not stand in need of our aid.

I concluded with remarking that had they really needed a military aid they could have reaped but little benefit from so small a force as two or three battalions, the furnishing of which would only have argued that we were not seriously disposed to support them, and that our professions and conduct were at variance.

The foregoing, my Lord, is the substance which I communicated to Sindia, and will, I believe, be found to differ but little even in terms from the Persian notes which I used on the occasion, and a copy of which I have herewith the honor of transmitting to your Lordship. I need hardly observe that I drew the greatest number, and the most forcible, of the

arguments which I have employed in his conference from the consultations of the Honourable Board, and from your Lordship's instructions to Mr. Malet and myself on the several points that came under discussion.

Your Lordship will perceive that I was totally silent in respect to the French. In this particular I acted conformably to the opinion I have all along held; and Sindia not having once alluded to them, there would have been the less propriety in my introducing the mention of them. I was also glad that he did not betray any dissatisfaction at his having been passed by in the late communication of our Government to the Poona ministry, not that I should have been in the least embarrassed on the occasion, but because I wished as little unpleasant matter to arise in our conference as possible.

It is rather, I confess, out of place to request of your Lordship to take notice that in my answer to Sindia's second proposition I have added to *amil* the words "and others"; my instructions, strictly speaking, confined me to the former description of revenue officers; but as I was satisfied that, in its spirit, it must necessarily on a principle of justice to Sindia and of consistency comprehend also *zamindars*, etc., I did not in the least scruple to make this addition, in which I assure myself of your Lordship's ready concurrence.

At Sindia's desire I left with him the Persian notes which I had made use of in our conference. What impression my arguments may have made on him, I cannot take upon me to determine, as he declined giving any opinion on them till he had considered them with due attention. I hope however to be able to furnish your Lordship with some information on this point in a few days.

It is proper I should inform your Lordship that after I had gone through the business which formed the special object of my visit to Sindia, I touched upon the circumstances on which it was necessary for him to afford me such satisfaction as should follow from his sincerity in the declaration he had on many occasions made, and which purported that he considered the English honor as inseparable from his own. He listened to me with as much attention as I could wish, while I expatiated on the impropriety of his suffering persons to reside in his Camp on whose account such a serious difference had taken place between him and my predecessor; and although he accounted for their re-appearance at his Durbar in a manner very far from satisfactory, yet he did not hesitate a moment in assuring me that they should be forthwith dismissed. In the evening he sent for them, and stating to them the necessity there was for their departure, desired that they would immediately leave Camp. They accordingly, I understand, set out this morning on their return to Delhi, from whence they had come.

Having accomplished this point, I urged to him the necessity which existed for yielding me due satisfaction on the point which had latterly occasioned my delay at Dehli and absence from Camp, and which remained entirely unsettled. This matter though highly affecting my honour and reputation, yet tending to involve a very worthless man in disgrace and difficulty, I found him rather slow in yielding to; and therefore notwithstanding he had promised to meet my wishes on this occasion, I am not entirely assured that he does not mean to amuse me. Being remarkably solicitous indeed just now for my continuance in Camp, nothing I believe but his imagining that I may be prevailed on to give up the point, makes him at all delay an entire compliance with my desire; and in truth, so much am I above feeling anything like personal resentment against the man alluded to, that very little would induce me to drop the affair altogether, were I not thoroughly persuaded that the prosecution of it is essential to the honour of my official character, and consequently necessary to my being enabled to discharge with effect the duty of my station.

Enclosure in Captain Kirkpatrick's letter of the 25th March 1787,
received at Calcutta on 9th April 1787.

*The recital of what passed between Captain Kirkpatrick and Maha
Rajah Sindia on the 3rd Jamadi-ul-Sany (23 March) at Manpoor
Sikandra.*

The answers to the 4 requests which Sindia transmitted some time since to Calcutta thro' Mr. Anderson are as follows:—

To the first subject respecting The conduct which former the Pilgrims.	Governors observed towards Sindia, Lord Cornwallis will also observe; Sindia will rest assured of this, and that he will at all times exert himself to strengthen the duties of friendship with Sindia which former gentlemen have established.
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To the second subject respecting Deserters.	Whenever any person receiving wages from Sindia, or any <i>amil</i> , etc., who having entered into engagements with Sindia shall seek protection and shelter in the country belonging to the Vizier or the Company, they shall not be permitted to remain; with respect to other deserters, whatever shall be proper in the eyes of justice or shall tend to
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the increase of the friendship existing between the parties, shall be complied with according to established custom; on this condition, that the same be observed on the part of Sindia; and with respect to the Gosain, Scindia may rest assured that Lord Cornwallis will never allow that such protection or shelter be afforded as shall tend to injure the friendship existing between the Vizier and Sindia.

To the third article respecting correspondence. On this subject Sindia may rest assured that in every respect and under every condition the English will not swerve from what is necessary to strengthen the treaty between the parties.

To the fourth article respecting mutual assistance. The engagements which are made between the English and the Chiefs of the Deccan and what appertains to them, have been observed and shall be so. It is necessary that other confederates observe the same conduct. Therefore, any engagement on this subject is impossible, because from such engagements a dispute with others and a relaxation in the treaty may be the result.

90. JOHN MACPHERSON, G. C., TO GEORGE FORSTER.

Calcutta, 19th July 1786.

Being desirous of forming a substantial connection between this Government and that of the Sikhs, for the purpose of protecting the Nabab Vizier's dominions from the incursions of that nation, and of obtaining also the alliance of a powerful neighbouring people, who, in any eventual operation in the upper part of India, are enabled either to promote or injure our interests, I depute you to proceed towards that quarter; and there pursue such measures, as may seem to you the most salutary, efficient, and the most conducive to establish such a connection.

You are to apply in the first instance to the Sikh vakils who are now at Lucknow, and consult them on the leading steps to be taken in accomplishing this service ; in the expediting which (with those vakils) the Resident at Lucknow will give you such assistance as may be required of him ; and he will also supply you with a guard for your protection and accommodation.

You are directed to advise me regularly and circumstantially of your proceedings in the prosecution of this business, and you are not to enter into any specific engagements, with the Sikh Chiefs or their vakils, without being furnished with my previous consent.

For defraying the expenses which may be incurred in the course of this agency, and which I trust will be moderate, I permit you to draw bills on me for the amount ; keeping at the same time, for my inspection and approbation, a particular account of your charges.

91. GEORGE FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 1st November 1786.

Your Lordship's commands of the 24th October which reached me this day, shall be executed with a strict attention to their purport and to the extent of my ability.

The person whom I sent to the Sikh Chiefs has arrived with them, but he has not yet forwarded to me any statement of the business he was charged with. On the receipt of any intelligence from that quarter, it shall be immediately communicated to your Lordship ; nor will I fail in explaining to the Sikhs a proper cause for your not wishing to enter into engagements with them.

92. GEORGE FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 11th November 1786.

I had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 1st instant, and now beg leave to inform you, that the person whom I mentioned in my former letter to have sent into the Sikh country has arrived there. He says that he will soon be enabled to advise me of the disposition of the Chiefs, whom he represents as much pleased at the appearance of a connection with our Government.

By the steps which I have taken, our credit will be sufficiently maintained with them, and the orders of your Lordship fully complied with.

That I may be the better enabled to keep your Lordship advised of the operations of those Powers, I have been induced to direct my servant to remain amongst them until I shall be farther instructed by your Lordship.

As the season is now approaching when the Ganges towards the frontier of the Sikhs will become in many places fordable, it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to obtain some regular intelligence of the motions, and perhaps the designs of a people, who have the ability, from our want of Cavalry, to do much mischief in Rohilcand, as has been already experienced.

The Sikh wakil, who makes frequent complaints of the cold and neglectful treatment of the Lucknow Durbar towards him, is desirous of returning to his country, but he has not yet obtained the Vizier's leave.

PS.—A confident reliance in the character of your Lordship prompts me, without the dread of offending, to add the following lines. It has this instant come to my knowledge, that Lieutenant Anderson, the Resident at the Camp of Mahajee Scindia, is about to resign his station. If my Lord, a series of a seventeen years' occupation in the service of the Company with having obtained but a slender portion of its advantages, and without any impeachment of character, can hold up in my behalf a claim to the notice of your Lordship, I am emboldened to prefer it, for the obtainment of Mr. Anderson's office, should it become vacant, and my attendance required. I pray your Lordship to excuse *this manner of application*, which I have adopted to avoid giving trouble.

93. GEORGE FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 18th December 1786.

I had the honour of addressing you, on the 11th November, since which I have not been favoured with your Lordship's commands.

The person whom I sent into the country of the Sikhs, has hitherto been prevented from forwarding the advices I expected, on account of the distant residence of some of the Chiefs and the occupation of others in the field.

My agent informs me, that such of the Sikh officers as he has seen, appear well disposed to our Government, and do not evince any hostile intentions towards the Vizier. He has promised to transmit me in the course of eight or ten days, addresses from four of the Sardars who possess the territories the most contiguous to the Ganges.

In my last letter, I apprised your Lordship of this person's being sent amongst the Sikhs, requesting also to know, whether your Lordship would permit his remaining there for the purpose of obtaining intelligence of the motions and eventually of the designs of those people. I am, again, emboldened to request the orders of your Lordship on this subject.

Captain Kirkpatrick on his way to Sindia's Camp spoke to me of your Lordship's desire of employing me in collecting a general [account] of the state and operations of the Powers bordering on this frontier. If I can be made useful to your Lordship in the manner explained by Captain Kirkpatrick, I shall receive much satisfaction. For under an administration that has challenged the praise of the most opposite classes of men, I have no hesitation in anticipating to myself a portion of that applause and credit which must be bestowed on the present Government of India. But that I may fully comprehend the extent of the charge which your Lordship may wish to entrust me with, I beg to be favoured with a few lines, describing the outlines of the services required of me.

I am to entreat your Lordship, not to take any offence at my solicitation for the office held by Mr. Anderson at Sindia's Court. I am precluded from the general advantages in the Company's service, and confined to the department of negotiation, and from my knowledge of the language Maratha business. I, therefore, considered that the duty I owed to myself called on me to make my pretensions known to your Lordship, nor, tho' unsupported by any private claims on your patronage, did I feel a scruple in preferring them.

I receive casual intelligence from two gentlemen, foreigners, in the service of Sindia. Being esteemed men of ability, they may assist in throwing lights on the transactions of that Chief.

In a letter from one of them, I observe that Sindia is moving towards the country of the Macheri-wala, or as he is commonly denominated the Row Rajah, whom he has been long endeavouring to make his instrument, in reducing the Rajah of Jaynagar. But Sindia has been deceived, and hitherto foiled by the Row Rajah, whom he now designs, if capacitated, to punish.

94. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 22nd Dec. 1786.

I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 18th instant, and now beg leave to inform you, that I have received letters from three of the Sikh Chiefs, Roy Sing, Banga Sing and Goordat Sing. They make warm professions of an amicable disposition towards the English Government, and express an earnest desire of being more intimately connected with it. Conformably to the orders of your Lordship, I do not hold up any encouragement to their advances, tho' in rejecting them care shall be taken that no indication appears of our being inimical to the present system of their policy.

I am concerned to learn, that a letter relative to your Lordship's directions, for my procedure in the business of the Sikhs, which I dispatched to my servant has been lost,

Precautions however shall be adopted, that no ill effects arise from the miscarriage.

My servant says, that Sindia who corresponds with the principal Sikh officers, has told them, that the claims of the Marathas on the southern division of the great Doab, which Shujah-ud-Dowlah took from them in one thousand seven hundred and seventy-four, are not relinquished, and that at a convenient season, he hopes for their assistance, which a valuable equivalent will be given for, in recovering the territory in question.

This intelligence, tho' perhaps, not altogether grounded on truth, does not militate against the honour, character and conduct of Sindia, nor indeed of any other Chief in Hindustan, possessed of the same power and ability.

The Sikh vakil at Lucknow is involved in much distress, on account of no provision being made for his maintenance. He complains greatly of this grievance, as he brought respectable credentials with him, and as it is the general practice in every Asiatic Durbar to grant a certain allowance to all agents deputed by foreign States for the transaction of public affairs.

Should your Lordship be pleased to give any recommendation in favour of this person, I take the liberty of requesting that the instructions may be forwarded to me, for the information of the Resident, as I am fearful that, if they are immediately transmitted to the Government here, the vakil will incur ill will and future embarrassments.

An act of attention of this kind, my Lord, may be in some degree conducive in keeping the Sikhs in good humour, and become one amongst the many channels of exhibiting the general principles which actuate the proceedings of our Government.

95. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

• *Lucknow, 27th Dec. 1786.*

Since my last address to your Lordship, I have received intelligence, that the Sikhs have spread great alarms over that part of the Doab which holds of Sindia, and that they surprised a body of his troops, which were stationed near Anupshahar and defeated them.

Colonel Harper, who was furnished with a particular account of the affair, informs me that he communicated it to your Lordship.

The Sikh vakil says, that Goordat Sing, one of the Sikh Chiefs from whom I lately received a letter, was either engaged in the incursion himself or furnished some horse to assist in the service.

Desultory hostilities have for the space of two years subsisted between Sindia and certain Chiefs of the Sikhs, who have beheld his transactions in the northern part of India with dread and distrust, fearing, that the sway which they have acquired there would be checked by an establishment of the Maratha Power. No fixed system of war has ever taken place between them, nor is it probable that any will. For the Sikhs, from their genius and from the spirit of their Governments, which is a mixture of the aristocratic and republican, are an independent, haughty people, and perhaps nothing less than a general invasion of their country would impel them to act under any common national influence; and Sindia's views of which were easy of accomplishment, thro' carrying a war into the dominions of the Sikhs (?)

Exclusive of the territories immediately in the possession of the Sikhs, they collect from their weaker neighbours, a tribute called by them *Rakhi*, resembling in some degree the *chout* of the Marathas, tho' in a smaller proportion; that being a fourth of the whole, whereas the Rakhi seldom exceeds four and five per cent. on the produce. It is in the levying this last species of contribution that disputes arise between the Marathas and the Sikhs.

Your Lordship may trust, that I shall not be deficient in communicating every event that may reach me, of the motions or designs of the Sikhs, and of such other States, as stand in any political relation to our Government, tho' from not specially knowing to what length I might be permitted to extend my expenses, I have been restricted from giving that scope to my exertions which I saw was necessary.

The season has now arrived when the Sikhs from the lowness of the waters commence their field service and commit devastations on the bordering countries. They have given us assurances of a friendly disposition, nor do I see cause to doubt the sincerity of them, for Sindia seems now to give a general tone to their operations (of those Chiefs I mean, who are contiguous to Delhi and Sarhind), and I do not think they will dare to raise up another enemy; yet I deem it incumbent on me to notice to your Lordship that Rohilkhand which at this day is wholly defenceless, holds out to them an alluring bait, and as they have already experienced the advantages resulting from incursions into that province, it is difficult to say whether the temptation might not tend them to make the experiment again.

Here I am to ask your Lordship's forgiveness for the observation which I am about to make, and which I am aware may be construed into an interference in matters unconnected with my situation; but should any benefit arise from the remarks, I will even risk a reprehension. Were the Sikhs to enter Rohilkand, they can meet with no obstruction or opposition, excepting from the troops at the Fathgarh station, which could not afford protection to that country in a less time than fifteen or twenty

days, and I much doubt that they could then give any efficient succour, when the progress of infantry is brought into comparison with the rapid marches of Sikh cavalry.

I am much afraid of having intruded on your Lordship, and have only to entreat, that the motives which actuated me may be indulgently interpreted. By going to the Doah side of the Vizier's country my situation would be better adopted, for procuring intelligence, than by remaining at Lucknow; and should your Lordship have no objection I will move towards that quarter.

96. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 21st January 1787.

The demand made on the Anupshahar districts, by some of the Sikh Chiefs will have been represented to your Lordship by Colonel Harper.

The Sikh wakil to whom I applied for information on this subject, tells me that the Sikhs for some years past have collected a *Rakhi* from the Rajah of Anupshahar, of about two thousand rupees (one moiety of which is paid in the spring, and the other in the autumn) and that they had at that time no other design than procuring this amount.

Sindia, agreeably to the newspapers' report is at or near Delhi after having made a discreditable campaign against the Mewatis, the possessors of a certain territory lying between Agra and Jaynagar. They made so stout a defence from their strongholds and by their harassing mode of fighting, that the Marathas were obliged to desist from the intention of reducing them.

Shaikh Muhi-ud-din, whom I mentioned to your Lordship in my last letter as chosen by the King to establish a communication with our Government, has left Lucknow and proceeded towards Benares.

Sindia's visit to Delhi is ascribed to his desire of soothing the King, who is said to be more than usually discontented with this Chief, to enter also into negotiations with Ghulam Qadir Khan (who is, as it is reported, on his way to Court), and to adopt some general system for checking the power of the Sikhs.

97. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 30th Jan. 1787.

Since my last address to your Lordship of the 21st instant, but little matter of any importance has come to my knowledge of the movements of the bordering Powers.

Ghulam Qadir Khan, who, it was said, intended to proceed to Dehli, and had actually joined one of Sindia's officers stationed in the Doab, suddenly crossed the Jamna and retired into his own country, on the pretence of repelling the incursions of a Sikh Chief, who had seized the opportunity of Ghulam Qadir's absence to raise contributions in the Ghaus-garh district.

The reason assigned by Ghulam Qadir for delaying his visit to Court may be just, for the Sikhs, tho' at this juncture embarked in the same general cause with this Chief, are from their Government and disposition so strongly influenced by objects which present the acquisition of any immediate advantage, that they would seem to prefer the gratification of an individual interest to the accomplishment of measures that merely embrace national purposes.

The Sikh wakil tells me, that Ghulam Qadir himself planned the Sikh depredations on his country that he might have a pretext for withholding a compliance with the orders of the King, or rather those of Sindia.

The newspapers mention that Sindia is pressingly invited to Court by the King, who thinks that in a conference with this Chief he will obtain more favourable terms, than what have been hitherto granted to him. It is also said, that, however desirous Sindia may be of proceeding towards the Dehlee quarters, for the purpose of awing the Sikhs and compelling Ghulam Qadir to take an effective part in the Maratha operations, he is at the same time fearful of a combination of the Rajpoot Powers (the Jaypoor, Macheri and Jodhpoor Rajahs) who appear now to have formed a united system for their common defence against the Maratha encroachments.

The Sikhs at this period do not shew any threatening force on the side of our frontiers. But as they now perceive that our Government is not disposed to establish any intimate connection with them, I much apprehend that on the event of a favourable occasion they may be induced to make a further trial of those depredations which have heretofore been committed by them on the western division of the Oude dominions.

I did not fail to communicate to the Sikh wakil your Lordship's wish of maintaining a friendly correspondence with the States of his constituents, and of your determination to severely resent any infraction on their part of the terms which now subsist between them and our Government.

As your Lordship has been pleased to confide in me the trust of procuring intelligence of the operations of the bordering Powers, I deem it my duty to inform your Lordship, that this service would receive a strong support from the assistance of Almas Aly Khan, one of the principal *amils* of the Vizier. This person, whom I have never seen or had any species of intercourse with, yet, from his situation, being the manager of the Doab

territories (from his known abilities and his local knowledge), is, I am humbly of opinion, fitly capacitated to be instrumental in keeping your Lordship advised of the events of these parts, together with the designs of the different neighbouring Powers; and I beg leave to submit to your Lordship the direction of the mode, in which he may be rendered the most useful to Government.

98. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 5 Feb. 1787.

I beg leave to forward to your Lordship by desire of Captain Kirkpatrick, ten Persian letters which were sent to him by the Sikh Chiefs who possess territories in the neighbourhood of the Doab. Five of the addresses are for your Lordship, and the others are directed to Captain Kirkpatrick.

This gentleman thinking that the station he now holds in the Durbar of Sindia, from the present situation of that Chief may render any intercourse on his part improper with the Sikhs, did not give an encouragement to their advances, but sent the letters unopened to me for perusal.

From Sindia's approach towards Dehli, and the appointment of one of his best officers, Ambajee, to proceed with a considerable force towards Panipat, on the frontiers of the Sikh territories, these Chiefs are alarmed, and are fearful, I imagine, of a Maratha invasion. They seem, therefore, at this juncture, desirous of forming a connection with our Government, that they may ward off the blow meditated against them.

A serious warfare between these Powers will greatly contribute to the security of that part of the Vizier's dominions, which lie contiguous to the Ganges. Letters of this day, from the encampment of Ghulam Qadir Khan, mention that he is carrying on predatory hostilities against some petty Sikh Chiefs who reside in his neighbourhood.

99. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 24 Feb. 1787.

Since my last address of the fifth instant, no occurrence has taken place in these parts deserving your Lordship's notice.

The Sikhs on the Daranagar frontier have for these last two months been rather warmly engaged with Ghulam Qadir Khan, who from his military disposition and resource had been induced to withhold payments of the tribute or *Rakhi* amounting to about a lac of rupees, which his father Zabita Khan had been compelled to pay to the Sikhs, but Ghulam Qadir, having severely felt the consequences of their late incursions, is now endeavouring to adjust the differences which have arisen between him and that people by a negotiation.

A continuance of the disagreements between Ghulam Qadir and the Sikhs, which from their respective views I did not think would have proceeded to any height, is much to be wished for at this period, as either of the parties will thereby be prevented probably from giving us molestation.

Letters from the Maratha Camp mention that Sindia is alarmed at the orders issued at the Cawnpore and Fathgarh stations, as well as at the late reviews of battalions made at these places.

I advised Captain Kirkpatrick of the arrival of the European Regiment here, requesting him to make such use of these movements as he might judge prudent, and I do not doubt but the advancing so respectable a Corps towards this frontier, where English infantry have never been seen, will impress on the minds of the neighbouring States, a proper sense of our military abilities.

The sword, my Lord, as it acquired the possessions we hold in India, must, as will be better known to your Lordship, be our grand security for the maintenance of them; and here, my Lord, I hope for excuse, when I say that treaties founded on no other basis than a simple negotiation will not be more binding on a native of Hindostan than "a rope of sand".

100. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 5 March 1787.

Agreeably to intelligence received this day, it appears that a straggling party of Sikhs approached the west side of the Ganges opposite to Daranagar and maintained for some little time across the river an irregular firing of small arms against a detached body of the Vizier's troops quartered in that neighbourhood.

The Sikhs, who were not sufficiently numerous to attempt forcing a passage, retired without doing more damage, I believe, tho' wounding some of the Nabob's sepoys.

Late advices from the Camp of Ghulam Qadir Khan mention that this Chief has not yet comprised his differences with the Sikhs. Those to whom he has given or promised donations have suspended hostilities against him, whilst the others, who have not received any acknowledgment, continue to lay waste his country.

The Maratha papers say that Sindia has marched to the southward; and it is generally believed that his motions are directed towards the Jaynagar side, where Sindia's schemes have hitherto been successfully opposed.

Deshmookh Row (the son-in-law of Sindia) and *Shah Nizam-ud-din* (of the Mahomadan mendicant order), the former Maratha agents with the King, have after visiting Sindia's Camp, returned again to Court. According to the newspaper account, Captain Kirkpatrick has not left the environs of Dehli.

101. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 15 March 1787.

Since my last address to your Lordship of the fifth instant, no material occurrences have taken place in the neighbourhood of this country.

Sindia is encamped near Dig, a fort situated about fifty miles to the northwest of Agra, whence, it is reported, he will move towards the territories of the Rajpoots who have hitherto not complied with the Maratha demands.

Advices of this day mention that Ghulam Qadir Khan is still harassed by the Sikhs, who by his refusal of acceding to their demands have laid waste a considerable part of his possessions.

By the last intelligence from Daranagar, I am glad to learn that the Sikhs have not made any serious attempt to cross the Ganges, nor is this motion much to be apprehended. They continue thus warmly engaged with Ghulam Qadir Khan.

Ambajee, the officer whom Sindia detached to Panipat, the western limit of the Delhi territories, has been joined by Baghel Sing, a petty Sikh Chief holding possessions in that quarter, but he is jealously watched by the Punjab Sikhs, who compose the most powerful part of this people, and who seem determined to oppose the Maratha progress in that quarter.

Could any substantial conjecture be formed of the councils of Sindia, which are ever wavering and guided by the events of the day, it would seem that at this juncture he is surrounded with embarrassments. His enemies at the King's Court are numerous and inveterate; the Sikhs, Rajpoots, and every Musalman in the upper part of India, are inimical to him, and he believes that the English view him with an unfriendly eye.

102. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 11 April 1787.

The newspapers of this day mention, that a body of Marathas, stationed in the Doab to the northward of Delhi, made a night attack on a marauding party of Sikhs, and captured some of their horses.

Ambajee, the Maratha officer commanding in the Panipat district, has been endeavouring to connect himself with the Sikh Chiefs of that quarter; but the object which these people and the Marathas are in pursuit of, having a similar tendency and are attainable only by one of the parties, it cannot be supposed that they can ever be actuated by goodwill to each other. The jealousies and disputes which have long subsisted, are now ripening into more serious dissensions, unless Sindia complies with certain demands which they have made on the score of *Rakhi*.

Chulam Qadir Khan, who still remains at Saharanpur, does not shew any inclination to join Ambhjee's forces, though daily called on by that Chief.

The Sikhs have suspended their hostilities against Chulam Qadir, and appear anxiously desirous of preventing a connection being formed between him and the Marathas.

Letters from Jaynagar, dated five days ago, mention that the negotiation is yet carrying on between Sindia and the Rajah, and that though the sum offered falls excessively short of the demand, there are hopes of a compromise.

103. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp near Sanganer, 11 April 1787.

My Lord, I had last the honor of addressing you under date the 6th instant respecting some deserters.

In a separate letter of the same date I informed your Lordship that the negotiations for an accommodation between Sindia and the Rajah of Jaynagar had been broken off in a manner that seemed to threaten an immediate commencement of hostilities. This appearance was afterwards considerably strengthened by the departure of the Jaynagar deputies from Camp without taking leave, and by the army's advancing on the 8th to its present station. Within these two days, however, the negotiations have been renewed, and, what is worthy of observation, not on the part of the Rajputs, but on that of Sindia. The truth is that this Chief has for some time past most anxiously wished to bring about an accommodation tolerably creditable; although, with a view to save appearances, he has affected much inflexibility, and has pretended to yield with great difficulty to the instances of Rana Khan Bhaer, and Rajee Patil, who warmly recommended pacific measures.

The Row Rajah and two or three disaffected Rajput fugitives are the only persons whose councils are violent; but their views are so evidently interested, and their representations concerning the strength and resources of the confederate chiefs agree so ill with appearances, that they seem to have no longer any credit with Sindia, in whom the preparations of the enemy (which far exceed what he had reckoned upon), joined to the good face that they put on their affairs, and the steady tone in which they have latterly affected to treat, have raised considerable apprehensions. In fact Sindia, being indebted for his success hitherto partly to his management, but principally to the disunion and supineness of the Chiefs in this quarter, will, in my humble judgment, do well to patch up matters with these Rajputs as expeditiously as he can. The longer he stickles ^{and} them for advantageous terms, the deeper does he commit his reputation and to maintain this at the hazard of a battle would be one of it

desperate and imprudent steps he could take. There is an association for the first time formed against him ; the forces of the confederates are numerous, and it may be presumed that they are at least better affected than the generality of Sindia's. This Chief distrusts all his Hindostan troops, even the Row Rajah is suspected ; and having established his power on this side of India without fighting or perhaps by not fighting, it is evident that he would hazard more than he would be likely to gain by a departure from this system. For these reasons, and because it is not conceivable that he should be able to keep the field much longer against the enemy without being obliged to give them battle, I am of opinion (independent of reports) that Sindia is seriously bent on an accommodation.

The deputies are expected to return to Camp to-day. It is thought that they are empowered to offer thirteen lacs on account of arrears, and the regular payment in future of the tribute fixed by Najaf Khan. To these terms there is but little doubt of Sindia's agreeing. To compensate for the disappointment of his expectations in this present expedition, it is not at all improbable but he may make some claims on the Row Rajah, which will end in his seizing upon as much of the latter's country as lies open to an easy reduction.

I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter of the 28th ultimo with the several inclosures. Although it will be a very easy matter for me to refute all the charges preferred against me by Sindia, yet I am obliged to decline this task for the present on account of indisposition.

This Durbar positively denies any knowledge of the complaints presented against me to your Lordship by Bhagwant Row. Sindhia went so far as to say that he supposed some newswriter had communicated these particulars to the Vakil on which the latter had grounded his accusations. Bhow Bakshee affirms that he happened to be absent from camp when the charges in question were transmitted to Calcutta; contradicting indirectly by this declaration the protestation of his master. I have mentioned this circumstance to your Lordship merely in order to throw some light on the character of this Durbar.

104. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Bankri, 8 cos from Jainagar, 15th April 1787.*

I had last the pleasure of writing you under date the 19th ultimo, when I acknowledged my receipt of your dispatches of the 7th February.

para. the 2nd instant I received your dispatch of the 7th March, which to each importance induced me to forward the same day by an express.

now in
certain 2 south of Basi Railway station, which is 13 m. east of Sanganer Railway station.

Contrary to the opinion which I expressed in my last, Sindia has advanced within a few *cos* of Jaynagar, The Rajpoot force increasing daily, Rajjee Patil began to think that it would be difficult for him to maintain his station. This circumstance joined to a persuasion (raised in him as well by the assurances and representations of the Row Rajah as by his own vanity) that on his appearing in this neighbourhood in person, he would at least be able to oblige the Jaynagar Chief to submit to whatever terms he might choose to impose on him, if not to make himself master of the place, induced him to march hither with extraordinary celerity. He fancied that by such a quick movement he should strike a considerable dread into the Confederate Chiefs. On his arrival here, however, he had the mortification to find that they did not hold his power in the estimation he had reckoned upon. It is true that deputies were sent to him apparently in order to treat of an accommodation; but it would seem from their conduct in the only audience they had of Sindia as if they had been instructed to defy and insult him instead of conciliate him. They broke off their conference with him in an abrupt manner, retired from it disrespectfully, and the next day left the Camp without taking leave. Sindia had demanded about 23 lacs, the deputies tendered him four; but even this sum was proposed to be paid to him on conditions and under restrictions which the Maratha Chief could ill brook even to hear mentioned.

The day after the departure of the deputies from Camp, Sindia advanced to this place: from whence however he condescended to revive negotiations for an accommodation. In consequence of this overture on his part, the deputies have returned hither; but they still affect so high a strain as gives but little room to suppose that the Maratha Chief will be able to make anything of them.

Little appearance as there is at present, however, of an accommodation taking place, I think such an event still more likely than either party's engaging in any serious hostilities. Sindia is, in particular, averse to action; and indeed the state of his army, and the great stake which he would have in a battle considered, his backwardness is not surprising. The truth is that he is exceedingly staggered at the bold face which the Rajpoots put on their affairs and the great force they have assembled; this not being short of 30,000 men. These considerations make him, I am well assured, very uneasy: nor am I without good reason for thinking that he repents heartily his indiscretion in having involved himself in a situation from which he cannot disengage himself with credit, but by hazarding measures the issue of which would be very doubtful. He has given out that he is to be reinforced considerably from Poona, in consequence of the peace concluded between Tippoo and the Peshwa.

The article omitted in the copy of Sindia's proposals to Lord Cornwallis expressed a desire that our Government would not hold any correspondence with the Chiefs on this side of India.

105. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp near Sanganer, 16 April 1787.

Mr. Malet informs me that the partizans of Mahajee Sindia at Poona are said to disapprove of the terms of the late accommodation with Tippoo, and to assert that much better could have been procured through his mediation.

My advices from Ambajee's Camp are as late as the 11th instant. He had by that time overcome the objections of his troops to crossing the Jamna, and detached about 3,000 men under Bakhshes Siam Rao into the Doab. The object of this expedition appears to be the expulsion of his new allies from that part of the country lying along the Jamna towards Meerat. It is in vain that he has attempted to prevent the incursions of this predatory tribe into the northern districts belonging to his master. He has twice engaged the Chiefs who have joined him to relinquish their claim of *Rakhi* (or tribute) upon the possessions of Sindia in the Doab : but as they soon discovered that there was little or no likelihood of their ever obtaining an equivalent for this cession, they continue to levy it wherever they can, in spite both of the remonstrances and threats of Ambajee.

This Commander, therefore, seems now entirely to despair of being able to draw any advantage from his connection with them, a circumstance that promises to have a favourable effect on the affairs of Ghulam Qadir Khan.

In my letter to your Lordship of the 28th February I informed you that Ambajee was then labouring by every means in his power to prevail on the Pathan Chief to join him : Ghulam Qadir for a long while evaded a compliance with this proposal, but at length determined to give Ambajee a meeting, to which measure he has been probably moved by a consideration of the Maratha's difficult situation, which it must be confessed is just now very unfavourable to his attempting anything against either the person or the country of the Pathan. The camps of this Chief and of Ambajee were divided on the 11th only by the Jamna. The 12th was fixed for the latter's paying the first visit to the Pathan.

The negotiations here go on very slowly. In consequence of Sindia's overtures for a renewal of them, the deputies of the Jaynagar Rajah returned to camp two days ago. Nothing, however, is yet determined.

106. OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARGES PREFERRED AGAINST CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK BY MAHAJEE SINDIA IN SINDIA'S LETTER TO LORD CORNWALLIS.

Sindhia's camp, 18 April 1787.

7. It is known that on the banks of the river Jamna, a

7. This affair is here strongly misrepresented, as well as related in

conversation happened between the washerman of Mr. Stuart, and the people belonging to Murar Row Daulat, who is at the Presence on the part of Rajah Deshmukh, and that a sepoy rose to the protection of the washerman, and began to beat people. The news of this was carried to Capt. K. and he was angry. At this time Murar Row Daulat sent both parties to Capt. K. When they arrived, he shut the doors, and let no one in. In this manner how could justice be done?

terms rather indistinct and equivocal. The facts are faithfully these :—The washerman was assaulted by a Maratha who, wanting the stone which he was using, drove him from it by force. A sepoy who was by interposed by words, upon which several Marathas assembling, attacked and beat both washerman and sepoy. This drew out more of our people to their aid, when the affray began to be very serious. The washerman escaping, was the first person who informed me of the affair. I instantly gave orders for all our people to draw off, and on no account to strike a blow. Some of the sepoys complaining that one of their number had been already wounded in the tumult and asking whether they must tamely submit to such an injury, I told them that it was then necessary for them to suppress their resentment, but that they might depend on my procuring justice to be done on the occasion. Two or three of them were so ill satisfied with this answer that they demanded their discharge. Regardless, however, of this sally of passion, I caused all our people to retire to their quarters, and took measures for preventing their issuing forth again. Daulat Row was in the meantime acting a very different part. When he was informed of the disturbance and asked what was to be done, he replied, "Have you not hands?" I rest the truth of this extraordinary speech on the evidence of a Maratha employed about me by Sindia. And when I had sent to Murar Row with the washerman, requesting that he would investigate the affair, and see

justice done, the answer I received to this application was a message complaining loudly of the excesses that had been committed by our people, and desiring me to punish the offenders.

It appearing from these circumstances that I had nothing to expect from the justice of Murar Rao, I was compelled to solicit the interference of the King. His Majesty accordingly took the matter up with some warmth, and desired Murar Rao to wait on me immediately with the parties concerned to the end that I might enquire into the affair.

Murar Rao accordingly waited on me in the evening, accompanied by one of the King's *khawases* (valets). He brought with him the two Marathas who had been most active in the tumult, one of them having begun it by assaulting the washerman, and the other having wounded the sepoy. A long and minute investigation took place, at which there were more (I believe) than a hundred persons present; many of them belonging to Murar Rao. Not being able to go through all the evidence at the first meeting, we had a second on the following morning, when it appeared, after the most candid and impartial examination, that the followers of Murar Rao had been the aggressors. He accordingly ordered them into close confinement before my face, and promised that due punishment should be inflicted upon them.

I represented what had passed in a letter to Sindia, but Murar Rao having also transmitted him an account of the affair, the answer

I received was a reproof for having "violated the respect due to the residence of His Majesty", and a desire that I would be careful for the future in preventing my people from committing such excesses and oppressions. I confess that I felt great displeasure at an accusation that I had given so little room for; but what particularly hurt me was his having pronounced so harsh a sentence on the bare testimony of his own servant. I remonstrated very freely against this injustice and indelicacy.

Fearing that if I remained in town some fresh disturbance might arise between our people and those of Murar Rao, I thought it prudent to retire to the mausoleum of Safdar Jang, which is at the distance of about six miles from the city. I could not think of proceeding to Camp till I had obtained the satisfaction which had been promised me for the late outrage.

Understanding that the men who had been confined before me by Murar Rao were kept under no sort of restraint. I sent a message to him by one of Sindia's servants, representing the impropriety of his having released them, and the inconveniences which might arise from such a loose kind of proceedings. He sent me for answer that the men were very secure, and that he would be responsible for their appearance.

After some time I prevailed so far as to get the time, place, and manner of punishment fixed. This last was to be very slight; but I thought it would be sufficient for the end I had in view, which was first the making good my promise to our

own people, and in the second place the shewing those among whom we were that I was not of a temper to submit quietly to unprovoked insults or injuries.

When some of my escort attended, according to agreement, at the place of punishment, they were told that the prisoners had made their escape.

When I communicated this circumstance to Sindia and told him of the warning I had given Murar Rao on this head, he replied that it was not unlikely but that the men, fearing punishment might have made their escape. He desired me, however, not to mind such a trifle, but to return immediately to camp, assuring me that search should be made after the fugitives. I confess that I was not satisfied with this answer, and the less so as I was well informed that the men in question had not absconded but were only secreted by Murar Rao.

What is meant by my having "Shut the doors and my refusing to let any one in", I do not know. I recollect objecting to a numerous train of armed followers coming into the area or square before the house I lived in, because I wished to guard as much as possible, at that time when both parties received each other with an evil eye, against any fresh tumult.

9. That day a harkarah of Rajah Deshmukh was going to the diwani. Captn. K.'s servant sepoy asked him who he was; he replied that he remained at the Presence on the part of Rajah Deshmukh. The sepoy suddenly wounded the harkarah with a bayonet. Here also it was

9. Had the people of Rajah Deshmukh said nothing about this affair, they would have acted very wisely. It happens however, that they said too much, for Murar Rao not only represented it to the King, but wrote to Sindia concerning it. It is true that Murar Rao was very desirous ere long of cutting the matter

a matter between low people in their own station, and the people of Rajah Deshmukh with a view to cut short the dispute, *said nothing about it*; and on the idea that this dispute could not have arisen without a cause, they were *silent*, on the principle of foresight.

short; and, indeed, he had good reason to be so, having discovered that the mysterious assault in question had been committed not by a sepoy of mine, but by a sepoy belong to an European in the country service.

This false accusation forms one of my complaints against Murar Rao, who, during the whole time I remained at Delhi seemed intent on nothing so much as the means of embroiling me with Sindia. With this view he eagerly caught at every occurrence in the least capable of being wrested to his purpose, and by artful misrepresentation contrived ever to transfer his own offences to me. When circumstances of this sort failed him, he had recourse to his invention, and he proceeded in these practices with confidence, as he well knew that the jealous and distrustful temper of his master made him susceptible of whatever impressions he might think proper to give him. Accordingly every thing communicated to him by Murar Rao was credited *implicitly*, while I in vain attempted to expose the artifices of a man who, if he did not act on some occasions according to the instructions of Sindia, at least conducted himself towards me in a manner that he was sure would be agreeable to him.

When I first heard of this pretended assault, I sent to Murar Rao, desiring that the wounded harkarah might be produced in order that I might do justice. His answer was that he could not be conveniently produced. On my further pressing this point I was told that the party had forgiven the injury, and that

it was not proposed to carry the matter to any greater length. Suspecting how the affair really stood, I continued to require that I might have an opportunity given me either of vindicating my people from the aspersion that had been thrown on them, or of discovering and punishing the offender. I urged this matter for several days; but without any effect. The reason of this backwardness was, that he had either known all along the true state of the case, or had very soon discovered it. His affectation of forbearance and moderation on this occasion was carried very far. It was in vain I observed that a regard to our national reputation for justice and abhorrence of violence, made it necessary for me to investigate the affair. His clemency was not to be subdued.

Bhow Bakhshée's agent going one day to the house of Murar Rao, while this business depended, there learned that the *harkara* had not been wounded by one of our people, but by a sepoy belonging to a French officer.

107. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp near Sanganer, 20th April 1787.

Expecting Mrs. Kirkpatrick to arrive soon at Agra, I have obtained Sindia's permission to proceed to that place for the purpose of receiving her and preparing as well as I may be able for her accommodation. My application on this occasion has been agreed to with a promptness which nothing but the particular situation I stand in could in the present conjuncture have induced. Ever since it has been known to this Durbar that I was acquainted with the accusations preferred against me by it to your Lordship, personal communication with me has been industriously avoided. For some time both Sindia and Bhow Bakhshée affected to maintain that they were not privy to the proceedings of their Vakeel, but finding it in the end impossible to continue this disguise, my presence

has become exceedingly embarrassing to them. This circumstance, joined to the certainty they are now under of my speedily quitting this station altogether, and the notoriety of my dissatisfaction which I have not thought it proper to conceal, has made them almost encourage what, at another time and in another situation of things, they would have been very solicitous to prevent.

I confess that I am not sorry for the opportunity offered me of retiring from this camp without either alarming or offending Sindia. The disregard into which I am fallen with this Durbar (and which has rather increased of late), subjects me to many circumstances that are neither of a pleasant nor creditable nature; and it being now pretty generally known that I am shortly to leave this station altogether, people will naturally relax more and more in their care of preserving appearances towards me.

Thus situated, considerations of policy, no less than a regard to my own personal satisfaction and honor, prompt me to seize the occasion which presents itself just now for my withdrawing from hence in a decent and unobjectionable manner.

It does not appear likely to me that there should suddenly arise any business between our Government and this Durbar of such a sort as to require my personal attendance on the latter. Were any thing of this kind however to occur, it would cost me but six or seven days to rejoin the Camp from Agra. In the meantime the better to inculcate the idea that my trip to that place is purely of a private as well as temporary nature, I propose leaving either my assistant Mr. Ensign James Macpherson or my Munshi behind me, if not both of them.

The negotiations between Sindia and the Rajpoots languish exceedingly. Desirous as the former secretly is of concluding a speedy accommodation, the very low and restricted offers of the latter, in which they persist with remarkable steadiness, afford him no opportunity of disengaging himself from his embarrassments with any advantage or reputation.

The negotiations here have advanced little or nothing since my last. There is hardly any doubt however of their concluding in an accommodation that will bring Sindia neither much profit nor credit. His embarrassed situation has an influence on Ambajee's operations that threatens to involve this Commander in considerable difficulties. He has been joined by Ghulam Qadir Khan, but the Pathan being exceedingly distrustful of the Maratha, his junction though it brings the latter an acquisition of force, can hardly be said to bring him any acquisition of strength.

I shall proceed to Agra in a day or two for the purpose I mentioned to your Lordship in my last address. I leave Mr. Macpherson and my Munshi behind me.

108. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Near Manpoor, 26th April 1787.

In a letter under date the 6th inst. I offered it to your Lordship as my opinion that Sindia's fears of being disturbed were stronger than his hopes of being supported by the Poona ministry, upon the final conclusion of peace between the latter and Tippoo Sultan. It is true that Bhow Bakshi would fain have made me believe otherwise, but I have within these few days had a better opportunity of learning the real sentiments of his master on this subject, and as I reckon the authority from which I derive my information to be very good, I do not hesitate to communicate it to your Lordship. I find from Mr. Malet (as I noticed in a late letter) that the partizans of Sindia at Poona pretend to disapprove of the terms of the peace and to maintain that this Chief could have procured a more advantageous one. Now the terms obtained by Hary Pandit appearing to be far more favourable than the success of his arms against Tippoo gave him any title to expect, it is not at all probable that either Sindia or his partizans are sincere in this declaration. On the contrary, I have reason to think that they hold this language for no other purpose but that of concealing the real cause of their dissatisfaction with the peace.

It seems that according to the political constitution of the Maratha State, the revenues and other profits accruing from foreign conquests made under the commission of the Peshwa are divided into five unequal shares consisting as follows : one of 25 per cent., one of $4\frac{1}{2}$, and three of $23\frac{1}{2}$ each. The first of these dividends belongs to the Peshwa, and the 2nd to the minister. The three last are the right of the Chiefs nominated to conduct the expedition, who are usually three in number, although so many do not always attend it in person.

Of those three shares, it appears that Tukojee Holkar has a claim to one. It is well known however, that an enmity of long standing subsists between this Chief and Sindia, in consequence of which the latter so far from remitting the other the amount of his dividend, or endeavouring in the least to conciliate him, has since his establishment in this quarter acted towards him on most occasions in a manner that has contributed exceedingly to widen the breach between them. Among other causes of disgust which Tukojee has received during this period, the conduct of Sindia relative to Razhogarh may be mentioned as not one of the least.

Nana Farnavis may possibly have drawn some pecuniary advantage from Sindia's success on this side of India, tho' I confess that the character of this Chief makes the contrary rather more likely. Be this as it may, it is certain that no remittances have been made to the Peshwa. Sindia indeed has long maintained, that instead of deriving any clear increase of revenue from his establishments in this country, he has in order to support

them, been obliged to draw considerable sums from his own proper possessions. It is not necessary that I should here examine the truth of this assertion. Whether it be well founded or not, it is not probable that his Government, or at least those members of it who are hostile to him, will be overforward to give it all the credit which he wishes it to obtain.

Of this Sindia himself is aware, and because he has all along dreaded being brought to account for his application of the funds arising from his conquests on this side of India, so soon as his Government should be at leisure to turn their attention to him, it has been the object of his politics to feed and protract the war between them and Tippoo Sultan. I am assured even, that it was both his wish and hope that the Peshwa's power might receive such a blow in this conflict as should altogether disable him from taking any cognizance of his past conduct, and it must be owned that, (not to mention the coolness with which he prosecuted the application of the Poona Government for our assistance), his having constantly evaded a compliance with the requisitions from the Deccan which frequently pressed him either to join the army employed against Tippoo in person, or at least to reinforce it by sending home the Government troops serving under him, furnishes no inconsiderable ground for such a suspicion. But however this may be, I have good reason to believe that with the view of spinning out the war, it has been his plan to inculcate the expediency of demanding such high concessions from Tippoo, as he knew that Prince would never agree to. Hence it is with perfect consistency that he now condemns a peace which has been concluded on terms less favourable, it would seem, than what ought in his opinion to have been insisted on. It will appear, however, from what I have stated, that it is not the conditions of the treaty in question (which as far as I can judge of it, is both honourable and advantageous to the Marathas) but its probable effects on his own situation, that make it disagreeable to him.

Of these effects the first will be, as he himself expects, the march of Tukojee Holkar into Hindostan, not to reinforce him as Bhow Bakshi insinuated, but rather to overthrow the fabric of power which he has been so many years engaged in raising ; and indeed, so weak are the foundations of this superstructure and so little skill has there been employed upon it, that a single fortunate hour is sufficient to bring about its entire annihilation. Never did any conqueror invade a country under more favourable circumstances than Sindia did the possessions of Najaf Khan's successors. Ignorant, however, of the manner of using his military force and other great resources to advantage, and relying more on an artful and insidious policy and his address in negotiations than on his strength, he has failed to draw any considerable benefit from his successes : in so much that nothing were easier than to drive him out of a country where his power has scarcely taken any root, and where his establishments are hardly more secure or firm at this time than they were five years ago.

He himself is sensible of the precarious state of his authority, nor has his pride or vanity been altogether able to blind him to some gross errors which he has committed. But to recover what he has lost by these seems to be an effort beyond his capacity, and it is more likely that the instances of his misconduct will multiply, than that he should discover a remedy for the bad effects of any one of his former mistakes. He is at length convinced that he has grasped at too many objects together, and he has for some time past *secretly* acknowledged his indiscretion in having underrated the strength of the Rajpoot confederacy and overvalued his own address as well as the fame and dread of his power. There appears but little likelihood, however, of his being able to extricate himself with any credit out of his present embarrassments; his consciousness of them seeming rather to depress and perplex his mind, than to stimulate it to any vigorous or judicious exertion.

Thus circumstanced, it is natural enough that he should be alarmed at the prospect presented to him by the peace said to be concluded between the Maratha State and Tippoo Sultan. The approach of an ancient rival and avowed enemy, flushed with the honour reaped in two active campaigns, exasperated by former and recent injuries, possessing considerable claims, armed with the sovereign authority, and supported by a strong faction, were sufficient to excite serious apprehensions in a person of a much more fearless and enterprising spirit than can be said to distinguish Sindia. Accordingly, although the danger is still at a great distance, yet his solicitude to prepare for its arrival is extreme. This indeed he endeavours to conceal, but still it is just now the spring of most of his actions. To accommodate matters speedily with the Rajpoots is, on this account, a point that he has much at heart; but then it is for the same reason necessary that he should not incur any disgrace from the manner of concluding his differences with that people, because every thing of this sort would bring an acquisition of strength to his political enemies among his own countrymen, and make it more difficult for him to bring about an advantageous settlement with his own Government.

The same consideration, while it will probably render him for the future exceeding indifferent (if not averse) to augmenting his territorial possessions on this side, will have the effect of increasing his usual avidity in the pursuit of money, for which he will be more ready than heretofore to compound his various claims. This line of conduct will consist precisely with the plan which I am informed he proposes adopting on the appearance of Tukojee Holkar, and which is briefly as follows. He will insist according to his custom on his having applied every rupee collected by him since his arrival in this quarter to the payment of the army, maintenance of the garrisons, etc., and he will produce accounts calculated not only to prove this but to demonstrate, likewise, that he has been a great sufferer in his private fortune by the service he has been engaged in. He will affirm that instead of being indebted to the State,

the State is considerably in his debt. He will affect great readiness to relinquish a situation in which he has lost so much, and he will finally leave Tukojee in possession of all his acquisitions in Hindostan, and repair himself to Poona, there to give an account in person of his administration.

He has already taken some preparatory steps to the execution of this scheme; he has separated the Khalsa lands from those destined for the maintenance of his army. Appropriating the former in appearance to the support of His Majesty's household, but giving them in charge to a creature of his own, to the superintendence of the latter he has nominated an officer belonging to the Peshwa; added to these measures, he has lately applied for the grant of jagir of 40 lacs per annum over and above his present one in the Deccan; not so much as a reward for past as an incitement to future services and an act of justice necessary to the reimbursing him the enormous sums he has expended in raising the national reputation and in establishing its power on this side of Hindostan. I understand that for the purpose here mentioned, he has an eye to the districts lying between Kalpi on the Jamna and his original possessions in Malwa, an acquisition that would make his dominions extend almost entirely across the Peninsula.

Such have I been assured, is the plan that Sindia proposes following in the event of his being disturbed next season by Tukojee Holkar, as his fears lead him to apprehend will be the case; and although during such an interval many circumstances may occur to divert the latter from an expedition into Hindostan and the former from his present moderate resolutions, yet I have thought it incumbent on me to communicate to your Lordship what I have learnt relative to a point of so much eventual importance to our political situation.

Tukojee is perhaps both more hostile to our nation and more closely connected with Tippoo Sultan, than would be desirable in any person who should succeed to the office and power enjoyed at this time by Mahajee Sindia, and which though exercised by him without any detriment to our interests would furnish an active and able neighbour with the means of disturbing us in a considerable degree.

There is one circumstance which deserves to be noticed, as it may operate much on the views of Tukojee Holkar, and consequently have an influence on the future resolutions and conduct of Sindia. Although both Tukojee Holkar and Hary Pandit are inimical to him, yet Nana Farnavis is thought to be attached to his interests. If this minister be sincerely well disposed towards him, he may be able to defeat any design which Tukojee may form to the prejudice of his friend, or at least the faction may find it necessary, in order to pave the way to the accomplishment of their views, to bring about a change in administration. This attempt would be requisite only in the case of Nana's manifesting a real and active concern in the affairs of Sindia: a circumstance under which it may be doubted whether Tukojee, though supported both by

Hari Pandit and the Bhonsle, would be able to carry his point. It is by no means clear however that Nana's attachment to Sindia is of this warm kind, and if his situation as minister were to be seriously endangered by his adherence to him it is not altogether unlikely but he would abandon his cause.

I am thus far on my way to Agra, whither I am proceeding (with the permission of Sindia) for the purpose of meeting Mrs. Kirkpatrick, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my letters under date the 20th and 22nd instant.

109. G. FORSTIER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 27th April 1787.

Since my last address to your Lordship, I have been advised by my servant stationed in the territories of Ghulam Qadir Khan, that the Ganges is low, there is no appearance of hostile measure being in agitation against the Vizier's country, that the different Powers in that quarter (the Marathas, Sikhs and Ghulam Qadir) being so watchful and apprehensive of each others' designs have no leisure to meditate a foreign expedition.

Ghulam Qadir has visited the Maratha officer. But no cordial or vigorous operation has yet been produced by this meeting.

The intelligence from Jaynagar dated the 21st, mentions that Sindia is still negotiating there, and the Rajpoots have within these few days evinced an apparently strong desire of bringing this dispute to the issue of a battle; it is generally imagined that it will be adjusted by a donation of four or five lacs of Rupees.

110. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 3rd May 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 29th ulto. regarding one James Barber, a deserter.

I arrived here this morning, and shall tomorrow send Barber and the four other deserters of whom I wrote your Lordship on the 6th ultimo, off for Cawnpore, under charge of a returning escort.

My letters from Camp today mention that Sindia had it in contemplation to fall back and take post at Lalsont, a station about eighteen *cos* south-east of Jaynagar. He pretends that his view in this is to draw the Rajpoots into the open country, where he will be able to engage them with greater advantage than in his present situation. He sometimes talks of cantoning

at Lalsont during the rains, and of recommencing his operations against the enemy with the utmost vigour on the setting in of the next dry season ; in which interval he calculates upon the dispersion of the Rajpoot forces. And, indeed, if the leaders of the confederates were to propose to remain inactive during that period, it is by no means likely that they would be able to keep their troops together so long, which being chiefly composed of husbandmen must necessarily separate about the month of August for the purposes of agriculture. It would seem, however, as if the Rajah of Jaynagar and his allies meant to push matters to an issue immediately, and it is Sindia's apprehension of this resolution more than any concerted plan of operation, that leads him to think of retreating to Lalsont. He at this time believes it too probable that he will have but little leisure to attend to the Rajpoots after the breaking up of the rains ; having received information that Tukojee Holkar proposes cantoning at Indur, and advancing towards him at the Dasahara. Possibly, he may stay a month at Lalsont ; but at present I am inclined to think that if he should make the movement here mentioned, his principal view in it will be the covering as long and as well as he can the disappointment of his hopes and designs relative to Jaynagar.

Rayji Pateel, who was encamped a few *cos* in front of the army, has fallen back by order of Sindia, who began to think him in danger, especially as his division was composed chiefly of Mogul and Hindostan troops, whose steadiness is now suspected more than ever. This measure has thrown a sort of damp on the Maratha Camp, and appears to have elevated the Rajpoots more than it need have done. The army of the latter, amounting to near 40,000 men, were by the last accounts encamped between Jaynagar and Sanganer, and it was expected that the Rajah would put himself at the head of it on the 2nd.

111. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 7th May 1787.

I received letters yesterday evening from the camp near Jaynagar informing me that Sindia, having determined to shift his ground, issued the necessary orders for that purpose on the 3rd at night. Accordingly the baggage and part of the troops were put in motion early in the morning of the 4th, but they had not proceeded far when a body of the confederates issued from one of the ghats and falling upon their flank threw them into the greatest disorder, which was presently communicated to the whole Maratha army, among whom it was believed that the enemy sought to bring on a general engagement immediately. Had this been really the intention of the Rajpoots, it appears very probable from the accounts transmitted me of this affair, that Sindia would have been completely routed.

Luckily for him, however, day light soon discovered that the enemy had formed no such design ; all this confusion among his troops having been occasioned by a party of Rajpoots and Rohilas not exceeding 2,000 men, who being apprized of the movement of the baggage were induced to attack it with no other view than that of booty.

Upon the first intelligence of this assault, Sindia, conceiving the enemy to have approached in force, countermanded the orders of march which he had issued the preceding evening, and prepared as well as he could to receive them ; nor did he, on discovering his mistake, prosecute his original intention but continued at his station, a measure which some of his councillors seemed to have disapproved of exceedingly, because as they asserted, he should not have allowed it to be imagined that so inconsiderable a cause had been capable of frustrating his purpose.

It does not clearly appear what this was, the real destination of the army on the 4th having been industriously concealed, but from the direction in which the baggage moved off, there is reason to believe that a retreat was intended by Sindia, altho' not exactly by the same route by which he had advanced. There were some parts of the Row Rajah's conduct during the disorder which prevailed on this occasion, that give rise to strong suspicions of his fidelity ; in so much that Rana Khan Bhai (a man by no means precipitate in forming his judgment) declared very plainly to the Maharajah that he was not without apprehensions of that Chief's drawing some calamity upon his head unless he took immediate measures for averting it. It is not at all improbable but that this circumstance may hasten the rupture which has long threatened to take place between Sindia and the Row Rajah ; altho' it must be acknowledged that the situation of the former does not appear just now to be favorable to his adopting any strong or violent proceedings against the suspected Chief.

On the 4th at noon Sindia signified publicly his intention of resuming his march the following morning. His chagrin and mortification at having been induced to suspend his purpose by so frivolous a cause as the one which has been mentioned, are described to be very poignant ; nor has he scrupled to confess the disgrace arising from it, which however he affirms himself determined to wipe off. I shall without loss of time apprise your Lordship of whatever I may learn from Camp of an interesting nature. The present conjuncture appears to be much more critical in respect to the future political situation of Sindia than what this Chief ever supposed the Rajpoots capable of producing. I think, however, that he has still some ground to hope for a more favourable termination of the difficulties which just now surround him, than many late occurrences would seem to promise, and this is furnished by the character of Partab Sing (the Rajah of Jaynagar) who is exceedingly deficient I believe in military spirit and enterprize and hardly to be orked up to any bold or vigorous exertion. The ardour of the principal

commander of his forces (Dowlat Ram) is repressed and his talent rendered useless, by the timid disposition and the irresolute councils of his master.

I think it proper to inform your Lordship that I was yesterday waited upon by a person named Syed Ghulam Mahommad, who delivered me a letter from Colonel Harper, from which I learnt that he was proceeding to the Court of Timur Shah, charged with letters from our Government to that Prince. As he required a safe conduct thro' Sindia's country to Jaynagar (by which route he purposes proceeding to Kahul), I judged it adviseable, in my application for this purpose, to intimate to that Chief that he was the bearer of complimentary addresses from our Governor to Timur Shah, for, as his arrival in this quarter, as well as the nature of his public character was very well known, and as his visit to me could not remain a secret, any appearance of concealment either on his part or mine would probably lead the people here to attribute more importance, to his deputation than it is really entitled to. As it is, I dare say that it will cause some uneasiness and jealousy to Sindia, but these emotions being, as I have often already had occasions to observe to your Lordship, liable to be excited in his mind by the most frivolous circumstances, it is absolutely out of the power of prudence to provide any remedy against an evil which, not resulting from reason or reflection but from prejudice and long habit of distrust, is therefore of the most incurable kind. In the present instance, the openness of our proceeding may have the effect of weakening if not of totally preventing his suspicions.

Ambajee has advanced from Karnal to Thanshwar, but having left behind the greater part of his army, under the nominal charge of Ghulam Qadir Khan, it would appear that his only view in this journey was the visiting of a place esteemed of great sanctity by the Hindoos. It is true that his absence has exceeded the time necessary for this purpose, and that he has entered into some negotiations with the Chiefs of that quarter; but the object of these is represented to be very unimportant. He frequently talks of repairing immediately to the camp of Sindia, but it is not as yet clear that he has any serious intention of this sort.

112. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 8th May 1787.

Ghulam Qadir Khan, who conformably to the orders of Sindia joined his troops under Ambajee at Karnal, is still at that place, which is about 50 miles distant from his own districts.

As Ghulam Qadir seems anxiously desirous of returning home, it is expected that he will soon detach himself from the Marathas.

A considerable party of Sikhs are also encamped in the neighbourhood of Ambajee, between whom and that people there appears to exist much ill

will and want of confidence. Tho' Sindia has ordered Ambajee to join the army at Jaynagar, this Chief is gone to Thaneshwar, 50 or 60 miles to the westward of Karnal, for the purpose of performing some religious ceremony. From this conduct of Ambajee I am led to imagine that either Sindia did not seriously order this officer to join him, meaning perhaps to intimidate the Rajah of Jaynagar, or that Ambajee himself is averse to the service.

The late letters from Jaynagar say that from the general combination of the Rajpoots in his favor the Rajah now maintains a spirited language with Sindia, but as this Chief knows that the Rajpoots possess no resources for carrying on a war, he will, as he says himself, protract the dispute to so distant a period, that the Jaynagar forces and allies will disperse, and that the demands now made will be on that event with certain qualifications granted him.

113. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 8th May 1787.

On the 23rd of April I left the Camp near Jaynagar and proceeded to this place for the purpose of meeting my family, which I expect will arrive here in a few days. When I have settled them I shall return to the army, which it is very probable will, about that time, be at Muttra, as I have good reason to think that Sindia has ere this begun to fall back for that place. He has for some while past most heartily repented of his indiscretion in having so rashly engaged in his present enterprize, and his alarm at the force collected by the enemy and at the spirit which seems to actuate them, is so great as to have prompted him to relinquish his designs against Jaynagar immediately. He is accordingly disposed to retreat, even without obtaining a single Rupee from the Rajah; yet it is not altogether clear that the latter will be content to let him off so cheaply, since he (or rather the Chief Commander of his forces, Daulat Ram) has manifested a desire of trying his strength with the Maratha army. It must be acknowledged that the conduct of Sindia has latterly been abundantly calculated to inspire the enemy with the boldest designs, it having for a long while past been very evident that fear of them had succeeded in his mind to the contempt that he had before affected to hold them in.

Should the Rajpoots press Sindia in his projected retreat, it is not impossible but something may occur sufficiently important to deserve being communicated to you. In any event of this interesting kind, you may rely on hearing from me without delay. If he returns to Muttra empty handed (which I really think will be the case), the effects of so disgraceful a circumstance on his political situation will probably be a very serious point. I have it from very good authority that he is

under considerable uneasiness on account of the peace concluded between the Peshwa and Tippoo Sultan, as he expects that it will be followed ere long by a visit to him from Tukojee Holkar.

114. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 11th May 1787.

I had last the honor of addressing you under date the 7th instant.

My latest letters from Camp are of the 8th. From them I learn that the army had proceeded by two easy marches on the 5th and 7th to a place called Sawlia, from whence Sindia seemed desirous of detaching a strong body of troops for the purpose of attacking an important post named Jehlava,* in possession of the Rajpoots and situated about 4 *cos* from Sawlia. As the enemy, however, appeared to be directing their route the same way, it was expected that Sindia would himself proceed against it with the whole army, or at least advance within an easy distance of it, in order the better to support the proposed attack.

Sindia, although he has increased his distance from Jaynagar by his two last marches (Sawlia being 14 *cos* from that city), has in some measure avoided the appearance of a retreat, by having moved in a direction somewhat westerly. His communication with Lalsont by his rear is still easy : and the post he has now taken would facilitate the junction of Apa Khanda Rao, should that Chief be ordered and be disposed to repair to the army. There are not wanting circumstances, however, for subjecting Apa to the suspicion of harbouring some treacherous intentions towards Sindia, who not having been able to conceal his distrust of him will probably find it difficult to prevail on him to join, should there occur any necessity for sending him instructions to that effect.

The Rajah of Jaynagar has, it seems, at length put himself at the head of his army, determined, as report says, to prevent the siege of Jehlava, should Sindia really form that design. Beejai Singh, the Rajah of Jodhpoor, is also said to have taken the field, and to be on his way to join the forces of Jaynagar.

I have within these few days learned from pretty good authority that Tukojee Holkar has lately addressed both Sindia and the Rajah of Jaynagar. The latter he has encouraged to persevere in his resistance against Sindia by openly assuring him of his speedy support : and to this Chief he has written in a very menacing strain, declaring his resolution to resent any injury that may be offered to the Rajpoot. It does not necessarily follow from these facts that Tukojee has yet received any commission from the Peshwa to act against Sindia ; the feudal principles which seem to subsist in the constitution of the Maratha State making proceedings of this kind independently of the paramount Power very common.

*Sawlia, 6½ m. s.s.e. of Chatsu, and 28 m. s. of Jaipur. Jhalai, 11½ m. s. of Sowlia.

On the 6th at night the Jaynagar deputies departed with great secrecy from Camp. As soon as they were missed, Sindia detached a considerable party of horse after them, with orders to bring them back either by fair means or by force. The pursuit however proved ineffectual. The deputies were accompanied in their flight by two Moghul sardars with their risalas, which however, were of no great strength.

Sindia, I understand, has ordered Mahomad Beg Hamdani to join him, but as that Commander is posted between the Jaynagar and Jodhpoor armies, it is imagined he will not find this an easy matter. As he has no reason to be attached to Sindia and as it is not altogether improbable that he is in correspondence with the Rajpoots, he may not indeed be very desirous of extricating himself out of this situation.

Ambajee some time ago received orders to join his master, but as he did not appear disposed to obey them with any promptitude, they were probably not of a positive or pressing nature. He has since received directions to prosecute his operations to the northward in consequence of which he has commanded the main body of his army to advance from Karnal to Thaneshwar, to which last place he had himself proceeded before with a small detachment for the purpose of performing certain religious ceremonies. I have this day had the honor of receiving the Board's letter of the 26th ultimo, to the communication contained in which I shall pay the necessary attention.

115. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 1st June 1787.

I had last the pleasure of addressing you under date the 8th ultimo, and on the 15th following received your dispatch of the 11th April. The letters which it contained were immediately forwarded to their several addresses.

I think it proper to apprise you that I expect to be relieved shortly from this station, as otherwise you might be at a loss to account for my long residence at this place. With the strongest inclination in the world to render myself agreeable to Sindia, I have found it impracticable to do so; and therefore requested permission to resign my employment. It being obviously necessary that the Resident should be on terms of good humour with the Durbar at which he resides, I have reason to think that my application will be complied with and that a successor to me will be appointed ere long. Till this event, however, absolutely takes place, it may not perhaps be improper to be silent on the subject.

It would be unpleasant to me and useless to you were I to detail the various circumstances which raised in me a desire to relinquish an

appointment so honourable and advantageous. It will be sufficient to observe that my disagreements with Sindia have been all of a private or personal nature. Perhaps I may in my own mind have allowed them more importance than they were properly entitled to : but not being satisfied that I have done so, I am willing to think that in retiring from such a situation I have better consulted the public interests than had I continued in it to the hazard of disturbing the harmony so necessary to subsist between Mahajee Sindia and our Government. I shall remain at this place till I am relieved.

My last letter to you described the affairs of Sindia as wearing a bad appearance. The aspect which they have since assumed is, however, infinitely more unfavourable. A spirit of defection has seized the Mahammadan part of his army ; and so rapidly has it already spread itself that it threatens to be very fatal, before it ceases, to the Maratha Commander. It first appeared in the desertion of small parties : but as no sardar accompanied these, the matter was but little regarded. On the 6th May, however, two Moghul Chiefs (Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Mansur Khan) went over to the Rajpoot army with their adherents. They were not followed by any officer of note till the 25th May, when Mahammad Beg Hamdani, to the great consternation of Sindia, joined the Rajah of Jaynagar. This Chief's name and history is no doubt well known to you. He was detached at the time of his desertion and in such a situation as, according to his own account, rendered his junction with Sindia altogether impracticable. The number of his followers is considerable ; but this is not of so much consequence to the Rajpoots as his military reputation. It is not to be omitted that his family (consisting of several females) are at this place. Since his desertion their persons have been secured and it is said that they are shortly to be sent to Gwalior. The Rajah of Jaynagar, who is encamped at the distance of about 14 cos from Sindia, appears determined since the arrival of the Hamdani not to stop short of driving the Maratha completely out of Hindoostan. It is not to be doubted but this object will be steadily pursued as long as the Hamdani preserves his credit with his new master ; and I am sure no extraordinary spirit or address is necessary to the accomplishment of it. If the present confederacy fail of effecting this point, it will be owing to the jarring parts which compose it and which render their union for any time exceedingly precarious, if not improbable. This circumstance is certainly favourable to Sindia, but on the other hand his present actual embarrassment and other difficulties and dangers which appear to threaten him from various quarters, are so numerous, that there is on the whole but little prospect of his being able to weather the storm now ready to burst on his head.

I refer you for the particular occurrences of this quarter to the Persian newspapers which accompany this. There is one circumstance, however, to which on account of its importance I must direct your attention ;

and that is the public execution (as I may call it) of Rajah Dayaram on the 29th May.

This man was one of the King's favourites and on that account has always been obnoxious to Sindia. He certainly was ill affected to the Government of the Maratha, nor is it to be doubted but that he intrigued with the enemies of the latter. Some of his letters being intercepted were sent by Sindia to his agent at Court, Shah Nizam-ud-din, who (by arguments that may be easily imagined) prevailed on the King to consent to his death. There is very good reason to believe that His Majesty himself was privy to the correspondence for which his favourite suffered: so that his conduct in sacrificing him to his enemies was, if possible, even more contemptible than that of our Charles I in a similar situation.

P.S.—My latest papers from Camp (dated 29th ult.) mention that Sindia has fallen back towards Lalsont. Ambajee has advanced to within a short distance of Patiala, accompanied by Ghulam Qadir Khan. He has received positive orders to join the army, which however he does not seem to be in a hurry to obey. Indeed I must doubt his being able to do so without previously satisfying the pecuniary demands of his troops, which he has no other means of doing but by staying some time where he is and levying contributions upon the petty Chiefs around him. His detachment being chiefly composed of Hindostanees, it will not surprize me to learn ere long of his being deserted by the whole or the greatest part of them.

116. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 9th June 1787.

It being pretty certain that the late Rajah Dayaram did not carry on the correspondence for which he suffered death, without being encouraged thereto either directly or indirectly by the King, it is natural enough that his Majesty should regret the fate of that unfortunate man. Accordingly, it would appear that that event preys exceedingly on his mind, that he sometimes secretly reproaches himself for having made such a sacrifice to the enemies of the deceased, and that he is under constant apprehensions not only of being forced into further rigorous measures against those whom he most confides in, but even of some violence being offered to his own person.

Under the influence of these fears, I have some reason to suppose that he wishes to procure an asylum in the Vizier's dominions, and that he even some times meditates an abrupt flight thither with a view of putting himself under the protection of our Government. What leads me to think thus is, that I have been sounded at a distance to this effect,

and taught to believe that it would be agreeable to the King, if I were to consent to forward to your Lordship some propositions of the nature here referred to. I have thought it my duty, however, to give this overture such a reception as I dare say will effectually prevent any repetition of it to me. It may, however, be made to your Lordship through some other channel, or His Majesty may even execute the project I have hinted at without waiting to receive from your Lordship any assurances of protection; his own fears when strengthened by the arguments and instances of those who are under equal apprehensions with himself for their personal safety, may have the effect of precipitating him into the measure very suddenly. The very respectful and generous conduct of the Vizier and of our Government towards the Prince Jahandar Shah is also likely, I have reason to think, to have considerable weight in disposing His Majesty to such a resolution, our liberality in this instance (which is frequently one of the topics of conversation between the King and his select friends) leading him to flatter himself that we should not, in the hour of necessity, be less attentive to him than to his son. It is to be observed that the present precarious state of Sindia's power, however agreeable it may be to this wretched monarch, affords him little or no prospect of a favourable change in his condition—since, should the arms of the Rajpoot and Moghul Confederacy prevail to the expulsion of the Marathas, and Mahomad Beg's authority be established at Delhi on the ruins of Sindia's, the ferocity and faithlessness of the Hamdani's character make it very doubtful whether either His Majesty's throne would be more secure, or his person more safe, than at this juncture. It is true I believe, that the Prince wishes fervently for the destruction of Sindia, and may perhaps be even secretly instrumental in effecting it; but in acting thus, I am persuaded, that he has hardly any view beyond the gratification of his resentment. He has had sufficient experience to be satisfied that his political situation is not to be improved by resolutions of the sort in question. His despondency therefore in this particular will serve probably to increase his desire for a peaceable retreat, especially as he is now arrived at an age when tranquillity is most alluring, and the turbulence of war and faction most disgusting.

Of the practicability of the King's flight to Anupshahar, there is hardly any reason to doubt, there being no Maratha force between Delhi and that place capable of opposing such an escort as the Nabob Nazir can collect. It might not however, perhaps, be easy for His Majesty to accomplish his escape, were he to be accompanied by his numerous family; and I confess the character of this Prince makes it rather unlikely that he should abandon them. Here therefore appears a difficulty that may have the effect of diverting him from such an enterprise, although, on the other hand, despair may make him disregard this and every consideration but those of personal quiet and security.

117. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 12th June 1787.

I write you at present chiefly to inform you that having applied some time since for permission to relinquish the office of Resident at the Durbar of Mahajee Sindia, Lord Cornwallis has within these few days signified to me that my resignation is accepted, and, in consequence instructed me to repair at my leisure to the Presidency. Having accordingly finished my preparations for this purpose, I shall set out tomorrow for Fathgarh and from thence proceed to Calcutta. My successor is not yet nominated : but you will of course be duly advised of this appointment as soon as it takes place.

Since my last Ghulam Qadir Khan has left Ambajee and returned to his own country. He quitted him in so abrupt a manner as leaves but little room to doubt of his having designed in this step to embarrass the Maratha Commander ; and of his being in correspondence with the confederacy at present formed against Sindia. According to my latest accounts, Ambajee had determined to relinquish all his views upon Patiala and the neighbouring country, and to repair immediately to his master. He was to set out for the main army on the 7th, but seemed to think that he would be harassed a good deal in his retreat. Indeed, the desertion of Ghulam Qadir Khan, the unfavourable situation of Sindia's affairs, and the intrigues of the confederates make it exceedingly probable that his Sikh auxiliaries will not suffer him to part from them in quiet.

Sindia is at present encamped in the vicinity of Lalsont, but has not yet descended the passes. He has sent his heavy artillery and baggage away, and is preparing it would seem to act with vigour against the confederates, who were (by the latest accounts) at Madhogarh*, a place within 12 *cos* of the Maratha army. He is certainly however under great alarm, and indeed his situation might be pronounced a desperate one, were it not for the character and circumstances of the enemy opposed to him. These are highly favourable to him : the Rajah of Jaynagar appearing to be a man different both in spirit and conduct, and the confederacy which he is at the head of, seeming to be knit together by very feeble bonds. If he knew how to avail himself of the advantages of his own, and the disadvantages of Sindia's situation, the destruction of the latter would be inevitable. At present, although there certainly hangs a black threatening cloud over the head of the Maratha, the storm may blow over with little injury to him. Should matters take this turn and the Poona Government give him no trouble, it is probable that he would become very formidable, for were the present confederacy to be broken, either by his acts or by reason of the discordant parts of which it is formed, the several members of it would become, I take it, an easy prey to him.

* Madhogarh, 23 miles south-east of Jaipur and 17 miles north-west of Lalsont.

118. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Ummedpoor, 6 cos from Agra, 13th June 1787.

I had yesterday the honor of advising your Lordship of my intention to depart from Agra this day. I am accordingly so far advanced on my way to Fathgarh.

On the 8th instant I informed your Lordship of the sudden defection of Ghulam Qadir Khan from Ambajee. I have since learned that, that Chief was not moved to this measure simply by the intrigues of the confederacy, or by resentment against the late elevation of his grand-uncle Afzal Khan, although both these circumstances have had their weight with him, and will no doubt continue to influence his conduct. A douceur of 20,000 Rupees from Nanu Mal, the Dewan of Sahib Singh, was what chiefly induced him to quit Ambajee so abruptly. He has since arrived at Saharanpoor.

I acquainted your Lordship that Ambajee on learning of the departure of the Pathan affected great indifference on that occasion and even declared a resolution of advancing further into the Sikh country. He was soon however obliged to desist from this vapouring strain, and to adopt resolutions better suited to the circumstances of his situation. Baghel Singh and Nanu Mal approved of his pretended design, and urged him strongly to put it into immediate execution. This solicitude on their part might serve to determine Ambajee against such a measure, since he was not ignorant that there was an agent from Jaynagar in the Camp of the former, who was not only employed to invite this and other sardars to join the confederacy against Sindia, but also provided with money for the purpose of giving the greater weight to his negotiations. This agent, he knew, was pressing the Sikhs to break faith with and attack him: and he had no reason to rely much on their honor or moderation. Under circumstances so unfavourable as these, to have proceeded might have occasioned the entire destruction of his detachment. In retreating there was less immediate danger. He might be annoyed and lose some of his baggage: he would suffer a diminution of credit, and he would probably bring on the neighbourhood of Delhi the calamity of a visit from his present predatory allies and others of the same nation. The necessity, however, of an early junction with his master and the obvious risk which would attend his advancing, made him quickly resolve on retreating. In pursuance of this determination he began his march towards Delhi on the 7th instant, and by this movement at once relinquished all the objects of his expedition. He talks indeed of leaving Bakhshiee Shyam Rao (his second) behind at Karnal, in order to keep the circumjacent country in subjection. As it is not yet, however, clear that the Sikhs are not bent upon hostilities against himself, it may be doubted whether he will be able to execute this design. Shyam Rao would require a greater force to enable him

to maintain his ground at a station so far advanced as Karnal, than may perhaps suit the exigency of Sindia's affairs to spare at present.

Ambajee was accompanied in his march on the seventh instant by Baghel Singh and all the other Sikh sardars that joined him in the neighbourhood of Panipat, excepting by Rao Singh, who moved off on the 4th along with Ghulam Qadir Khan; Nanu Mal, the deputy from Saheb Singh (and his Dewan) took up Ambajee's ground on the Maratha's quitting it.

I have a tolerable good opportunity of occasionally learning the private sentiments of Ambajee. That a man of considerable spirits and military reputation should be exceedingly hurt at being obliged to return with some circumstances of discredit from an expedition in which he engaged with a sanguine expectation of acquiring an increase both of fame and of fortune, is nothing surprising. But it is not so obvious a circumstance that he should be extremely discontented with his master on account of his disappointment, yet this is certainly the case. He is constantly lamenting what he terms his disgrace, frequently reproaches Sindia as the author of it, and on every occasion condemns the conduct of his master with great freedom, and not altogether without asperity. He is without exception the best officer in the service of Sindia, for which reason it equally imports the latter to keep him in good humour and the confederates to prevent his junction; and should he join and, uninfluenced by his private dissatisfaction and resentments, acquit himself with his usual activity and zeal, his exertions would probably contribute more than anything else to the extricating of Sindia out of his present difficulties.

Sindia continues encamped at Piplai,* to which place he moved (as I informed your Lordship some days ago) on the 4th instant. He has sent off his heavy artillery and stores to Khushhalgarh, and is at present deliberating whether he shall send the baggage and principal women with his army. The Rajah of Jaynagar appears to be very inactive. He is either afraid to hazard an action with the Maratha, or thinks it a better plan of operations to spread his army over the country and get possession of as many posts, especially in the Row Rajah's district, as he can. Whether, however, he is actuated by fear, or by a vain confidence in his own judgment, it is certain that both Dawlat Ram and Mahommed Beg Hamdani are very uneasy at his conduct, which, if persisted in much longer, will give Sindia a decided advantage over him. Were the latter opposed by an enemy possessing an ordinary share of spirit and military knowledge, his destruction would be a very easy business; but the character and circumstances of the confederacy at present formed against him are so much in his favour that, thick as the storm which hangs over him appears to be, it may after all be dissipated without his receiving any material injury from it. The head of this confederacy is a young

* Piplai, 15 miles east of Lalsoni,

man immersed, it would seem, in pleasure and exceedingly deficient in judgment, if not also in courage. The bonds which unite the members of it are very weak, owing to the jealousy, distrust and even in some degree the opposition of interests, which may be discovered among them, so that time, and a very little time—would break them asunder without the aid of any external force. In spite, however, of these disadvantages, this confederacy is in other respects so formidable, the peculiar situation of Sindia considered, that were its powers to be put in action properly and speedily, it could hardly fail of success. On the other hand, if it remains much longer inactive, or which is the same thing, if its exertions be improperly directed, it will soon fall to pieces, and in its ruin lay the foundation of a new superstructure of power to be raised by Sindia, if he should be allowed by his countrymen to remain undisturbed in this quarter.

Political speculations as to the probable course of events are, at all times and in all countries, to be attended to with reserve. In the present case, when the conduct of either party is so little regulated by any fixed or steady principles of policy, and when so much depends upon a variety of contingencies, which either do not occur, or have not so much influence, in States farther advanced in political and military knowledge,—such conjectures are to be received with particular caution. In respect to those which I occasionally hazard, I shall only observe that if I am rather forward in offering them, it arises from my persuasion that they cannot betray your Lordship into any error (since it can hardly ever be necessary for our Government to adopt any other than provisional measures on such grounds), and from an idea that a free and unrestrained communication of this sort is always agreeable, though it may be seldom useful to you.

My accounts of yesterday from Delhi inform me that, after repeated applications and instances from Shah Nizam-ud-din on the part of Sindia, the King has at length consented to take the field and to join this Chief. The 17th of June is the day fixed for the commencement of his march. It is not however yet clear that His Majesty means to keep his word in this instance. The season of the year and the declining state of his health considered, he must, independent of other circumstances, be exceedingly averse to this measure. If he is prevailed on actually to concur in it, it will hardly be by any other argument than that which was employed by the Shah in the case of Rajah Dayaram. The acting minister is on this occasion said to have plainly intimated to his Majesty that if he did not consent to the death of that obnoxious favourite, there would, he feared, be a sudden end to his reign.

119. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 15th June 1787.

The letters from the northern parts of the Doab mention that the Maratha detachment under Ambajee has not yet moved out of the Sarhind

and Thaneshwar districts, where Ghulam Qadir Khan's party is also stationed. The country of this Chief has been overrun by some straggling bodies of Sikhs, who on the pretence of collecting a Rakhi (tribute) have committed great devastations there.

As the Ganges is daily rising and the Sikhs engaged in watching the motions of the Marathas, it is not probable that their excursions will extend to this side of the river.

Sindia has lately conducted his expedition against Jaynagar, so unskillfully and with such timidity, that his character as a soldier has suffered a great degradation throughout this part of India. When the actions, my Lord, of this Chief are dispassionately considered, it will be seen, that from the battle of Panipat, fought in 1761 between the Marathas and the Mahomadans for the empire of Hindustan, and in which Sindia was wounded, to the period of the late revolution which gave him a controlling power over the King's person, he has displayed a fund of resource, civil as well as military, and a dexterity of conduct that has extracted benefits from every event that has befallen him.

His interposition in behalf of the English on two important occasions hath brought him into their notice and entitles him, as an useful ally, to their consideration. He saved the Bombay army at Wargaum, and he made our last Maratha peace. But his reputation has now sunk so much beneath its former level, that instead of looking on him with an eye of jealousy as a dangerous neighbour, the light in which I had been taught to view him, since my last arrival in India,—I am rather apprehensive that some powerful combination may compel him to quit the station he now occupies; when other Powers will appear, from whose vicinity every mischief that arises from a bad government and a lawless people may be dreaded. This, my Lord, is simply an apprehension. For these, there is no substantial authority for saying that Sindia is not much superior to his enemies, in the strength of his army, in his artillery and in his treasure.

It is a well known fact that the Rajpoots have no money and it now appears that the Chief of Jodhpur, who furnished the Rajah of Jaynagar with a body of auxiliaries, has directed the officer commanding them to make a demand of certain districts of the Jaynagar country as a recompense for the assistance that had been sent. This requisition has not been acceded to, and has caused a want of cordiality between the Rajpoots, since which the Jodhpur troops have shewn a want of exertion in all their operations. The defection of Mahommed Beg Hamdani dispirits and embarrasses Sindhia, who now entertains a general suspicion of his Mogul and Hindustany troops, which compose the flower of his army.

quick marches lately made by Sindhia were occasioned, I understand, by his desire of keeping the passes open, that provisions might be brought into the Camp and a junction favoured with Appa

Khande Row, a Maratha officer that had been stationed in the Bundelkand Province with an army of 10,000 men. Should this officer join without any spirited opposition on the part of the Rajpoots, it may be inferred, I think, that they do not design to act offensively.

120. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Mainpuri, 17th June 1787.

Sindia's scouts having reported to him on the evening of the 12th that the Confederate army had advanced to Dhownsa, and other accounts leading him to apprehend that the enemy designed by this movement to turn his rear, and throw themselves between him and Dig, he suddenly determined on marching the following morning towards Lalsont, as if with an intention of proceeding against Jaynagar. He accordingly moved about 2 cos in that direction on the 13th, encamping near a place called Soorajpoor, which is between three and four cos from Lalsont. There he gave it out to be his resolution to march again the following day. I do not believe him to have any serious thoughts of countermarching towards Jaynagar, which is eighteen cos from Lalsont. There is too much enterprize in such a measure for the military genius of Sindia, and indeed, the attempt would, at the best, be a desperate one. It is different with the scheme attributed to the Rajah of Jaynagar. There being, perhaps, hardly a single zamindar between Dhownsa and Dig who would not cheerfully favour his progress, although they might not openly repair to his standard,—if the Rajpoots should really make this attempt, it is more likely that Sindia will endeavor to get before them, than that he should imitate their manœuvre and at the hazard of being totally surrounded under peculiar disadvantages: for whatever the Row Rajah may have made him believe, it appears pretty clear that his party among the zamindars dependent on Jaynagar, is very inconsiderable.

Ambajee is proceeding to join his master as expeditiously as the Sikhs will allow him. His rear is very much molested by those light depredators, and he himself expects to have great difficulty in reaching Karnal.

Mr. Macpherson arrived at Agra on the 15th instant, which was some days sooner than I had reckoned upon. He will proceed in a day or two towards Fathgarh, which I hope to reach on the 20th.

121. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 20th June 1787.

I have the honor to acquaint you that I arrived here this morning, and that I expect to be joined by Mr. Macpherson and the rest of my party on the 25th.

* 12 m. north-east of Lalsont.

I find since I had last the honor of addressing your Lordship, that Sindia has advanced within a short distance of Lalsont. The confederate army remains at Dhownsa; Mahommed Beg is employed in reducing a fort belonging to the Rōw Rajah. The Rajpoots have hitherto conducted their operations with so little judgment, that if they persevere much longer in their present plan it may happen to Sindia as to some constitutions which are said to be invigorated by an ague attack.

121A. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 20th June 1787.

I have the honor to forward you under a separate cover a sketch of that part of the country to the westward of the Jamna which has been the scene of Sindia's operations since the beginning of the year 1784.

It is the production of Lieut. Stewart, a young gentleman of much merit, who has been attached during some years to the Residency at the Durbar of Sindia, and at present commands the escort of the Resident. I am hopeful it will enable your Lordship to form a tolerable accurate idea of the movements of the armies now opposed to each other in the neighbourhood of Jaynagar.

122. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 22nd June 1787.

I had last the honor of addressing you under date the 20th instant, when I informed your Lordship of my arrival at this place.

The confederate army advanced from Dhownsa* on the 16th to a place which brought them within ten cos of the Marathas; and I understand that they have since proceeded to Ramgarh, by which movement their distance from Sindia is reduced to seven cos.

The pass at Lalsont is not yet occupied by either army; and yet it would appear particularly necessary for Sindia to secure the command of it, as the facility of his communication with Agra and Dig materially depends on his possession of it. To procure this advantage, however, he would be obliged to throw himself between it and the approaching enemy, to take up a post in which he could hardly avoid a battle, and by this means to hazard a sudden engagement, to which he appears rather disinclined, wishing to be previously joined by Ambajee and by Apa Khande Rao. On the other hand, by descending the pass he would, it is true, be able to keep the enemy at bay, and to render his communication with the places before mentioned tolerably safe and easy. But as such a movement would look very like a flight, and would be followed by the immediate ruin of all his connections above the passes,

* Dhownsa, 12 m. south of Bhandarej, and 12 m. n. e. of Lalsont

he seems to be even more averse to this than to the other measure. His present post is not tenable for any length of time ; so that he will probably soon be necessitated either to risk a battle or to retire before the enemy. That the latter are bent upon bringing Sindia to an engagement before the junction of Ambajee, I will not venture to affirm, on account of the character of the Rajah of Jaynagar, and of the great caution which marks the councils of the Jodhpoor general. Of Dowlat Ram's and the Hamdani's inclination there is no doubt, and it would seem from the latter motions of the confederates as if these had been predominant. The Hamdani has taken the fort which I informed your Lordship he had attacked, having put the garrison to the sword for having made a defence somewhat obstinate. The Row Rajah is not without his fears lest all his strongholds should yield without resistance to the enemy.

There is no longer any doubt of Dharam Rao's having joined the Rajah's army. Malik Mahomad Khan has also gone over to him. This Moghul sardar was on command in Mewat, which as well as Rewari may be almost said to have thrown off its subjection to Sindia.

Badil Beg Khan (Turk Jang), who was at first said to have repaired to the confederate army with the Hamdani, has lately amused Sindia with assurances of his intention to join him as soon as he shall find a favorable opportunity of passing by the enemy ; but I have some reason to suspect that his treaty with the Rajah is concluded, and that we shall ere long hear of his arrival in the confederate camp.

Ambajee reached Karnal on the 14th inst. with less loss and difficulty than he had reckoned upon ; the Sikhs having contented themselves with carrying off about two hundred head of cattle, and with sometimes robbing his camp in the night. Having left Bakhshée Shyam Rao with about 2,000 horse (Marathas and Hindostanees) and 6 battalions of infantry, including Samroo's, for the protection of Karnal and the adjacent country, he proceeded himself on the 16th inst. attended by 1,000 Maratha horse, the *risala* of Morad Beg Khan and Ahmad Khan Barech, 2 battalions of infantry, and 25 pieces of artillery, for Sindia's army, with which his junction (if permitted by the confederates) will be of the utmost importance to the affairs of his master.

Ambajee was desirous of bringing Samroo's battalions along with him, but finding the measure impracticable, he affected to approve of their remaining behind with Shyam Rao. Baghel Singh, Goordat Singh etc., with about 3,000 horse, were also left at Karnal, but it is very doubtful whether these Sikhs will adhere to the Bakhshée. Ambajee had great difficulty in managing them, and Shyam Rao is much inferior to that Commander in every respect.

Najaf Quli Khan continues to act upon his neutral plan, but as Ambajee will pass near him in proceeding to the army, this circumstance may

possibly have the effect of precipitating him into the confederacy. It is scarce possible he should even think of joining Sindia.

123. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 27th June 1787.

I had last the honor of addressing you under date the 22nd instant, since which nothing has occurred till to-day worth communicating to your Lordship.

My advices from Camp of the 23rd instant, however, give some reason to expect that something decisive may very soon take place. Early that morning Rana Khan, at the head of the greatest part of Sindia's army, proceeded beyond the pass of Lalsont, of which he took possession. The Rajpoots had, a few days before, seized on this post, but, for what reason does not appear, voluntarily evacuated it very soon after.

Sindia himself remained behind with all the baggage of Rana Khan's division, and about seven or eight thousand men. He was in expectation of being joined on the following day by Apa Khanda Rao.

The sending of Rana Khan forward, to meet and oppose the enemy, was a measure very suddenly resolved upon, but seems to have been approved of not only by the Rao Rajah, but by all the Maratha Chiefs. The reputation of Sindia had suffered considerably by some of his late movements, as they seemed to indicate a fear of the confederates, and had conduced too much to elevate the latter. To advance against the enemy, therefore, in the present moment, without waiting the junction either of Apa Khanda or of Ambajee, would redeem his military credit, and most probably intimidate the Rajah.

Such appear to have been Sindia's reasons for this vigorous step, which is not at all unlikely to produce the expected effect, as far as respects the Rajah, and may indeed be followed in a few days by somewhat of a decisive nature.

The Rajah's situation was not very well known when my last advices from Sindia's camp came away; and I fear that two or three of my late despatches from the Rajpoot army have been intercepted. If, however, he should have been at Ramgarh when Rana Khan advanced beyond the passes, the distance between the armics would not exceed 4 cos.

Ambajee arrived at Dehli on the 22nd instant and was to have proceeded for the army on the 24th, the day subsequent to the date of my latest letters from that place. My intelligence has remained with Bakhshée Shyam Rao at Karnal, where I purpose he shall continue till I am honoured with your Lordship's orders on my address of the 9th instant from Agra.

124. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 4th July 1787.

If I have latterly observed a longer silence than usual, it proceeded from the want of sufficient interesting matter with which to trouble your Lordship.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 27th ultimo, when I informed your Lordship of Rana Khan's having advanced towards the army of the confederates at the head of the greater part of Sindia's force.

This movement, it would seem, has determined the Rajah of Jaynagar to remain at Madhogarh with a small body of men, and to send the remainder of his troops to Ramgarh* in order to oppose Rana Khan, who is encamped within 3 or 4 cos of the latter place. The Rajah professes an intention of regulating his motions by those of Sindia, and has signified his resolution of joining his advanced army in the event of Sindia's joining Rana Khan.

Rana Khan's present post is distant about 6 cos from the Rajpoot camp. He wishes much to be permitted to move nearer to it; but this Sindia's caution has not yet allowed. He has informed this commander that he purposed advancing himself on the 30th June; but till he was ready to occupy his ground he thought it would be as prudent for him to quit it, as such a movement might bring on a general engagement sooner than would be proper. It would appear as if Sindia was desirous of being joined by Ambajee before he gave battle to the Rajpoots. Ambajee may be expected to reach the army (if not interrupted by the enemy, about this day. His march has been somewhat impeded by the rains, which have fallen between Dehli and Dig, and by the discontents prevailing in his detachment on the score of arrears.

The advanced army which the Rajah of Jaynagar talks of forming, in imitation of that under Rana Khan Bhai, is to be commanded by the Hamdani, Dowlat Ram, Bheem Raj (the Jodhpoor general) and Malik Mahommad Khan.

I mentioned in a former letter to your Lordship a suspicion which I had that the defection of Dharam Rao had originated in the political enmity of Tukojee Holkar towards Sindia, and I am confirmed in this idea by later advices. Ahalya Bai, I have also learned, affects great displeasure against Sindia on account of depredations which she affirms to have been committed by his army within the limits of her jagir. The connexion subsisting between this lady and Holkar is, of course, well known to your Lordship. I mentioned in my letter of the 23rd May the risk which Sindia runs of widening the breach between himself and Holkar by having moved into the vicinity of Tonk.

* *Madhogarh* is 11 m. n. w. of *Ramgarh* which is 6 m. n. w. of *Lalsont*.

Apa Khande Rao joined the army on the 26th June without any attempt on the part of the enemy to obstruct his march. He brought with him two battalions of Sepoys, a body of Najibs (or faqirs) and about 3,000 horse,—making altogether between four and five thousand men. He was accompanied by Rajdhar Goojar (the Rajah of Samthar*) at the head of a few hundred horses. Sindia is secretly very much dissatisfied with Apa, but does not think the present a proper season for calling him to the strict account, which in another conjuncture he could certainly do.

I forbear to touch upon Deccan intelligence, judging that you are regularly advised by Mr. Malet of every interesting occurrence of that quarter.

The Poona papers latterly contain nothing particular, but the mention of Holkar's and Tantua's return to the capital.

125. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G.G.

Fathgarh, 7th July 1787.

I had last the honor of addressing you under date the 4th instant, since which I have had the pleasure of receiving notice from Captain Haldane that your Lordship has approved of my arrangements for the prevention of desertion and for the obtaining of intelligence.

I understand from a quarter of tolerable good authority that the Rajah of Jaynagar, the Rajah of Jodhpoor, and Mahommad Beg Khan Hamdani, have lately concluded a treaty of partition founded on the event of Sindia's expulsion from Hindostan. The leading articles of this convention are said to be as follows :—

1st.—The Rajah of Jaynagar is to be put in possession of all the territories that belonged to his family during the time of Madho Singh.

2nd.—He is to divide equally with Beejai Singh (the Rajah of Jodhpoor) the dominions of the Row Rajah.

3rd.—Mahommad Beg is to enjoy whatever may remain of the country possessed by the late Najaf Khan, after restoring to the Rajah of Jaynagar such parts of it as originally appertained to his family.

4th.—Of whatever other districts the confederates may subdue, the Hamdani is to keep one moiety, and the two Rajahs are to divide equally the remaining one.

Supposing such a partition to have been actually agreed to, the principle of it would appear to be exceeding just and liberal : Yet there is great reason to think that, were Sindia to be totally expelled from this country, the treaty would not prove entirely agreeable to any of the contracting parties. Each of them would be apt to imagine that he might have made better terms for himself ; and the Hamdani, in particular, would probably but ill digest the surrender of so many considerable districts as he would have to relinquish in such an event.

* *Samthar*, a petty State in Bundelkhand. *Tonk*, 52 miles south of Jaipur.

In respect to our own Government, it would no doubt have a very quiet and inoffensive neighbour in the Hamdani, who would have enough to do to maintain his ground against the future attempts of the Marathas, to recover their influence in this quarter, as well as against the jealousy and competition of Najaf Quli Khan, Ghulam Qadir Khan, and others, who would probably never be brought to submit heartily to his authority.

I have been assured that the confederates purpose intercepting Ambaji, and that they have taken measures to that effect. He will do right to avoid their detachments if possible, by taking a circuitous route, since he has no reason to rely on the firmness of his party which is chiefly composed of Hindostanis.

Sindia's suspicions of the Jaynagar exiles (Khooshhali Ram Bohrah, and Tirath Ram) have latterly risen to a great height. His distrust also of the Row Rajah is so considerable that he has frequently objected to that Chief's accompanying any of the advanced parties. He seems by no means sure of his adherence, and is not entirely satisfied that he has not already secretly made his peace with the Rajah. Whether there be any just foundation or not for this jealousy, it must be owned that it is not warranted by any plain appearances—His Chief Officer (Sewah Ram) seems to be as forward and as active against the enemy as any of Sindia's own.

126. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 16th July 1787.

* * * The late newspapers from the King's Durbar and from Sindhia's camp which accompany this, will acquaint you of the disturbances committed by the troops at Delhi and of the height to which the animosities have risen between Rajah Deshmukh and Shah Nizam-ud-din, and which now seem to threaten a serious convulsion in that quarter.

I . . . arrived here on the 20th ultimo. No successor is as yet appointed to reside at Sindhia's Durbar.

P.S.—I have been obliged to employ another hand to write this letter owing to indisposition. Lord C. is expected to leave Calcutta on his tour to the military stations about 15th. I fancy, I shall await his arrival here.

David Woodburn and his lively wife desire me to convey to you their best compliments.

127. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G.G.

Fathgarh, 19th July 1787.

My last address to you was under date the 7th instant. I have been prevented from writing to your Lordship for some days past by indisposition.

The two armies, although they have somewhat approached each other since my last, continue to be nearly as inactive as ever. Their operations are confined to the picking up of straggling cattle, the intercepting of small supplies of provisions, and the parading of the respective picquets opposite to one other, but always at such a distance as to preclude the effusion of much blood. Rana Khan and Sindia advanced towards the enemy on the same day (10th instant), the former about two *cos*, and the latter to the ground which had been occupied by Rana Khan's detachments. The Rajah with his whole army have taken post at Topka. His camp is about 6 or 7 miles from Rana Khan's, from which it is divided by a deep and difficult nullah. The situation of the confederates is described as exceeding strong.

It is some time since Sindia formed, partly on the model of our detachments at the frontier stations, what are called two camps. They consist each of six battalions of sepoys, and, in point of number, a respectable train of artillery. The command of these Brigades was conferred on Messieurs Lestineau and Vasseut, the only two Europeans in Sindia's service that either deserve or possess his confidence. It was not altogether without difficulty that they were prevailed on to accept of this trust, of which they are become, I understand, heartily tired, on account of the distresses of their troops, to whom very heavy arrears are due, at the same time that all provisions bear an excessive high price, wheat selling at 7 seer per Rupee. These hardships have excited a mutinous spirit in the battalions, that allows but little authority to be exercised over them, which is an evil of the greater consequence as they form the most advanced post or guard of the army. In point of distress, the same may be said to be the case with his whole force, which would seem to be ready to fall to pieces on this account; yet, partly by means of an address that consists in the reiteration of promises which have been violated over and over, but which nevertheless, have not yet entirely lost their effect, and partly owing to the necessitous circumstances of the soldiery, who have little or no reason to believe that they would be better off with the enemy,—he manages to keep them tolerably well together. There is a crisis, however, in these matters when, the difficulties of the troops becoming really and utterly insupportable, their discontent not uncommonly breaks out in acts fatal either to the authority or to the person of the commander. This was very near being exemplified not long since at Dehli, where some battalions mutinying for pay, assaulted the house of Rajah Deshmukh, and were, after losing several of their body, with difficulty prevailed on to draw off.

Ambajee's progress from Dig has been exceeding slow, owing, chiefly I understand to his being employed in escorting a considerable supply of provisions to the army, which he had not joined so late as the 14th instant

Contrary to my conjectures and expectations, Badil Beg Khan has joined Sindia, who appears remarkably solicitous to conciliate him.

The Dehli news-papers will have made your Lordship acquainted with the late commotions in that quarter. The animosity subsisting between Deshmukh and Shah Nizam-ud-din has latterly risen to a height that promises to be productive of some interesting consequences. These, however, will in some sort depend on what may happen between the two armies in the neighbourhood of Jaynagar. In the meantime, the Shah appears to be very active in raising troops, and has even opened a correspondence with Najaf Quli Khan and Ghulam Qadir Khan, the object of which is suspected to be unfriendly to Sindia, although he has endeavor'd to give this measure a different turn.

I have learned that some little misunderstanding has taken place between the Peshwa and the Nizam owing to the latter's having laid claim to a participation of the money paid by Tippoo to the Marathas, which the former considers as a very unreasonable pretension. Sindia has been applied to by the Nizam's vakeel residing with him to interpose his mediation in this business.

I am informed that Raja Chait Sing has deputed one of his confidential servants named Ghulam Husain Khan to Lucknow for the purpose of meeting your Lordship.

Since writing the former part of this letter, I have received accounts of a very smart skirmish which took place on the 14th instant between the advanced parties of the two armies; several were killed and wounded on both sides, and if Rana Khan may be credited he obtained the advantage of the enemy on this occasion. Most of the principal commanders of both armies were engaged in this encounter.

128. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G.G.

Fathgarh, 20th July 1787.

Although I doubt whether I have any longer a right to address you officially, yet, I do not hesitate to transmit the enclosed paper to you, with a request that you will do me the favor to peruse it at your leisure. My object in it has been, primarily to convey to your Lordship the best information in my power on a subject of much political importance, and, in the next place, to throw such a light on the character and manners of Sindia's Durbar as is necessary to the accounting for my unfortunate failure in the earnest endeavors which I used to conciliate that Chief. If any thing I have stated should have the effect of disposing your Lordship to admit that an English minister at the Court of Sindia may possibly become obnoxious without deserving to be so, it would make me happy, could your Lordship allow the accompanying sheets to be recorded with

the rest of my public correspondence. The accusations preferred against me by Sindia, and at his suggestion by the King, being liable to bring my conduct and reputation into question at Home, I confess myself to be exceedingly anxious to avert the possible ill effects of such misrepresentations, by every means consistent with strict truth and honour. It is for this purpose that I have attempted in the subsequent pages faithfully to delineate the character, and to explain the views of our Maratha neighbours, as far as we are concerned in either. If, however, my reasonings and statements should not in any degree produce in your Lordship's mind the kind of impression I have mentioned, I shall have no desire for their passing under any other eye than your own, being too well satisfied of your candour and of your favorable disposition towards me, as to be certain that if they should have no weight with your Lordship, they could have none where I could wish them to have some.

129. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G.C.

Fathgarh, 21st July 1787.

I learn from letters which I have just received from the army that Ambajee arrived in camp on the 16th instant, after having marched on that day near five and twenty *cos*. He came very slightly attended, having left his detachment to join with the greatest speed that the incumbrances accompanying them would allow. He does not appear to have met with the slightest obstruction in his march.

It is probable that the future direction of the war will be committed to Ambajee, in which case the confederates may have reason to repent of their pusillanimity in not attempting to prevent his junction.

130. CALCUTTA COUNCIL TO CHARLES WARRE MALET.

Calcutta, 20th July 1787.

Captain Kirkpatrick having requested to be relieved from his station of Resident with Mahajee Sindia, we have complied with his desire and appointed Major William Palmer to succeed him.

Major Palmer has been directed to acquaint you when he shall have received charge of the office, and to furnish you with such information as may be useful in the performance of your duty.

SECTION 3

Mahadji Sindhia's reverse at Lalsont and loss of control over Delhi Government (July-October 1787)

131. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 25 July, 1787.

It would appear from letters which I have just received from Camp dated the 20th instant, that Sindia, after holding a council of war, composed of all the commanders of his army, determined on offering battle to the confederates the following day. It would seem also from a newspaper of the same date from the Rajpoot Camp, as if the Rajah had fixed on the same day for offering battle to Sindia. It is certain that there was much bustle in the Maratha army on the night of the 20th, preparatory to its movement on the morrow against the enemy. I am informed through more channels than one that Sindia received a letter from the Rajah on the 19th at night, challenging him to an immediate trial of strength, and that he communicated this letter to the council which he assembled on the 20th. My correspondent in the confederate camp had previously advised me of such a letter having been addressed to Sindia.

Should my next advices from Camp contain any thing interesting (as they promise to do), your Lordship may rely on hearing from me again by tomorrow's *daḡ*. Both the Marathas and Rajpoots, however, are so much addicted to gasconade, that it is very seldom that their performance equals either their promises or preparations.

132. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 28 July 1787.

I had last the honour to address you under date the 25th instant, when I informed your Lordship of Sindia's resolution to offer battle to the confederates on the 21st. This he accordingly did, but the enemy thought proper to decline the invitation. It seems that the Rajah's propitious day was not arrived. His soothsayers have referred his fortunate hour to the 25th. Whether or not he meant to attempt any thing on this day, is the more doubtful, as there are some appearances of his wishing to accommodate matters with Sindia. The overtures, however, which he has made to this effect, through Ambajee and Eetal Rao, may be designed only to amuse. Be this as it may, Sindia has peremptorily refused to listen to any proposals of peace, giving for reason that the existence of his power and authority depends on his chastizing of the present confederacy in an exemplary manner.

Rana Khan encamped on the spot to which he advanced on the 21st instant, with the view of giving battle to the enemy, so that his distance from the confederate army is now very inconsiderable. Ambajee has taken post with the division under his command, about 2 cos to the left of Rana Khan, with the design it would seem, of turning the right flank of the enemy whenever an engagement may commence.

The Rajah being said to be somewhat afraid of Sindia's numerous artillery, it is thought by some that he will choose a rainy day for giving battle, in the idea that the Maratha Chief will be less able to manage his guns under such circumstances.

133. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 30th July, 1787.

Since my last address to your Lordship (which was dated the 28th instant) I have learned that Ghulam Qadir Khan has entered upon certain measures which seem to indicate a resolution on his part of observing no longer terms with Sindia. He is said to have put his troops in motion with the view of over-running all the upper part of the Doab at present in the possession of the Marathas, and it is even affirmed that he has summoned all the jagirdars of that district to repair without delay to his standard on pain of having their jagirs sequestered.

These proceedings appear to have raised considerable alarm in the mind of Bakhshee Shyam Rao, the Maratha governor in the Karnal quarter, especially as it is well known that the Rohila Chief is in close

correspondence both with Baghel Singh and with the widow of Samroo. There are also some grounds for suspecting that he has even secretly received encouragement from Shah Nizam-ud-din.

As Sindia cannot be said to have received hitherto any check from the confederates which should lead Ghulam Qadir Khan to imagine that he may act hostilely against him with impunity, it certainly is not agreeable to the usual policy of the Hindostan Chiefs to engage so precipitately in such strong measures as those imputed to the Rohila. When it is considered, however, that owing to his conduct in forsaking Ambajee, he cannot possibly hope for a reconciliation with Sindia, and when all the circumstances of the latter's embarrassed situation are duly weighed, there will perhaps appear more of decision and vigour than of rashness in the councils which he is reported to have adopted.

It is certain that Ghulam Qadir and Najaf Quli Khan are in correspondence, but it is as yet doubtful whether or not the latter has entered into the designs of the Rohila Chieftain. He is, as well as Ghulam Qadir, within a few days' march of Delhi.

I mentioned in my last letter to your Lordship that the Rajah of Jaynagar had made some overtures of peace through Ambajee and Siwajee Eetal Rao. The preliminary proposals on both sides however (so far as I can ascertain) are so extravagant, that I cannot believe either party to be very serious in the business. The Rajah demands that the Row Rajah be abandoned, and Sindia requires, previous to settling the future tribute to be paid by the Rajah, that he be reimbursed the expenses of the expedition, and that the Hamdani be delivered into his hands.

134. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 26 July 1787.

Since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 12th, no occurrence of note has happened in the bordering territories.

Sindia's advanced troops have had a skirmishing engagement with the Rajpoots, in which about 100 men of both parties have been killed and wounded, the advantages seemed to have preponderated on the side of Sindia.

Ghulam Qadir Khan has left Saharanpur, his usual place of residence, and with his forces encamped on the Jamna, where it is said he is negotiating with the Sikhs.

Agreeably to public intelligence, this Chief is endeavouring to draw the Sikhs towards the Delhi quarter, that by their assistance he may be prepared to reap the advantages arising from the events of the day.

The report is either believed in the upper country, or, for the accomplishment of certain purposes, it is industriously circulated, that the Maratha affairs wear an unpromising aspect, that the issue of the Jaynagar war will terminate in their disgrace, and become the signal of a combined attack against their power.

This reasoning, it is said, actuates Ghulam Qadir, the Sikhs, and the Court of Delhi, which wishes, for it must ever fall under the control of some intriguing powerful Minister, to change its master. It is also said that Shah Nizam-ud-din, the ostensible agent of Sindia with the King, favors this design, and that he is raising troops to support it.

I have taken the liberty of communicating this information to your Lordship, with a remark, that as a report it is entitled to a [? no] degree of credit.

As Sindia's army is superior in numbers, much superior in artillery, and his resource drawn from a valuable country, remote from the seat of war, I cannot foresee the ill fortune predicted of him, in the Rajpoot contest, nor acquiesce in the belief, that he will be speedily driven from the station he now holds.

Sindia, who endangers the success of his schemes by a pernicious avarice, incurs the greatest risk of failure in his present expedition by keeping his army, an usage prevalent in India, in long arrears.

135. INTELLIGENCE FROM THE CAMP OF SINDIA, WRITTEN 12th SHAWAL 1201 HIGIREE (28th JULY 1787), NEAR THE HILL JOWANNA.

(Sent by Colonel Harper to G. G. Received 15th August 1787.)

Yesterday every particular was represented down to 8 o'clock p.m. and afterwards mention was made that scouts belonging to the Rajah of Jaynagar had taken, upon the road to Kushhal Garh,* 200 bullocks laden with grain, horses and had wounded several people. The troops of the Sarcar followed them, but apprehended no one. It was then said that one hundred Rohilas with Abdal Khan and 200 Najibs under Afzal Khan, had fled to the army of the Jaynagar Rajah. It was then learnt from the newspapers that the Jaynagar Rajah, after consulting with all his advisers, intends tomorrow to take the field. Sometime after a letter from the Rajah of Jaynagar for Rana Khan was sent to the Presence. In it was written, that until the present time he thought himself a zamindar and had in no respects acted with disrespect or impudence, and that he is to this time ready to pay the revenue; and negotiation is best for both sides, that the *Raj* of each may remain without being shaken. If Sindia is determined right or wrong to take the *Raj* and does not agree to

*Khush-hal-garh, nine cos from Kerowli. [DR. ii 221.]

a negotiation, what benefit arises from this inactivity? Let him come out tomorrow with his whole army, into the field, I will also come out to meet him, and let there be a battle. Rana Khan writes that he holds consultations respecting a battle with his advisers and chiefs, and that the march of the army tomorrow must be delayed. A letter was then written to Rana Khan, ordering him to take the field in the morning at 4 o'clock with his whole force and artillery, and orders were sent to all Sindia's army to finish their meal, and be in readiness at 4 o'clock in the morning, and that his own conveyance should be in readiness before day-break. Sindia went then to the *Deoghar*, and remained before the idol until midnight, and was very earnest in supplications. The pleasing news was published that victory would decide in his favor, and he was desired to take the horse called *Deshpoojah* with him, and during the battle to clothe himself in the garments bestowed on him by Syed Mansur Sahib, his Oracle. He consulted the astrologers, and retired to rest about 2 in the morning. The rest also went away. This morning, waking at 4 o'clock, he remained within. The officers all paid him their respects. Orders were given that 5 batteries of cannon should be prepared and ready round the camp. He then bathed, went to the *Deoghar*, ate, and about day-break Rahim Beg, etc., came into the Presence. Sindia then mounted his horse and went to the camp at Rana Khan. The troops all paid their respects. He then alighted near where Rana Khan's tent stood formerly, and sat upon the *dam-dama* (raised battery), and sent a man on a camel for news from Rana Khan. Two *harcarahs* came and said that the *chokeys* from the Jaynagar army were stationed, and that the Raja with his whole army were ready to mount, and that skirmishes took place between the *chokeys*. That 25 Mogul cavalry had quitted Sindia's army and were going to join Mahomad Beg Hamdani, but that troops pursuing them, two who were badly mounted, were overtaken, one killed and the other made prisoner. It was then represented that the troops of Jaynagar had quitted their *chokeys*, and attacked and taken an escort belonging to Sindia's army. It was said that Rana Khan with all the battalions and troops and artillery had crossed the river, and Khandojee with troops and Ambajee and Rajah [Rayji] Patel and all the other chiefs with the *Sanyasis* had formed the line of battle. The son of Sadaseo Moonshee agreeable to orders went and drew a plan of the line. It was afterwards represented that Mohammad Beg Hamdani with his troops had come up to the left with intent to attack the trenches of Row Rajah. The Rajpoots of Rathor took up the *pan* in the presence of the Rajah of Jaynagar declaring they would on the morrow set out, and not return alive but with the victory. Then taking ten great guns from the army, Sindia kept them

in his own train, and saw with a spying glass the disposition of the two armies. Row Rajah came and said that whenever the troops of Jaynagar should come, his troops would be like theirs, but desired that Sindia would not attack his own army; Sindia then appointed Malhar Hazari and 5 troopers with him. Rana Khan sent words that his line was like a trench, that he should send troops and artillery forward, and the Jaynagar troops are come forward also. At this period it was said the horse of Khandojee Appa died from pain; Sindia sent him another good horse. Two *harkaraks* arrived and said that Sindia's troops were advanced into the plain, one *cos* beyond the *nulla*, and that the Jaynagar troops had advanced one *cos* from Sohim, where their *choky* was stationed, and the fire [was] so brisk on both sides that the balls were innumerable. As the Jaynagar guns are large, their balls reach Sindia's Camp, and men and horses are killed, but Sindia's shots being fired from smaller guns, do not reach the Jaynagar Camp; Sindia then sent four large guns to Rana Khan. At this time, it was said that the Rathor Rajpoots were severely hurt by Sindia's shot, but yet they advanced. Mahomad Beg Hamdani fell upon the lines of Row Rajah, who was very fearful; and Sindia sent Baboojee Apeel Row* and other Chiefs to his assistance. Other *harkaraks* represented that the battle of artillery was done, that they now fought with small arms, arrows, rockets and swords. Sindia, on hearing this about 11 o'clock a.m., mounted his horse and rode forward, and arrived at the village Budarka where he again mounted the *damdama* (gun platform). The camel-riders came and said that, about 3 or 4,000 Rathor Rajpoots were attacking the artillery and lines of Khandojee Appa. The noise of great guns is ceased, and the Sanyasis, Moguls, and other troops of Khandojee are retreating. The Rathoreans had killed and wounded hundreds of the Sanyasis and others. At this time, Mr. DeBoigne's battalion advanced a little, drew up in a line, and fired some shot and vollies of small arms. The Rajpoots did not mind them. Then Baboojee Apeel Row, Ambajee, and Khandojee himself, and Rayjee Pateel went to their assistance, insulted (*sic*, ?=rebuked) the Sanyasis and Moguls, took them with them, and joined by the whole army attacked the Rajpoots; but they did not retreat. At this time the men who were with the sons of Murtaza Khan alighted from their horses, fought with their swords; and Rana Khan sent some guns for assistance, and the Rajpoots retreated, and Khandojee Appa strengthened himself in the same place from whence he had been driven. The Rajpoots returned to their own station. Mulhar Row Panwar, Chinnajee, Dewan of Baboojee Apeel Row, and the nephew of Baboojee

*Baboojee Apeel Row is a mistake for *Bapu Shivaji Vittal Rao*, due to misreading of the Persian *akhbar*. *Budarka* is probably *Bidarka*, 10 miles n.w. of Lalsont. Is *Sohim* a mistake for *Lohwar* 10 m. north of Bidark?—?

Apeel Row, with Ghazi Khan (brother of Murtaza Khan) and other chiefs were wounded, and Sambajee, Sindia's principal chief, and other chiefs and armed men were killed. In this battle near 1,000 men of Sindia's army were killed and wounded, and about 250 horses carried off. But Sindia's trenches remained firm. Some time after *harkaruhs* came from the camp of the Rajpoots and represented that one Bhandari, a great chief, and other chiefs with about 400 or 500 men were killed and wounded, and that Sindia's people had seized about one hundred horses, and that the Rajpoots were now entrenched in the former place; that the guns were still firing. The camel-riders came and represented that the Rajpoots had again attacked the lines of Apajee, who had retreated; at this time Sindia's troops arriving to their assistance, the Rajpoots retreated and Apajee remained there. It was then represented that the Jaynagar troops mean to make a descent upon the lines of Row Rajah. Sindia then ordered other troops to go to the assistance of Row Rajah. It was said that the Rathor Rajpoots had two or three times intended to attack the artillery and lines of Sindia's army, but were opposed by the troops, who stood their ground. The shots fired by the Rajah of Jaynagar were picked up and carried before Sindia, and they weighed from 5 *seers* to 14 *seers* each, and about 2,000 rockets were fixed on each side. Orders were given to carry the palanquins of all the chiefs to the field of battle and bring in the wounded. Camel-riders were sent for news of Rana Khan. It was then learnt that a servant of Rana Khan, who was standing close by his master's horse, was killed by a shot. That one Jamadar with Khajah Niamatullah, cavalry-man, was killed, and another Jamadar with Hamid Beg, horse-man, was wounded, and that many of the *risalah* of the sons of Murtaza Khan, [and] of the battalions of Sindia's army, were killed and wounded. An order was issued to all the *yakeels* of the Hindostany and Deccan troops to give in a list of their killed and wounded. He sent for 5 camels loaded with money from the army [camp]. It was then represented, that the infantry, the sons of Murtaza Khan, the cavalry and Mr. DeBoigne's battalion, the Panwars and Baboojee Apeel Row had so exerted themselves that the army kept its ground, otherwise the business would have been deranged. About 2 or 3,000 men on each side were killed and wounded. Sindia then consulted with those who were by, and determined that if the Jaynagar Rajah retires, we will with our artillery retire to the banks of the *nulla* and encamp; but if the Rajah of Jaynagar remains in this manner, our troops shall stay here and fire on them in the night. To this it was replied that the Rajahs and zamindars round about were waiting the issue. Now that they will hear of a battle, they will all join and create disturbances all over the country, and will go to the assistance of the Rajah of Jaynagar, and it will take a long time

for troops to come from the Deccan to the assistance of Sindia. And now that fighting is commenced, everything ought to be settled somehow by tomorrow or next day. Sindia answered that at night he would send for Rana Khan and consult with him. It was then represented that it was well known that under veil of the night several Hindostany battalions will run away to the Rajah of Jaynagar. This was ordered to be enquired into. About 8 o'clock p.m., both armies were in their encampments, but the firing still continued.

136. COPY OF A LETTER FROM MOLAVY MAHOMAD ZEB-E-ALAM KHAN.

Written 28th July 1787, received 15th August.

To-day from day-break until evening the Maharajah with his whole army were drawn out and were employed in fighting. Even now that it is midnight, the Maharajah is out on the advanced station. There are no certain accounts. But I sent my *harkaraks* to the head of the army. What is written in the newspaper of the retreat of Appajee and of the succour brought by Khandojee &c. and his being again firm is very true. And with respect to the account of killed and wounded, as it is usual to write more killed and wounded of the enemy than of their own, whose number they conceal; it is therefore still uncertain how many are killed and wounded. The camel-driver brought accounts to the Rajah that Bhandary and Hamdany were both slain, and received a reward of 25 Rupees. But accounts of Bhandary are received from other places, and the report of the death of Hamdany may have been by way of consolation. At any rate, many are killed and wounded on both sides. The certain number is not known. My *harkarah* represents the victory in favor of the Jaynagar Rajah, and the camel-driver in favor of Sindia. At all events, both sides at present are alike. The victory cannot be declared. I will write what I learn tomorrow.

137. PAPER OF INTELLIGENCE FROM SINDIA'S ARMY, RELATIVE TO THE ACTION OF THE 12th SHAWAL OR 28th JULY.

(Received at Poona, 25th August 1787.)

This morning two hours before day, Patel Bahadur, i.e., Sindia, arose and after performing his ablutions and religious ceremonies and breaking his fast, proceeded on horseback before sunrise to the quarters of the *Jhari fati*, i.e. the advanced army, unencumbered by baggage, and sent orders to the Rear Encampment to be ready to advance when directed. After proceeding two *cos* he alighted at the encampment

of Rayjee Patel and sat down on a mound (*damdama*) that had been thrown up. There intelligence was brought that the artillery and battalions had crossed the river in front, and that the Rajpoots also having advanced with their guns were preparing for action, while the cavalry on each side kept up a distant firing at each other. Patel Bahadur dispatched his *huzras*, *chobdars*, *jasuses*, and camel-couriers to the stations of the different Chiefs and Commanders with strict injunctions to bring successive and instant intelligence of what happened. About this time it was reported that Appa Khanderao's horse was killed, another from the Patel's stud was immediately sent. A pair of *halkarahs* brought intelligence that Mahomad Beg Khan, Thakoor Pauar Sing and the Rathor forces having advanced with their guns, had commenced the engagement. At this moment the report of guns was heard. A camel-courier arrived from Rao Rajah begging that as the enemy were advanced against his station, the Patel would send somebody to observe and witness his and his troops' conduct. A *huzra* and two *jasuses* were accordingly despatched. A camel-courier arrived with a report that the Rathors had driven off some of the *tattoos* (ponies) of the foragers, and that the artillery and regular infantry or battalions were drawn up in a line extending two *cos*, and that a constant cannonade was kept up from 200 pieces of different calibres. Another courier brought intelligence that some advanced guns of the Rajpoots had been forced to retreat by the superior fire of his (the Patel's) artillery. A camel-courier from Rao Rajah brought intelligence that the Rajah of Jaynagar was advancing to the field in person, and that the Rathor foot had taken possession of the defiles in his front, so that he did not think it prudent to advance from his post. The Patel in reply ordered him to continue the action with his artillery and to avoid any precipitation; after which the Patel put on his coat of mail, and accoutring himself with his warlike weapons proceeded to a mound near the tent of Rana Khan, where he alighted and sat down on another commanding eminence. The cannonade was kept up till midday; and at 4 o'clock intelligence was brought that near 4,000 Rathor horse had charged the post of Ambajee, who by an oblique manoeuvre evaded the onset. Appa Khanderao, Bapoo Wittal Rao and the corps of Mortiza Khan marched to Ambajee's succour, and forced the Rajpoots to retreat near a *cos*, with the loss of 5 or 6 hundred men slain and wounded. In this affair the Marathas captured 150 horses, a standard, and a pair of kettle-drums. Amongst the Rajpoots slain were five chiefs. On the Maratha side Chimnaji Bapoo, Wittul's diwan, Dhero Pindara's son, Muncar Rao Pawar were wounded, and Chazi Pathan slain; 100 horsemen killed and 200 wounded. On the part of the Rajpoots, Sobachand Bhandaree and his

son were slain, and Dowlat Ram's horse killed under him. The Patel sent *palankreens* for his wounded. The camel-couriers of Rana Khan were despatched to the baggage camp to bring provender for the cattle, the Patel resolving to remain on that spot all night. 100 of the Nagas with their Chief were slain. About half an hour before sunset a camel-courier arrived from Rana Khan with intelligence that a large party of Rajpoots had advanced towards his station and commenced a cannonade. Another messenger brought intelligence that Mahomad Beg Khan Hamdani being mounted on an elephant, had been killed by a cannon ball, and his body falling to the ground had been carried off by his followers. A turban and *shela* were given to the messenger; a camel-courier arrived from Rao Rajah with advice that the Rajpoots were in confusion, and that Mahomad Beg Khan was killed. About four hours after sunset intelligence was brought that the Rajpoot forces were returned to their Camp and that Rana Khan leaving Monsr. Lestineaux with the infantry and artillery on the field, was also returning to his Camp. About 9 o'clock, the Patel having taken some refreshment reclined in his *palankren*; and about an hour after Rana Khan, Dhar Rao and other Chieftains, came to pay their respects, and each placed his hand on the Patel's feet, who took them all to his embrace. It was said that 200 of Dawlat Ram's followers were slain, and his own horse killed under him and that about 1,000 were slain on either side. The Patel distributed three camel-loads of money and sarpech and bracelets of gold and silver which he had brought with him for that purpose, and sent 25,000 Rupees to the different Chieftains with which to purchase and distribute sweetmeats to their followers. Bappoo Wittal came and represented that as a great many of his followers were wounded he should go to the baggage camp. The Patel assented. Rana Khan withdrew, and the Patel after despatching the elephants to the baggage camp for fodder, retired to rest at 1 o'clock in a *bechoba* tent erected for the purpose.

The next day both armies appeared prepared for action, but none ensued. On the 3rd day a number of battalions with a large portion of artillery demanded their arrears of Patel Bahadur in a very urgent manner, but no settlement being effected the whole body with upwards of 80 pieces of caanon moved off to the Rajpoot Camp, and were well received by the Rajah of Jaynagar. The battalions were chiefly led by their Chiefs and Subadars. Mons. Lestineau and Mons. Vasseult remained with Sindia. In consequence of this desertion, Patel Bahadur ordered his baggage camp to move off immediately to *Khush-hal-garh* about 12 *cos* from the field of action, and he followed in person with the advanced army very early the next morning, leaving one gun upon the ground. The Rajpoots did not pursue him, nor decamp the day following. The 2nd day they (the Rajpoots) advanced to *Baman Wara*,* about six *cos* from the field of

* Probably *Bamnias*, 14 m. east of Lalson.

action. Grain was at $3\frac{1}{2}$ seer per rupee in the army of Patel Bahadur previous to his retreat. The Rajah of Jaynagar has sent circular letters to the Raja of Kerouli and all the other zamindars of those parts, forbidding their assisting Patel Bahadur with provisions or suffering them to pass thro' their districts. Previous to the desertion of the battalions, Sindia had made advances to an accommodation but without success. A European in the service of the Row Rajah also went off to the Rajah of Jaynagar with his troops and ten pieces of cannon. Patel Bahadur retreated in four marches to Dig, about 45 cos from the field of action, and the Rajah of Jaynagar was establishing his territory in the whole country.

138. G. HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 3rd Aug. 1787.

The letters which I had the honor to address your Lordship the 1st and 2nd instant, will have informed you of the battle fought on the 28th July between the Maratha and Jaypoor armies. It appears by accounts that I have since received, that Mohamad Beg Hamdanee was killed by a cannon shot, and that the command of the troops which he carried over to the party of Jaypoor had, together with his titles, been conferred on his son Najaf Aly. Some Chiefs of note were also killed on the side of the Maratha, the most distinguished of whom is Ghazi Khan, one of the sons of the famous Mustapha Khan*, who formerly in the service of Alivardi Khan, the Subahdar of Bengal, fought with great success against the Marathas who had invaded that Province.

139. G. HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 5 Aug. 1787, 1 o'clock.

I have this moment an express from Sindia's Camp, which left it the 1st instant, giving account of the defection of most of his battalions of infantry who carried off great part of the park of artillery to the Jaypoor Rajah. Sindia in consequence was premeditating a retreat with the troops of his own nation and was in dread of an immediate attack, [which] if it has taken place, would most likely prove decisive indeed.

* Mustapha Khan, of the Barech clan of Afghans, was Nawab Alivardi Khan's supreme general; he helped to massacre Bhasker Pandit and other Maratha generals (1744), but afterwards rebelled against his master and was killed in battle: See J. Sarkar's *Bihar & Orissa during the Fall of the Mughal Empire*, pp. 29-96.

140. LETTER FROM COLONEL HARPER TO THE NAWAB HYDAR BEG KHAN.

Written 12th August 1787, received 19th Aug.

I have learnt by newspapers that Rajah Umrao-Gir and Rajah Himmat Bahadur, notwithstanding the *Shukka* from His Excellency, are not inclined to remain quiet, but are now collecting a force to raise a disturbance in the country and possessions of Maharajah Sindia, and with this view have removed their families and connections to Dhoulser. I have already given you intimation of this. It is improper that they should be guilty of this conduct while residing in His Excellency's country. The Governor-General and the English gentlemen will certainly be displeased at it. It is highly necessary that every possible measure should be adopted to restrain them from this improper conduct.

*Nawab Hydar Beg's answer to the above, received at Lucknow
12th August 1787.*

I have been made happy with the receipt of your letter. You write with respect to Rajah Umrao-Gir and Rajah Himmat Bahadur. The particulars of Rajah Umrao-Gir were formerly known. A *Shukka* was sent from His Excellency forbidding him, and a copy was sent to you. Now another *Shukka* shall be dispatched, reprimanding Rajah Umrao-Gir and Rajah Himmat Bahadur, so that they may not be guilty of such conduct, while they remain in His Excellency's dominions; or, any other mode which you will recommend shall be adopted.

141. G. FORSTER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 7 Aug. 1787.

Your Lordship will have heard of the desertion of Sindia's battalions, who went over, with a large train of artillery to the Jaynagar Camp on the 1st of this month. This severe blow, which will render his situation in the upper country precarious and full of danger, has wholly arisen from his wretched impolitic avarice.

Though his troops behaved with much gallantry in the engagement with the Rajpoots, who were repulsed, after a bloody action, in an attack made on his advanced army, he would not make any payments to them of a long arrear, nor was he able to supply them with provisions but at an immoderately high price and in great scarcity.

This event, my Lord, is not favorable to our Government, from the reasons which I took the liberty of stating in a former letter to your Lordship on a supposition of a decline of Sindia's fortune.

By holding a superiority over the bordering Powers he kept them engaged and prevented them from undertaking foreign expeditions. But should he not arise from this shock, they will be left at liberty to pursue schemes which cannot be favorable to this country. Sindia's motions, now directed towards Dig or Agra, must ultimately be guided by the circumstance of the day.

Ghulam Qadir Khan has moved towards Dehli and seized on the districts dependent on the capital. This Chief, the most active and popular Mahommadan soldier in the upper part of India, has the prospect of deriving powerful advantages from this disaster, and should the Marathas be expelled, he probably may acquire a strong influence at the Court of Dehli. The Sikhs by the letters of this day are moving towards Ghulam Qadir's party, which is daily increasing.

142. GABRIEL HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 8 Aug. 1787.

I had the honor to write your Lordship yesterday, and have received advice to-day that on the 3rd instant Rana Khan joined Sindia 24 *cos* from the pass of Lalsont towards Dig, so that he must have followed with as much dispatch as his Chief fled; I am not yet in possession of certain information of the number of troops that joined Sindia under Rana Khan; or whether the King will be induced to join the Jaypoor Chiefs or continue with the Maratha. Much will depend on this, but as the Jaypoor army marched on the 3rd in pursuit of Sindia, I much doubt if the King will not be inclined to join the successful party, which, there is good reason to believe, he has secretly encouraged. Ghulam Qadir Khan and Mohamad Quli Khan will not leave any means untried to prevail on His Majesty to decide in favor of his natural subjects, the Jaypoor people; and I conceive that, if Sindia should take post at Dig, or retire to Agra, his affairs will be in a worse state than at the time of his retreat, or rather flight.

143. GABRIEL HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 12 Aug. 1787.

Since my address of the 8th instant I have sent to Captain Kennaway a Persian detail of the transactions of Sindia and the Jaypoor troops, and of the state of affairs to the 6th instant, since when no advices have arrived, owing I imagine to the very heavy rains that have fallen for some days past. I am getting prepared by Mr. Stokoe a correct plan of the present scene of war, which I hope to enclose for your Lordship's information in this

address, or certainly to-morrow. I have done this because I have not been able on any of our present maps to trace the operations of the two armies, owing to the very incorrect manner of writing the names of places in the Jaynagar country.

Since I began this address, I have received advices from the camp of Sindia at Patan, which is 13 *cos* from Dig ; the particulars are contained in the enclosed paper. I have no authentic advices from the Jaypoor army, which is however, I have reason to think, advancing very regularly to Dig.

I am taking every measure I can to defeat the intrigues of the Gosain Chiefs against Sindia, and I wish your Lordship to cause some message to be delivered to the Prince at Benares to deter him from encouraging these men to take arms at this time, as I have every reason to be convinced His Royal Highness will incite every chief, particularly the Gosains, to distress the affairs of the Maratha. I enclose for your Lordship's information copy of an official letter which I have thought it necessary to write to-day to the Vizier's minister to induce him to adopt some effectual measures to prevent the Gosains taking any part against Sindia.

I have advices that the troops of Ghulam Qadir Khan have taken possession of the city of Sikandra[-bad] which was hitherto in the hands of Sindia. It is situated in the Doab, on the Vizier's frontier, about midway between Dehli and Anupshahar. I cannot however help doubting this.

144. GABRIEL HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 13 Aug. 1787.

After despatching my address of yesterday I was honoured by your Lordship's letter of the 31st July from Agradwip and received by the same post from Mr. Cherry, your Lordship's letters to the Vizier and the ministers, which I this morning delivered, and urged to His Excellency with such arguments as your Lord had instructed me, to induce him to meet you at Allahabad, instead of proceeding for this purpose so far as Benares ; and I have now in charge from His Excellency to say that he will be guided entirely in this matter by your Lordship's wishes. I enclose for your Lordship's information copy of the minister's answer to my public letter to him of yesterday ; and in concert with the Vizier, we this morning devised other means to restrain the intended operations of the Gosain Chiefs against Sindia, as well as to prevent the junction of a number of the Rohilas from Rampoor and other places with Ghulam Qadir Khan, who on the news of his success, were flocking to his standard. The account of his having taken possession of the city of Sikandra[-bad] in the Doab,

which I expressed my doubts of yesterday, is to-day confirmed ; and that all the Marathas in that district were retreating to the Jamna in order to join their Chief, who, on the 8th inst. was at a place called Khata Omada*, having deviated from the road to Dig : further particulars of his affairs, and of the Jaynagar Chief's, are contained in the enclosed Persian paper which came to me this morning : Kaman, the place mentioned in this account, is called " the door of Jaypoor " ; it is a fort which commands a pass on the direct road to Dig, from whence it is distant seven or eight cos [actually *nine* miles due north].

Evening. This letter having been kept open in hopes of sending the map I mentioned yesterday, gives me the opportunity of telling your Lordship, that Sindia on the 9th inst. moved again towards Dig, and was then encamped about seven cos from it.

145. G. HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 16 Aug. 1787.

My address of yesterday acquainted your Lordship of the measures I had taken to prevent the Gosain and Rohila Chiefs doing anything injurious to the affairs of the Maratha ; and enclosing copy of the letters, which I had taken the liberty, without being in possession of your Lordship's special orders, to write to Sindia, to prevent his entertaining any suspicion of the good faith of the English or the Vizier, in consequence of the proceedings of the above Chiefs.

I have now the honor to enclose the advices, which I have received to-day from Sindia's camp and from Delhi, the first detailing his measures for sending away his family, treasure and heavy baggage to Gwalior, the other giving an account of the violent proceedings of two battalions of Sindia's a little distance from the capital.

Of all the unwise resolutions of Sindia, since his first invasion of Jaypoor to the present time, that of sending away his family, and treasures to Gwalior, appears to me to stand foremost ; for beside the danger attending their progress to Dholpoor, on the banks of the Chambal, it will impress all his own followers and those who may secretly wish well to him (if any such exist), that his own opinion of his situation is almost desperate. He had a place of safety so near him to lodge his family and treasure that I own I cannot help thinking he meditates a hasty retreat across the Chambal as soon as he hears from (sic) ; otherwise it is past my comprehension, why he did not chuse Agra as a proper place for their security.

* There is a *Khera*, 18 miles n.e. of Lalsont and 9 miles north of Bamnā was.

146. G. HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 17 Aug. 1787.

My letter of the 5th instant acquainted your Lordship of the defection in Sindia's army, and of his meditating a retreat, and my address of the 6th told your Lordship of his flight and leaving Rana Khan with the wreck of his army to favor his escape.

The accounts I have since received say, that he marched sixteen *cos* (without halting) towards Dig or Agra, and I think the only motive that could induce him to take that route is the hope of saving his son-in-law and the troops under his command, who are with the king in the capital. This is however only conjecture, founded on the little prospect I think he has of mending his present fortune by retiring to either of those fortresses.

Some days ago I heard that one of the Gosain Chiefs who had taken refuge in the Vizier's country, was levying troops with intention to disturb the affairs of the Marathas on this side of the Jamna.

I applied immediately to the Vizier to prevent this proceeding, as being contrary to the friendship subsisting between our Government, his own, and the Maratha State. His Excellency saw the propriety of my advice and wrote immediately to the Gosain in terms to prevent his adopting any measures that might be injurious to the affairs of Sindia. I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Vizier's orders to the Gosain Chief, and I have furnished the Maratha vakeel with another copy, that he may immediately convince his master how ready we are to prevent any improper behaviour in any persons dependant on our own or the Vizier's Government, where his interests were concerned.

147. LETTER FROM HIS EXCELLENCY THE VIZIER TO RAJAH UMRAO-GIR BAHADUR, RECEIVED FROM COL. HARPER.

15th Aug. 1787.

It is known that you entertain troops and intend to attack the possessions of Madho Row Sindia. It has been repeatedly represented to you before, that friendship exists between Madho Row Sindia, the English gentlemen, and myself. If it is your wish to remain in my dominions without disturbance or dispute, it is well; and if you make any commotion, you will find no protection in my country and you will quit my dominions. If you stay in my territory, you must not vary from the line of conduct you have hitherto observed.

148. GABRIEL HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 27th Aug. 1787.

In consequence of the advices I received from Captain Kennaway of your Lordship's approach to Patna on the 21st, the Vizier intended to march to-morrow towards Allahabad ; but the rains have fallen so heavy and incessantly the last twenty-four hours that he is obliged to postpone his departure to the 29th, and I conceive it will be the 8th of September before he can reach Allahabad.

I have this evening received accounts that Ghulam Qadir Khan having on the 23rd instant appeared in force opposite to Delhi, in the Doab, Deshmook the son-in-law of Sindia had retreated the same evening from the Capital to join Sindia, who had himself marched seven *cos* from Dig towards the Chambal by the route of Agra. This intelligence is not from my own agents, but it is from so good authority in my opinion, that I venture to give it to your Lordship to be depended on.

149. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 3rd Aug. 1787.

I have the honour to transmit to you the sketch of the engagement of the 28th ultimo which I yesterday promised to forward to your Lordship. It is the production of Lieut. Stewart, who worked from the materials furnished by my Moulvee. I do not presume to offer it as capable of conveying an accurate idea of the dispositions of the two armies, but it will probably serve in some degree to illustrate the accounts contained in the newspapers.

Bakhshee Shyam Rao has advanced from Karnal to Mirgain Ghat on the Jamna with the view of intimidating Ghulam Qadir Khan, who encamped on the 29th ultimo at Budouli,* a place only four *cos* distant from the Bakhshee's army. Both Commanders are collecting boats for the purpose, as would seem, of crossing the Jamna. The Sikh Chief Baghel Singh, however, not having yet proceeded from Karnal, and still continuing to excuse his delay in joining on frivolous pretences, it is not certain that the Bakhshee will be in a condition to oppose the Rohila, especially as he has some reason to suspect that Samroo's Begam and the Hindostan troops are secretly in league with the latter. The steadiness of these no doubt depends in a great measure on what passes between the two armies near Lalsont, but if they adhere to the Bakhshee till the news of the Hamdani's death reaches them, this event may have the effect of fixing them in their duty ; the loss of that Chief being, on account of his great military reputation, considerably calculated to disconcert the designs of such as are disaffected to Sindia.

* *Rid* It, 10 miles s.-e. of Karnal, but on the eastern side of the Jamuna.

150. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 5th August 1787.

I judge the contents of the inclosed papers to be of sufficient importance to be despatched to your Lordship by express. My letters last night informed me of the commotions which had begun among the Brigades and regular battalions, but as I thought it possible that Sindia might, as usual, be able to pacify these people and allay the disturbance, I purposely delayed apprizing your Lordship of it. As I observed, however, in my address of the 9th ultimo, there is a crisis in these matters, "when the difficulties of the troops becoming really and utterly insupportable, their discontent not uncommonly breaks out into acts fatal, either to the authority or to the person of the Commander". The truth of this remark is now seriously exemplified in the total defection of most, if not of all, the regular battalions in the service of Sindia. Whether or not these corps have carried off with them so many guns as a hundred and forty, may perhaps be doubted, but it is certain that they have taken with them the best that Sindia had. Your Lordship will perceive from the accompanying papers, that the Rajah has made large promises to the deserters since their junction with him, but there appears no reason for suspecting that they were previously seduced by his promises to abandon the Maratha Chief. They seem to have acted purely from the impulse of distress, as they themselves affirmed, and their behaviour in the action of the 28th ultimo warrants us in believing, that they at that time harboured no designs of a treacherous nature.

I understand that the Gosain Himmat Bahadur is making levies of troops with the view of co-operating with Ghulam Qadir Khan. His object probably is the recovery of the districts of Ferozabad, Saadabad &c. which formerly constituted his *jaidad*. It is to be lamented that during the distresses of Sindia this man should be permitted to draw as it were the means of adding to his difficulties from the protection yielded to him by the Vizier. A circumstance of this sort is too much calculated to attach suspicion to the character and conduct of our Government after the professions which we have made to Sindia on this subject. I do not any longer think myself authorized to press this matter with Colonel Harper; but I shall nevertheless take the liberty of offering my opinion on it to him in a private manner.

151. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 6th Aug. 1787.

I had yesterday the honour of informing you by express of the extraordinary defection which took place among the troops of Sindia on the 1st instant.

I now forward to your Lordship the Camp newspaper of the 2nd instant, and a letter addressed to me by my Maulvee under the same date. The latter may be said to be chiefly of a personal or private nature; and is no further deserving of your Lordship's perusal than as it is strongly expressive of the disorder and distress of Sindia's army in its retreat to Peeplai on the 2nd instant. And yet, had the Rajpoots acquitted themselves on this occasion with ordinary spirit and decision, it may be reasonably supposed that the rout of the Maratha forces would have been infinitely more complete than it appears to have been. Indeed considering the circumstances of alarm and difficulty under which the unfortunate march of the 2nd instant was conducted, it may be said to have terminated rather happily for Sindia.

The daughter and other females of this Chief's family being at Dig, it is not likely, I think, that he should take the Dholpoor road, since he would thereby in a manner abandon those who are most dear to him, or at least very much hazard their safety. Besides, to judge from the conduct of the Rajah subsequent to his being joined by the unfaithful battalions, it would not appear as if Sindia would risk any thing by proceeding to Dig for the purpose of removing his family. His passing by the pass of Lalsont in his retreat, and pursuing the upper route by Peeplai certainly looks as if he intended not to stop till he reached the Chambal; and it is to be observed that when he arrives on the banks of this river, he might post himself to great advantage, and proceed either towards Gwalior or Agra as circumstances should render advisable. Dholpoor Bari, which is on the Chambal, is about midway between Agra and Gwalior; and here, too, he might be joined by his family from Dig, although it must be confessed not without their running some danger of being intercepted on the road by the peasantry, who are by this time, no doubt, up in arms. On the whole, I should not be surprised were the want of spirit and conduct so strongly manifested by the Rajah, to encourage Sindia to maintain his ground, and to fall back either to Dig or Agra, instead of giving up the game entirely, which he would do by retreating to Gwalior. The national honor and interests of the Marathas being concerned in the preservation of the dominion acquired by him on this side of India, it may be supposed that, however well their Government might have been pleased with a check being given to his exorbitant and over-grown ambition, it will hardly sit down quietly under his total expulsion. Whether it may enable him to resume the war against the confederates by re-inforcing him, or whether it may depute some other Chief to recover what is lost to the State, must for some time be uncertain; but that it will make an effort to regain its footing in this quarter, can scarcely be doubted, though it is very probable that Tukojee Holkar and not Sindia will be employed on this service.

152. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 7th Aug. 1787.

I do myself the honour to transmit to you a newspaper from Sindia's Camp of the 3rd instant. He marched on that day ten *cos* further in the direction of Karowli and Dholpoor; but he has given it out to be his intention to proceed to Dig, which he may certainly still do by a circuitous route.

Your Lordship will see that agreeably to Mr. Anderson's prediction, Naubat Rai has fallen into disgrace. Besides his own person being secured, all his family have been made prisoners at Agra, pursuant to orders from Sindia. This rigorous measure, however, is very probably more the effect of vexation in Sindia than of any positive or ascertained guilt on the part of Naubat Rai; since no surmise of his having been in correspondence with the Rajah seems ever to have been started, and it is certain that neither he nor any other man could have prevented the defection of the battalions, and artillery, without satisfying at least in some degree, their just and reasonable demands.

I have received the General Orders of the 22nd ultimo from the Adjutant-General's Office apprizing me of my appointment to the 1st European Regiment, and shall in consequence, permit me to inform your Lordship, proceed to Cawnpore whenever I may think I can do so without occasioning any delay in your Lordship's receipt of the interesting advices that may for some time be daily expected from the westward.

153. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 8th Aug. 1787.

I have the honour to forward to you the newspapers from Sindia's army of the 4th and 5th instant. Your Lordship will learn from them that Sindia has taken the Hindaun road, and proceeds by Bhasawar* to Dig.

154. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 15th Aug. 1787.

When Sindia in consequence of the alarming defection among his battalions, determined upon retreating, his mind wavered for some time in respect to the route which it was expedient for him to take. The panic with which his whole army was struck on this occasion, the mutual distrust and jealousy between the Marathas and remaining Hindostanis which it was

*Bhasawar, 37 miles west of Fathgarh, Sikri, and 8 miles west of Wer fort.

calculated to heighten and confirm, the probable insurrection of the country in his rear, the actual revolt of Ghulam Qadir Khan, and of Najaf Quli Khan, the doubtful dispositions of the King (to say the least of them), and the expectations of being closely pressed by the confederate troops, which it was reasonable to imagine would not delay in improving the important advantage they had suddenly acquired,—all these considerations had an obvious tendency to incline him to seek for immediate and certain safety in a direct retreat either to Gwalior or to the banks of the Chambal. Weighty, however, as these inducements to a hasty relinquishment of the influence and dominion which he had been so many years employed in establishing appear to be, it was not long before they yielded to the suggestions of natural affection, which is a principle, I believe, of considerable power over the heart of this Chief. His son-in-law was at Dehli, and his daughter, with other females of his family at Dig. Had he directed his march straight to the Chambal, the personal safety of both would, no doubt, have been greatly endangered. Such a measure would have looked like, and would have been nearly tantamount to, an express dereliction of all his views and pretensions on this side of India, and it would have operated accordingly. His despondency would have communicated itself to all his governors and commanders, none of whom would have been slow in imitating the example of their Chief. They would have retired precipitately from their stations, and by so doing they would have given the signal for insurrection, pillage and carnage, both to the particular enemies of the Maratha Government and to the peasantry in general, who have rarely any reason to be well affected to any administration whatsoever. Under such circumstances it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impracticable, for any of his distant detachments or officers to have joined him in safety. These reflections (which immediately referred to those most dear to himself) aided, probably, in the first instance, by the reluctance with which ambition naturally renounces its pursuits, and ultimately by the confidence with which the injudicious and indecisive conduct of the confederates was calculated to inspire him, determined him, very properly, in favour of the route to Dig, in the neighbourhood of which place he arrived on the 9th instant, without having suffered any distress or loss in his retreat, but what were necessarily occasioned by its precipitancy and by the difficulties of the road. It was in this juncture, that Sindia bore testimony in a remarkable manner to the military reputation of the Hamdani, by observing that had he been living the confederates would have availed themselves very differently of their good fortune, and by taking occasion from hence to congratulate himself on the timely death of that Chief.

When the alarming situation of Sindia became known at Delhi, Rajah Deshmukh (his son-in-law) yielding either to the impulse of despair or desirous of sounding the dispositions of the King, requested His Majesty's permission to withdraw from Court. Fortunately for the critical posture of the Maratha's affairs, this Prince was prevailed on by Shah Nizam-ud-din to oppose the design of Deshmukh, to whom he accordingly gave the *strongest assurances of his royal protection and favour*. The abrupt retreat of Sindia's representative at Dehli could hardly have failed of proving fatal to the Maratha cause; and, among other bad consequences would most probably have been immediately followed by the destruction of Bakhshree Shyam Rao and his party. The attachment, therefore, of the Shah to the interests of Sindia (whether real, or only the result of a prudent regard to his own safety, which, perhaps, entirely depends on the re-establishment of the Maratha power) was never more usefully manifested than on this delicate occasion. It is not to be concluded, however, from the part which the King was persuaded to act in this conjuncture, that His Majesty is in the least desirous of contributing to the restoration of Sindia's affairs. The truth is that Shah Nizam-ud-din's counsels are usually delivered in a manner that bestows on them an irresistible weight; and that long practice, originating in political necessity, has taught the wretched monarch to dissemble occasionally with a facility and address that often baffle the penetration of the shrewdest courtiers.

When Sindia arrived in the neighbourhood of Dig, the Row Rajah, representing to him that his presence has become absolutely necessary in his own country (part of which the Rajah of Jaynagar had already overrun) requested his dismissal, and the aid of a body of troops to enable him to check the progress of the confederate arms. Sindia after some hesitation complied with the desire of his ally, but although the Row had marched to the protection of his dominions, yet he was obliged to depart from the Maratha Camp without being joined by any detachment of Sindia's army. Rayji Pateel was selected for this service, but that Commander made some remonstrances on the occasion which have caused a suspension of the intended measure, and may, possibly lead to its entire relinquishment. He is said to have observed, among other things, that as Sindia himself with his whole force had been unable to make head against the enemy, there could be but little good expected from a division of his army acting in conjunction with the Row Rajah. Although, however, there is some appearance of reason in this objection, yet the truth is that most of the Maratha sardars are exceedingly indisposed towards the Row, some of them regarding him with jealousy, and others considering him as the author of all the difficulties in which their Chief is at present involved; yet if his fidelity be not suspected by Sindia (for which there certainly appears to be no room), it is obviously the interest of the latter to support him effectually. It either an erroneous policy, however, or absolute inability, on the danger of dividing his forces

at this conjuncture, should prevent Sindia from affording him the promised succours, it is not easy to conceive how he should be able singly to maintain his ground against the Rajah. His army is far from considerable, while his resources are by no means reputed great, and, to add to his embarrassments, he was deserted by one of his battalions the very day on which he quitted the Maratha Camp. Some accounts, too, from the army of the confederates mention that since the death of the Hamdani, the Rajah has conferred the sanads for the Row's country on Ismail Beg, who (if this report be true) is not of a character to be slow in possessing himself of it.

From Churaman, which is 5 *cos* from Dig, Sindia sent Ambajee to the latter place for the purpose of escorting the females of his family from thence to Camp. After Ambajee shall have performed this service, his master has some idea of deputing him to Dehli, where, certainly, the presence of some person superior in abilities and dignity to Deshmukh is at this time especially necessary to the prosperity of his affairs. There are some difficulties, however, to be surmounted before this scheme can be put in execution, which may altogether defeat it. Ambajee will be backward in undertaking so delicate an office without being furnished amply with the means both of keeping the King in good humour, and the troops he may command in good order and subjection,—neither of which he knows is practicable without larger supplies of money than perhaps Sindia may be either willing or able to remit to him. For my own part however, I confess I doubt his capacity to acquit himself of his pecuniary engagements, less than his inclination,—his resources being unquestionably very considerable. But whether in his particular case, this conduct be the result of a fallacious policy or merely the effect of avarice, or really arises from the want of money, it is certainly not uncommon for the Princes of Hindostan to withhold the rights of the soldiery, when they possess abundant means of doing them justice. One would imagine that Sindia had had recent experience enough of the fatal tendency of such measures, to have been taught to avoid them for the future; but the errors which proceed from a love of money, usually taking deeper root than most others, are seldom known to be renounced. Accordingly, notwithstanding the difficulties which a mis-timed parsimony has so lately brought upon him, he appears to be at this moment as slow and as unwilling as ever to satisfy the reasonable demands of his troops, which, in regard to the Hindostan part of them, may indeed be owing in some measure to an apprehension of their quitting him upon receiving the arrears due to them. Of flattering assurances he is now more liberal, if possible, than formerly, and since the fatal 1st of August has manifested an uncommon readiness to bestow *jaidads* on such of the Mogul Chiefs as he most wishes to attach to his interests. His promises, however, being addressed to men actually distressed for the means of subsistence, have

lost all their customary influence : and his offers of territorial assignments are but little regarded at a period when, politically speaking, his right to bestow them may in some degree be questioned ; and when, at the most, the possession can only be nominal, since to render it otherwise he would be obliged to consent to the dispersion of the very men whom it is as yet his object to keep together. Wherever, indeed, his distrust of them may rise to such a height as to make him desirous of getting rid of them, it is not improbable but he may effect this point by ordering them to proceed to their *jaidads*.

In his retreat towards Dig, Sindia laid down a plan of future operations which, however, a variety of circumstances may prevent him from pursuing. His idea was to remove his own family and those of all the Deccan Commanders to Gwalior ; and, collecting together at Dig all the Maratha troops he could, to carry on a predatory war in the Rajah's country, till he should be re-inforced from Malwa, Ujjain and Poona, to all of which places he wrote pressing (subsequent to his last misfortune) for speedy succours ; and at the same time earnestly besought Fath Singh Gaikwar to make a diversion in his favour by penetrating into the dominions of the Jodhpoor Rajah whom Sindia considers as the main spring that sets the present confederacy against him in motion. What the Maratha Chief may hereafter be able to accomplish is uncertain : but there is just now little room for supposing it possible for him to make any impression of consequence on the Jaynagar country, and at the same time maintain his ground in the Doab against Ghulam Qadir Khan and the Gosains, in Rewari and Mewat against Najaf Quli Khan, at Dehli against the intrigues of his secret enemies, and in every other place against the general revolt and disaffection of the peasantry. Indeed, though he were entirely easy on all these scores, it is to be doubted whether he would now be able to make such an irregular incursion into the Rajah's territories as he proposed ; the confederates being in possession of all the passes leading into them, excepting the one near Karrowli ; and Manikpuri (the Rajah of that district) being suspected to be secretly in the interests of the enemy. Besides these obstacles to such an enterprize, there are others which perhaps are of superior influence. A detachment of Rajpoots has lately seized upon Kaman, a fortress of some consequence situated about 7 cos to the N. W. of Dig, and formerly the eastern boundary of the districts dependant on the Jaynagar Raj ; and the main body of the confederate army has made some movements that seem to indicate an intention, however late, of pushing the advantage already obtained over Sindia as far as possible. Under such circumstances of complicated difficulty, it is not improbable but this Chief may after all determine on retiring to the Chambal, to wait there the arrival of reinforcements from the Deccan ; but though he should be encouraged, either by the inaction of his enemies, or other favourable incidents, to adopt more

resolute councils, y^t it is exceeding likely that he will not suddenly engage in any military operations that will carry him to any considerable distance from Dig.

The progress of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the Doab has been very rapid, the Maratha *amils* and the superintendents of jagirs having, for the most part, fled before his detachments without making the least resistance. He himself, encamped for some time at Bidauli [10m. s.e. of Kernall] near the Jamna and almost opposite to Bakhshée Shyam Row. Here he waited till he should assemble a sufficient force, and for the convenience of negotiating with the Sikhs and Hindostan troops belonging to the Bakhshée's army, both of which he has been labouring a long while to draw over to his interests, but, not with the success, it would seem, that he hoped for, since he has latterly advanced to Jhunjhana, a place about forty cos from Dehli, and appears to have broken off his treaty with Baghel Singh, and the widow of Samroo. How far he may have succeeded in his endeavours to engage these two persons to enter into his views, is a point upon which the extreme spirit of caution and procrastination for which the politicians of this part of the world are remarkable, makes it difficult to offer any satisfactory opinion. I shall, therefore, only observe on this head, that although the present embarrassments of Sindia (of which Ghulam Qadir Khan took care to convey to them the earliest accounts) has not hitherto determined them to declare in his favour, he may nevertheless have so far prevailed with them as to prevent their acting heartily against him,—a sort of alliance often no less useful than the most open hostility, and to which the parties alluded to are by no means unaccustomed. As for the King's projected expedition against this rebel, it is no longer talked of; although, including Nizam-ud-din's new levies, there is a sufficient force on foot at Dehli for the purpose of chastising him, could its fidelity be relied on or were its exertions to be proportioned to its amount. His Majesty has certainly been all along averse to this enterprize, whatever he may have affected to the contrary; and though I will not venture to affirm that the Rohila is secretly encouraged by him, yet there are many persons at Dehli who entertain no doubt upon this subject; but expect him to make his appearance there very suddenly. Ghulam Qadir not only endeavours occasionally to inculcate this notion, but sometimes pretends, as I have been informed, that he acts under the authority of the Prince Jahander Shah.

Najaf Quli Khan's irruption into Rewari has been nearly as successful as that of Ghulam Qadir Khan into Mewat and other parts of the Doab. He has at length thrown off the mask which has long sat but awkwardly on him; and he has no longer any safety but in pushing matters to the greatest possible extremity against Sindia. By the latest accounts he was lying before Cokulgarh, a stronghold in Rewari. When this falls, there will hardly remain any hindrance to his overrunning Mewat,

The garrison of Gokulgarh, which consists chiefly of Hindostan troops and with whom Najaf Quli has been tampering, have reported to Sindia that he possesses the King's *sanads* for Rewari. I will not take upon me to vouch for the truth of this assertion, although I have long known that His Majesty kept up a correspondence with this Chief through the medium of the Nabob Nazir.

Since writing the above I have learned that Sindia's family joined him from Dig on the 10th instant, and on the following day they departed for Gwalior under the escort of Apa Khande Rao, and accompanied by most of the heavy baggage of the army as well as by the females and children of all the Deccan commanders and troops. The same accounts mention that Ambajee's deputation to Dehli was positively determined on, the real object of which I understand to be the engaging of the King to join the army at Dig. Should this negotiation fail, I am assured that Sindia has made up his mind to falling back without delay to the Chambal; and that it is with this view that he has despatched the greater part of his heavy artillery and stores to Gwalior. Should it succeed, he purposes, it is said, making head in the best manner he can against the confederates till he be reinforced from the Deccan.

155. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 15th August 1787.

On the 21st ultimo Rana Khan encamped on the spot to which he had advanced with the view of giving battle to the enemy, so that his distance from the confederate army was very inconsiderable. Ambajee took post with the division under his command, about 2 cos to the left of Rana Khan, with the design (it would seem) of turning the right flank of the enemy whenever an engagement should commence.

On the 28th ultimo both armies engaged from morning, until night obliged them to separate; the confederates attacked Sindia in the centre and on both flanks; the latter they obliged to fall back, but having afterwards rallied, the Rajpoots retired first from the field,—from which circumstance Sindia claimed a victory, and his right to it was considerably strengthened by the loss the confederates sustained in the death of the Hamdani, who was accidentally killed by a cannon shot. The military reputation of this Chief was very high and Sindia has lately had occasion to remark on his good fortune in having got rid of him. About a thousand men were killed on both sides, and although the battle was obstinate it was by no means decisive, nor did Sindia derive any advantage from it.

On the 30th ultimo the two Brigades and regular battalions mutinied and began to be very troublesome on account of their arrears. They seem to have acted purely from the impulse of distress, as they themselves affirmed; and their behaviour in the action of the 28th ultimo warrant-

us in believing that they at that time harboured no designs of a treacherous nature. Their demands not having been complied with, although they continued disorderly all the next day, they marched away on the 1st instant to the number of 14 battalions, carrying with them about 140 of Sindia's guns. On approaching the confederate army they saluted the Rajah with a round from all their artillery, and large promises were immediately made them respecting the payment of their arrears by the Rajah of Jaynagar.

Sindia at this juncture found his situation exceeding desperate, and without loss of time decamped after burning some of his tumbrils and leaving a good deal of baggage on the ground. Rana Khan marched off in some order until a tumbril accidentally blowing up, and some straggling Rajpoots who were pushing on the rear, threw them into such confusion, that not knowing friend from foe the Marathas began to plunder the baggage of their own army. Sindia after this proceeded sixteen cos without molestation and encamped at Pecplai; at this time his destination was not known; it was supposed he would either retire to Dholpoor on the banks of the Chambal, or to Dig where he had left his family; the following day he moved twelve cos towards Karauli, leaving three large guns on the road for want of carriage cattle and losing a number of people by the accidental blowing up of tumbrils. The third day he moved again and passing by Hindaun, he ordered it to be destroyed and killed many of the inhabitants; after a tedious march (caused by the number of *nullas*) of ten cos, he got safe to his ground. The fourth day he reached Bhasawar, which is only three easy marches from Dig.

I shall now proceed to give you an account of the motions of the confederates upon this unexpected and favourable change in their situation, which with a very little exertion on their part might possibly have accomplished the total annihilation of Sindia's power and even endangered his very existence: however a fatality seems to attend them, notwithstanding fortune has favoured them in the most ample manner, from the inability and want of foresight in the Rajah of Jaynagar who, upon Sindia's decamping in the manner above related, moved to take up the ground he quitted, contenting himself with the baggage Sindia had left. He fired a salute and halted during the day, giving out that he intended to proceed against the country at present in the possession of the Rao Rajah. The following day he moved five cos to the pass of Lalsont, where by the latest accounts he is still encamped. He has taken the fort of Khushhalgarh, in which it is said he found a good deal of baggage and some of Sindia's heavy cannon: he has also taken possession of the town of Hindaun. But as yet all his designs seem to center in the subjection of the Rao Rajah's country.

On the 30th ultimo I learned that Ghulam Qadir had entered into certain measures which indicated a resolution on his part to observe no longer

any terms with Sindia : he was said at that time to have put his troops in motion with the view of overrunning all the upper part of the Doab in the possession of the Marathas and it was even affirmed that he had summoned all the jagirdars of that district to repair without delay to his standard on pain of having their jagirs sequestered.

These proceedings raised great alarm in the mind of Bakhshée Shyam Rao, the Maratha Commander in the Karnal quarter, especially as it was well known that the Rohila Chief was in close correspondence both with Baghel Singh and Samroo's Begam.

Sindia at that time had received no check from the confederates which could lead Ghulam Qadir to imagine that he might act hostilely against him with impunity ; however when it is considered that owing to his conduct in forsaking Ambajee, he could not possibly hope for a reconciliation with Sindia, and when all the circumstances of the latter's embarrassed situation are duly weighed, there will perhaps appear more of decision and vigour than rashness in the conduct which he is reported to have adopted.

It is certain that Ghulam Qadir and Najaf Quli Khan are in correspondence, but it is yet doubtful whether or not the latter has entered into the designs of the Rohila Chieftain. He is, as well as Ghulam Qadir, within a few days' march of Dehli.

On the 1st instant I learnt that Ghulam Qadir had begun his operations by seizing on Shamli and some other places near his own borders. His Majesty talked of crossing the Jamna and proceeding against him, but I never believed him serious and the subsequent change in Sindia's affairs has laid the intention entirely aside.

On the 3rd instant I received intelligence of Bakhshée Shyam Rao's having advanced from Karnal to Mirgun-Ghat on the Jamna, with the view of intimidating Ghulam Qadir, who encamped on the 29th ultimo at Bidauli, a place only four cos distant from the Bakhshée's army. Both Commanders were collecting boats and intent upon crossing the Jamna.

It is said that Sindia, in consequence of the defection of the battalions and the late change in his situation, sent orders to all his detachments to join him without delay at Dig, to enable him to make head against the Rajpoots, whom he means to attack in the Deccan style by committing predatory excursions upon them with his cavalry. Should this be true, the absence of Bakhshée Shyam Rao will leave an open field for Ghulam Qadir.

Naubat Rai on the 2nd instant was put in confinement and his family at Agra are also prisoners : he has been long Paymaster to the Infantry and Manager of the Artillery. But I have not heard that any treacherous intention has been laid to his charge ; and, indeed I am led to think his

confinement has proceeded more from vexation and disappointment in Sindia than from any particular crime he may charge him with.

On the 16th ultimo Major Palmer was appointed to succeed me to the office of Resident at the Durbar of Sindia. I expect to meet him about the end of next month at Cawnpoor.

156. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 23rd August 1787.

Some delay having taken place in the dispatch of my letters of the 14th instant to Surat, I now take the opportunity of sending you by that route an account of the occurrences since that time.

On the 10th instant the females of Sindia's family joined him from Dig under the escort of Ambajec, who had been deputed by Sindia for that purpose: on the following day they departed for Gwalior with a detachment under the command of Appa Khande Rao and accompanied by all the artillery except twelve pieces, by the heavy baggage of the army, as well as by the females of all the Deckan commanders and troops.

The Rajah of Jaynagar it is said has sent a detachment under Morad Beg Khan to besiege the fort of Kishangarh. A detachment of Rajpoots has lately seized upon Kaman, a fortress of some consequence situated about 7 cos to the north west of Dig and formerly the eastern boundary of the districts dependent on the Jaynagar Raj. The main body of the confederate army by the latest accounts is encamped at Balahiry, a place about 30 cos south-west from Dig, to which they advanced by easy marches.

Ghulam Qadir Khan and Najaf Quli Khan continue their depredations without much opposition, the former in the Doab, and the latter in Rewary.

Sindia has delivered the town of Dig into the hands of Ranjit Sing, who I understand, was with some difficulty prevailed upon to accept of it.

P.S.—Umrao-gir, the brother of Himmatt Bahadur, having at the head of 4 or 5,000 men entered the district of Koat in a hostile manner was, I have the pleasure to inform you, repulsed and forced to return to his asylum in the Vizier's country, from whence I am hopeful that he will for the honour of our Government be driven altogether.

157. W. KIRKPATRICK TO COLONEL HARPER.

Fathgarh, 23 Aug. 1787.

I have just learned the following particulars.

That Umrao-gir about four days ago, being at the head of between four and five thousand men, joined battle with nearly the same number

of Marathas which had assembled together for the purpose of opposing him. That at first he gained a considerable advantage over them, having routed and pursued them to some distance, but that his troops dispersing and neglecting to keep watch after this success, were surprised the same day by the Marathas and routed in their turn, but more completely than the latter had been. My information states that many men were slain on both sides, and that the Gosain leaving all his baggage behind him fled precipitately back to Soarah. If all this be true, I have no doubt but that His Excellency, after such an unequivocal breach of engagement on the part of the Gosain, will insist upon his immediately quitting his dominions altogether.

158. CALCUTTA COUNCIL TO, EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G. (on tour).

Calcutta, 28th Aug. 1787.

The Secretary has laid before us the letters which he has received from your Private Secretary under date the 11th, 14, 15, 17 and 19th August, with the correspondence which accompanied them between your Lordship and Colonel Harper, Captain Kirkpatrick and Mr. Forster, to the latest period.

We have perused these papers with the attention which they deserve, and as your Lordship's present situation in the vicinity of the contending Powers in the northern part of Hindostan will enable you to form a better judgment of the part which we should take in the present situation of affairs, we request that you will be pleased to continue your correspondence with the Residents with Mahajee Sindia and at Lucknow, and to furnish them with your instructions for their guidance whenever the occasion may require them.

As your Lordship may wish to be informed of our sentiments in regard to the line which it may be proper to pursue under the circumstances which have come to our knowledge, we have the honour to communicate them for your information. These sentiments we believe will be found to correspond with those entertained by your Lordship; the communication of them, however, may preclude the necessity of future references, and at the same time we leave it to your Lordship's discretion to adopt such measures as a better information may render expedient.

In the present situation of Mahajee Sindia's affairs, we are of opinion that every act should be avoided by this Government and its allies tending to give countenance and encouragement to the Chiefs and Powers who have taken arms against him, and under this idea, that while the Shahzada continues to reside within our territories or those of the Vizier, we think he should be strongly urged and enjoined to forbear carrying on any correspondence with the Jaynagar Chiefs, or with any others in opposition to Sindia.

If the Gosain Chiefs who obtained protection in the Vizier's dominions shall have taken up arms against Mahajee Sindia, as it was suspected to be their intention, it might perhaps be productive of beneficial consequences, and create in the neighbouring Powers a confidence in our moderation and good faith if His Excellency were requested to issue a proclamation declaring that as the Gosains have been admitted into his dominions and have in defiance of his orders entered into measures hostile to the ally of the English and of his own Government, he thinks it incumbent on him to testify his strong disapprobation of their conduct by declaring that they have forfeited all right to his protection and that his officers are instructed to apprehend their persons if they shall hereafter be found within his territories.

The correspondence between this Government and Mahajee Sindia we think should be continued as heretofore on the most friendly footing, that no suspicion may be entertained by him or by any other power in Hindostan that we have encouraged his enemies, or wish to break off our connection with him; but it should at the same time be understood that we are not bound either in equity or by the faith of treaties to afford Sindia the more substantial assistance of our arms.

The Resident with Mahajee Sindia may be directed to communicate to Sindia in person the substance of our resolutions to avoid every measure either on our own part or on that of persons living under our protection which may tend to afford any countenance to his enemies, and to correspond with him on the same friendly footing as heretofore, assuring him at the same time that his late miscarriages have not in any respect altered our friendship and the regard we profess to entertain for him.

These points are submitted to your Lordship's consideration; and we leave it to you to determine, in case overtures should be made, how far it may be proper to discourage any idea in Sindia of our assisting him with troops, avoiding at the same time the positive declaration that we are not bound either in equity or by treaty to afford him any such assistance, unless compelled to make it by the urgency of his application.

159. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 26th August 1787.

My advices of this day from Sindia's Camp inform me of that Chief's having marched on the 22nd instant to Alinagar, which is situated about 11 *cos* to the westward of Dig. I confess myself to be totally at a loss to explain his design in this movement. His force, I understand, does not consist of more than fifteen thousand men, great numbers of the Hindostan troops having quitted him on the eve of the 22nd, some of them after a regular dismissal, and others without asking his leave. This measure has, besides, been marked by several other circumstances that would seem

to denote a resolution of immediately abandoning all his interests on this side of India, with which a single march in the direction of Jaynagar would not be at all irreconcilable. There are not wanting considerations, however, that make strongly against the probability of such a design ; among which the situation of Deshmukh at Delhi does not constitute the least. It is pretty certain that the latter has received orders to quit his station and to join his father-in-law with all possible speed, but till he shall have joined, I have great difficulty in believing it to be Sindia's intention to fall back directly to the Chambal. The Rajah appearing, from the latest accounts, to have been in full march towards Kaman, perhaps Sindia's anxiety for the safety of his son-in-law has induced him to throw himself between that place and the confederate army ; a position in which, he no doubt, runs great hazard, but without taking of which the junction of Deshmukh would have been almost impracticable, as had the Rajah been permitted to reach Kaman, it would have been a very easy matter for him from thence to have cut off the communication of the Maratha army with Delhi. Sindia's present position is favourable to the safe junction of Deshmukh, since though very unequal to the confederates in point of strength, he may nevertheless be able to check their progress for a few days.

Ghulam Qadir Khan had by the last accounts approached within twelve *cos* of Delhi. The progress of this Chief will no doubt accelerate the flight of Deshmukh, who cannot place any dependence on the wretched army lately set on foot to repel that rebel.

P.S.—I have just learned that Bakshee Shyam Rao has determined on falling back to Delhi, so that it is very probable Deshmukh will wait the arrival of the commander to have the advantage of his escort.

160. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 27th Aug. 1787.

The Persian advices which you will receive with this will inform your Lordship of Ghulam Qadir's arrival at the Shahdarah (which is opposite to Delhi) and of the engagement which happened between his army and the Maratha troops on the 24th instant. This action, though by no means decisive, seems to have occasioned great consternation among the adherents of Sindia, who did not reckon upon the Rohila's making his appearance so suddenly.

Both the King and Shah Nizam-ud-din are said to have secretly deputed agents to treat with Ghulam Qadir, but whether merely with the view of amusing him, or of throwing themselves upon his protection, is difficult to determine.

The Jamuna being very high and rapid at this period, it will not be easy for the Rohila to make himself master either of Delhi or the King's person, so long as either Deshmukh or Shah Nizam-ud-din think proper to make head against him.

Your Lordship will learn from the enclosed paper that Sindia proposed marching on the 24th instant, towards Alwar, which is the capital and principal fortress of the Row Rajah. This route is so much out of the line of the confederate army, and lies in so westerly a direction, that I am as much at a loss as ever to penetrate his design.

161. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 28th Aug. 1787.

I had yesterday the honour of informing your Lordship of the arrival of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the vicinity of Delhi. I have this moment received advices which mention that Rajah Deshmukh, accompanied by 500 Maratha horse, fled precipitately from Delhi on the evening of the 24th instant. He took the Ballamgarh road which leads to Dig.

From certain proceedings of Shah Nizam-ud-din in the course of the same day, it would seem as if his negotiations with the Rohila Chief had failed, and that he had resolved on following Deshmukh. There would certainly be but little safety for him in Delhi, should that place fall into the hands of G. Q. K.,—an event which may now be reckoned very near, since the army opposed to him will hardly continue to act against him, after being apprized of the hasty retreat of their ostensible commander.

162. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 29th August, 1787.

I had yesterday the honour of acquainting you with the flight of Rajah Deshmukh from Delhi. I am now to inform your Lordship that he was accompanied by Shah Nizam-ud-din.

It would seem that they were moved to take this measure so suddenly, by accounts which they had received from their army on the other side of the river. The commanders of this, conceiving the affairs of their employers to be desperate, and finding their troops much disaffected to the service they were engaged in, were easily prevailed on by Ghulam Qadir Khan to make their submission to him and to join his force. This transaction took place on the 24th, and on the evening of the same day Deshmukh and his colleague very prudently took their leave of a place which probably would not have been safe for them three hours longer.

It is observable that the army opposed to Ghulam Qadir Khan was headed by a Maratha named Madho Rao Phalke. It is said that he had received certain information of Deshmukh's design, and, in consequence, determined to submit to the Rohila Chief as the only means of safety left him.

Some letters and messengers passed between the King and Ghulam Qadir in the course of the 24th. The latter, it is conjectured, previous to crossing the river, is desirous of obtaining his Majesty's consent to garrisoning the fort of Delhi, without which security his present prosperity might be but of a short date.

It is hard to say what will become of Bakhsee Shyam Rao. He was at Panipat on the 24th on his way to Delhi, where I believe it was originally the intention of Deshmukh to have waited his arrival. He may perhaps consult his safety by following the example of Madho Rao.

Sindia arrived on the 24th instant in the neighbourhood of Alwar, where he was again joined by the Row Rajah, on the same day, Bhow Bakhsee was dismissed for Lucknow, where he is to wait the arrival of your Lordship.

163. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 30th August 1787.

Although I am not perhaps, any longer the regular channel of communication between your Lordship and the King, yet as his Majesty has thought proper to charge me with the transmission of the enclosed *Shukah* to your Lordship's address, I trust that my compliance in this instance with the wishes of this Prince will not, however extra-official it may be, appear blameable in your Lordship's judgment. With his Majesty's letter to your Lordship, I take the liberty of forwarding copy of his *Shukah* to myself, and the original letter which accompanied them from my agent at the royal Durbar.

It is unnecessary for me to observe on the extravagance of the King's application to your Lordship and of his proposal to my agent. They are both, however, no more than what might be expected from him in his present critical situation, and show that he has no confidence in any of the parties who are likely to contend for the possession of his favour and person.

I should not deal candidly with your Lordship were I to conceal from you the satisfaction which I derive from the testimony borne by His Majesty (in the accompanying letter to your Lordship) to my official conduct. This is the more agreeable to me as it has been perfectly voluntary on the King's part. Some time has elapsed since His Majesty spontaneously offered to address your Lordship respecting me in whatever terms I might require. This proposal was communicated to me by my agent, and my reply to it was that, although I should have been very well pleased with such a mark of His Majesty's favour, yet it would by no means become me to solicit it.

My reply to the King's *Shukah* shall be confined to the acquainting of His Majesty that I have forwarded his letter to your Lordship's address.

I had a few days ago directed my agent at Delhi to apply for his dismission, and to join me at this place. I shall repeat my orders, and desire him to signify to the King's acting ministers that it will not be proper for the future to make me the channel of His Majesty's correspondence with your Lordship.

164. LETTER FROM FYAZ ALY KHAN FROM DELHI TO CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK, DATED 10th ZILKAD (24th AUGUST 1787.)

Received by the Captain on 30th Aug. 1787.

Received by G. G. 3rd Sept. 1787.

Last night the 9th Zikada (23rd Aug.) Rajah Deshmukh with Shah Nizam-ud-din, Murar Row, Eetal Row and other Maratha Chiefs fled without the royal dismission, about 10 o'clock, notwithstanding a large body of cavalry and infantry who were with them. Many of their effects and baggage were plundered from the house of Firooz Shah to the Western Serai. At noon on that day, 4 Companies belonging to Shahjee crossed the Jamna, to attack the troops of Ghulam Qadir Khan; Deshmukh's troops had two guns with them, one of which was landed from the boat. Monsr. Bayz, a Chief belonging to Ghulam Qadir Khan, attacked the eight Companies with two pieces of cannon and 3 or 400 horse, and carried off one of the guns, many were killed and many threw themselves into the river and were drowned, and Madho Row Phalke a Maratha, who five days ago crossed the Jamna with 500 horse and one battalion under Matiullah etc. and 12 pieces of cannon, to attack the army of Ghulam Qadir Khan, joined him this day the 24th August. This morning three people, one after the other, came for me. I repaired to the royal Presence, and His Majesty was pleased to say, that you had written in a letter addressed to me, that you were not displeased with His Majesty. His Majesty said, he was much pleased with the abilities and understanding of that gentleman, that he had written with his own hand the draft of a *Shukka* to the Governor-General, that the moonshees should write it fair and it should be sent to you. That he had seen Col. Harper at Allahabad, and that his *arzis* breathed friendship. That he had written a *Shukku* to him also and ordered it to be sent to you with a copy of it, that if you thought proper you might send it to Col. Harper. His Majesty ordered me to write in my *arzi* to you, that Sindia had deviated from his engagements and had withdrawn himself from obedience, that His Majesty after the death of Afrasiab Khan had fallen into the hands of the Maratha, had from necessity accepted his engagements, and had granted his to him. God be praised, Sindia had himself broken his engagements, had not paid for 14 months what was settled from the mahals etc. of the royal Khalsa, had reduced the servants of the royal household to the greatest distress, and had left some battalions with 200 cavalry with Deshmukh for the protection of the royal Presence, and in spite of all

His Majesty had written to send Ambajee with other Chiefs that Ghulam Qadir Khan and Najaf Quli Khan might be prevented from appropriating to themselves the mahals of the royal Khalsa, and he had written in 10 or 20 *arzis* that he would shortly send a proper force,—he has clandestinely acted an opposite part, and called Deshmukh with the troops stationed here to him. Now that Sindia has of himself swerved from his engagements, and on this side there has not been the difference of a hair's breadth, and also since he contrary to the royal pleasure caused complaints to be written against you, had stopped sending his own letters for some time, and had with great solicitation called Deshmukh and Shah Nizam-ud-din, it is necessary at this time, which is the season for assistance and alliance, that you should show your obedience, as it will become of great credit to you thro' all Hindostan; and in this time, which is a period of strange want of aid, a great reward would afterwards arise. His Majesty desired me to write to you that at any rate 2 or 3 battalions should be sent for the protection of the royal person before the arrival of the Governor-General, and that there should be no delay in this matter. Ghulam Qadir Khan and Najaf Quli Khan are obedient to his Majesty, but they are not fit for the royal friendship. The bad men who carried us away from Allahabad, and brought the displeasure from the English upon us, are all dead and in hell. Genl. Carnac first showed respect to the royal Presence, that you may raise your name still higher. His Majesty was very rigid and earnest with me to procure an answer from you to my *arzi*, as he waits for it day and night. The Nawab Nazir Manzoor Aly Khan sends his respects to you, and represents that he is a slave of His Majesty and incapable of superintending the royal affairs, but that when you arrived here, learning your good qualities, he entertained friendship and obedience, and is ready with his life and soul to act agreeable to your desire. I hope that you will write your respects on a separate paper to the Nawab Nazir.

165. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 30th August, 1787.

I had this morning the honour of transmitting to you a letter from the King to your Lordship's address, since which I have received advices from Delhi purporting that Ghulam Qadir Khan crossing the Jamna on the 27th instant very slightly attended, proceeded on foot to the royal Durbar, for the purpose of paying his respects to the King, to whom he was accordingly introduced by the Nabob Nazir. This visit was very sudden and unexpected, his Majesty having manifested a desire of delaying it as long as possible, with the design probably, of making the better terms with the Rohila, and although there is some reason for believing that this Chief had concerted the matter with the Nabob Nazir, yet his conduct on the occasion, at the same time that it marks much boldness and

decision of character, seems well calculated to inspire the King with a confidence in this new Minister who, to keep well with his Majesty has but little more to do besides punctually executing whatever pecuniary engagements he may enter into.

After his public audience the Rohila was admitted to a private conference with His Majesty, which lasted about half an hour, and at which the Nabob Nazir assisted. It was supposed that his army would cross the river on the following day (the 28th), and encamp on the Agra road.

It is not to be doubted but Ghulam Qadir will have more than one competitor in the direction of the King's affairs. This rivalry promises to be fruitful of many future disturbances, if not also of revolutions, some of which Sindia may hereafter, possibly, be able to turn to good account, though he will hardly ever get possession of the King's person again.

Both the father and grandfather of Ghulam Qadir Khan enjoyed the rank and office of Amir-ul-umara and first Bakhsh (or Captain General) of the Empire. Ghulam Qadir aspires to the same dignities, and if to a respectful and conciliating carriage towards his Majesty he will add a *nazarana* of a few lacs of Rupees, there is but little doubt of his obtaining them. His manners, however, it is to be observed, are represented as rather uncourtly and unaccommodating, and it is certain that his pecuniary circumstances are at present far from being efficient. We may reckon upon this Chief's being soon in possession of all the districts of the Doab at present in the hands of the Marathas; and should he continue to maintain them, he will at once constitute a very good barrier in that quarter to the Vizier's dominions, and be a neighbour from whom His Excellency will never have anything to fear.

166. GABRIEL HARPER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Express.

*Camp, on the banks of the Sai al(Rai) Bareilly,
1st September 1787, daylight.*

I had the honor to write you yesterday. This moment an express is arrived from Delhi, saying that Ghulam Qadir Khan crossed the Jamna the 27th August, attended by twenty of his own officers, and went immediately to the Palace, where he paid his duty to the King and was honorably received and dismissed in safety to his army, which lay opposite to the city in the Doab. I cannot but view this action of Ghulam Qadir Khan in an extraordinary point, and I daresay your Lordship will agree with me in opinion that it denotes an intrepid and great mind, seldom to be met with. The retreat of Deshmukh is a strong contrast to the conduct of Ghulam Qadir Khan; this Maratha fled without a vessel to drink out of, and the rabble of the city have plundered his effects. Thus is

the King released for the present from the Maratha power, and the idea of Sindia's resources and abilities as a soldier and politician being fully exploded, I think it not likely that he will again reinstate himself in his late authority.

167. W. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 2nd September 1787.

I have the honour to forward to you my private intelligence from Sindia's camp of the 27th and 28th ultimo. If this may be credited the Maratha Chief is only waiting to be joined by Deshmukh in order to commence his retreat to Ujjain ; and, in truth, it may be doubted whether under the present posture of his affairs, he could prudently, or with any prospect of success, pursue a different conduct. Had he, immediately upon his return to Dig, either proceeded in person to Delhi, or detached Ambajee thither at the head of a respectable force (as was, at one time, his intention), he might possibly have been able to have maintained his ground, and have preserved his ministerial station and pretensions, till the arrival of re-inforcements from the Deccan should have put it in his power to act offensively against the Confederates. But by abandoning Delhi, and suffering the person and authority of the King to pass into the hands of his enemies, he has shaken the fidelity of the few Hindostan Chiefs who appeared to be sincerely attached to his interests, and who have now abundant reason to apprehend that he purposes ere long to leave them to shift for themselves. Under this impression it would not be at all surprising were even the Row Rajah to attempt to conciliate his ancient master by forsaking, in a critical moment, his present ally and friend. It must be owned that since the arrival of Sindia in the vicinity of Alwar, the conduct of the Row has bespoke the best intentions, and the most firm adherence to the former ; but as it is very certain that in this respect he has been governed purely by motives of an interested nature, so the same principle of action may suggest to him, under a change of circumstances, the expediency of providing other measures for his own safety. While there remains a probability or a possibility of Sindia's maintaining his situation on this side of India, it is perhaps the interest of the Macheri Chief to adhere to him ; but whenever it appears clear either that he cannot any longer keep his ground, or that he does not intend to attempt it, the Row will obviously cease to have any political motive for relieving his present distresses by supplying him with money, and should he depart from his engagements on this particular (which are for 13 or 14 lacs of Rupees), it is hard to say how far he may be prompted by a desire of making his peace with the Rajah of Jaynagar, to carry his perfidy. It is rarely that the Asiatic princes act upon any other grounds than those of present convenience ; so that Sindia is not likely to place any imprudent confidence in the gratitude of the Row, and though the latter should prove

treacherous, the person of the Maratha Chief would hardly be in any danger, as he is still at the head of a force sufficiently strong to escort him in safety to his own country.

It appears by the latest accounts from Dehli that Ghulam Qadir Khan was employed in crossing his army over the Jamna. Bakhsh Shyam Rao had not been able to advance beyond Panipat as late as the 27th ultimo, owing to the seditious disposition of his army. His situation appears very critical.

The accompanying extract of news relative to Umrao-Gir proves too clearly, I fear, that that Gosain has grossly abused the protection granted to him by the Vizier.

168. W. KIRKPATRICK TO COLONEL G. HARPER.

Fathgarh, 4 Sept. 1787.

I last night received from my agent at the King's Durbar the enclosed *Shukkah* to the Vizier's address to whom I beg the favour of you to present it. Be so good at the same time to observe to His Excellency that it is a duplicate, the original having fallen into the hands of some robbers near Delhi.

The enclosed extract from my agent's letter to me will show you that he reluctantly obeyed His Majesty's orders in transmitting the *Shukkah* for the Vizier to me, having very properly stated that I was not any longer the regular channel of communication between His Majesty and His Excellency. Perhaps, however, the King thought it proper to convey this particular letter through me, on account of his having rested the justification of his conduct towards Sindia on the general conduct and character of the Marathas, with which he is pleased to say I am well acquainted. There appears to me, however, no necessity for His Majesty's making this or any other apology on the occasion; since Sindia having abandoned him, it followed of course that he must seek protection elsewhere, and throw himself into other hands.

Respecting the King's proposal to the Vizier, I dare say you will think in the same manner with me, that it would be neither for His Excellency's interest nor for our Government's to listen to it, in the extent His Majesty would seem to aim at: if, even, in any degree whatever. For supposing even delicacy and prudence in regard to the Marathas entirely out of the question (which however, they ought not to be), it is to be considered that the objects referred to could not be attained without going to greater lengths than would consist either with the general maxims of sound policy, or our particular intention at this conjuncture. It is possible indeed, that were the Vizier to enter the lists against those who are about to contend for the direction of the King's affairs, they might all of them yield to his pretensions without striking a blow; but it is also possible that they might

separately resist his attempts, or not confederate against him, in which event it would not be in the power of any man to determine how far we should be engaged, or what the issue of the enterprise would be.

I confess I have long wished that the Vizier had a better frontier in the Doab than he now has, and that the Marathas had no footing in it. I dare say, the latter would at this time relinquish on very easy terms, if not altogether gratuitously, their pretensions in that quarter in favour of the Vizier; and perhaps if this be as desirable a point as I am inclined to think it, it would be better to accomplish it by treaty with Sindia than in any other manner. To afford this Chief military aid for the purpose of enabling him to maintain his ground on this side of India is what will probably never be thought of; though I have no doubt but Bhow Baxy will press it earnestly, and though perhaps there might be something like political argument urged in support of such a measure; but even without our going so far, it is not improbable but Sindia would rather make over the Doab (or part of it) to the Vizier than let it fall into the hands of any of those who * * * * * [letter torn here]

169. FROM THE KING SHAH ALAM II TO THE NAWAB WAZIR OF OUDH

Received at Calcutta (?), 4th Oct. 1787.

By arzees from our beloved son the Prince Mirza Mohamad Jawanbakht Jahandar Shah Bahadur, we have fully understood the zeal and attachment which you bear towards us, and the fruits of them are an increase of our royal favor towards you. We are convinced that you will prove your zeal for us and for the arrangement of the royal affairs. Immediately on the receipt of this *Shukhka* admit of no delay in coming to the presence, because we are excessively anxious for your arrival and desirous to see you. In case of any delay, you will on the receipt of this write orders to the battalions encamped on the banks of the river to cross over and commence hostilities in the country and districts belonging to that rebel, with whose conduct and rebellious acts you have been doubtless acquainted from the newspapers, so that he may under apprehensions and fears return to that quarter and cease the disturbances he has created about the Palace. Altho' we are fully convinced of your obedience to our royal orders, yet we are sensible you will act agreeably to our commands, and from a view of the state of the Royal Presence admit of no delay.

170. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 5th Sept. 1787.

I had the pleasure of writing you on the 15th ult., acknowledging my receipt of your dispatch of the 28th June, which I immediately forwarded to Lord Cornwallis, and afterwards on the 23rd *via* Surat. Since then I have not been favoured with any letters from you.

On the 23rd ultimo Sindia disbanded the greatest part of his Infantry, lightened his Bazar and Baggage and proceeded at the head of his Cavalry amounting to about 13,000 men, towards Alwar, the principal fortress in the possession of the Row Rajah, in the neighbourhood of which he arrived on the 24th ultimo, and was immediately joined again by the Row who engaged to supply him with money; but there is no doubt he will be guided in the performance of this engagement by future events; should he perceive that Sindia is not intent upon recovering his late heavy losses or that he means to forsake him, the Row will be very sparing of his money, and may even perhaps act hostilely towards Sindia as a means of ingratiating himself into the favour of the Rajah of Jaynagar, with whom it would then be his interest to make terms for himself.

After the departure of the agents of Sindia from the royal Durbar His Majesty wrote to Lord Cornwallis to proceed to Delhi to take charge of affairs, and in the meantime requested him to send five battalions to that quarter. There is no occasion for me to remark on the extravagance of either of these proposals.

Bakhshee Shyam Row was not able to advance from Panipat until the 28th ultimo, owing to the seditious disposition of his army and the high demands of Samroo's Begam, to whom he was obliged to cede Panipat and to act entirely by her directions. By accounts as late as the 29th, he had arrived within 20 cos of Delhi. If my private intelligence from Sindia's Camp of the 27th and 28th ultimo may be credited, the Maratha Chief is only waiting to be joined by Deshmukh in order to commence his retreat to Ujjain.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Patna on the 21st ultimo, and was expected at Benares on the 1st instant.

171. G. HARPER TO C. W. MALET.

Camp at Jhusi, opposite Allahabad, 7th September 1787.

I have the pleasure to enclose a letter to your address from the Right Honourable Governor General, whom I hope to see at this place the 12th instant, on his visit to the Upper Provinces and to view the military stations in this subah. I enclose from myself a letter to Mr. Boddam, which I request you will forward to him immediately.

The affairs of Sindia in this country are in a desperate situation, and I doubt if he will be able to effect a retreat to Gwalior.

The Vizier and ministers are with me at this ground for the purpose of meeting Earl Cornwallis. I shall return with the Governor-General to C-~~leutt~~

172. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 7th Sept. 1787.

I had last the pleasure of addressing you under date the 7th ultimo, and on the 4th instant was favoured with your letter of the 27th August accompanied by the duplicate of another dated the 6th of the same month.

You will receive by the present dispatch two public letters, one of them from Lord Cornwallis and the other from Mr. Cherry, the Persian Translator.

Ismael Beg does not make any great progress in the siege of Agra, although it has hitherto been quite uninterrupted: nor have the Gosains yet captured Ferozabad. But I fancy it will fall into their hands in a few days more, after which it is probable, I think, that they will advance against Aligarh, unless Ismael Beg should have the address to prevail on them to join him. For particulars respecting the state of affairs at Dehli, etc., I refer you to the accompanying Persian papers.

I shall have occasion to write you again in the course of a few days, as I expect Major Palmer here by the 9th or 10th, when I shall deliver over to him charge of my late office and he will advise you accordingly.

The cause of my resignation was briefly this: I thought Sindia's behaviour to me unsuitable to the honor of our Government and to the friendship subsisting between us, and as I was warranted both by experience and the opinion of my predecessor in believing that it was one of the objects of our ally's politics to deceive his neighbours in regard to the nature of our connection with him, I conceived it to be my duty to act in such a manner as should defeat so unjustifiable a design. The consequence, as I foresaw, was that I became exceedingly obnoxious to Sindia, who not only fabricated himself various frivolous complaints against me but also caused the King to remonstrate against my conduct. This behaviour destroying all confidence between us, I thought it my duty to relinquish a situation in which it was clear I could no longer be serviceable to my employers, but on the contrary might materially injure their affairs. The King has lately spontaneously contradicted his former accusations against me.

173. W. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 9th Sept. 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the 2nd instant, since which time I have regularly transmitted the Persian intelligence to Captain Kennaway, who will have communicated to your Lordship whatever it contained of an interesting nature.

In my address of the 30th ultimo I informed your Lordship that Ghulam Qadir Khan aimed at obtaining the dignity and office of *Amir-ul-umara* and Bakhshree of the Empire. He accordingly, on the 6th instant, obliged the King to confer those honours on him, together with the title of Mukhtar-ul-mulk or [Supreme] Minister of the Kingdom. It is certain that His Majesty, who is by no means satisfied with the conduct of the Rohila, very reluctantly complied with the wishes of the Chief, and it is obvious that he could not have resisted them any longer without hazarding more than the occasion seems to have warranted. It is probable that in Ghulam Qadir Khan he will find as useful and as faithful a servant as either Najaf Quli Khan or the son of the Hamdani would have proved; and as it is not any longer in the power of Shah Alam to choose his ministers, he must always of necessity calculate on their obedience, be they who they may, as a matter of very precarious duration. It does not appear that the Rohila either advanced His Majesty any money on occasion of his promotion, or ever entered into any engagements to that effect, though the latter is not altogether improbable. The measure seems to have been suddenly pressed, though proposed very early after his appearance at Court, in the idea that his immediate elevation to the station of Bakhshree was indispensably requisite to his engaging such partizans in his cause as were necessary to its success. On the arrival of Shyam Rao in the suburbs of Delhi, Goordat Singh (a principal Sikh Chieftain of the Maratha party) came over to him; but Samroo's widow and Baghel Singh hesitated, and effected a resolution of being directed by the King. As a natural consequence of the Rohila's advancement, they have been ordered to join and to obey him; and as both their safety and interest depend in some measure on their compliance, it is probable that this will be yielded without much delay.

Sindia, who continues encamped close to the walls of Alwar, detached the greatest part of his army on the 5th instant on a desultory expedition, the object of which is said to be the ravaging of the Jaynagar country. By adopting this measure, which was recommended by the Row Rajah, he has in some sort put himself in the power of the latter, a conduct that seems to be violently condemned by Eetal Row, whose distrust of the Row's intention seems to exceed that of every other Maratha Chief.

Ismael Beg, the nephew of the Hamdani, is said to be in motion towards Agra. Raejee Patel is posted between Kumbher and Bharatpoor, in order to watch and as far as he may be able, to check his progress. Deshmukh and Shah Nizam-ud-din proceeded from Mathura [?] to Raejee's camp, instead of repairing to the army at Alwar; and it is said that the Shah's person is under a secret sort of restraint. Be this as it may, it is certain that Majd-ud-daula, the ancient minister of the King, and long a prisoner in the fort of Agra, has lately been desired to prepare to proceed to Delhi, though it is obvious that were he to make this journey

without being accompanied by a respectable army, it would be either to change prisons or to abandon the interests of Sindia and engage in the views of Ghulam Qadir. On the 8th instant the fort of Ferozabad was invested by the troops of the Gosain Umrao-Gir, and in all probability will soon surrender.

174. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 12th Sept. 1787.

I had last the honour of addressing you under date the ninth instant, when I hinted at a design that Sindia had of substituting Majd-ud-dowlah as his agent at the royal Darbar, in the place of Shah Nizam-ud-din. Your Lordship will find this conjecture verified by the enclosed copy of a *Shukka* addressed lately by His Majesty to his ancient favourite, and transmitted to me by your Lordship's diligent intelligencer at Dehli. It is accompanied by the copy of another *Shukka* to the address of Sindia. The former is curious, as referring to a vindication of the Maratha Chief from the King's most serious charge against him, framed probably by Sindia himself, but little founded I believe in truth. It marks strongly also the solicitude of His Majesty concerning pecuniary matters, and shows that the situation of the fugitive minister Shah Nizam-ud-din is just now a very perilous one. Both letters at the same time exhibit strong proofs of the King's dissatisfaction with Ghulam Qadir Khan and of His Majesty's duplicity and temporizing policy; if there are defects however in the Prince's conduct, they proceed, I am of opinion, less from disposition or inclination, than from the peculiar difficulty of his situation.

The newspapers which I forwarded last night to Captain Kennaway will have informed your Lordship of the arrival of Ismail Beg (the nephew of Mahommed Beg Hamdani) in the vicinity of Agra. His force is stated at four thousand Rajpoot cavalry, eight thousand Hindoostan and Moghul horse, four battalions of sepoys, and a train of artillery, the strength of which is not specified. The guns and battalions are some of those which Sindia lost in the fatal defection of the thirty-first July. Agra is but slightly garrisoned, and would probably in the event of a siege be but badly defended. Ismail Beg however may possibly find it impracticable to invest the place, Raejee Pateel being encamped within a few cos of it at the head of an army little inferior in number to that of the enemy, and a considerable force being said to be on its march from the Chambal for the purpose of supporting it. It is not improbable but Ismael Beg may either choose or be obliged to give battle to the Maratha troops in his neighbourhood before he commences the siege of Agra.

Samroo's widow and Baghel Singh have engaged to join Ghulam Qadir Khan in consequence of the King's orders. Zafaryab Khan, the son of Samroo, paid the new Amir-ul-umara a visit of compliment the day

succeeding his investiture. The submission of these two chiefs, however, is marked with circumstances that make the sincerity of it doubtful.

Several of the Mughul Chiefs lately in the service of Sindia are repairing to Delhi, Badil Beg Khan, accompanied by the widow and infant son of the late Afrasiab Khan, is arrived there. They were received in an honourable manner by Ghulam Qadir Khan, but have not as yet openly espoused his cause.

The Gosain Umrao-Gir continues to be before Ferozabad, the garrison of which have begun to treat with him for the surrender of the place.

I have just had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the sixth instant, and am happy at the testimony of approbation which it contains.

175. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgurh, 14th Sept., 1787.

In a letter which I had the honour of addressing to you under date the 15th ultimo, I endeavoured to convey to your Lordship a general idea of the posture of Sindia's affairs at that period. Since then my correspondence has been chiefly confined to the communication of such occurrences as I deemed most interesting; but as these details owing to the suppression of intervening and less important circumstances, and their consequent want of connexion, may not be sufficient for the purpose of enabling your Lordship to form a satisfactory judgment of the present state of things in the westward, I shall here attempt to supply this defect in the best manner that my information will admit of.

Previous to the revolt of Mahommed Beg Hamdani, it must be confessed that the Rajpoot confederacy considered abstractedly was not calculated to raise any idea of formidable or serious danger in the mind of the Maratha Chief. Supported by a faint and irregular spirit of union and directed in its immediate efforts by a Prince but scantily endowed either with political or military talents, Sindia was in some sort warranted in imagining that he should have but little difficulty in breaking such a combination, whether he resolved to accomplish this object by arms or by negotiation. It is certain however that in estimating both his own apparent resources and power and those of his enemies he took a narrow view of things, and overlooked more material circumstances than one. He forgot that he governed a country the inhabitants of which had no reason to be fond of his administration, and that he was at the head of an army the greatest part of which in adhering to him sacrificed their feelings and inclinations only to present necessity and convenience. He forgot that those Hindostan Chiefs, whom he had reduced either to a state of insignificance or of vassalage, would probably seize the opportunity of his being engaged in distant hostilities in order to assert and recover their former

independence. And he forgot that owing to his long inattention to the King's pecuniary demands, the mind of His Majesty had become exceedingly indisposed towards him. Or, if these considerations occurred to him, they at least seem to have had but little weight with him. There is reason indeed to believe that the error which he committed by embarking in the unfortunate enterprize against Jaynagar, proceeded entirely from an inordinate ambition which no prudential suggestions were able to restrain. I have on a former occasion stated that Ambajee had taken some pains to divert his master from a design which he justly deemed pregnant with danger; and I have been frequently informed that the counsels of Rana Khan were for a long while directed to the same end. The King also often predicted that this expedition would prove injurious to the affairs of Sindia; but as the sincerity of His Majesty's solicitude for the interests of this Chief was most probably justly doubted, his arguments were of course totally disregarded. The Row Raja's opinions and advice, according better with Sindia's ruling passion, prevailed over every other consideration, and betrayed him into difficulties of which he did not become sensible till he had advanced too far to retreat without sacrificing his military reputation and consequently without hazarding his political existence in this quarter of Hindostan. In this dilemma, he came to the resolution of persevering in his enterprize, arduous as he now found it, and doubtful as he now grew of its success. But as this measure, so far from being followed up by others equally vigorous, was succeeded by some fatal errors, the chief of which originating in an infatuating avarice, it only led to the very issue which he had designed it to prevent. The revolt of the Hamdani served as the signal to general insurrection and defection, but Sindia might still have secured the adherence of his troops could he have been prevailed on to render them bare justice; and at the head of a well paid army, though he should have been obliged to relinquish his views upon Jaynagar, he would have had but little difficulty in retrieving his affairs or in completely chastising Ghulam Qadir Khan as well as all the other insurgents. The strange defects however of his character and conduct, fortunately for his enemies, outweighed their want of union and decision, and threw advantages into their hands which none of them, unless we except the Rohila Chieftain, seem to have deserved and of which he alone has availed himself with promptitude and spirit.

Desperate even as the situation of Sindia might appear on his return to Dig, it could only be pronounced to be so upon the presumption that the singular folly which had principally occasioned his disgraceful retreat was incurable. His most formidable adversary had recently shewn that he knew not how to improve his good fortune, and that consequently there was but little to be feared from him. Half the force that Sindia still headed, if tolerably well paid, would have sufficed at least to check the progress of the Rajah and perhaps have compelled him to fall back towards

his Capital. It was otherwise in respect to Ghulam Qadir Khan, the conduct of this Chief having from the beginning been marked with a firmness and all his motions with a celerity that claimed the most serious attention. Sindia therefore would probably have done well had he left a moiety of his army to employ the spiritless and dilatory Rajpoots, and proceeded himself with the remainder to Dehli. By such a measure, it is reasonable to suppose that he would at once have confirmed the Sikh Chieftains and Samroo's corps in their adherence, and at least have confined the operations of Ghulam Qadir to the district of Meerat, while, by securing the person of the King, he would have preserved his ministerial authority (which, in spite of the annihilation of the imperial power, continues to be an important instrument in the hands of an able and ambitious Chief), and with it many means of embarrassing and dividing his enemies which he relinquished with the possession of Dehli. As an enterprize of this sort however could not be successfully executed with disaffected troops, and as to satisfy the King as well as his army he must have parted with more money than was agreeable to his parsimonious or prudential maxims,—Sindia, tho' he at one time talked of repairing to the Presence and at another declared a resolution of deputing Ambajee thither at the head of a considerable force, probably never seriously proposed adopting either of these measures. Indeed a disinclination to open his coffers was not perhaps the sole cause of his disregarding the counsel of those few (among whom was Eetal Rao) who earnestly pressed him to proceed in person to Dehli. He had recently come to the knowledge of certain circumstances which induced him to believe that the King was entirely in the interests of his enemies, nor were there wanting sufficient appearances to inspire him with a distrust of the fidelity of Shah Nizam-ud-din. These suspicions were likely enough to discourage him from the enterprize in question, since they would incline him to view it as fraught with much danger and difficulty, and to consider its issue as very doubtful; yet as he could not possibly expect to retrieve his affairs without risking something, nor could he ignorant either that his presence would most probably put an end to His Majesty's secret intrigues by rendering it almost impracticable to conduct them, or that little more was necessary to conciliate this Prince's mind than to satisfy his pecuniary claims, I confess myself to be of opinion that in declining to march to Dehli he was less influenced by timid considerations than by avarice. Sindia, tho' his military operations are for the most part feeble, slothful and ill concerted, is by no means deficient either in personal or in political courage.

But whatever his motives might be for not engaging in this enterprize, he judged it necessary to his affairs to put himself in motion, and it was with the view perhaps of confirming the Row Rajah in his fidelity, as well as of perplexing and intimidating the Rajpoots, that he directed his march

to Alwar. This measure was far from being approved of by all his officers, and Eetal Row in particular, either influenced by his extreme distrust of the Row Rajah or disappointed by Sindia's refusal to proceed to Dehli, was so much dissatisfied as to be prevailed on with great difficulty to accompany the army. There is some reason to believe that an expectation of receiving a considerable subsidy in money from the Row was not the least powerful of the motives that determined the conduct of the Maratha Chief on this occasion. But however such an expectation might be warranted by the promises of the Rajpoot, it is certain that Sindia has hitherto drawn from him little or no pecuniary assistance. Generally speaking, the Princes of Hindostan would seem to be of opinion that the possession or retention of money, and not according to the European idea its judicious application, constituted the nerve of war, and that by parting with it they parted with their power. It is to this error (which might almost be styled a constitutional one), seconded by the passion for artillery and large bodies of infantry (formed somewhat on the model of ours) with which all or most of the Hindostan Chieftains have of late years been inspired, that we are principally indebted for our present firm establishment in India. The influence of the former of these causes must be abundantly obvious, and unprovided or scantily furnished with cavalry as we are and always have been, it is undoubtedly fortunate for us that the armies occasionally opposed to us are less capable than formerly of harrassing us by desultory and predatory operations, and less able to avoid that sort of engagement in which our superior discipline and knowledge will always perhaps secure to us the most decisive advantages.

But to return from this digression, Sindia, having dispatched his family and the greatest part of his heavy baggage and artillery to Gwalior and caused all the Deccanis belonging to his army to follow his example in the former respect, having dismissed most of the Hindostan Chiefs and troops that continued to adhere to him, some of them by sending them to their *jaidads* and others upon different pretexts; and having totally abandoned all his interests at the royal Durbar by the recall of Deshmukh and his resolution against proceeding thither, it was almost universally imagined that he purposed retiring precipitately to the Chambal as soon as he should learn of the safe arrival of Apa Khande Rao at Gwalior and be joined by his son-in-law from Dehli. The event has proved however the erroneousness of this conjecture, which I myself was far from thinking a wild one after the hasty departure of Deshmukh from Dehli and the consequent success of Ghulam Qadir Khan. The stand which the Maratha Chief may be said to have made at Alwar and several of the measures which he has taken since his arrival there, shew that his despondency is by no means so great as the apparent desperateness of his affairs might have occasioned and in some sort have justified. The firmness which he seems to display under his present difficulties, arises

partly no doubt from his acquaintance with the character of his enemies and partly from the expectation he is in of being speedily reinforced from the Deccan. The union that subsists between his enemies rests on such slight foundations, and is so likely to be disturbed by the contrariety of their views and pretensions, that a very inconsiderable force would be equal to the task of completely overthrowing it, provided its operations were to be seconded by a judicious liberality. Sindia is neither ignorant of this fact nor of the most effectual mode of re-establishing himself in the favour of the King; but his avarice raises an almost insuperable obstacle to his deriving any advantage from either of these favourable circumstances. This passion prevents him from properly improving such incidents, as either his own good fortune or the misconduct of his adversaries occasionally presents to him, and disposes him to believe with too much ease that the confederacy of the latter will of itself fall to pieces ere long; but tho' it should keep together beyond the period which he himself and his flatterers may have assigned for its duration, he reckons upon being speedily at the head of an army that nothing on this side of Marwar will be able to resist. His hopes of receiving early succours from Poona are I fancy sufficiently well grounded, at least there is good reason to suppose that the Maratha Government will make some effort to recover their influence in this quarter, to whomsoever they may commit the chief direction of their operations. A certain degree of uneasiness on this head, joined to other fears, doubts and embarrassments almost inseparable from his present situation, must unquestionably raise his anxiety to a considerable height, yet amidst all his difficulties he manifests a greater disregard of the exertions and designs of his numerous opponents, than these, however feeble the one or ill concerted the other may be, would seem to deserve. Much of this contemptuous fortitude may be the result of an unyielding pride, or it may be partly assumed for political purposes. Be this as it will be, a slight survey of the position and apparent views of his principal enemies at the present period will shew that in spite of the little union or good conduct discoverable among them, their operations may nevertheless have the effect of compelling him to abandon entirely his remaining possessions on this side of Hindostan, before he can be reinforced from the Deccan, and consequently that they are still too formidable to be despised.

On the Ajmere side, what may be called the proper dominions of Sindia seem to be seriously threatened by Beejai Singh the Rajah of Jodhpoor, who is considered as the prime mover of the Rajpoot combination, and indeed as the author of it. His troops have overrun the district, seized on the town of Ajmere and invested the citadel, which is commanded by a brother of Mirza Rahim Beg, who is one of Sindia's most confidential adherents and governor both of Dig and Ajmere. Some time has elapsed since Sindia wrote to Fath Sing Guikwar, earnestly pressing him to

pour a body of troops into Marwar, which is the general name of Beejai Singh's territories. A diversion of this kind is perhaps necessary to prevent the fall of Ajmere, which would be an event of serious consequence to Sindia, as the possession of it would enable the Rajpoots to penetrate into the very heart of his hereditary dominions.

In the Dehli quarter, his affairs wear a far more desperate appearance. The abrupt and disgraceful flight of Deshmukh from that city, whether the effect of personal fear in that inexperienced youth or of orders dictated by the anxiety of his father-in-law, was a very fatal measure. It must be acknowledged however that, circumstanced as he was, his continuance at Dehli could have answered no useful purpose. He could not reasonably repose any confidence in the wretched army opposed to Ghulam Qadir Khan, as the Maratha part of it was very considerable, and, whatever grounds he might have to reckon upon the firmness of Shyam Rao's detachment, it was evident after the submission or defection of the troops under Madho Rao Phalké that he could not wait its arrival at Dehli without a moral certainty of falling into the hands of the Rohila Chief, which perhaps would have been an event of even more pernicious influence than what has attended his flight. Little weight is due to the disapprobation which the King has since declared of this measure. There probably is but little sincerity in it, as His Majesty could not be ignorant that, destitute of all support and resources as Deshmukh was, no other Maratha in his circumstances could have successfully pursued a different conduct. The blame and fatal consequences of the measure must in every view be charged to the bad policy of Sindia himself.

Ghulam Qadir Khan's elevation to the dignity of Bakhshée was a necessary consequence of his obtaining possession of the King's person, and the promotion of the Rohila was as naturally followed by the submission of Samroo's Corps and of the Sikh Chieftain's to his authority. It is true that the dissatisfaction of the King with his new minister, the distrust entertained of him by those who have recently (but it would seem unwillingly) joined his arms, and the jealousy with which his views are regarded not only by Najaf Quli Khan, but also by the son and nephew of the late Hamdani, when combined with the scantiness of his resources, appear extremely unfavourable to the duration of his power. But precarious as his situation may be, and unsteady as the attachment of his new associates may prove, Sindia will most probably never be able under any change of circumstances to recover all that this enterprising Chief has wrested from him, without considerable difficulty or without making some important sacrifices. The secret encouragement which a temporizing policy still induces the King to give to Sindia, may neither be serviceable to the latter, nor safe for His Majesty, since it is likely to drive the Rohila into the most vigorous and decisive measures. At present he seems impatient to advance against Dig, but previous to his engaging in such

an enterprize it is necessary that he should effectually guard both against the inconstancy of the King and the ambiguous dispositions of Samroo's widow and of the Sikh Chieftain Baghel Singh. To accomplish the former of these objects, he needs only to make himself master of the citadel of Dehli, an easy task but an odious measure. To effect the latter is far more difficult, since perhaps there is no other way by which he can entirely secure himself from the intrigues of the widow but by disarming her troops. Baghel Singh, less ambitious and more mercenary, may be conciliated on as moderate terms as the rest of his tribe when no longer connected with that extraordinary woman.

From Najaf Quli Khan Sindia has perhaps less to fear than to hope; possessing neither firmness nor enterprize, his exertions however directed will hardly ever produce any important effects. Enraged against Ghulam Qadir Khan for having accomplished what he himself was afraid to attempt, he may give that Chieftain some trouble, and by so doing indirectly promote the interest of Sindia. Indeed, it is affirmed that he is at this very time in treaty with the Marathas, but mortified as he may be at the success of the Rohila, it is improbable that he should be so weak as to trust to any assurances from Sindia after what has passed. That he may affect a desire of returning to his duty is not unlikely, since like the generality of Asiatics he is at once fond of and dexterous in pursuing a trimming or temporising line of politics.

In the Doab, besides Ghulam Qadir Khan Sindia has another successful enemy in the Gosain Umrao-Gir. But it will be easier perhaps for Sindia to repel this invader than it may be for your Lordship to remove the impression which this unfortunate occurrence is too likely to make on the mind of the Maratha Chief. The Vizier's proclamation, however, well intended, will hardly produce the desired effect, unless it should actually operate to the disappointment of the unwarrantable views of the Gosain, by obliging him to relinquish them. In such an event Sindia's confidence in the faith and honor of our Government would probably become so firmly established as not to be liable to be shaken hereafter by any appearances or by any doubts insinuated by the incendiaries who surround him. Our having simply abstained from taking advantage of his misfortunes, seems to have excited his admiration and applause. Were we to take any measures that should conduce to the chastisement of the Gosains, it is not impossible but they might be requited by a lasting gratitude on the part of the Maratha Chief.

In the Agra quarter, Ismail Beg, a young man of an active and enterprising spirit and one of the most irreconcilable of Sindia's enemies, supported by a considerable army and unrestrained by the slow and timid counsels of the Rajpoots, threatens what may be termed the seat of the Maratha Empire in Hindostan. His success however must be pronounced to be rather doubtful, as he has got to encounter not only strong walls but

a tolerable strong force headed by Raejee Pateel, who hovers round the army of the Mogul Chief. A detachment under the command of the son of Apa Khande Rao is also destined for the relief of Agra, but in advancing from the Chambal its progress is likely to be checked by the insurrection of the intervening zamindars and the hostile conduct of the Kerrowlee Rajah, who seems now to have taken a decided part against Sindia.

To Sindia himself the main body of the Rajpoot army may be said to be opposed, being encamped (according to the latest accounts) at the distance only of fourteen cos from Alwar. Of the desultory operations in which the Maratha troops are at present employed by Sindia, I shall only observe that the object of them is not perhaps so likely to be attained as this Chief would seem to think, since he hopes that they will perplex the Rajpoot councils, alarm the Rajah for the safety of his capital, and weaken his army by detaching from it several jagirdars and auxiliaries, who he supposes will prefer providing for the immediate security of their respective possessions to a performance of what they owe to the general cause and to their own permanent interests. Sindia, at all events in executing this plan, has evidently hazarded a great deal, as in the absence of his principal commanders and best troops, little address or spirit seems necessary to the reducing him to the last extremity. His temerity is nevertheless, it must be owned, considerably warranted by the character of his enemy.

I am too well acquainted with your Lordship's indulgence to fear that the attempt which I have made in this letter to delineate the present situation of Sindia, prolix even as it is, will prove unacceptable to you. It may be proper for me however to observe before I conclude, that I have been the more full in this address because it may probably close my correspondence with your Lordship. Thinking it possible that in your approaching conferences with Bhow Bakshee you may have occasion to apply to me on some points for information, I intend paying my respects to your Lordship at Lucknow, and for that purpose shall proceed thither in two or three days.

176. W. KIRKPATRICK TO C. W. MALET.

Fathgarh, 15th September 1787.

I had last the pleasure of writing to you under the 23rd ultimo. I now, at the desire of Colonel Harper, forward to you a letter from that gentleman covering some orders to you from the Governor General, who was in the neighbourhood of Allahabad on the 10th instant. He will be at Lucknow about the 20th as he proceeds thither by land from Allahabad in company with the Vizier.

Since my last Ghulam Qadir Khan has made himself master of Delhi, which was hastily abandoned by Deshmukh and Shah Nizam-ud-din on the 24th August in consequence, as is generally supposed, of the Rohila's sudden appearance on the other side of the river and the submission of the Maratha army (which chiefly consisted of raw levies) to that Chief. I have reason, however, to believe that previous to this event Deshmukh had resolved on flying from Delhi in pursuance of orders from Sindia.

On the 27th August the Rohila crossed the river slightly attended, and without any of the previous forms usual on such occasions repaired on foot to the royal Durbar. On the 6th instant the King was constrained (very much, I believe, against his inclinations) to confer on this Chief the office of Meer Bakhshée, and the titles of Amir-ul-umara and Mukhtar-ul-mulk. Shyam Rao's detachment, arriving about the same time in the outskirts of Delhi, was obliged to submit to the new minister. The widow of Samroo however and the Sikh Chieftain Baghel Singh appear by no means satisfied with their new master.

Sindia after having dispatched the principal part of his family, and that of his artillery and baggage to Gwalior, moved on the 22nd instant from his Camp near Dig towards Alwar (the capital of the Row Rajah), where he arrived on the 25th. His army at present consists chiefly of Maratha cavalry, with a few battalions of infantry and a few guns. It does not exceed altogether 13,000 men. By the latest accounts, he was employed in some desultory operations against the Jaynagar country : but as the Rajpoot army was not at a greater distance from him than 14 cos, I fancy that he will draw very little advantage from this enterprize. The Row Rajah continues to adhere firmly to him, at least apparently.

Ismael Beg, the nephew of the late Hamdani, at the head of 4,000 Rajpoots, 4 battalions of sepoy and some guns, and about 8,000 Hindoostani cavalry, threatens Agra, having advanced within 8 cos of that place. He is opposed indeed by Raejee Pateel, whose force however is hardly a match for that of the young Moghul Chief.

Umrao-Gir has seized on the greatest part of the country constituting Bhow Bakhshes's government. He is at present employed in the siege of Ferozpoore. The Vizier has issued a proclamation against the Gosains, of which you will no doubt receive a copy. For further particulars I refer you to the accompanying newspapers.

177. Wm. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 17th September 1787.

Your astonishment will no doubt be in some degree excited upon hearing that Ghulam Qadir Khan unexpectedly recrossed the Jaimna with his whole army on the 13th instant. What induced this sudden measure does not clearly appear ; more than one cause either has been or may be assigned for it. He is supposed to have conceived some apprehensions

for the safety of his hereditary possessions, which it would seem are threatened by a body of hostile Sikhs, and it is even hinted that he is under considerable anxiety in regard to our motions. If he really entertains any fears on this head, they most probably arise from the steps which I understand the Vizier very properly took in order to prevent the Rohila procuring any levies from Rampoor and which were communicated to the latter by Faizullah Khan.

But perhaps, a consciousness of his inability to satisfy the King was what chiefly prompted Ghulam Qadir Khan to abandon this ministerial trust. His Majesty's indisposition towards him being notorious, he found his influence unequal to the execution of the extensive designs which it is probable he at first formed. Thus circumstanced in respect to the King, and destitute of those resources necessary to secure the attachment of a numerous army, he may have judged it advisable to contract his views and to confine his military operations to the Doab. Nor is the range which his ambition may here take a limited one. Aligarh alone, should he venture to advance so far, will find him sufficient employment for some time to come.

The paper from Sindia's camp of the 12th instant contains an article of intelligence that, should it prove true, will not be less favourable to the affairs of the Maratha Chief than the unlooked for evacuation of Delhi by the Rohila may turn out, if properly improved by Sindia. It is said that the Rajah has determined to quit the field and to retire with his army to Jaynagar; although however the character of this Prince renders the report in some measure probable, yet its authenticity must not be hastily admitted. It is not to be doubted indeed that he has great difficulty in keeping together an army chiefly composed of men whose proper avocations are those of husbandry; but so long as Beejai Singh adheres firmly to the confederacy, there can be no want of troops to oppose to Sindia, however wretchedly they may be commanded.

The papers which I transmitted to Captain Kennaway on the 15th instant will have informed your Lordship of Ismail Beg's operations in the environs of Agra on the 11th and 12th instants. I forwarded him today an account of the movements of both armies on the 13th. Your Lordship will see that nothing of a decisive nature has as yet taken place; nevertheless my correspondent at Agra seems to think that the Mogul has brought himself into a dangerous situation. In a passage in the intelligence from Sindia's camp it appears that Ismail Beg was in greater danger from his own troops than from the Maratha army.

Fathgarh, 17th September, 7 p.m.

I do myself the honour to forward to your Lordship an express from Agra, which I have this moment received. It is dated the 16th (or yesterday), when Ismail Beg gained possession of the town of Agra and closely

invested the fort, after having, it would seem, obliged Raejee Pateel and Monsr. Lestenau to abandon the defence of the suburbs. The Governor (Lakhua Dada) gained the fort, but Raejee Pateel and Lestenau are said to have fled.

178. W. KIRKPATRICK TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Havilganj, 21st September 1787.

The Agra papers of the sixteenth instant which I transmitted yesterday to Captain Kennaway, will have informed your Lordship that Monsieur Lestenau had manifested a desire of forsaking the declining cause of Sindia and of following the rising fortune of Ismail Beg. From my intelligence of the seventh your Lordship will learn that the Frenchman has actually joined the Moghul Chieftain. The reward of his defection is a grant of the parganas of Saadabad and Khundauli [due north of Agra], both of them situated in the Doab and the former constituting part of Bhow Bakhsh's governments in that quarter.

The desertion of this man in whose fidelity as well as talents Sindia placed great confidence, joined to the successful progress of Ismael Beg, will no doubt alarm the Maratha Chief for the safety of the fort of Agra, and perhaps urge him to hasten to its relief. The Rajah of Jaynagar is however so advantageously posted for the purpose that he may easily frustrate any attempt of this nature. But it may even be doubted whether he has either the capacity or the spirit necessary for so simple an enterprize.

Ismail Beg was also joined on the sixteenth instant by a European of the name of Lewis, who I understand commanded the Row Rajah's artillery in the action of the twenty-eighth July. He was afterwards it seems entertained in the service of Sindia and with Lestenau was employed at the head of a few companies of sepoys to assist in repelling the Moghul Chief.

Sulaiman Beg Khan, Qasim Jan, Alayar Beg Khan and Niyaz Beg Khan are Moghul sardars of considerable eminence. They adhered steadily to Sindia till the latter moved from Dig towards Alwar, when not wishing them to accompany him, he dismissed them on one pretext or another. They have most probably joined Ismail Beg before this time, as they were arrived opposite to the town of Agra on the seventeenth and only waited for boats to transport them across the Jamna. I do not exactly know what force they have with them, but I have some reason to believe that it cannot amount to less than fifteen hundred or two thousand horse.

The Jat Chief's fidelity to the cause of Sindia has hitherto remained unshaken, but as he has deputed a vakeel to Ismail Beg since the success of the latter, it is not improbable but he may have begun to think it prudent to provide for his safety in the event of the total expulsion of the Marathas,

He was hitherto in possession both of Agra and of Dig, but the only forts of consequence at present in his hands are Bharatpoor and Kumbher. Raejee Pateel it seems has taken refuge with his discomfited forces under the walls of the former of these places, which is situated about fifteen cos west of Agra.

It appears that Lackwa Dada, the Maratha Subadar of Agra, fled with Raejee Pateel, but that he found means to regain the fort on the seventeenth instant, without meeting with any obstruction from the besiegers, whose vigilance cannot of course be very great.

Ghulam Qadir Khan has not yet crossed all his army into the Doab. It is pretty generally supposed that he has a design upon Aligarh, the garrison of which are said to have made some overtures to him. It would seem that he has given a commission to Badil Beg Khan to make himself master of all the country lying to the westward of the Jamna between Faridabad and Agra. If this account may be credited, it confirms the idea that I before suggested, relative to his intention of confining his usurpations to the districts of the Doab.

179. CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK TO MAJOR Wm. PALMER.

Fathgarh, 15th October 1787.

The Right Honourable the Governor General in Council having signified to me that they had been pleased to nominate you to succeed me in the office of Resident at the Durbar of Mahajee Sindia and directed me to deliver over the same to you on your arrival at this station, I proceed to comply with their orders. The books and papers which I consign to you are as follows :—

No. 1 is a letter book which I received from Lieutenant Anderson with the charge of my late office. It commences the 12th January 1786 and ends the 15th December 1786.

No. 2 is a book containing copies of Persian letters and other public papers, which I also received from Lieutenant Anderson.

No. 3 is a bundle containing letters from Lord Cornwallis, Mr. Malet and Colonel Harper to the address of Lieutenant Anderson ; with a few other papers also delivered to me by my predecessor.

No. 4 is a letter addressed to me by Lieutenant Anderson previous to his delivering over charge to me, and contains much useful information.

No. 5 is a book containing the cypher employed in the correspondence between the Board and their ministers at foreign courts.

No. 6 is a bundle containing letters received by me from Mr. Malet and from Colonel Harper.

No. 7 is a bundle containing letters received by me from the Board and Lord Cornwallis.

No. 8 is a book containing my public correspondence from the 1st December 1786 to the 14th September 1787. I have omitted in this copy of my correspondence, a few letters of intelligence or public occurrences, which are no longer interesting or useful.

At the end of this book is a Persian copy of the Memorandums which I delivered to Mahajee Sindia on the 23rd of March 1787, referred to in my letter to Lord Cornwallis bearing date the 25th of the same month. It may not be amiss to inform you that I learned at some distance of time that Sindia had transmitted a copy of this paper to Poona soon after he had received it from me.

There are a few other papers of little or no consequence contained in a trunk which the *mutasuddi* at Agra has the charge of, and which will be delivered to you by him on your arrival at that place.

The *Khasah* money (with the nature of which you are already no doubt well acquainted) has been paid by me to no later a period than the end of Jamadi-ul-Awwal. I am ignorant whether or not the Vizier has made any further remittances to Delhi since the last which passed through me.

Lieutenant Stewart, who is at present in charge of the escort belonging to the Residency, will be able to give you a variety of information on points of a minute but interesting nature. I have great obligations to him for the assistance I derived from him during the period of my residence at the Durbar of Sindia.

If I am capable of furnishing you with any useful lights in addition to those which may be contained in my official correspondence, I shall take great pleasure in performing this duty during your stay at this station.

The considerable change which has taken place in the situation of Sindia since I quitted his camp, will no doubt have worked a material alteration in his general deportment, and have disposed him to carry himself towards you in particular in a very different manner from what I was so unfortunate as to experience. This is a circumstance on which I heartily congratulate both you and the public, since it is obviously favourable to the preservation of that harmony so desirable in the intercourse between our Government and the Maratha chief.

180. W. KIRKPATRICK.

20th October 1787.

Received from Mr. Secretary Haldane for dispatch original and duplicate letters to Mr. Malet.

Same day at night dispatched the original to Lieutenant Stewart to be forwarded by him.

21st October noon, dispatched the duplicate by a pair of *qasids*, Nanda and Hansa. If they arrived in 28 days they were to receive 20 Rs. *inam*, if in 27 days 30 Rs., if in 26 days 40 Rs., and if in 25 days 50 Rs.

181. FROM GHULAM QADIR KHAN TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Received 24th October 1787.

It is well known that between me and the English a friendship has long subsisted, and I am from my heart desirous that the root of this system may daily increase in strength. The boundaries of our countries join, and from this there is a necessity for us to strengthen our friendship. Now, I have removed all the *thanahs* of the people from the southward [= Marathas] from out the Doab, and have been honoured by paying my respects to His Majesty, who bestowed on me the *Malboos Khas*, *dastar-i-sarbasta*, string of pearls, *jighah* and *sarpech*, an elephant, horse and sword and target, on account of the office of *Meer Bakhsy*, *Vakeel-i-Mutlaq* and superintendent of the affairs of the Sultanat. As in my heart I am desirous of friendship with the English, I am in every respect anxious for your pleasure and satisfaction, and your Lordship will consider without reserve all these places as belonging to yourself. If your Lordship will be pleased to order me, your Lordship's *thanahs* will be placed, or wherever your Lordship pleases if you will inform me, my *thanahs* shall be maintained. I am from my heart obedient to your Lordship's pleasure. I hope to be always honored with letters from your Lordship.

182. W. KIRKPATRICK TO E. O. IVES, RESIDENT AT LUCKNOW.

Fathgarh, 6th Nov. 1787.

It having for several years past frequently struck me that there must be, amongst the stupendous ruins of a city so ancient and so celebrated as Qanaui, many monuments of antiquity that, if discovered, would throw considerable light upon the earlier history and civil and religious institutions of Hindostan, I have hardly ever ceased to wish for an opportunity of ascertaining by such a limited experiment as might suit with my circumstances, what success would be likely to attend such an undertaking, should it be engaged in on an extensive scale and with the countenance of Government.

My fortune has now presented me with the occasion I have so long waited for ; it being pretty certain that I shall remain up the country for at least some months, I should like, therefore, to make my experiment during the ensuing cold season ; but as it would neither be proper, nor perhaps practicable, without the Vizier's or Minister's authority, permit me to request that you will (if you see no objection to the thing) procure for me such a *parwanah* (permit) as will prevent me from receiving any interruption from the Government officers at Qanaui. I mean to dig about 200 square yards, which I reckon I shall be able to accomplish in a week or ten days. If I have any success, I will make you acquainted with it.

SECTION 4

*Early Residency of William Palmer.
Mahadji Sindhia inactive under reverses
(15 October 1787-March 1788)*

183. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Cawnpore, 30th October 1787.

By intelligence received this day, I learn that Mahajee Sindia had been joined by Ambajee with about 8,000 horse, and in consequence had made a short march from Alwar with the declared intention to proceed to Dig. It is reported that the Rajah of Jaypore had begun to assemble his forces in order to oppose Sindia's retreat. But as a large reinforcement, sent by Appa Khande Row from Gwalior, is said to be on its march to join Sindia, there can be little doubt that he will reach his intended destination in safety.

The only certain account which I have received of Bhow Bakshy since your Lordship's departure from hence, was that he was seen at Gohad about ten days ago, by *qasids* who passed that place from Surat, and talked of setting out in two days for Kalpi.

My opinion is that the Bhow will proceed no further when he learns that your Lordship is on your return to Calcutta. This is a point which I hope to ascertain to-day or to-morrow, by the return of messengers which I despatched several days ago with letters to him, by both routes of Etawa and Kalpi. His answer, or such intelligence as I may obtain concerning him, will determine my departure and the route which I shall take in order to meet Sindia with the greatest possible expedition.

184. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Cawnpore, 31st October 1787.

I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter of the 30th ultimo accompanied with your public instructions for my conduct at the Durbar of Mahajee Sindia. To these, and to such as your Lordship has already given to my predecessors in office, I shall pay the most exact obedience, and endeavour by unremitting attention to them and to the views of Government to promote in my station the public welfare and the honor of your Lordship's administration.

This instant my harkarahs are returned with an answer from Bhow Bakhshy to my letter dispatched some days since. The Bhow informs me that he was within ten cos of Kalpi, and will certainly be at Cawnpore on the 8th instant, from whence after he shall have explained to me the objects of his journey to be forwarded to your Lordship, he will immediately return with me to his master.

The Bhow ascribes his disappointment of not meeting your Lordship at this place to the delay of Appa Khande Row in furnishing him with an escort from Gwalior. But I am strongly inclined to believe that, a personal interview with you was not seriously intended by either the Bhow or his master, and that the mission of the former was calculated to affect an expectation of succours which Sindia knew could not be obtained, and the procrastination of the Bhow's journey was probably to avoid the mortification and ill consequences of an absolute refusal. For these purposes, the negotiation for an aid will I apprehend be commenced on the Bhow's arrival here, and be ostensibly kept open on the part of Sindia as long as it may be expedient for his affairs.

185. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Cawnpore, 2nd November 1787.

I dispatch to you this day a pair of *gasids* with a letter from Lord Cornwallis. I shall forward to you by the next dispatch in a few days the article mentioned in this, which I am directed to transmit by a separate conveyance.

I likewise forward to you the country intelligence to the latest period I have received it. The situation of the contending parties is pretty exactly recounted, at least as far as has come to my knowledge. I confess that Sindia's affairs appear to me in a desperate state, unless speedy succour should arrive from the Deccan. The want of union and a common principle of action in his enemies have hitherto preserved him; but they may adopt a different conduct, and it is very probable they will see

the necessity of it, if Sindia seriously attempts to retire to Agra or Delhi as he gives out. That movement will probably be decisive of his fate.

I have been delayed here since the departure of Lord Cornwallis, to wait the arrival of Bhow Bakhshy, who was dispatched by Sindia three months since declaredly on affairs of the greatest importance, to his Lordship. And as he might have performed his journey in three weeks, I cannot ascribe it to mere indolence (great as that of the Bhow is said to be); since he has made such unaccountable delay, I suspect that Sindia, aware of his proposals being declined, has wished to keep up the appearance of expecting our aid and at the same time to avoid the mortification and ill effects of a refusal.

186. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Cawnpore, 16th November 1787.

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a copy of the papers delivered to me by Bhow Bakhshy as a declaration of the proposals which he was charged to deliver to your Lordship by Mahajee Sindia, the original (in the Persian language also) is in the handwriting of the Bhow's munshy. I required the Bhow's signature to it, which he declined, alleging for his reason, that it was sufficiently authenticated by being written in the hand of his moonshy and dictated by himself in my presence.

As I was desirous to give Bhow Bakhshy all the information in my power of your Lordship's sentiments respecting Mahajee Sindia, and of the light in which I supposed you would consider these specific propositions before he should determine to have them transmitted to you, I gave him the most explicit assurances, that your Lordship was as much disposed by inclination, as your Government was bound by treaty, to maintain the friendly connection subsisting between the Company, the Maratha State, and Sindia himself. That you entertained a sincere regard and esteem for Sindia personally, unalterable by any change of fortune, and that you would manifest this friendly disposition by every act consistent with public indispensable duties, and with the obligations of justice and policy to offer no injury to those who do not disturb the possessions of the Company or those of their allies, which they are bound to protect.

Upon the first proposition I observed, that the declaration in which it was contained avowed a knowledge of our Government being precluded from making war for foreign interests, that the country described came strictly within the prohibition, since no mutual guarantee of dominion was stipulated between us, and if such a provision had been established by treaty, it could not comprehend countries at the time not in possession of either of the contracting parties, and in the reduction of which one

of them had no participation. That the concern which your Lordship felt at the unfortunate events which had taken place was resolved by the consideration, that the Power which had been able without any extraneous aid to subdue those countries, was able by its own exertions to recover them after their defection. That our assistance was not necessary, nor the object in itself of sufficient magnitude, for Sindia to urge our taking a part in it. That he should not seek to engage our Government in his petty contests, but reserve for the great and important pressure of national danger from a mutual and formidable enemy the co-operation of our forces.

The proposition for reducing the Sikhs appears to me so ill timed, that I am at a loss to conjecture for what purpose it is now introduced, unless it should be with a design, in case your Lordship's approbation of it should be obtained, to excite the Sikhs to ravage the Vizier's dominions, in the hope that such an outrage would draw our arms to the scenes in which Sindia is at present engaged, and thereby insensibly involve us in his projects; or at least in the appearances of supporting him, which alone might be productive of very material advantage to his cause. The design is the more apparent to me from the mention which is made of their depredatory incursion into Rohilcand in the year 1785. Under this apprehension, I was cautious of giving any encouragement to hope for your Lordship's assistance in such an enterprise, or to expect your express approbation of it. I observed that our Government had no kind of connection with the Sikhs, that if they should invade our dominions or those of the Vizier, we should repel and punish them. That Mahajee Sindia, whilst he held the administration of the King's affairs, was the proper judge of the conduct of the Sikhs towards his Majesty, and that our Government would not think it had a right to interfere in such measures as he might adopt to restrain, or to resent, their encroachments upon the royal authority or dominions. I added, that I thought the danger was too remote for immediate consideration. But the Bhow was tenacious upon this subject, and earnest to receive your Lordship's opinion of it.

The Bhow went to Lucknow on the 13th, and I sent my son to attend him. I hear that he had been received by the Vizier with much distinction: I informed him at his departure, that I would positively march on the 20th, whether he should return or not. I since learn that he is so well pleased with his reception and situation that he is not likely soon to quit the latter, and I shall proceed on the day I have fixed upon. My route will be by Etawa, as Sindia is come to Rewary and has sent Ambajee to the King to negotiate his return to Delhi.

I am very doubtful of Sindia's success in this negotiation, as the confederacy which is opposed to him appears very formidable by the junction of the prince with the Rajah of Jaypore and Ismail Beg Khan.

The Shah has been reconciled to Ghulam Qadir Khan, which is another obstacle in the way of Sindia's return to Delhi,—for although it does not appear for what ultimate purpose this reconciliation has been brought about, yet as it was effected by the Nabob Nazir, who is declaredly inimical to Sindia, it is obviously calculated in the first instance to oppose his interests. In the meantime, the views of the contending parties being directed to the same object, the direction of the King's affairs, he is assiduously courted by all for the sanction of his authority, and thereby enjoys a temporary power and consequence to which he is little accustomed and which will produce to him the single advantage of chusing his master.

It is generally understood that he most dreads to see his authority delegated to his successor; and this is the only circumstance which seems to favour Sindia's view of regaining his situation at the royal Durbar; should the interests of his enemies prevail there, he will I conclude retire to Ajmir. But as the King will probably contrive to keep the parties in suspense until he can make his own election, I hope to reach Sindia where he now is. My route after I reach Etawa will be directed by his motions, of which I shall give your Lordship the earliest information.

187. TRANSLATION OF PROPOSALS DELIVERED IN WRITING BY
BHOW BAKHSY TO MAJOR WILLIAM PALMER.

Cawnpore, 14th November 1787.

The friendship and regard which the Peshwa, the Poona Chiefs, and Mahajee Sindia have for the English East India Company resembles in strength and firmness the wall of Alexander, and will increase daily. It is the wish of Mahajee Sindia that the extent of it should be known to the world.

At present the Rajah of Jaynagar, the zamindars and inhabitants in the neighbourhood of Agra and Delhi, and some Sikh Chiefs have behaved improperly to Mahajee Sindia, by disobeying his orders, raising the standard of rebellion to resist his power and by several other acts. It is known to Mahajee Sindia that the orders from Europe to the illustrious English Chiefs are, not to send troops to fight in the territory of strangers, but as the Government of the royal possessions is by the Poona Chiefs entrusted to his care, and as the zamindars and servants who receive pay or possess *jaidads* in them have rebelled and do not fulfill their pecuniary engagements, he wishes the illustrious English Chiefs or the Nabob Vizier would assist him with a force (which he engages to pay, whilst they are retained, in the same manner as the English Company do, and to deliver over a country in *jaidad* for the amount whatever it may be), to act in conjunction with him, in resettling the country that was lately under his care: Mahajee Sindia says, that

considering the world of friendship, there would be nothing inconsistent in this, that it would be of mutual advantage, and not contrary to the orders from Europe. An army from the Deccan will soon arrive to assist him.

The Sikh Chiefs often commit ravages in the King's possessions which are under Mahajee Sindia's care, and sometimes they commit the like in those of the Nabob Vizier ; formerly it appeared absolutely necessary for both parties to join in avenging these predatory incursions, and now, Mahajee Sindia is induced to ask the opinion of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General and of the Nabob Vizier on this subject. If Mahajee Sindia should commence hostilities against the Sikhs with the view of preventing their incursions, overthrowing their power entirely, and settling their country under his own authority, what would the English Governor-General or the Nabob Vizier say in regard to the propriety of his operations? Would they think them necessary, proper, or in short, approve of them?

188. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Etawa, 9th December 1787.

I have had the honor to receive your letter dated the 20th ultimo at Murshidabad, communicating the intelligence which your Lordship had received from Mr. Malet of Tippoo's having taken the fort of Kitoor from the Marathas. I shall be particularly attentive to turn this circumstance to such advantage as may be derived from it in my conferences with Mahajee Sindia.

It would afford me particular satisfaction if I could inform your Lordship of any appearance in Sindia [of a wish] to relinquish his views of recovering his situation in this quarter ; but he has suddenly resumed them with a considerable degree of ardor and some prospect of success. After retreating to his old station of Alwar apparently with the design to retire to Ajmere, he unexpectedly returned and by rapid marches has arrived near Agra with a declared intention to attack Ismail Beg Khan, and by an express this moment arrived, his advanced party had begun to cannonade. I am in hourly expectation to hear of a general action. This, in any event, will probably be decisive of the fortune of Sindia in these countries, and certainly so, should he be defeated or even repulsed. He is greatly superior in strength to Ismail Beg, and if he acts with spirit and conduct, cannot fail to be victorious. No succours can possibly arrive in time to the latter, unless Sindia should unaccountably delay the attack. His success in this attempt would probably disperse the parties now opposed to him, as their leaders are destitute of resources and instead of acting in concert or upon any settled plan, have each a separate and contending interest : The Raja of Jaypore, who has been considered as the head of the confederacy, appears to be satisfied with

the advantages which he has already obtained, and evidently avoids to engage in any hostile measures beyond the limits of his own possessions.

The sense which I entertain of the danger which ultimately threatens the Company, should Tippoo irrecoverably reduce the power of the Maratha State, would, if I had not received your Lordship's express commands to that purpose, stimulate my best exertions with Sindia to pursue that conduct which his duty, his reputation, and indeed, the safety of his own possessions should dictate to him on the occasion.

I have hitherto furnished Mr. Malet with the most complete information in my power of occurrences on this side of India, and shall continue to transmit to him all material intelligence with the greatest possible dispatch.

I shall cross the Jamna tomorrow at Choura Chat, about 8 cos above this place, from whence I expect to join Sindia in a few days.

189. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

16th December 1787.

I had the honor to address your Lordship on the 9th instant from Etawa. Nothing of consequence has been done or attempted by Sindia against the army of Ismail Beg Khan. But this moment intelligence is brought to me, that yesterday morning the latter marched out of his post with a strong body of horse and foot, and 33 pieces of cannon, and attacked the Marathas. It does not appear from the report I have received, that the armies were yet closely engaged when the account came away, nor do I think that a decisive action has ensued as the firing was plainly heard in my camp until noon, when it ceased, and which was about the time that the intelligence was dispatched to me.

The inactivity or irresolution of Sindia has afforded time for the arrival of Aly Akbar Khan, and Malik Mahomed Khan to join Ismail Beg. I believe however, that they brought him no great accession of strength, nor does Sindia appear to have been intimidated by their junction. But as he did not attack Ismail Beg before their arrival, I conclude that it never was his serious intention to risk his fortune upon the issue of a battle; if he declined it, whilst he had the option and to all appearance the superiority, it cannot be supposed that he will hazard it when his enemy has been reinforced, and fresh succours are certainly at hand from Jaypore conducted by Himmat Bahadur; and Ghulam Qadir Khan with his army is by this time actually arrived.

Sindia's return from Alwar, and the conduct which he has since pursued, indicate a determination to remain in this country, and trust to future events for his restoration to power. His plan is probably to keep up a predatory war, to harass the confederates and impede their resources, and finally to depend on negotiation and intrigue, as the disappointments and dissensions of his opponents may open a way to them.

I am now within 15 cos of Agra, and wait the direction of Sindia by which road to join him. I am in hourly expectation of a letter from him.

A second report is just brought to me of the action of yesterday, from which it appears that Sindia has been driven from his ground, and I apprehend will retreat to Dholpur.

I have received a letter from Ismail Beg Khan, desiring to meet me at Agra; I shall decline his invitation, and follow Sindia by whatever route he may take.

190. E. O. IVES TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 19th December 1787.

The enclosed Papers of Intelligence will inform you of the particulars of an engagement which has taken place between Sindia and Ismail Beg, in which the latter has had the advantage and compelled Sindia to retreat towards Dholpur, which is on the road to Gwalior. The fort of Aligarh is besieged by Ghulam Qadir Khan's people. He himself has left it, and is on his way to join Ismail Beg.

The Prince is still at Delhi, he wished to return to Agra, but the King detains him under pretence of accompanying him,—a circumstance, from which I am led to conclude that His Majesty is not free from suspicions of him. Your Lordship will have observed that, if the news-writers are to be credited his Royal Highness has solicited the office of Vizier for himself and has since his arrival at Delhi, manifested designs inimical to the Nawab. I have not as yet been able to obtain the bill for his lac of Rupees. All money business here goes on very slowly, and Hyder Beg Khan again urges the impossibility of procuring good bills payable at Delhi, during the present troubles there. We have however fallen on an expedient, with which the Prince's vakeel expresses himself satisfied. It is for the minister to get the merchants here to give me a *tip* payable in 20 or 30 days, for the money; upon which I am to give to his Royal Highness authority to draw on me for the amount. Mansaram is expected to-day from [blank in orig.] whither he is gone with Almas Aly Khan (who has at length settled his business and proceeded to his districts), and on his return the minister promises I shall have the *tip*. I am myself by no means satisfied with Hyder Beg for the procrastination of this business—s'nce the arrival of your Lordship's letter on the subject, especially as it is now upwards of two months since the promise of the money was made, and he ought to have been prepared for the event of your recommending his giving the bill. Nor, indeed, has he been more punctual with respect to the money due to the Company, not having yet paid a Rupee on account of the two lacs which, as I had the honor of informing you, he gave me hopes he should let me have in the course of a day or two.

191. MAJOR PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Raipur (18 miles n. e. of Kalpi), 19 Dec. 1787.

I received repeated accounts that Sindia had retreated towards Dholpur, in consequence of the attack made upon him by Ismael Beg Khan on the 15th, and these were last night confirmed by a letter from Sindia himself, desiring to meet me at Dholpur by the shortest route I could take. I accordingly crossed the Chambal at this place this morning, taking a small circuit to avoid the districts in possession of Ismael Khan's troops and am within 18 cos of Dholpur.

Sindia has sustained little or no loss in the action.

Ghulam Qadir Khan has joined Ismael Khan; it is however probable that they will separate without pursuing Sindia, to resume their respective operations in the Doab and against Agra.

Sindia professes a determination to wait for advantages which he expects to derive from the jarring interests of the Chiefs who now oppose him, and to rely for his success upon intrigue rather than force.

192. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 26th Decr. 1787.

I have this moment received intelligence by the way of Jaynagar that the Raja of Jodhpore has taken the fort of Ajmerc. The account is so circumstantial as to leave little or no doubt of its authenticity.

This unfortunate event joined to the reports of the Raja of Jaypore and the Shahzadah being on the point of marching to Agra, will I think determine Sindia to relinquish his views in this quarter and return to the care of his more essential interest in the Deccan.

His present strength is totally inadequate to the recovery of his power and possessions to the northward of the Chambal by arms, and the apparent determination of the confederates to pursue their late successes against him affords but little prospect of it, by the only means which appeared to be left, negotiation and intrigue.

I shall earnestly recommend to him the immediate pursuit of such measures as yet leave him any prospect of a solid advantage or a just reputation, which I conceive to be security of his own possessions in the Deccan, and of the Maratha State against the designs of Tippoo.

Sindia has not yet made me a visit, for which he has apologized on account of the intervention of Christmas day, and this day not being a fortunate one, I understand that tomorrow is fixed upon, but have yet received no formal notice of it. I expect that he will be very explicit upon his affairs, as he appears to be much affected by his situation, and

professes in his Durbar a resolution to act in conformity to the advice and wishes of your Lordship.

Sindia has just sent me a message that he intends to visit me tomorrow and to march to Gwalior immediately afterwards. I shall follow him the next day.

193. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Sindia's Camp, 26th Decr. 1787.

I had the pleasure to address you by *qasids* on the 2nd instant from Fathgarh. I then advised you that Sindia has determined to retreat to Ajmere and had actually commenced his march. After reaching Alwar, he unexpectedly and rapidly returned and appeared before Agra. His operation there and since his repulse and second retreat, the newspapers which I now transmit will amply detail. His situation is, I think from the intelligence which I have just received, become desperate. The fort of Ajmere is captured by the Raja of Jodhpore. The Prince and the Rajah of Jaypore are on the point of marching to join Ismael Beg Khan before Agra. Sindia is in no condition to oppose this combination by arms, and as they appear determined to act with cordiality at least until they have effected his expulsion, he can have but little prospect of success from negotiation or intrigue.

Thus deprived of all hope of recovering his power in this quarter, he cannot, I think, hesitate to adopt the only measure from which he can now realise solid advantage or reputation, that of his immediate return to the Deccan for the security of his own possessions there, and an application of all the strength he can spare from that object to the assistance of the Poona Government against Tippoo; a conduct which I shall not fail to recommend to him in the strongest terms, since I conceive it to be ultimately conducive to the interests of the Company, as well as immediately honourable and beneficial to Sindia himself.

194. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 29th Decr. 1787.

Sindia visited me on the 27th, accompanied by his principal Sardars. As he made this interview entirely ceremonious and complimentary, I took occasion at the close of it to tell him, that I was ready to attend him at his convenience to communicate your Lordship's instructions and to receive his commands upon such subjects as he might wish to impart to our Government. He appointed yesterday morning, when I waited upon him and had a long conversation upon and candid discussion of every material topic connected with the relative interests of the Company, the Maratha State and himself: these it is unnecessary to

detail at present, as he is preparing an address to your Lordship, which will fully explain his situation and his views.

He received with great satisfaction the assurances which I gave him of personal esteem from your Lordship and the other gentlemen in administration, and expressed the most entire confidence in your steady adherence to the treaties subsisting between him, the Maratha State, and the Company.

I explained to him the reasons both of justice and obedience which precluded your interference in the contests which he is at present engaged in, and convinced him that your Lordship had neglected no means which it was justifiable to use to prevent the Prince and the Gosains from taking part with his enemies. Upon the whole he appeared to be perfectly satisfied that the neutrality which your Lordship had adopted was indispensable, and was particularly pleased at those instances of personal regard which you had shown towards him, where you could exert it without a breach of public duty, as in the business of the Prince and the Gosains, and my mission directly to his Durbar without previously waiting upon the King.

I could not obtain from Sindia any express declaration of the resolution he should take in case of a requisition from Poona to assist in the war against Tippoo. But he appeared considerably alarmed at the powers and designs of that Chief. He seemed sanguine too that he shall be instrumental in drawing the connection closer between the Company and the Maratha State, for the purpose of checking the progress and humbling the pride of Tippoo. I explained to him the obstacles which prevent at this time such a union as would be effectual for these purposes, and also the possibility of their removal from the wellknown violence and injustice of Tippoo's character, whose aggrandisement would be regarded with deep concern by our Government, especially if obtained at the expense of the Maratha State.

Sindia speaks confidently of a large reinforcement being on its march to join him from Ujjain. But reports of the defection of the Raja of Narwar, thro' whose country the route of his reinforcement directly lies, seems to contradict the Patel's assertion. From all appearances, Sindia must give up any further attempts to recover his power at Delhi, and I think he is scarcely strong enough to retain what is still left him on the south of the Chambal, Gwalior excepted. I am much mistaken if he would not regard an order to march to Poona as a circumstance very favourable to his reputation under his present embarrassments in his quarter.

The Prince is on the way to Agra, but I do not learn that the Rajah of Jaypore is prosecuting his march to that place, as reported some days since. I have had no further particulars of the capture of Ajmere & the report is contradicted in this camp.

Ghulam Qadir Khan is making a rapid progress in the reduction of the places subject to Sindia in the Doab. This is regarded by the Prince & Ismael Beg with great jealousy, & will probably produce a quarrel between them. But should he firmly establish himself in those districts, he will be enabled to support an army that may afford real cause of alarm to the Vizier for the tranquillity of his western frontier. The Rohilas are devoted to Ghulam Qadir Khan; they are now numerous, bold, enterprising, and rapacious.

195. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp, 31st Decr. 1787.

I have the honor to transmit to you two letters from Mahajee Sindia, in answer to those of your Lordship which advised him of my appointment to reside at his Durbar & of your arrival in Calcutta.

Sindia marched this morning about seven *cos* to the southward, in order to overawe the Rajas of Narwar and Kerauli, who have dispossessed him of some mahals which he had reduced in their respective countries, and to support the detachment under Rayjee Patel which he had sent into those districts.

The rapid fall of Sindia's power has excited an almost general defection among the Rajas who have been subjected to his authority from the Jamna to the Narbada. He has received certain intelligence of the capture of the fort of Ajmeer. I do not think it practicable for him to maintain his ground on this side a month longer.

In a second interview which I have had with Sindia, I observe that he has not entirely relinquished his hope of assistance from our Government, & will I apprehend make another application to your Lordship, notwithstanding the discouragement which he has repeatedly received & which my conversation strongly confirmed. He appears anxiously desirous of becoming the instrument of an alliance offensive as well as defensive between the Maratha State & the Company for the express purpose of defeating the designs of Tippoo against either. I cannot pretend to determine whether his offer to propose an alliance of this nature is sincere, or whether he possesses sufficient influence at the Poona Durbar to effect it. Possibly he expects that the offer may induce our Government from motives of policy & generosity to contribute towards the recovery of his power in this part of Hindostan.

196. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

8 Jan. 1788.

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter to your Lordship from Mahajee Sindia, which contains a further application for aid to recover

his station and territory on this side of India. Although he can scarce entertain a hope of success after the explicit answers of your Lordship to his former requisitions and the repeated explanations which I have given him of the obstacle to a compliance with his wishes, yet he either flatters himself that circumstances may arise to induce a deviation from that strict line of neutrality, which has been prescribed to our Government, or he expects to derive some temporary advantage from its being known that he continues to negotiate for your assistance.

Sindia continues steady in assurances of an earnest desire to promote a treaty between the Company's Government and that of Poona for a mutual defence in case of an attack on the possessions of either by Tippoo. He would write to your Lordship himself upon this subject, but observes that it is of a nature too delicate and important to be entrusted to more channels of communication than are absolutely necessary to convey it to the respective parties. I have no information upon which I can form a judgment of the degree of influence which Sindia possesses at the Peshwa's Durbar to effect an object of such magnitude. But I have little or no doubt of the sincerity of his offer, since the success of his mediation could not fail to enhance his consequence in the Maratha State.

I have as little doubt that the measure would be acceptable at Poona.

How far existing treaties may have left your Lordship at liberty to form such an engagement, I am not informed, but the proposal appears to me of such consequence as to make the communication of it indispensibly my duty.

Since I had last the honor to address your Lordship, I have had several conversations with Sindia and with his most confidential servants by his appointment. I am concerned to observe from the general tenor of their discourses, that his mind appears to be immoveably fixed on the recovery of his station at the King's Durbar and the power and possessions annexed to it. It was with a view to this object that he produced to me a *shukla* from the King alluded to in his letter to your Lordship, and which contains the most friendly assurances from His Majesty to Sindia, and declares that such part of his conduct as does not correspond with these professions is compulsory, to which His Majesty also adds a promise to recall Sindia to Court when circumstances shall leave him master of his own actions. I cannot take upon me to vouch for the authenticity of this letter. But the obvious aim of Sindia in producing it is to remove an objection which your Lordship may be supposed to have to a compliance with Sindia's requisition on account of the King's apparent indisposition towards him.

Sindia has detached the greatest and best part of his troops under his best commanders, Rana Khan, Rayjee Patel, and Ambajee, to reduce the Rajahs of Narwer and Kerauli, who have thrown off their subjection

to him and have joined their forces to oppose him. These are said to amount to 15,000, which exceeds the number detached against them by Sindia. Should he fail to reduce these Rajas his retreat to Ujjain would be very difficult, if not impracticable, and he would in all probability be obliged to take immediate shelter under the walls of Gwalior.

His present strength is so little proportioned to his avowed object of regaining his power at Delhi, that I am inclined to credit his declaration of reliance on succours from Poona and on his own resources from Ujjain ; some expectation too he undoubtedly founds upon the supposed distrust which the Shah (Alam) entertains of the Prince, and the contests which are likely to arise between the leader of the confederacy, in the distribution of territory neither of whom acknowledges the right of conquest made by another.

In the meantime Sindia has adopted the only line of conduct from which he can in the present inferiority of his army reap any solid advantage, by employing the force and the leisure which is left him in support of the collections under Appa Khande Row, and from which his receipts have been considerable since his arrival in the neighbourhood of Gwalior.

I confess that I am disappointed in the hope which both the situation of Sindia and the Poona Government led me to form, of seeing the future operations of the former directed to that object which is essential to the interests of the Company.

The administration at Poona may possibly determine that Sindia can render more essential service by extending their dominion and revenue on this side of India, than by his assistance in the immediate defence of the State. The force which they may appoint for that purpose will secure to them the certain receipt of such a share of the acquisition as they may require.

197. GHULAM QADIR KHAN TO EARL CORNWALLIS G. G.

Received, 20th January, 1788.

I have had the happiness to receive your Lordship's friendly letter and overjoyed at hearing of your health. There is no necessity for writing what your Lordship has expressed respecting friendship ; that friendship which is of old firm between us will daily increase and there can be no distinction in it. Your Lordship has written for my information that you had stationed troops towards the westward. This is highly proper and advisable. As our affairs are in every respect the same, all these troops that are [mine are] also your Lordship's. Whatever business for them there may be depending on this quarter, your Lordship without scruple will inform me of it, that it may be accomplished according to your wish. Your Lordship

should even write to the officers of these districts, to inform me of whatever may be necessary. Whatever demand they may make of troops they shall be sent from hence. Your Lordship will always write me friendly letters.

198. PRINCE JAWAN BAKHT TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Received, 23rd January 1788.

Having entertained troops, we are arrived in perfect safety in this zilah ; and according to His Majesty's summons by repeated marches we had the happiness to pay our respects to His Majesty, who from the excess of his royal kindness has nominated us to the control over all affairs. Now we have taken leave of His Majesty and are come to make the settlement of Akbarabad and to take possession of the country. You will have learnt all the particulars from the newspapers. At this time, assistance in money and troops from you my brother is necessary. In the manner that formerly in that quarter, your Battalions were stationed as a guard over our tent, so now assist with some money and 4 Battalions that they may serve as a guard and perform obedience as before. In performing this, by God's help the whole of the country will come into our possession. At this time Maharajah Madajee Sindia has no footing in this country, that you cannot afford assistance in consequence of your engagements with him. Whatever troops and money you shall supply, resource shall be made for them separate in this country. In consequence of your engagement with Sindia, we had no wish to injure him either, for we came to Dehli agreeable to His Majesty's summons, and we did not wish to hesitate about them. When Sindia arrived in the neighbourhood of Akbarabad, an engagement took place with Ismael Beg Khan ; but being unequal to keep his ground he fled and is arrived at Gwalior and means to go farther. As an intimate friendship exists between us, at this time a little assistance will regulate all matters. Sending Mr. John Bristow with the battalions to the Presence would not be contrary to brotherly attention. In the affairs here our burthen is upon you ; therefore, speedy assistance from you is highly necessary. Write us the news of your health and make us happy by it, as we are anxious to hear it.

199. RAJAH PARTAB SING TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Received, 16th January 1788.

Your Lordship's kind letter arrived and afforded me great satisfaction, and I have perfectly understood its particulars tending to the increase of friendship, and have been made very happy. God be praised that our friendship is increasing daily in a degree that cannot be written. The news of your Lordship's visit to Lucknow and your interview with the Nawab Vizier, my heart has been made joyful on hearing it. From the intimacy between us it is necessary for your Lordship to inform me of

what prudence and foresight determined between your Lordship and the Vizier with respect to the important affairs of Bengal. The improper conduct of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the royal Presence will have been made known to your Lordship by the newspapers. At this time several royal *shukkas* and letters from Manzur Aly Khan have been frequently sent to me, on the subject of my attendance on the Presence. As obedience and allegiance to the royal order has been universal in my family, I have therefore ordered Sri Gour Mohant Maharajah Jograj and Bakhshy Meeta Lal, with a proper force consisting of Kachhwa, Rathor, Rajpoots to go to the Presence. They will shortly arrive. As from our connection the counsel of each other is the same, I have written this and Ray Ram Sing will inform your Lordship of other particulars. Your Lordship considering me desirous of news of your happiness, will write me frequent letters.

200. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 16th January 1788.

The newspapers of yesterday and this day have brought intelligence of two events from which Sindia derives great expectation of a favourable turn in his affairs. These are the defection of five battalions of sepoys from the service of the Rajah of Jaypore, and the separation of the Prince from Mirza Ismael Beg,—His Highness having crossed the Jamna with his troops for the declared purpose of checking the progress of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the Doab.

It does not appear to me that Sindia's hopes of important consequences from these events are well founded. The battalions will doubtless join Ismael Beg before Agra, and as the Prince has not a force sufficient to execute his designs against Ghulam Qadir, and Ismael Beg is exceedingly averse to the attempt, it will probably end in an accommodation with some small cession of country to the Prince. But should appearances indicate a more serious issue, I will give your Lordship the earliest information of their probable effects upon the future proceedings of Sindia. In the meantime, this division of force and opposition of interest cannot fail to confirm Sindia's resolution to wait for the advantages which he has long expected would result to him from the misconduct of his enemies. His expectations are also considerably raised by the appointment of a force from Poona to his assistance, which he asserts is advanced as far as Khandesh and by a letter from the Shah [Alam II], expressing his approbation of his conduct whilst in the management of his Majesty's affairs, and encouraging him to exert himself for the recovery of his power and authority.

I have perused the letter from the Shah which appears by the character in which it is written to be genuine, but I suspect it to be dictated by the fears which Sindia has continued to excite in His Majesty's mind of a speedy and effectual assistance for the re-establishment of his power.

Sindia's detachments to the southward under the conduct of Rana Khan and Ambajee have met with considerable success in the reduction of several forts in the districts of Narwar and Kerauli and in the collection of revenue. He has also raised several lacs of Rupees upon loan, since he came into the neighbourhood of Gwalior; but whether from constitutional avarice or with a view to apply the money to other purposes which he judges more essential, he has distributed from it but a very small portion of the arrears due to his troops.

201. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 3rd February 1788.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 11th instant. I feel the highest gratification in the approbation which your Lordship is pleased to express of my proceeding in the little intercourse which I have hitherto had with Mahajee Sindia, and wish for nothing more ardently than that by my residence at this Durbar, I may become instrumental to the public service and to the success of your Lordship's administration. I must however confess that I am not very sanguine in my hopes of attaining these objects, since both the situation and conduct of Sindia seem to portend the total suppression of his power and influence.

What resources Sindia may ultimately possess and what resolution he may have formed for the application of them to the extricating of himself from his present difficulties, it is not easy to ascertain. The extremity to which he appears to be reduced, would lead me to conclude that he is wholly destitute of the means of relief, had I not daily experience of his submitting to the defection of his troops rather than pay them any part of their arrears from the money which I know he has lately collected to the amount of 12 or 15 lacs of Rupees, and thus expose himself to the danger of being entirely deserted. Even the Province of Malwa, the tenure [?] centre] of his political existence, has been left defenceless and incapable of repelling the invasion of the Rana of Udipore, who it is reported has made an entire conquest of a valuable district depending on Malwa called Jawad [10 miles north of Neernach], or of preventing the depredations of the Pindaras who have ravaged the whole Province. The latter are said to be in the pay of Tukojee Holkar, and it is supposed that both they and the Rana have been encouraged by that Chief to make those attacks upon Sindia.

The extreme parsimony observed by Sindia in the management of his affairs in Indostan at this period of his distress, may however be accounted for without having recourse to his habitual avarice; his doubts of the permanency of any advantages which he might obtain, will naturally induce him to suspend any expensive operations until he can learn the real objects which the Poona ministry have in view in the appointment of Aly Bahadur to the expedition into Indostan. He probably also expects important consequences from an application of his money to the distresses

of the leaders lately confederated against him, and which they all begin to feel severely from inability to subsist their troops. The Prince has already offered to join him, and advances are indirectly making to him from the Rajah of Jaypore and from Ismael Beg Khan. What reception these have met with from Sindia I cannot learn with certainty, but understand that it has been favorable. It is possible that their mutual necessities may bring them to some accommodation, but their hatred and distrust is too deep rooted and their interests too incompatible to admit of a sincere or lasting union, or to be productive of any material consequences, if a temporary one should take place; nor is it likely that these negotiations and intrigues will be brought to a conclusion in time to avert the ruin which threatens Sindia from the loss of his subahdary. The only prospect of his relief which appears to me, is the force destined from Poona to Indostan; but I believe he is yet ignorant whether it is to act for the recovery of his authority or for the establishment of a new minister for the Maratha affairs.

What grounds of reliance Sindia may have upon the intended force from Poona being destined to the purpose of reinstating him in his authority in Hindostan, your Lordship will be better able to judge from the information of Mr. Malet than any that I can obtain. But it can scarcely be doubted that the arrival of that force will restore the Maratha power and influence in whatever hands they may determine to place it. The Chiefs who are in opposition to them are rivals for the same object, and are more eager to supplant and circumvent each other than to act in concert for the exclusion of their common enemy; and neither of them singly is able to maintain the contest against the Marathas. The King has no motive of preference to either party, but that of ability and disposition best to supply his wants.

It is reasonable to suppose that Sindia's first object must be the preservation of Malwa. If the accounts which he receives of the progress of his enemies in the reduction of it are true, they are sufficiently alarming to engage his whole attention; yet he has made but very feeble efforts for its relief, whether from inability or security in the strength of the Province cannot with certainty be ascertained, as public report is but little to be relied on, and the extreme caution and reserve of the Marathas in their own concerns renders it very difficult to obtain authentic private intelligence, which is to be had only from themselves. But from all the circumstances which I can combine, the former is the true cause of Sindia's inactivity. He has detached Ambajee to Malwa, but his force is inadequate to its protection against that which the invaders are reported to have assembled.

I have invariably discouraged any hopes which Sindia has appeared to entertain of aid from your Lordship towards the recovery of his station in Indostan, by a plain recital of the insurmountable obstacles which in the present state of our Government oppose his wishes, and I have

frequently hinted to him your Lordship's apprehensions of the danger to which he exposes his best interests by persevering in this apparently unattainable object. But on this subject he is immovable, and either has or affects to have, a firm persuasion that he shall in the end accomplish all his views.

A direct disapprobation of this favourite pursuit would only tend to create a reserve and distrust in any future negotiations in which his alliance or mediation may possibly be beneficial to the Company.

Since I began this letter Sindia has issued one month's pay to his troops; he has ordered a further reinforcement to Malwa, and is endeavouring to conciliate the minds of the zamindars of the district of Gwalior and other places which yet remain under his authority. These measures indicate a design to place himself on the most respectable footing he can before the arrival of Aly Bahadur.

I wish that I could give your Lordship a clearer insight of the situation and views of Sindia. But with whatever survey and caution he may now guard and conceal them, they will soon be certainly ascertained from the course of events. The arrival of the force from Poona, or the movements which will follow the interview between the Shah and the Rajah of Jaypore, will be decisive of his fate.

The conveyance of the *khalsa* and *nazaranas* to the King from the Vizier, has always been attended with delays, which occasioned complaints of slight and were discreditable to the Vizier. A few days after my arrival in Sindia's Camp, I dispatched *qasids* with His Excellency's order to the *amil* of Rohilcand for the arrears due to that time, to which I have not yet received an answer. I should be glad that the King was gratified in this point by any mode of punctual remittance. But I apprehend that if a change in the channel of conveyance should be proposed to Sindia, it would produce the effect which your Lordship wishes to avoid, of his inferring that you consider his connection with the King as finally terminated. I imagine however that the remittance might be made directly from Lucknow without Sindia's knowledge of the change. But as Sindia's authority in the King's affairs must soon be formally annulled or effectually re-established, your Lordship may choose to suspend any alteration which might be productive of future inconvenience and that is of little immediate consequence.

I have hitherto communicated the fullest intelligence which I could obtain to Mr. Malet, and shall continue to transmit to him every material occurrence in this quarter.

202. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp 8th February 1788.

Sindia has just now sent to inform me, that he has received a letter from Aly Bahadur dated 18 days since, acquainting him that he was

advanced 40 *cos* on this side Poona, and should continue his march with all possible expedition; and that Tukojee Holkar has also taken leave of the Peshwa to proceed to Indostan; Sindia being a little indisposed to-day has desired to confer with me tomorrow upon the subject of this intelligence.

The Rajah of Jaypore has made his visit of ceremony to the Shah, and the Prince has joined Ghulam Qadir Khan. These events will probably determine the King's march to Agra.

P.S.—Sindia has received intelligence this evening by express from Ujjain, that the troops which he ordered from Burhanpore for the protect on of Malwa, have totally defeated the Odipureans, and taken their guns and baggage.

203. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G.C.

C. 10th February 1788.

I waited upon Sindia yesterday to deliver your Lordship's letter in answer to his last application for military aid; upon this occasion I repeated to him all the reasons and arguments which I have formerly stated to convince him of both the impracticability and impropriety of your Lordship's compliance with this requisition. He appeared to be neither disappointed nor mortified at this refusal, which I am certain he considers as final; that he expected it, and that he will not renew his solicitation for an object which he knows to be unattainable, nor disgust by an unreasonable importunity the Power whose open and steady attachment is the only support of his credit under the accumulated misfortunes and disgraces which he has lately sustained.

When this point was discussed, I remarked to Sindia, that your Lordship considered his reputation and interest as but immaterially involved in the success of his views upon Indostan; that he was still in possession of acquisitions in it which added to his patrimonial territories could not fail, if properly managed, to give him such an ascendancy in the Maratha State as would place him in the most important light both in Europe and India; that his own prosperity most ultimately depend upon that of the Government of which he was so distinguished a member, and his true glory would consist in being a principal instrument in its preservation; that he could not be ignorant of the danger with which it is threatened from the restless ambition and formidable power of Tippoo, nor of the indispensable necessity of his assistance if it should be attacked by that Nabob; that your Lordship from motives of personal esteem as well as from a consideration of political connection wished to see him stand most conspicuous amongst the Maratha Chiefs in the defence of his country, and was desirous to promote his attainment of this honorable station by constituting him the mediator between your

Government and that of Poona, for forming such an engagement as may tend in certain circumstances to the security of both States by mutual stipulation.

Sindia expressed the highest degree of satisfaction at this mark of your Lordship's confidence in him and attention to his fame and welfare. He appeared to be fully sensible of the dangerous designs of Tippoo, and said that he was convinced that there could be no effectual security against them but in a firm alliance between the Company and the Peshwa. That he wished for nothing more ardently than to promote such an alliance and had repeatedly written to Poona to recommend it. I then explained to him the conditions upon which your Lordship is willing to execute a new treaty with the Government of Poona, for mutual support in case of either party being attacked by that Prince in confederacy with any European Power, and stated to him the obstacles which at present obstruct a less qualified engagement on our part, observing at the same time that this might be considered as preparatory to a more unreserved alliance whenever these obstacles may be removed; that our Government was ever on its guard against the power and designs of Tippoo, but by no means alarmed at either whilst unaided by the forces of a European Power, that if a war should take place in Europe, there could be little doubt that the French would join Tippoo; but of such an event there was no present appearance, and that we were never better prepared for it than now should it unexpectedly happen; that our army on the other side of India had been augmented to a very respectable force, which if called into action would be conducted by a general* of distinguished abilities and great experience from His Majesty's service, lately appointed to the Government of Bombay and command of the forces there, which were circumstances that would render success almost infallible whenever the state of affairs should admit and require the junction of our troops with those of the Marathas; that our object in such a union was simply self-preservation, and that our allies would reap the advantages of conquest.

This conversation seemed to make a strong impression on the mind of Sindia. He certainly wishes to recover his credit and influence at Poona, and due reflection upon his situation and prospects will point out to him that the only means left to effect it is steadily to pursue the object which your Lordship has recommended. I believe that he has little or no expectation of the continuance of his authority after the arrival of Ali Bahadur, which must naturally turn his attention to the security and good government of his original possessions as indispensable to his weight and consideration in the State. He cannot now be insensible to the superior value of these over the delusive appearances held out by his late station in the management of the King's authority.

Sindia has intelligence by *gasids* arrived from the Deccan, that they passed Ali Bahadur's camp twelve days since on this side of the Narbada. Sindia tells me that he has no letter from Ali Bahadur, but he endeavours

* Robert Abercromby.

to establish a belief of that Chief's being instructed to act under his orders ; but this is not probable from the superior rank and connection of the former and from the circumstances of his being attended by the Vakeels of all the Rajpoot Chiefs now in arms against Sindia, which indicates a power invested in him to accommodate their disputes.

I have learnt from a person of consideration at Sindia's Darbar that Ali Bahadur is restricted from making war in Indoostan, and is only to offer the services of the Maratha Govt. in the administration of the King's affairs, which if His Majesty should decline, he is to confine his operation to adjusting the tribute and other concerns with the Rajpoots & other Chiefs who have usually been subjected to the Maratha Power, & that he has not brought an army adequate in any degree to the purpose of re-establishing the Peshwa's authority in the King's affairs by force.

It is by no means improbable that Ali Bahadur may obtain the latter object by conciliation, as the King is highly disgusted with all the competitors whose insincerity and procrastinations have reduced him to severe distress, and I am informed by authority on which I can rely that His Majesty has serious thoughts of recalling Sindia. I do not however think that the re-establishment of the Patel is practicable under the universal dread and detestation of him which prevails amongst the Moguls.

Appa Bhyronath has just now brought me a message from Sindia that he has reflected much on the principal subject of my discourse at our last interview, and that the more he considers it the more important it appears. That he is so firmly convinced of the great security and other advantages which the Maratha State would derive from a mutual guarantee of territory between the Company and the Peshwa and of the honor and influence which he should acquire by being instrumental in effecting it, that he has come to a resolution to repair to Poona in person for that purpose, if it should be found necessary after the arrival of Ali Bahadur, on whom the charge of affairs in Indostan may safely devolve. To this declaration he added professions of entire devotion to the English nation and Government and the strongest conviction that a close alliance with it was indispensable to the very existence of the Maratha Power, and on which they must alone depend for future aggrandisement at the expense of a powerful and inveterate enemy.

Without placing much reliance on Sindia's profession of zeal for the honor and safety of his own Government, and of attachment to ours, I can trust for the sincerity of his intentions to less extravagant motives. His message is with me almost conclusive of the supercession of his authority by Ali Bahadur and his determination not to act in Indoostan in a subordinate station. Admitting this to be the case, the proposal which your Lordship has made of using his mediation for the conditional treaty is an honorable pretext for his retreat, and in fact the only road open to his former influence in the State and to the future exercise of it ; and I think your Lordship

may rely upon his best exertions towards effecting every object of your Government with that of the Marathas, since his interest seems to be so materially dependent upon the services which he may render to it.

204. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 26th Feby. 1788.

It may be material to give your Lordship the earliest intelligence of the Prince's having quitted Ghulam Qadir Khan in disgust and retired within the limits of the Vizier's dominions. I believe he has finally relinquished any further concern in the present troubles, and will again resort to the protection of your Lordship's and the Vizier's Governments.

Three days since Sindia, attended by the few troops remaining in his Camp with him but without taking his bazar, proceeded to the detachment under Rana Khan and other principal Commanders about 18 cos from hence, in the district of Kerowly. He acquainted me that he should return in four or five days. I understand the chief motive to this excursion is to consult with his most confidential officers upon the state of his affairs in Indostan, which are drawing to a crisis by the approach of Aly Bahadur. I have scarcely a doubt that the result will be a determination to return to the Deccan as soon as the authority of that Chief and the objects of it are publicly declared, as I believe it is nearly certain that both are of a nature to terminate Sindia's prospect of a return to the power and influence which he has lost.

The small force and slow progress of Aly Bahadur indicate a consciousness in the Poona ministry in their own weakness, and a resolution not to hazard further loss of reputation in enterprizes to which recent events must have taught them that they are unequal. Nor do they probably consider the recovery of their authority in Indostan an object of sufficient importance for the expenditure of their treasure or strength of the State, and will therefore refrain from any further attempts towards it unless the divisions and misconduct of their enemies should render it attainable without danger or expense.

I have no intelligence upon which I can rely of the advance which Aly Bahadur has made on his march. By the last certain account which I received of him he was on the northern bank of the Narhada, later reports say that he was near Ujjain; but these have not been confirmed. Sindia has neither the ability nor the inclination to engage in any measure of consequence until he can ascertain his real situation by the arrival of Aly Bahadur. The Rajpoots seem resolved to maintain the independency which they have lately acquired by the disasters of Sindia and to assert it against the whole force of the Maratha Government.

Sindia possibly expects that his presence in Rana Khan's camp will intimidate the Rajah of Kerowly into a compliance with his demands for

money, but I do not apprehend that he will seriously undertake the reduction of Kerowly in his present situation.

205. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 27th Feb. 1788.

I am honored with your commands of the 16th instant, and conformably thereto shall in future address directly to your Lordship every future requisition from Sindia of a political tendency.

I shall pay to Lieut. Stewart 100 Rupees monthly, in augmentation to the 160 Rupees allowed for the expences of his plans and surveys, as your Lordship has directed.

I have this morning received a request from Sindia to join him, with which I shall immediately comply. He declares his intention to undertake the entire reduction of the district of Kerowly, an enterprize apparently beyond his strength and of hazardous consequence, as the Rajah has collected a considerable force and is in possession of forts which may be maintained until succours can be received from the Rajah of Jaypore and Ismail Beg Khan, which Sindia knows they are disposed and able to afford. For these reasons I do not think Sindia seriously designs to attack Kerowly, he probably expects to intimidate the Rajah by his preparation into a compliance with his demand of money.

206. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 4th March 1788.

I have the honor to forward herewith an address from Mr. Malet received*by *qasids* in 19 days. This packet is accompanied by duplicate of a letter to your Lordship from Mr. Malet dated 3rd ultimo, which shall be despatched as soon as deciphered. The *qasids* passed Aly Bahadur's camp about 50 cos on this side of Poona. They report the force then collected to be very inconsiderable, not exceeding two thousand men and these much dissatisfied with the service. This force is intended to be augmented as it proceeds, but it is evident from its progress that the recovery of the Maratha power in Indostan is not the object of its destination.

Sindia must be completely convinced from this and numberless concurring circumstances, that the re-establishment of his affairs in this quarter is utterly impracticable, and that his total ruin will be the consequence of neglecting the more important interests in the Deccan. I am persuaded that he is resolved on his retreat, and that he only delays the execution of it until the *rabi* (spring harvest) collection of the districts still subject to him are secured. This resolution is likely to

SECTION 5

*Mahadji Sindhia renews contest for the Delhi Government.
Ghulam Qadir Khan's campaigns, atrocities, and
downfall. Mahadji finally gains supreme
control over the Emperor (1788.)*

208. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 21st March 1788.

The events which have lately taken place and which will have been detailed to your Lordship from the newspapers daily transmitted to Captain Kennaway have, in a considerable degree, revived the hopes of Sindia and encouraged him to adopt vigorous measures for the recovery of his authority in the affairs of Hindostan. He has detached a strong body of horse, with a battalion of infantry and artillery, across the Chambal, to the assistance of Ranjeet Sing, which promises to give to that Chief, who is entirely in the interest of Sindia, a decided superiority over Ismael Beg Khan, unless the latter should be supported by Ghulam Qadir Khan, which is a circumstance not very probable, as his force is fully occupied in the protection of his own possessions from the ravages of the Sikhs, and in guarding against the effects of the jealousy which he supposes the Vizier to entertain of his new acquisitions in the Doab. Neither does it appear that he would prefer Ismail Beg as his neighbour on this side of the Jamna, to Sindia or the Jats. His alliance, or his neutrality, are courted by all parties in the present state of the contest, and if his aim is only to preserve what he has acquired, he will adopt the last.

If Sindia, in conjunction with the Jats, should prove successful against Ismail Beg, I imagine that his prospects will be but little affected by any

issue of the dispute between the King and Najaf Quli Khan, and least by an accommodation of which there is now strong appearance. But at all events the step which he has now taken will prove decisive of his fortune, and his re-establishment or his final retreat must, in my opinion, speedily ensue. He talks of crossing the Chambal with the remainder of his army, but this will, I imagine, be determined by the success of the operations of his detachment.

It is confidently reported in Camp that Aly Bahadur is recalled to Poona, and at the instance of Sindia. As we have no intelligence of his approach I am inclined to believe the fact, tho' I cannot pretend to judge of the motive. But be the latter what it may, the delay of that Chief is doubtless an additional incentive to Sindia's exertions, as it removes his apprehension of supercession.

I observe that Mr. Malet, in his letter to your Lordship of the 3rd of February, ascribes partly the reserve of Nana Farnavees upon the proposed alliance to the expectation which Sindia's letter has raised of obtaining its accomplishment upon the minister's own terms, through my agency. For your Lordship's immediate satisfaction I can assure you, that all my discourse with Sindia upon this subject has been strictly conformable to your Lordship's instructions and views, and perfectly correspondent to Mr. Malet's negotiation. Sindia could not mistake either the conditions on which your Lordship was willing to enter into a new treaty with the Maratha Government, or the part which your Lordship was desirous to assign to him in promoting it; and, as he could not entertain the most distant idea of my being empowered to conclude it, I cannot think he would write to that effect, and expose himself to the consequences of having deceived the minister. It is however by no means improbable that he may have solicited powers from Poona for the conducting this negotiation with your Lordship, and have given hopes of facilitating its execution from his nearer situation to our Government. I am the more disposed to believe that he has not written to the purport which Mr. Malet has been informed, because, he assures me, that he has received no answer from Nana to his communication of what I imparted from your Lordship. From this and other circumstances, I am led to believe that most of the information which Mr. Malet has received, has been fabricated at Poona, with a view to obtain concessions from him by affecting to have other channels open for conducting the treaty to a conclusion.

If I am not mistaken, some kind of obligation, either expressed or implied, subsists on the part of our Government to communicate to Sindia its negotiations with the Maratha State. But without adverting to the obligation, the policy of such communication is sufficiently obvious, and has appeared so to your Lordship. I have had the honour repeatedly to give you my sentiments upon the apparent disposition of Sindia towards our Government, of which there is little cause to be suspicious, as it is

evidently founded on his interests, which, he is perfectly sensible, derive their best support from his connection with it, and the generous attention which [your] administration has shewn to him personally in the time of his distress, and I have the firmest confidence in his steady exertions at the Poona Durbar to promote such an alliance as your Lordship proposes with that Government, or to engage in a separate treaty to the same effect, whenever your Lordship shall judge that circumstances render it expedient to make propositions to him of such a nature.

209. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 26th March 1788.

I have earnestly desired for some days past to have an interview with Sindia, which he has postponed from day to day on various pretences. It was my wish to discover what resolution he had formed in case his attempt to succour the Jats should fail. It has failed, and I think irretrievably, by the defeat of his detachment, and by the arrival of Ghulam Qadir Khan at Agra, as the latter circumstance must convince him that the Chiefs of Indostan consider his expulsion as their first and indispensable object, and will unite to effect, as often as he makes an effort to recover his powers, whatever distrust and opposition may subsist amongst them upon other points; and he may now expect to be attacked on this side the Chambal, since the exertion which he has just made cannot fail to convince Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg Khan, of the absolute necessity of driving him entirely out of Indostan, before they can hope to establish their own power.

I am apprehensive that Sindia places some reliance on an accommodation with Ghulam Qadir Khan. The situation of the latter makes it not improbable that they may unite, but such an union is not likely to prove either sincere or effectual. The Shah since his reconciliation with Najaf Quli Khan, has determined on coming to Agra, and has actually commenced his march. His force is now superior to any in the field, and its direction is undoubtedly designed against Ghulam Qadir Khan, who has recently added injury to the insults which he formerly offered to the King, by withholding his Majesty's share of the conquests made in the Doab. To these causes for attacking Ghulam Qadir may be added the incentive of his being in possession of the most fertile, best cultivated and best secured portion of the territory which acknowledges the authority of the Shah, in which are the *jaidads* of many of his oldest and most faithful adherents, whom Ghulam Qadir has expelled, contrary to repeated engagements. Ghulam Qadir can hardly expect that Ismail Beg will support him in a war against the King, from whom Ismail Beg will easily obtain his views, which do not extend beyond the subahdary of Agra, and of whose designs he has always been suspicious; and although he

can have no better reason to trust to the intentions of Sindia, he is less jealous of his power, and more secure in this apparent necessity which Sindia has for some immediate support. Should such a connection ensue, it probably would not long protract the contest for the rule of these countries, but the consequences might be fatal to the influence and possessions of Sindia in the Deccan.

Whilst I am writing, intelligence is brought that Sindia's detachment has been forced to recross the Chambal. The Jat forces seem to have made no movement towards effecting a junction with it.

I hope to see Sindia to-morrow, and to learn his final resolution on the present state of his affairs. If your Lordship would be pleased to write to him, though only on a friendly or complimentary way, it would tend to support his consequence with the Maratha Government and to excite his zeal towards the attainment of your future views with that State.

210. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp at Nurabad (13 miles north of Gwalior), 2nd April 1788.

Sindia having expected to be attacked by Mirza Ismail Beg recommended it to me to retire to this place. I left him on the 28th ultimo. As Sindia evidently wished to decline the interview which I had desired before my departure from him, I did not press it upon him, knowing that the difficulties of his situation and the embarrassment of his mind, disqualified him for the discussion of any subjects which did not require his immediate attention.

It does not appear to me that the decision of the contest between Sindia and Ismail Beg is likely to be accelerated by the present vicinity of their armies, as the latter, by the sudden and unexpected departure of Ghulam Qadir Khan from Agra, has no means of protecting the country from which he draws his subsistence, against the Jat forces, if he should cross the Chambal, nor of subsisting his troops on this side whilst Sindia possesses the superiority in cavalry. I expected a speedy determination of the dispute when Ghulam Qadir Khan appeared on the banks of the Jamna, and had he remained steady in the support of Ismail Beg there can be little doubt that Sindia would have been soon compelled to relinquish his views in Indostan and retreat to the Deccan.

It is difficult to discover the cause of the abrupt retreat of Ghulam Qadir from Agra. Possibly he has been induced to it by the intelligence of designs meditating against him in the Shah's Durbar, which would render the reduction of Ferozabad an indispensable precaution; probably he has discovered on a nearer view the little chance which Sindia has of regaining any formidable degree of power, and may conceive his own security and interest to depend upon the equality of strength between the contending parties.

The King, has, I believe, little inclination and less ability to move from Delhi, his disappointments from the Indostan Chiefs and the consequent personal distresses which he has suffered makes him desirous of returning to a dependance on Sindia, and he publicly declares his intention to recall him ; but he will probably await the decided superiority of some one of the competitors, unless the intrigues of Himmat Bahadur should prevail over his natural indolence and irresolution, and engage him to take an active part. If this could be effected, the probable consequence would be the Shah's march to Agra and junction of his army with that of Ismail Beg, an event that would compel Sindia and Ghulam Qadir to unite for their mutual safety, although the union would last no longer than the danger. But in this situation the power of the parties would be nearly balanced and the issue of the dispute as indeterminate as at present.

Whilst these appearances last, there is little probability that Sindia will relinquish his object in Indostan.

211. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp at Nurabad, 10th April, 1788.

The juncture between Gulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg and the proceedings of Sindia's troops to the northward of the Chambal will have been detailed to your Lordship from the country intelligence. I wished to have had an interview with Sindia in consequence of these events that I might have informed you with more certainty of their probable effects on Sindia's views and resolutions ; but he has answered my request to that purpose by acquainting me that he is preparing to march as lightly equipped as possible, and wishes me to defer joining him until he shall give me notice that I may do it with convenience.

I do not now apprehend that degree of danger to Sindia from the alliance between his most formidable opponents which threatened him when that event was before likely to take place, as the combined force of the Jats and the detachment under Rana Khan will enable him to protract the contest and thereby probably to defeat the object of the alliance against him, which appears to be his immediate expulsion from Indostan. A union of longer duration than the hope of obtaining that object, is not likely to last between those chiefs who mutually distrust each other's views, connexions, and dispositions. This consideration, added to that of the unprotected state in which Ghulam Qadir Khan has left his possessions in the Doab, lead me to conjecture that their efforts will not be very strenuous or persevering, and that Sindia's prospects will suffer little by the alliance. The King undoubtedly prefers Sindia to

either of the other competitors, but he will wait the event and quietly reconcile himself to whoever shall be successful.

212. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 20th April 1788.

I have the honor to forward a packet received yesterday from Mr. Malet containing duplicates of his letters and intelligence to your Lordship under date 14th and 29th February last.

The *qasids* who brought this dispatch passed Aly Bahadur's camp at Burhanpore 16 days ago. His force consisted of about 8,000 cavalry; he was employed in raising money for the payment of his troops and the report of his Camp was that he would proceed into Indostan by the route of Bhupal. The *qasids* saw nothing of Holkar, but were informed that he was arrived at Chandore and that his destination was for Marwar.

I returned to this Camp on the 16th, and found no change in the resolution of Sindia to persist in the destructive pursuit of regaining his power, although, as I discover from his conversation, he has no other reliance for success, nor of averting the ruin which threatens him, than his expectation of dissensions between Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismael Beg. I do not observe any preparations for his retreat or security in case this reliance should fail; I therefore conclude that his intention is to retire to Gwalior and wait for succours from the Deccan, or until the course of events shall turn in his favor and enable him to renew his attempts. Ghulam Qadir Khan and his ally, will endeavour to bring the Jat force and Rana Khan to an immediate and decisive engagement; and should they be able to effect it, there can be little doubt of their obtaining the victory. Ranjeet Sing and the Marathas are equally averse to stake their fate upon a general action. They have but little confidence in each other, and there is strong reason to suspect the fidelity of Malik Mahomad Khan and other Mogul Commanders in the Jat service. They have also great advantage to expect from procrastination, which would possibly excite an invasion of Ghulam Qadir's possessions in the Doab, and compel him to recross the Jamna and disperse the troops of Ismael Beg, who have no prospect of subsistence but in speedy success.

Critical as the situation of Sindia is and has been for several months past, he has not made one creditable effort to relieve himself, but seems to trust entirely to the errors and misconduct of his enemies for the attainment of his object, without exposing himself to any hazard of expense. This confidence may prove false and fatal, for should the Jat force be now defeated, he would be inevitably ruined without the interposition of his own Government for his preservation, of which I believe he does not entertain the smallest expectation.

Whether Sindia actually relies on the defects i. e. the character of his enemies for the success of his object, or has devoted himself thro' pride and obstinacy, and whether he has been restrained by parsimony or precluded by poverty from using such means as would have ensured the accomplishment of his views, I cannot ascertain. But upon whatever principle or necessity he may have acted, it seems to have carried him beyond the power of retreat, and he must now either succeed or perish. If he has resources, it can scarcely be imagined that he will not draw them forth in the last extremity, and to that point he would be brought by the defeat of his troops with the Jats, and from hence, if that event should happen, his fate I think will be easily determined.

213. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

25th April 1788.

The troops of Sindia and Ranjit Sing have been totally defeated with the loss of almost all their artillery and ammunition. The particulars of the action are detailed in the papers of intelligence which Captain Kennaway will receive by this post. I apprehend that the dispersion of the troops and the submission of Ranjit Sing to the victors, Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg, will be the immediate consequences of this event.

Sindia has not yet given any indication of his intentions in consequence of this misfortune ; but I am told by those who know him best that it will not induce him to relinquish his object. I sincerely regret his perseverance in so desperate a pursuit, which threatens not only to deprive him of his remaining possessions in Indostan but to involve the loss of his authority and influence in the Maratha State, which alone afford any prospect of advantage to the Company from their alliance with him.

I am at a loss to conjecture upon what foundation he can still rest any hope of success. He must, I imagine, be convinced of the fallacy of depending upon assistance from any of the Chiefs of Hindostan. The decided superiority now established by Ghulam Qadir Khan, will deter them from any avowed opposition to his progress, and they are besides as little disposed to promote the power of Sindia as of his opponents. Neither is it to be expected that the latter will allow him leisure to form confederacies or excite opposition to their measures, but will immediately pursue their advantage and attack him on this side the Chambal. His prospect of succour from Aly Bahadur is too remote for the purpose of maintaining his ground against the present attempts of his enemies, and his own resources appear to be inadequate to that effect. He has, I believe, positively enjoined Ambajee to repair to him with his whole force from Malwa ; but this reinforcement can but little advance

his affairs or serve any other purposes than those of personal security to himself and depredation upon the defenceless part of the country. From all these considerations I am inclined to believe, notwithstanding the opinions of others and their better knowledge of his character, that he will retreat at least as far as Narwar, if not into Malwa, where [he will be] rejoined by the troops with Rana Khan, or reinforced by Ambajee. And altho' he will probably not abandon but with life his enterprize against Indostan, I think he will postpone it, until the retrieval of his affairs in the Deccan and the recovery of his credit at Poona may enable him to renew it with a fair prospect of success. I have no further intelligence of Aly Bahadur.

214. W. PALMER TO E. O. IVES.

1st May 1788.

The faujdar of Jhansi having advised Sindia that he shall immediately send to his assistance a body of horse, and proposed as the nearest route to effect their junction that they may pass over the Jamna at Jagannathpur into the Vizier's territories, Sindia has requested me to forward to His Excellency the enclosed letter of application for a passage thro' his dominions, for the purpose of facilitating the arrival of these troops. Their number may amount to four thousand.

It is with the less scruple that I forward this requisition that a favorable precedent for it exists in the permission granted for a passage to the detachment of Appa Candy Rao during the Residency of Mr. Anderson at this Durbar. I believe too that such permission is conformable to the practice established between friendly Powers both here and in Europe.

As this reinforcement is to proceed immediately, there is no time for reference to the Governor-General, which I should have made preferably to a direct application to the Vizier; I am however perfectly certain that the requisition is altogether unnecessary and that Sindia makes it merely to take away all pretext for failure from the faujdar, not placing the smallest reliance on the promised assistance.

215. E. O. IVES TO W. PALMER.

Lucknow, 5th May 1788.

I have received your favor of the 1st instant, and am truly sorry that my idea of Lord Cornwallis's wishes should again compel me to differ from one on whose opinion I should in general place the fullest confidence.

What may be the custom in Europe on similar occasions, I cannot take upon me to say; but it seems manifest that to allow of one party's

passing an army through the Vizier's territories and deny the same favour to another, would be shewing a partiality which it is the anxious desire of Government to avoid, and that to grant such a licence indiscriminately to all who may request it, would be subjecting His Excellency's dominions to many and great evils. With respect to the circumstances you have mentioned about Appa Candy Rao, I am not a sufficient master of the subject to judge whether it should serve as a precedent in a similar case ; but I understand it differed materially from the present instance, Appa Candy being on his retreat from a victorious enemy, whereas the troops to be supplied by the faujdar of Jhansi are to march for the express purpose of attacking Ghulam Qadir Khan.

In addition to the above arguments, which (as it appears to me) evince the impropriety of a compliance on the part of the Vizier, the minister does not think it can be necessary, since the route on the other side the Jamna is, he says, nearly if not equally, as expeditious as the route proposed.

I enclose you the Vizier's answer to Sindia to the same purpose as above.

216. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

2nd May 1788.

The forces of Sindia and Ranjeet Sing have made another feeble attempt to check the progress of Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismael Beg, in which they have been defeated and forced to retire under the walls of Bharatpore, but with little or no loss.

Raja Himmat Bahadur, Najaf Quli Khan, and the widow of Samroo are preparing to march with their respective troops and will doubtless join the victorious party. This accession of strength to the already decided superiority of his enemies and the insurrection of the zamindars on this side the Chambal, encouraged by his encreasing weakness, threaten instantly to overwhelm Sindia ; and I shall think him fortunate if he effects his retreat into the Deccan after the loss of all his possessions in Indostan. After such a series of losses and disgraces as he has sustained. I cannot suppose that he has had the means of obviating them, and I of course conclude that it is not in his power to avert their consequences. Yet he maintains a composure of mind, and perseverance of conduct, which in so alarming a situation it is difficult to account for, but may proceed from a secret reliance on his own resource or the support of the Maratha Government. A very few days will probably convince him of the fallacy of such expectations, which if he really entertains them, appear to have no better foundation than his own sanguine disposition.

217. E. O. IVES TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 4th May 1788.

I have hitherto delayed writing your Lordship on the subject of the engagements which have lately taken place between the combined forces of Ismael Beg and Ghulam Qadir Khan and the detachment from Sindhia's army under the command of Rayjee Patil, in the expectation that something decisive would have taken place before this.

After the engagement at Karauli, near Bharatpur, on the 15th of Rajab (or 23rd April), in which the Marathas were worsted with the loss of near 300 men and twelve pieces of cannon, nothing but skirmishes of no material consequence happened till the 23rd of Rajab (or the 1st instant), when the two armies were engaged at the time the advices which are just received came away.

The reason of my writing your Lordship on the subject at present is to inform you, that by secret intelligence from Delhi I find that the superiority gained by Ismael Beg and Ghulam Qadir Khan on the 23rd ultimo has caused great alarms to his Majesty and his family, and that serious apprehensions are entertained regarding the loyalty of these Chieftains, which has it is supposed been lately shaken by the interception of several letters from His Majesty to Sindhia, in consequence of which it is surmised that they have formed a design of raising the son of Meerza Ahmad (one of the children of the late King Mahommed Shah) to the throne. In consequence of this, there is reason to believe that in the event of Ghulam Qadir Khan's coming to the capital, as he has lately talked of, his Majesty has resolved to quit it, and after recommending his family to the care of the Nawab Nazir, who is himself a partizan of Ghulam Qadir Khan's, to take refuge in the Vizier's dominions and throw himself on his and your Lordship's protection.

I cannot pretend to say what may be the intention of Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismael Beg; but the repeated advices I have received, these three or four days past, leave me in little doubt but that such apprehensions as the above are entertained at the Durbar, and that his Majesty, though he may not have come to any decided resolution, has meditated the step abovementioned. I have therefore judged it my duty to apprize your Lordship of it, that I may, if you deem it necessary, be previously furnished with instructions for my guidance in such an event. Your Lordship's late answer to his Majesty's *shookah* ought doubtless to prevent him from taking the measure in question, and it might have been productive of some additional weight, had the Nawab Vizier's answer been, as I have frequently reminded the minister it ought to have been, dispatched likewise. But his Majesty's *shookahs*, from the first in which he proposed the Vizier's meeting him at Garh Mukteshwar, remain unreplyed to;

I have again repeated my advice for the answers to be prepared without delay, though I must at the same time observe that as the firm union subsisting between the Nawab Vizier and the Company is so well understood, I should hope that the official communication of your Lordship's sentiments must make the requisite impression on His Majesty even without the receipt of a similar answer from His Excellency.

P.S.—May 5th. I learn from advices received today that the engagement abovementioned produced nothing decisive; Rana Khan is said to have been wounded and Rayjee Patil to have been missing.

218. EARL CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR PALMER.

Calcutta, 16th May 1788.

I can say nothing new on the subject of my regret and surprize at Sindia's persevering to a degree which has the appearance of infatuation, in endeavouring to recover the power and influence which he has lost in the affairs of the Upper Provinces. But being neither called upon by our interest, nor by any stipulations, to take a concern in those convulsions, it is only important for us to conduct ourselves in such a manner as to preserve the character with all parties of having acted with dignity and impartiality.

You will receive notice in due time of the resolution that we may finally adopt, respecting the precise mode of carrying the object of Capt. Kennaway's mission [to Nawab Nizam Ali Khan] into execution, and you will be instructed to make a declaration to Sindia about the time that Mr. Malet will make a communication upon that head to the administration at Poona.

219. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Gwalior, 12th May 1788.

Sindia's hopes of success in his favorite pursuit seem to be somewhat revived by the perseverance of Ranjeet Sing, the arrival of a reinforcement from the Deccan, and the presence of Shah Nizam-ud-din, who has been the sole instigator of Ranjeet Sing's co-operation in the views of Sindia, and whose present object is to concert and settle with Sindia their future proceedings. He has produced a letter from the King, encouraging Sindia to renew his attempts for the recovery of his power and promising to support it by the sanction of his authority as soon as circumstances will admit of his declaring it with safety. I am assured by persons in my confidence who have perused the letter, that it is genuine, being in the King's own handwriting, with which they are well acquainted. But the sincerity of it is not so certain as its authenticity. There is however no doubt that the Shah would trust the charge of his Government and of his subsistence to Sindia rather than to any of his present competitors,

I do not think that Sindia's prospects are much improved by the favorable intentions of the Shah towards him, or the check which the Jats have given to the progress of his enemies. It may be expected that Ghulam Qadir Khan, alarmed as he is by the intrigues of Shah Nizam-ud-din, will, now that he is in the vicinity of Delhi, take immediate measures to secure the person of the King,—a step that will entirely frustrate the schemes of Sindia and his confederates and leave him no means of attaining his views but by superiority in arms. The extreme poverty of Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg, and consequent distress and discontent of their troops, promises greater effects for the interests of Sindia than his own efforts or the machinations of his emissaries. If the siege of Dig should be protracted until the rainy season, the troops of the besiegers will disperse, and Sindia may find leisure to continue his attempts for regaining admission into Delhi. This appears to me to be the only means by which there remains the smallest probability of his success, and even to this must be opposed the apparently invincible dread and aversion of the King's most confidential servants. I have frequently hinted to Sindia that I thought his project hopeless and ruinous, and this has been the undisguised opinion of several of his counsellors and most faithful adherents, but pride and obstinacy I suspect rather than hope, have determined him to persist to the last extremity.

It is reported at Sindia's Durbar that Aly Bahadur and Tuojee Holkar have joined their forces and marched towards Indoor, the Capital of Holkar's subahdary. If this is true, their object is evidently to conciliate the Rajpoot and other tributaries and to wait the decision of Sindia's contest or other circumstances for the re-establishment of the Maratha influence in Indostan. I learn from authority on which I can rely, that Sindia's authority will be superseded whenever Aly Bahadur is called upon to act in this quarter. Probably, the Poona administration from personal consideration or other motives may be willing to afford Sindia opportunity to retrieve his reputation and his affairs by his own efforts, but when these shall be decidedly insufficient, they will not scruple to divest him of an authority which he has exercised so unfortunately for the credit and interest of the State.

220. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Gwalior, 24th May 1788.

I have received two letters from the King, which appear to me of so important a nature as to render it my indispensable duty to communicate them to your Lordship, although my knowledge of your sentiments upon the requisition which they contain, leaves no room for doubt or hesitation on my part in the answers which I ought to give to His Majesty. To the

first, which urges me to repair immediately to the Presence, I have replied that my attendance in Sindhia's camp is necessary on account of the frequent discussions which arise from his particular and relative connection with our Government, and on account of my inability to undertake any negotiation in His Majesty's concerns that do not immediately affect the interests of the Company or the Vizier. I have not given so direct an answer to the latter, which solicits your Lordship's interposition to adjust the terms of Sindhia's reinstatement in the office and authority which he lately held, but have expressed my apprehension to the King that your Lordship will not think yourself authorized to use the smallest degree of interference in the settlement of His Majesty's administration, lest it should involve your Government ultimately in contests which you were enjoined to avoid; assuring him at the same time, that your Lordship personally entertains the most anxious desire to see his dignity and interests restored. I have thought it right to make my answer upon this subject thus general, because the expression made use of by the King and by the Nawab Nazir, to whose letter he refers, does not imply the guaranty or any responsibility annexed to the interposition solicited of your Lordship, though it may be understood and expected by the King, and I cannot pretend to say whether a simple mediation undertaken at the request of both parties, and involving no consequences to the public (admitting this to be the case), would be thought by your Lordship a deviation from your determined system or incompatible with the public interests.

I have not communicated the King's letters to Sindia, and shall observe an entire silence towards him upon the subject of them, until I have the honor to receive your Lordship's commands.

The views and characters of the several competitors for the administration of the King's authority are so intimately known to your Lordship that I shall not presume to trouble you with an opinion of the consequences which may be expected from the success of either. It is not probable that the Company or its allies will be soon or materially affected by any termination of the contest.

I do not think that Ghulam Qadir Khan will cross the Chambal, as is reported in the daily intelligence of his camp. The approach of the rains, the exposure of the countries on the north of that river and the Jamna, and the check given to all his operations by the large body of Sindhia's cavalry, and the distress to which his troops are reduced for provisions, seem to render the enterprize impracticable. His real design is probably to gain Agra, where he may secure supplies from the Doab, and reduce the fort, which appears to be the only undertaking from which he can promise himself success.

The enclosed paper of intelligence from Dehli I have received from my agent with the King; it is corroborated by various accounts from other

places. There can be no doubt of the King's suspicions from the precautions which he is actually taking. But it does not appear that they are well founded, as it does not appear that Samroo's widow would reap any considerable advantage from a revolution, nor that those of the royal family who it is said have bribed her to depose the King, have wealth adequate to the purpose, or even if they had, would risk it on so uncertain an event.

I am told by Sindia's wakil that Ali Bahadur is arrived at Ujjain and intends to proceed into Hindustan without further delay. Holkar it is said, is gone to Indor. This report is not improbable, as from every fact I can collect, the Maratha Government seems determined not to relinquish their influence in the King's affairs, though like Sindhia they are not willing to be at much expense for the recovery of it, and trust for success to the division and misconduct of their opponents, rather than to their own exertions.

Samroo's Begam has called in all her troops from jagirs ; and it is said by several, that after the arrival of her troops she will petition the King to examine the returns and to allow jagirs and specie accordingly ; otherwise she will repair elsewhere with her army. Other reports are, that she will raise a dispute with His Majesty and take the amount of the *tankhas* which was agreed upon. Another account says that His Majesty's sister has entered into a negociation with Samroo's Begam and has promised several lacs of rupees to make her husband King and to dethrone the present King. His Majesty has become acquainted with these particulars, and has called in his troops which were stationed in different places. He sent Ahmad Ali Khan yesterday to bring Himmat Bahadur, and orders have been issued to the zamindars of Ballamgarh, Bahadurgarh, Najafgarh, and other mahals in the environs, to be in readiness to attend immediately when ordered. His Majesty wants to poison the husband of his sister. Preparations for war are privately going on in the Begam's army, and they are also in agitation in the royal fort. It is also known that Najaf Quli Khan has sent bills for lacs of rupees, on the part of Row Rajah, to His Majesty, thro' Samroo's Begam, who is desirous to take herself 45,000 Rupees on account of *tankhas* for 3 months from the bills. His Majesty does not agree to, and consequently a difference has taken place between them. Whatever shall be known to be (*sic*) from these reports shall be represented.

221. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Gwalior, 2nd June 1788.

I have been honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 16th. Sensible of the advantages which the Company may derive from their connection with Sindia in any future emergency, should he retrieve his

affairs and recover his influence in the Deccan, I have endeavoured to attach him to your Lordship's Government by convincing him of your disposition to grant any indulgence he might require, that should not be inconsistent with the neutrality required by justice and prescribed by authority; and in this view I have been induced to prefer his requisitions, trusting that it would be more agreeable to your Lordship to assign reasons for declining a compliance, than to preclude him from making them by my refusal to receive them. If I may judge from his personal deportment, he is satisfied of the justice and expediency of that guarded conduct observed by both Governments in the contests of the Upper Provinces, and has expressed no dissatisfaction when it has operated to the disappointment of his expectations. He has not even complained of the refuge which has been given to the family of Umrao-gir in the Vizier's dominions since the capture of that Chief, who have openly resided at Etawa and sold their effects at public outcry, notwithstanding His Excellency's proclamation still in force against Umrao-gir and his brother Himmat Bahadur; and since the escape of the former, Sindia has been contented merely to request that he may not find an asylum and the means of giving him further disturbance under the Vizier's authority.

I hope that this moderation in Sindia proceeds from the conviction of the benefits of his alliance with the Company, and that it will actuate his conduct in more important concerns if our Government should ever have occasion for his co-operation. In fact he does not hesitate to acknowledge this conviction and to declare it his firm purpose to act in concert with us whenever he shall be called upon, but I fear that he will exhaust in a fruitless and degrading competition the influence, strength and resources on which depend his utility to the Company.

The operations of the contending parties in the field are likely to be suspended by the approaching rains, before any material events can take place except the capture of Agra, which will probably soon surrender for want of provision.

The *qasids* who brought the accompanying dispatch left Aly Bahadur on the banks of the Narbada, whence there was no appearance of his moving before the rains. I understand that the principal impediment to his progress has been the same [? famine] which has raged in the Deccan, and from which his detachment has suffered severely.

I have no doubt that the Maratha Government will, as soon as in a proper situation, make a serious attempt to recover its influence and authority in Indostan, and there is little appearance of any effectual opposition to such a Power as theirs. Sindia seems to be as averse to this attempt as to the progress of his avowed enemies.

I am sorry to learn that the Shah complains without reserve of being abandoned by the English and the Vizier, as if he had a right by treaty to

demand their assistance. He has called for the treaties formerly made with the Company and the Vizier, with an intent, I imagine, to urge their existing force and validity. But as this point has received the most explicit decision of successive Governments there can be no room for further discussion, and I have directed my vakeel at His Majesty's Durbar to decline forwarding any representation or remonstrances upon the subject, until I can be apprised of your Lordship's pleasure upon receiving or rejecting them.

222. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Gwalior, 11th June 1788.

Sindia's troops on the north side of the Chambal have lately been unusually alert and not without some degree of success, as your Lordship will have observed from the country intelligence. His views however can be but little advanced by these small checks given to the progress of his enemies. It is reported that Ghulam Qadir Khan and Mirza Ismael Beg have marched from Agra to attack Rana Khan and the Jats. But an action is not likely to be decisive of any material consequences, unless the latter should prove victorious, which is very improbable.

A strong detachment of Sindia's best cavalry have entered the new territories of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the Doab, and he has sent a considerable force to oppose them. If the Marathas should be defeated there, they have no way open to retreat but thro' the Vizier's dominions. It is therefore probable that Sindia will apply for their being permitted to retire by the route of Shikohabad and Etawa in case of necessity. I could wish to be prepared to answer such a requisition by being previously honoured with your Lordship's commands upon it.

223. TRANSLATION OF A LETTER RECEIVED BY BHAGWANT ROW, AND DELIVERED TO THE CALCUTTA COUNCIL.

16th July 1788.

Rana Khan, Royjee Pateel, Jeova Dada Bakshy, Baboojee Janardan, and other Chiefs, with De Boigne's battalion and Monsr Lesteneau with the artillery, went under the command of Rana Khan to engage Ismail Beg Khan, who was near Agra, from whence our army was encamped about 5 cos. They marched with every necessary for war, and an engagement took place on the 13th Ramzan [Tuesday, 17 June] from day-break until noon, a severe battle continued with the artillery so hot that there was not a twinkling of the eye lost. At length Rana Khan divided his army into four, and carried on the engagement on all sides. Ismael Beg Khan's battalions were cut to pieces and his artillery taken. Ismael

Beg, accompanied by 10 or 20 men, crossed the Jamna and went to Gulam Qadir Khan. His whole army was defeated and fled, and were plundered. Our army was inclined to cross the Jamna at that time, but in consequence of the depth of the water they were searching for a ford, where they crossed in the course of 4 or 5 days. Boat-bridges are built at Mathura. Troops will have crossed there also and marched into Ghulam Qadir Khan's country in the Doab. Ghulam Qadir Khan is at Aligarh. Ismail Beg first went to Shikohabad, and it is now said he has joined Ghulam Qadir Khan. About 100 pieces of cannon, 13 elephants and the *top-khana* with the plunder, has been received by Sindia's people; camels, horses, and other articles without number. You will conceive, by the help of God, that Ghulam Qadir Khan will be punished, as Ismail Beg has been for his conduct. The Maharajah has written to the Governor-General thro' Major Palmer, and all the particulars have been written him, but you must represent these matters also. The Maharajah will cross the Chambal in a day or two. He will march first to Mathura and halt there. Ali Bahadur is arrived at Dhar, and Tukoji Holkar is arrived at Indore. They will shortly arrive.

224. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 9th July 1788.

In fact Sindia seems to regard the continuation of his alliance with the Company and harmony with its administration as objects of the first importance to his credit and interest, and frequently and publicly avows the obligations which he has to them. I ardently wish that this disposition could be directed to the public advantage by such an effectual and durable security to the Vizier's western frontier as might in any emergency admit of your Lordship's applying the whole strength of the Company against an enemy in his own territories.

There seems to be no obstacle to Sindia's immediate recovery of his authority under the Shah, but the distrust of His Majesty's principal servants and Commanders, which he is endeavouring to remove by offers of security and provision under the most solemn engagement. I doubt, however, whether these will prove effectual, although the attachment of the Chiefs to the cause of Ghulam Qadir Khan has I believe no other foundation than their dread of Sindia and is much weakened by the misconduct and imbecility which he has shewn since the defeat of Ismael Beg.

If I am well informed, Sindia has taken the resolution to adopt a very different line of conduct from that he pursued when lately in power. It is his intention, I am told, to put Ranjeet Sing on this side the Jamna and other principal zamindars in the Doab in possession of all the country not appropriated to the King's subsistence or in *jaidads* to his Sardars. His

view in this arrangement is rather to defeat the expectation of the Poona Durbar and obviate the temptation to supersede his authority, than to a system of moderation and the prosperity of the country. His known capacity makes it probable that he will resume the collections whenever his power shall be fully confirmed or his apprehensions cease. But should he act with that good faith and forbearance which he professes, he may establish his administration over these provinces under sanction of the King's authority on the most permanent basis, and form an effectual barrier to the Vizier's and the Company's dominions against any attack from the westward.

The King, having declared for Sindia's restoration to authority and required him to repair to the presence, will probably expect and desire that I should now wait upon him, and my compliance will I believe be agreeable to and wished for by Sindia, lest the King should be displeased by my refusal and impute it to him. I wish to obtain your Lordship's approbation of my waiting upon the King before Sindia's formal reinstatement in his office, but shall not think it justifiable to refuse this mark of respect should it be required with earnestness.

225. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp at Muttra, 19th July 1788.

I have been honoured with your commands of the 27th ultimo, and shall by every conciliatory means in my power endeavour to prevent any further requisitions from Sindia, which may subject your Lordship or the Vizier, to the embarrassment of an improper compliance, or to the appearance of unkindness towards an ally and friend. And should the occasion recur which induced the last application, I hope to convince Sindia that a previous consent to it is incompatible with the neutrality professed by the Vizier and with the tranquillity of his dominions; and at the same time shall in general terms assure him of a sincere disposition in both Governments to shew him every attention consistent with the principles of justice in the exercise of the offices of humanity, hospitality and friendship.

I arrived at this Camp yesterday and purposed visiting Sindia this morning, but he has excused himself on account of the necessity he is under to determine instantly his measures in consequence of Ghulam Qadir Khan having got possession of Delhi and of the King's person. I am informed that he has resolved to march immediately and put his fortune upon the issue of a battle. He has engaged the widow of Sanroo to join him, and part of her troops are already with those which he has detached toward Delhi. His success depends principally upon dispatch. Delay will afford the leisure and means to his enemies of increasing their force by the plunder of Delhi and of the Shah. The wanton insolence with which

Ghulam Qadir Khan has treated the King since he has fallen into his power, leaves but little reason to expect that either the property, the office, or even the life of His Majesty will be spared.

Sindia seems to have committed a great error in not proceeding to Delhi on the King's invitation and while the reputation of his victory over Ismael Beg had thrown his enemies into consternation and dismay. He has shewn a coolness to the advances made by the King for which it is difficult to find any solid arguments. The most probable conjectures which I can form of his motives, are his parsimony, his apprehension of treachery from the Mogul Sardars, or his desire to drive them into it, in order to elude the cessions which he had agreed to make to them. But whatever have been his real views, he appears to be sensible that he has risked too great a sacrifice for the attainment of them. He may find it a work of time and difficulty to repair his mistake, but he possesses advantages over his enemies in his pecuniary resources and in the fidelity and attachment of his troops, which if prudently applied cannot fail to predominate in the end.

226. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Muttra, 25th July 1788.

Since I had the honor to address you on the 19th instant, I have had an interview with Sindia. He was sufficiently open and communicative on his own affairs to convince me that he has no serious intention to risk a final decision of the contest for the administration of the King's Government, but means to rely on his usual system of procrastination and intrigue to produce from the discordant association of his enemies the attainment of his object without much hazard or expense.

Neither the pressing invitations of the King and the firm opposition which His Majesty has shewn to Ghulam Qadir, nor the engagements of the Mogul Sardars, have been sufficient to persuade him of their sincerity or good faith, and this distrust has induced him to delay the assistance required until the King has been compelled to an accommodation with his enemies, and to yield to their demand of the residence of Mirza Sulaiman Shiko in their Camp. The presence of this Prince will give weight to their cause, and proportionately diminish the influence of Sindia, who under this circumstance will appear to act against the royal authority. Their force is already superior to his, and is daily increasing. If they make an early and judicious application of it, he will find it difficult to remain on this side the Chambal, and must for the present suspend any further attempt to recover his power. But the Mogul Chiefs are far from being sincere in their support of Ghulam Qadir, and have joined him on no other motive than their greater and more immediate apprehensions of Sindia. It is from their jealousy of his power that he has been prevented

from executing his designs against the King, and His Majesty's personal safety has been secured, and they will abandon him as soon as their fears of Sindia's success shall subside. This is the event on which the latter seems to place his sole reliance, without reflecting that his own ruin may precede it, and without having yet adopted any measures to avert the fatal consequences which threaten him from the accumulating strength of his enemies and the disheartened and discontented state of his own troops. Those which he has detached to oppose Ghulam Qadir and Ismael Beg are in no condition to resist an attack, and I expect hourly to hear of their retreat, in which case Sindia must either retire across the Chambal or under the walls of Bharatpur.

His neglect to seize the advantages which offered after his success against Ismael Beg, has given that Chief and Ghulam Qadir time to recover themselves, and this they have so well effected that nothing now but their own misconduct can prevent his regaining an ascendancy in the affairs of Indostan.

If I had not seen several instances of Sindia's escape from dangers that seemed insurmountable, I should now conclude his destruction inevitable. But the mistakes and dissensions of his enemies and his own address may again extricate him, and he no doubt expects that they will, since he shews little or no uneasiness or embarrassment from the unfavourable aspect of his situation.

I believe he is more perplexed by the proceedings of Aly Bahadur, who has adjusted the contributions of the Rajpoots in the neighbourhood of Malwa to the Maratha Government, and has thereby superseded the authority with which Sindia has been hitherto invested, and who is yet ignorant of the extent of this supersession.

These provinces are threatened with a failure of the periodical rains, a calamity which will be insupportable to the inhabitants already harassed and exhausted by war and rapine.

227. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 2nd August 1788.

I think it proper to advise your Lordship of intelligence this instant arrived from Dehli of the King's having been compelled to deliver up the fort to the troops of Ghulam Qadir Khan and Mirza Ismael Beg. By this surrender His Majesty is left entirely at the mercy of those Chiefs; and as he is supposed to possess considerable property in money and jewels, it is much to be feared that he will be exposed to personal rigors and indignities to extort it from him by men so needy, rapacious and unprincipled and who have shewn the most shameless disregard to their engagements, and oaths recently given for the security of His Majesty and

the inhabitants of the city in their persons and effects, under the most formal solemnities of the Mahomadan religion.

I have also received private information that Ghulam Qadir Khan has proposed to invest Ismael Beg with the *Vizarat*, but that the latter had declined to accept it until their affairs shall be in a more prosperous train.

Sindia appears seriously to expect the arrival of Aly Bahadur and Holkar in Indostan, and his apprehension of being superseded in authority is probably the true cause of the delay and irresolution which he has shewn in the most critical and favourable conjuncture which has yet offered for the recovery of his power. The opposition of interests the dissensions and distrust which prevail amongst the Indostany leaders make it probable that no decisive event will take place before the arrival of the Deccan army, in which case there can be little doubt of the re-establishment of the Maratha influence.

228. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 3 August 1788.

Late last night I received the enclosed intelligence from my agent at the King's Durbar of Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismael Beg having deposed Shah Alam and raised to the *masnad* Mirza Bedar Bakht, the son of Ahmad Shah and grandson of Mahomad Shah. The news-papers which accompanied this intelligence mention that Ismael Beg disapproved of the successor and wished to have preferred Mirza Sulaiman Shiko, that on this account he had retired to his camp in disgust and was preparing to support his choice by arms.

It is not easy to conjecture the consequences of this revolution, but if Ghulam Qadir has acquired by it the treasure and effects which are reported to have been in the old King's possession, he will probably maintain the ascendancy which it has given him.

Copy of a Paper of Intelligence transmitted to the Resident Major Palmer.

Received at Calcutta, 14 Aug. 1788.

I yesterday had the honor to represent the state of affairs till 4 o'clock p.m. Today, Friday the 27th Showal (1st August), about 9 o'clock in the morning he placed Mirza Bedar Bakht, the son of Ahmad Shah deceased, upon the imperial throne and threw Shah Alam into confinement. At present the fort is in the hands of the Rohilas, and no one is permitted to go in, nor can any one that is within come out. The name of the new King is Jahan Shah. It is said that the King Jahan Shah will go at noon to the Jama Masjeed to perform the Friday prayers and return thanks to God, that he had thrown Mirza Solyman Shiko into a covered litter, brought him from the army, and confined him in the *salateen*. With

respect to Shah Alam there are many reports ; some people say he had deprived him of his sight, some that he has confined him in the *salateen*,* and some that he has probably put him to death ; but hitherto there has been no certain account. I will write what certain account I may learn. The two Chiefs are in attendance on Jahan Shah. The deposed King's effects are seized. This morning prior to these events, Shah Alam agreed to give these Chiefs 21 lacs of Rupees, but as the royal confidence was destroyed, and the day before yesterday several *shukkas* addressed to Sindia, Umrao-Gir and Himmat Bahadur were intercepted and brought to Ghulam Qadir Khan, he therefore determined to depose him. People say that a large sum of money has been discovered, and that seven lacs of Rupees were found in one place. I will write you what I learn and obey such orders as you may give me. Seetal Das is under close confinement, and the Nawab Nazir closely watched.

Translate of extracts from Delhi news-papers.

Received at Calcutta, 13th August 1788.

31 July.—From the news-papers presented to the King it appeared, that Sindia had made offers to the Rajah of Jodhpore, who in consequence had written to the Rajah of Jaynagar, but the latter, unwilling to leave the credit of any accommodation in the hands of the Jodhpore Rajah, had declared his mistrust of Sindia, and with a view of forcing him to enter into negotiations with himself had ordered troops to his frontiers with the apparent intention of assisting Ismail Beg Khan. Sindia is engaged in collecting money for his troops and negotiating with Samroo's Begam, and there is an apparent disagreement between Sindia and Rajah Ranjeet Sing, who is carrying on a correspondence with Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir Khan. Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir Khan are not upon good terms of friendship from the impetuous temper they both possess.

The Sikhs negotiate with both parties and receive and write letters to each of the same purport. Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg Khan having procured *shukkas* from the King addressed to all the Chiefs round about, informing them of the march of Sulaiman Shiko with the confederate Chiefs and desiring them all to join to expel Sindia, wish also to accompany these *shukkas* with others under the seal of Sulaiman Shiko to the same purport, which they send with presents to each Chief. They confine every person suspected of wealth in the city of Delhi, to extort money. On hearing this, the King sends for their vakeels and remonstrates upon such breach of engagements.

1st August.—The state of alarm of the whole city is represented in the flight of many, and many sheltering themselves in the fort. The King sends Matlab Khan to Ismail Beg Khan, desiring him to prevent Ghulam

*Quarters set apart in the Delhi fort for the grandsons of former Emperors, who were kept like prisoners.

Qadir from these oppressions, and to persuade him to come to the royal Presence. Matlab Khan accompanied Ismail Beg to Ghulam Qadir Khan, and the news-papers of his Durbar presented to his Majesty mention as follows : When Matlab Khan had had a long conversation with Ghulam Qadir Khan, the latter said, " We have no money for our troops, nothing is collected from the lands ; the King prevents us from taking from the inhabitants of the town [while] Rajah Himmat Bahadur was permitted. If His Majesty wishes the peace of Dehli, let him give me ten lacs of Rupees, or I will take what I can get." Long conversation passed ; at length Matlab Khan informed him that His Majesty sent for him. Ghulam Qadir Khan ordered his equipage and 10,000 armed men to accompany it. Matlab Khan on seeing this said, " His Majesty is now at rest, this is not a proper time to go ". But they both persisted and went to the fort. When his Majesty heard they were arrived in the fort, he sent for Ismail Beg and ordered the Nawab Nazir to bring Ghulam Qadir Khan. He declined going, until Ismail Beg came by his Majesty's order to fetch him, when he suddenly made his appearance. It was then reported that two Frenchmen in Ghulam Qadir Khan's service were drawing a plan of the fort and Maniar Singh, etc., also in his service, were armed on the outside of the Fort and all his army in readiness. When the King heard this, he ordered his own battalions to be in readiness. They accordingly armed, shut the gates. While Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg with Nawab Nazir held a consultation within, Ray Sital Das carried several messages backwards and forwards to the King from them ; at length Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg Khan posted themselves at a gate of the fort, opened them, and called in Maniar Singh's troops, and engaged themselves in making their own arrangements in the fort. The King's troops reported themselves in readiness, but the Nawab Nazir said there was now no necessity to be so, for Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg had made their own arrangements. The confederate Chiefs sent the King's troops and those of Nawab Nazir to their Camp ; the two Nawabs staid in the *tasbih-khanah* (prayer-room), and held a consultation with the Nawab Nazir, whom they repeatedly sent to the King to demand money. The King replied, " If he had any money, matters should not have come to this ; let them take what money they can find. It is now night ; so let them do what they mean to do towards us without delay ". Ismail Beg went to his tent and Ghulam Qadir Khan staid all night in the fort keeping Nawab Nazir with him. The King was in his sleeping apartments. During the night Ghulam Qadir Khan determined on Mirza Bedar Bakht, son of Ahmad Shah and grandson of Mahomad Shah. In the morning, 2nd August, Ismail Beg returned to the fort and held a consultation with Ghulam Qadir Khan. They both sent for Mirza Bedar Bakht and placed him on the throne, presented their *nazars*, and ordered the rejoicings to be made in the town. They then sent to Malika Zamani Saheba, the Begam of Mahomad

Shah, requesting she would come into the fort ; and going into the King's sleeping apartments, took from him his sword and target and such jewels as he had, when they sent him with Akbar Shah (the eldest Prince) and 17 other Princes to the places where the *salateen* are kept, called Asad-burj, and then sent [for] Sulaiman Shiko who was in the Camp. They then consulted what places they should dig in search of money. The Rohilas entered the Zanana Mahal to plunder it. When Matlab Khan heard this, he went to Ghulam Qadir Khan about it, who seizing him by the beard said, he had no business with these matters. Upon this, Matlab Khan became angry, said there was no appearance of rebellion in the fort, that he would fortify himself in his own residence, and went away. Ghulam Qadir Khan with 3,000 men he had in the fort, went to his tent, accompanied by the people of the fort, and prepared for war. He comforted Mirza Sulaiman Shiko and sent a message to all the Mogul Chiefs resident in Delhi to arm themselves and come to him. They have many of them joined him ; and keeping about 30,000 [p 3,000] Rohilas with him in the fort he has ordered the rest to camp, where he is preparing to go himself. The Nawab Nazir is in Moti mahal and Seetal Das in the Shah burj under charge of Rohilas, Himmat Bahadur is at Faridabad, and Samroo's Begam in Sindia's camp. The troops of Najaf [Quli] have deserted him and joined Ismail Beg Khan.

229. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 4th August 1788.

Your Lordship will be fully informed by the country intelligence which I have received this day and forward by this post of the further proceedings of Ghulam Qadir Khan and the state of affairs at Delhi.

I do not expect that the misunderstanding between Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg will be productive of hostilities or be of any continuance. The former has obtained such a superiority by the possession of the fort and the acquisition of the treasures of the unfortunate Shah Alam, that Ismail Beg and the Moguls will be unable to oppose him, unless they join with Sindia, which is very improbable. They will therefore submit to any tolerable accommodation, and as their defection at this critical time would be attended with great danger to Ghulam Qadir, he will no doubt make some concessions to retain them.

This revolution in the Empire is of such importance to the prospects of Sindia in Indostan, that it will, if anything can, excite some determination and vigor in his councils and operations. But I still doubt both his inclination and ability, to retrieve by any spirited exertions the advantages which he has lost by his hesitation and timidity ; and expect that he will continue to wait the consequences which are likely to be produced by the mutual enmity and distrust which subsist between the

Moguls and Afghans ; and indeed this conduct appears to be the most prudent he can adopt, against an enemy at present greatly superior to him in force. A disjunction of their confederacy, or the arrival of Aly Bahadur, would give a favorable turn to the Maratha interests in these commotions ; and one, or both of these events, appears to be at no great distance. .

I had determined, upon the first intelligence of Shah Alam's being deposed, to recall my agent from Dehli, but reflecting that such a step might be construed as declaratory of your Lordship's sentiments of a revolution in which you may determine to take no concern, I have directed him for the present to remain there, but totally to refrain from any kind of political intercourse with the new Government, and, if called upon to that effect, to declare that my commission was exclusively to Shah Alam and expired of course with his authority, and that I must wait for new instructions from your Lordship before I can enter upon business with a new sovereign. I have permitted him as a mere individual to pay his compliments at the Durbar, if it should be required, and if he is apprehensive that his refusal may expose him to injury or insult.

Your Lordship is so intimately acquainted with the circumstances of the present revolution, the situation of the existing descendants of Timur and of their rights, power and authority, that I shall not presume to offer any opinion on the future connection of your Government with the casual sovereign of Indostan. In fact, the dominion of the House of Timur no longer exists, but is a mere pageant held up to preserve appearances and delude the prejudices of mankind, in order to serve the purposes of any successful usurper of the authority and possessions of the Empire.

229A. EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G., TO W. PALMER.

Calcutta, 16th August 1788.

I have received your letters dated 2nd, 3rd and 4th instant.

I approve of the orders which you have given to your agent at Delhi, and have at present no further instructions to transmit to you on that subject.

I do not think that, under our present orders from the Court of Directors and the existing acts of Parliament, we should be justified by the late violent proceedings of Ghulam Qadir Khan in interfering in the disturbances of the Upper Provinces, nor do I see that we are called upon to do it either by motives of honor, or interest or even of humanity.

The unfortunate Shah has been long since in fact deposed without power, money, or troops. He has been a wretch'd pageant in the hands of the Prince or State which happened at the time to be the most powerful of his neighbours. If we should now free him from Ghulam Qadir Khan, unless we could give him an army and a permanent fund for the payment

of it, he would immediately again become the slave and perhaps the prisoner of some other tyrant.

I have signified to the widows and children of the late Prince Jahandar Shah, that they may remain under our protection at Benares during the present unhappy situation of their family.

230. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 15th August 1788.

I have been honored with your Lordship's commands of the 21st ulto., enclosing an answer to Sindia's notification of his victory over Ismael Beg Khan.

The recovery of Sindia's power after that successful action was so obvious and easy, that it is extremely difficult to reconcile his total neglect of the means with the object which he professes so strong a desire to attain. Whatever may be his real motives for a conduct so apparently inconsistent, I think they cannot much longer remain a mystery, as the approach of Aly Bahadur and Holkar appears to be now certain, and their arrival will finally decide the part which he will be either permitted, or of himself determined to take, in the affairs of Indostan. It has probably proceeded from his expectation of the junction of these Chiefs and his uncertainty of the stability of his present authority, that he has avoided every measure that might expose him to risk or expense at a conjuncture which required his most liberal and vigorous exertions.

It is generally understood and acknowledged by Sindia's confidential servants, that the superiority of rank and command will be vested in Aly Bahadur. In this case, I am persuaded that Sindia will not remain in Indostan. And as it is asserted that the former comes only at his earnest entreaty, I am induced to believe that he is desirous of disengaging himself from a pursuit in which his success would not compensate the expense of it, and from which he may yet retreat with some credit by leaving the pretensions of the Maratha State unrelinquished to his successor; and it has probably been from an unwillingness to impair their claims that he has rejected the proposals of Mirza Ismael Beg which stipulated for a cession of *jaidads* in the Doab.

If, contrary to expectation, the authority of the Poona Government should remain with Sindia, its influence is not likely to meet with any effectual or lasting opposition from so ill-formed a confederacy as that between Ismael Beg and Ghulam Qadir Khan.

Ghulam Qadir has been so solely intent upon plunder since the revolution which he effected, that I am almost convinced that he had no object in deposing Shah 'Alam but the possession of his wealth, and as the advantages of supporting a King, who by thirty years' indisputed

possession of the throne, had established in the minds of the people a reverence for his authority and an attachment to his person and family, were manifestly greater than could be derived from a Prince born and bred in a prison, indigent and unknown, and whose elevation could in general be considered as a usurpation, and certainly would be contested as such,—I expected that he would have restored the old King, until news arrived of the inhuman treatment to which he has subjected that unhappy Prince, from no motive of policy or self security, but from vengeance and disappointed avarice. It is however still doubtful whether he will support the King whom he has created. His immediate object is the further acquisition of treasure, by the plunder of Malika Zamani and Sahiba Mahal, the wives of Mahomad Shah. Their wealth is reported to be great, and he hopes to attain a possession of it by their apprehensions for the safety of the new King, their grandson, who will experience as little consideration and humanity as has been shewn towards his predecessor, if the property is not disclosed and given up. When Ghulam Qadir shall have effected this purpose, he will probably dismiss Bedar Bakht and place one of Shah Alam's sons on the throne, in the hope of diminishing the general execration in which he is conscious he shall be held for his cruelty to the father, and to remove all pretext from those who may be inclined to assert the right of Shah Alam.

I do not expect that an action between Sindia and the confederates will soon ensue. It is evidently the interest of the former to delay it: and the latter have I believe devoted the city of Delhi to pillage, before they leave the booty in it to the chance of a battle.

Upon the whole, it appears to me nearly certain, that the contest will terminate in the re-establishment of the Maratha Power in Indostan and the restoration of the family of Shah Alam to the throne, if no other Powers than those at present engaged should take a part in the controversy.

I shall be happy if these observations and conjectures have a tendency to facilitate any measures which your Lordship may have in contemplation; at the same time I am sensible that little reliance can be placed upon any judgment formed of men who have no steady principle of action or scarcely a determinable object, but are influenced by sudden and momentary impulses of passion and caprice to deviate from the plain line of their interest and security.

231. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 25th August 1788.

I have the honour to forward herewith duplicate of Mr. Malet's letters to your Lordship, dated 15th June and 6th of July, of which and their enclosures I have taken copies, and shall regulate my proceedings by

them in any instances to which they may apply in my negotiations with Sindia.

Appa Bhyronath came from Camp some days since, expressly upon the subject of the enclosed letter to your Lordship, and a similar application to the Vizier, to explain to me the nature and extent of the aid which Sindia solicits from the Vizier, and the arguments upon which he grounds his hopes of success in the application. These are the obligations of duty, gratitude, and interest. He observes that the Vizier is indebted to the favour and bounty of Shah Alam and his ancestors, for the rank, station and possessions which he holds in Indostan, and that the world will naturally be attentive to his conduct towards a family from which he derives such exalted dignity and fortune in the present deplorable situation. That it is equally important to His Excellency's security as to his reputation, to assist in restoring the line of Shah Alam to the Sultanat, since a continuance of the present usurpation will be dangerous to his tranquillity from the character and designs of Ghulam Qadir Khan.

I thought it necessary to make such observations upon these arguments as might prepare Sindia for a refusal of his requisition. As Appa appeared sanguine in his expectation of a compliance with it, I remarked in general that the Vizier was under no obligation either positive or implied to support the late Government at Delhi. That although there could be no doubt of His Excellency's attachment to the interests and respect to the person and family of the deposed King, or of his affliction at the miserable situation to which they are reduced, nor of his desire to alleviate their sufferings and redress their wrongs, and [he] might from these motives justly engage in their support,—he might be restrained by considerations more indispensable, the preservation and prosperity of his own dominions. That it was at least doubtful whether these last objects might not be best promoted by a strict neutrality in the present contentions. That supposing Ghulam Qadir Khan to be successful in the contest and to become the effective ruler of those Provinces, the Vizier had but little to fear from his enmity, as there was not the least probability of his power becoming so formidable as to cause any serious alarm. He might indeed disturb the tranquillity of the Vizier's country, but with no prospect of making any conquest and at the risk of drawing the Company's arms upon himself; and it could scarcely be supposed therefore that he would attempt it.

But as it was undoubtedly the wish of the Vizier to succour the unfortunate monarch, and to see the administration of Indostan in the hands of a Power that may possess both ability and disposition to maintain the peace and security of the country, His Excellency had already consulted with your Lordship upon the conduct proper to be adopted by him in the present state of affairs, and that as your Lordship would be guided by a regard to justice, and to the dignity and prosperity of the Vizier, I had no doubt that Sindia would acquiesce in your sentiments whatever they

may be, and not impute a refusal, if it should be given, to an indisposition towards his views and interest or an indifference to the misfortunes of Shah Alam.

The aid which Sindia solicits from the Vizier is four battalions of sepoy with a proportion of field artillery, and he engages to reimburse the Vizier for the expense of this force at the rate of 10,000 Rupees per month, to be previously secured to His Excellency by assignments on revenue or the engagements of bankers, to be paid when the service shall be terminated.

I am afraid that little dependence can be placed on Sindia's engagement to the above effect. But an object of much greater importance might I think be obtained for the Vizier in lieu of it; that is, a natural and effective barrier to his dominions on the westward. I have little doubt that the Marathas, in consideration of such assistance as shall establish their authority in the administration of Indostan, would relinquish to the Vizier all the country on the east of the Jamna to which they now make preterision, and agree to make that river the boundary of their respective jurisdiction.

If such a partition of possessions should take place, I think there would be no cause of apprehension for the tranquillity of those of the Vizier from the Maratha Power, which would find full employment in preserving the subjection of their new acquisitions.

I also beg leave to submit to your Lordship's consideration, in case it should be resolved to undertake the restoration of Shah Alam or his heir by the assistance of the Company's or the Vizier's forces, whether it would not be an object of great importance, to obtain a cession of that nominal sovereignty which the King retains over the Company's dominions and which only serves to degrade and embarrass their Government, without producing the smallest benefit to him and which he is utterly unable either to protect or control, and when the exercise of his authority has everywhere ceased with the decline of that power on which alone it was established.

I can at present add nothing to the information which is daily communicated to your Lordship from the country intelligence on the situation of the contending parties. Sindia's inactivity arises, I believe, principally from parsimony and the uncertain state of his influence, that of Ghulam Qadir and Ismael Beg from poverty and mutual distrust. The arrival of Aly Bahadur and Holkar will give a decided turn to the contest. I have not had any intelligence of their motions for some days; by the last accounts they were near Ajmere, and, if they have continued to advance, will join Sindia in a few days.

232. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 25th September 1788.

I have been honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 16th ultimo, and with your letter to Mr. Malet dated the 18th : The latter I despatched by express qasids on the 7th instant, having taken a copy of it for my guidance if future circumstances should require an application of any part of it to my negotiations with Sindia.

As Sindia's time and attention are solely occupied by his views on Indostan, I have had no communication since my last to make to your Lordship more interesting than the occurrences which are detailed in the daily newspapers.

My agent at the Shah's Durbar, having been turned out of the house which he inhabited belonging to the Vizier in Dehli, his effects plundered by the Rohilas, and being apprehensive of further violence, requested my permission to withdraw. As his situation appeared to me neither very safe nor very creditable, and has been useless since the revolution, I complied with his request and he has this day returned to me. Ghulam Qadir disavowed the insult offered by his people, but took no steps to redress it.

I have obtained from my agent such information respecting the views and situation of the principal persons at Dehli engaged in the present commotions as he had the means of acquiring from personal intercourse with some of the Mogul sardars, and from which may be ascertained, with some degree of decision what will be the result of this long struggle for power in Indostan. It appears that the disagreement between Ghulam Qadir and Ismael Beg is irreconcilable : the latter entertains the deepest resentment of the defeat which he sustained near this place by the desertion of his confederate, and his discontent is augmented by the fraudulent proceedings of Ghulam Qadir in the division of the spoils of Dehli.

The Mogul Chiefs have an invincible distrust of the Afghans, and an inveterate hatred to the person of Ghulam Qadir, and foment the difference between him and Ismael Beg, whom they have excited to make proposals for an accommodation with Sindia.

Ghulam Qadir is sufficiently informed of these circumstances and aware of the danger to which they may expose him, and having no hopes of engaging the Moguls in his interest, nor any reliance on their fidelity, is determined to secure himself from their machinations by a speedy retreat to his own country. He has already passed a considerable part of his troops and artillery into the Doab under pretence of clearing it of the Marathas, and it is his intention secretly to follow them in person and retire with his booty to Ghausgarh.

Sindia seems to rely so entirely on the situation and intention of Ghulam Qadir as to be indifferent to the proposals of Ismael Beg and the Moguls, or rather not to desire an accommodation with them unless upon his own terms, which he supposes they will be compelled to accept on the separation of the Rohila Chief. But as it is not probable that Ismael Beg and his adherents will conclude an insecure treaty with him, or that he will confide in them unless he can totally subject them to his power, there is but little prospect of their uniting, and Ismael Beg will probably be driven to seek support from the Rajpoots, or to form an alliance with Najaf Quli Khan.

In these events, no obstacles will remain to the immediate re-establishment of Sindia's power at Delhi, which he will probably choose to exercise in the name of Shah Alam, whose incapacity for government from his recent misfortunes would leave Sindia in the uncontrolled direction of affairs, without the odium of usurping the King's authority.

Whether he will be long able to maintain the power which he may thus recover, appears very doubtful. He can have no other dependence than upon his own strength and resources, with almost all Hindostan against him. The Rajpoots are unchangeably averse to his authority, and he has not sufficient confidence in the Mahommadan Chiefs or troops to receive them into his service. Aly Bahadur and Holkar, as I am well assured, are unable to move for want of money. They receive no supply from Poona, and have failed to raise the expected tributes on the Rajah.

The Maratha Government, contrary to their usual conduct and general policy, have shewn an unaccountable neglect of their interests and influence in Indostan; but, whether it proceeds from the weakness of the State or a change of system, [it] indicates but little danger of their power becoming formidable in this part of India, whether established by the administration at Poona, or by the single efforts of Sindia.

I have this day received from the Persian Translator your Lordship's answer to Sindia's requisition for assistance from the Vizier. I have so plainly discouraged any hopes of success in it, and your motives for avoiding all interference in disputes with which neither the Company nor the Vizier have any immediate concern, have been so frequently stated by your Lordship and explained by me, that he will not I conceive on this occasion suffer much mortification or disappointment.

233. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 5th October 1788.

I have the honor to forward herewith duplicate of a despatch to your Lordship dated 14th August, which I have received under cover from Mr. Malet *via* Nagpore.

The retreat of Ghulam Qadir Khan into the Doab has rendered the measures lately adopted by Sindia less decisive than was expected, and as the possession of Salimgarh gives the Rohilas the command of the river, the remainder of Ghulam Qadir's troops and effects will reach him in security and enable him to continue his opposition to Sindia, and as he will probably be supported by the Sikhs, who draw a yearly tribute from his country, the contest may be yet considerably protracted.

Sindia does not appear to desire any further co-operation of the troops under Ismail Beg, after they shall have put him in possession of Delhi; nor do I believe he will think himself secure whilst that Chief retains such a force as is at present engaged in his service; and I have little doubt that whenever he has the means, he will either by violence or artifice reduce him to entire subjection.

The views and inclinations of the most powerful chiefs in Indostan are so hostile to the authority of Sindia that its complete and permanent re-establishment even after his acquisition of Delhi will be an event of much uncertainty; and considering the great expense which will unavoidably attend it and which his disposition of the country has deprived him of the means of defraying from the revenues of it, I am very doubtful whether he has any further design than to display the recovery of his credit and power by restoring the succession of the Empire to the line of Shah Alam and the authority and influence of the Maratha State in the administration of affairs. But should he, contrary to my expectations, determine to retain the authority in his own hands, he will have little scruple in resuming the revenues which he has alienated.

He will, I believe, be under considerable embarrassment in the disposal of the vacant throne, for I understand that blindness is an insuperable disqualification that must preclude the restoration of Shah Alam. His choice will I conclude be confined to Mirza Hadi and Akbar Shah. He is desirous to obtain the sanction of your Lordship and the Vizier to the election which he may make, and at the same time, apprehensive that the effects of that sanction will render the new King less dependent on him than will suit his purposes.

Although the return of the Maratha power and influence in Indostan is now certain, I do not apprehend it will attain such a degree as ever to become formidable to the tranquillity of the Company or the Vizier's Government. I am rather of opinion that it will render that State more dependant on our assistance, and lay it more open to our attacks in case of a rupture. At least I have strong reasons to believe that Sindia views it in this light; his solicitude to avoid offence to the Vizier and to obtain assistance from and connect himself more closely with both His Excellency's Government and your Lordship's, are to me unequivocal proofs of it.

234. TRANSLATION OF A PAPER OF INTELLIGENCE FROM GHULAM QADIR KHAN, DATED 29TH ZELHEJA (30TH SEPTEMBER 1788).

Received at Calcutta, 12th October 1788.

Advice was brought Ghulam Qadir Khan that Ismail Beg Khan had sent Gul Mahomad Khan and Mirza Matlab Khan to Rajah Himmat Bahadur and Rayji Sindia. Rajah Himmat Bahadur had encamped near the Bazar of Shaik Mahomad. On hearing this Ghulam Qadir Khan was very uneasy, and sent two sardars to Ismail Beg to say that an intimacy subsisted between them, that he considered him his elder brother, and entertained very different hopes from him, and to desire him to abide by the oaths taken between each other, that if he was displeased on account of the plundered property he might now receive his half share and let him, Ghulam Qadir, cross the river. These sardars returned with an answer from Ismail Beg remonstrating with him at his having taken all the plunder, that Ismail Beg's troops had entered into negociation with Sindia, without whose pleasure nothing can now be done. Ghulam Qadir very uneasy returned to Salimgarh, where and in the fort there is a great scarcity. This day advice was brought that the Camp on the other side the river had been attacked by robbers, several Rohilas killed, and horses, camels and one piece of cannon had been carried away. Ismail Beg and Himmat Bahadur were both in different parts of the town, and had planted their artillery to fire on the Asad-burj, and the people who were in the Bastion descended from it. Ismail Beg had stationed his artillery in different parts of the town so as to prevent the passage across the river from the ghat of Salimgarh. Ghulam Qadir Khan exceedingly alarmed came to Salimgarh, where his people embarked on board boats; but as there were no boatmen, they came on shore again. Ghulam Qadir again sent people to Ismail Beg to urge him to let him cross the river. To this an answer was received, that Ismail Beg would not permit it, and he had no authority, since Sindia had now the control. But to preserve the intimacy between them, whenever the fort should be besieged, if he would relinquish every article he had taken in the plunder from the King, every person, after having been searched, should be permitted to go wherever he pleased. Ismail Beg has issued a proclamation in the town to open all the shops, and security seems now to be restored.

235. ALI IBRAHIM KHAN, JUDGE AT BENARES, TO LORD CORNWALLIS.

17th October 1788.

I have already sent you two letters giving an account of the situation at Shahjahanabad. I now write for your information what further intelligence I could gather from the papers of news. On 9th October 1788, corresponding to 8 *Muharram* 1203, Rana Khan and other Maratha *sardars*, forming confederacy with Mirza Ismail Beg Khan,

delivered a combined attack on the fort and forced an entrance into it. A free fight ensued between them and the defenders of the fort, in which both the sword and the gun were used. At last the Marathas succeeded in seizing Manyar Singh *Kumedan* (Commandant), a dependant of Ghulam Qadir Khan, who led the defence. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Rana Khan then released the Emperor Shah Alam from the room in which he was confined by Ghulam Qadir Khan, who had barricaded its doors before he fled. Rana Khan treated the Emperor with great respect and honour. The Marathas are now holding the fort. Ghulam Qadir is encamped with his army on the other side of the Jamna. He is short of provision and a Maratha force has surrounded him.

236. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 13th October 1788.

The country intelligence by this day's dawk will give your Lordship a circumstantial account of the evacuation of the Fort of Dehli by the Rohilas, and of the Marathas having taken possession of it.

I do not expect that in consequence of this event Sindia will immediately proceed to the choice and declaration of a Prince to fill the throne, but will wait to learn the sentiments of your Lordship and the Vizier respecting a successor, supposing that the misfortune of Shah Alam unavoidably precludes his resumption of the Government. I am confirmed in this opinion by hearing that Sindia has dispatched Appa Bhyronath to attend me here, altho' I had acquainted him with my intention to repair to camp immediately after *Dasahara*.

It appears to me that Sindia would prefer Mirza Hadi to any of the sons of Shah Alam for the vacant *masnad*, to obviate the consequences which might be apprehended from leaving the person and claim of the lineal heir to such powerful protection as that of the Company and the Vizier.

Should it be the object of Bhyronath's journey hither to learn whether the elevation of Mirza Hadi would receive your Lordship's approbation, I shall defer any answer or opinion upon it to the instructions which you may be pleased to give me, and I hope to be honored with your Lordship's immediate commands, whether you may determine to use or to decline your advice or recommendation to Sindia upon the subject. Rumours of Timoor Shah's intention to invade Indostan this season still prevail, but I cannot discover any good foundation for them, and by the concurring accounts which I heard from travellers, the state of his Government and finances do not admit his undertaking so distant and expensive an enterprize.

237. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agia, 3 November 1788.

The arrival of Aly Bahadur in the vicinity of Muttra is now certain, and an interview between him and Sindia will take place in three or four days. I shall not intrude upon you Lordship's time with conjectures on the result of an event which will so soon be known with certainty. Sindia does not appear to be apprehensive of any diminution of influence or authority from this junction, and whatever arrangement of the powers of the different Chiefs may follow it, there can be little doubt that the general interests of the Maratha State in Indostan will be established by this accession of force.

I shall endeavour to obtain and communicate to your Lordship the most early and accurate information of the measures proposed or adopted in consequence of Aly Bahadur's arrival. Sindia will probably be forward enough to impart to me his designs and situation, if he should be under any embarrassment from the powers or instructions given to Aly Bahadur, as he hopes to derive weight and respectability from the appearance of concert with our Government.

It is my wish to shew every mark of personal attention and respect to Aly Bahadur which his rank and commission from the State may entitle him to. But as he has no direct connection with your Lordship's Government, and Sindia may be suspicious or mortified at the smallest appearance of particular consideration for his colleague, I shall submit to him the ceremonials of my visits, unless his regulation of them should become improper from any future knowledge of circumstances, or commands from your Lordship.

238. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 6th Decr. 1788.

In my last I had the honor to inform your Lordship that I proposed to regulate my meeting with Aly Bahadur by a proper attention to his rank and authority in the Maratha Government, and at the same time a due regard to the delicacy of Sindia's situation and his particular connexion with the Company. In consequence of this intention, I acquainted Sindia with my desire of repairing to Camp, and left it to him to adjust the time and ceremonials of an interview between Aly Bahadur and myself. This intimation was accompanied by a complimentary letter to Aly Bahadur which Sindia perused and delivered. In answer to my wish of meeting Aly Bahadur, Sindia informed me, that he was impatient to join the army in the Doab and determined to march in a day or two; but that if he should delay his departure he would request of me to repair to Camp. He remained however a considerable time, and at length set out for Delhi,

without Sindia's intimating his desire that we should meet. I received no answer to my letter to Aly Bahadur, but Sindia acknowledges that one was sent to him, which he returned because the address was less ceremonious than that which he himself always uses. From both these circumstances I conjecture that there is an assumption of superiority on the part of Aly Bahadur, which Sindia is not willing should appear to our Government. The preeminence of rank and the ensigns of the authority of the State are evidently vested in Aly Bahadur, but the real power and sole direction of affairs remain with Sindia, and I am well informed that this system will be continuing. It was however the original intention of the Poona Durbar to supersede Sindia entirely, and to place the management of the Maratha interests in the hands of Holkar under the nominal authority of Aly Bahadur, but partly from some favourable turns in his affairs and partly by his own address, he brought over Nana Farnavees to his support and detached Aly Bahadur from his connection with Holkar.

The reduction of Ghulam Qadir Khan appears to be inevitable, but I think he will find means to preserve himself from entire destruction.

Sindia has I believe resolved to continue the administration of Government in the name of Shah Alam, but the old King himself wishes to transfer his ideal sovereignty to his son Mirza Akbar.

The enclosed intelligence of Timur Shah's motions came from Lahore, and is confirmed by direct information to Sindia from some of the Sikh Chiefs with the addition of their having prevented his passages of the Attock nearer to their confines, and being determined to oppose his progress in whatever direction beyond the limits of Multan. It is probable that their country is the real object of his expedition, as the Abdalis have never been able to endure the heats of Indostan and it offers no compensation for the great expense, from a predatory incursion.

Colonel Macleod having expressed an earnest desire to see Sindia, received from him a very polite invitation to his camp; and on his arrival met with a very cordial and honorable reception. The Colonel wishing to see Delhi, consulted me on the propriety of his making a private visit to that Capital, with respect to any effect that might be produced by it on the parties engaged in the present commotions, and as it appeared to me that Sindia alone could possibly be affected by it, I thought there could be no objection if he approved of it. The proposal was made to him subject to his free decision, and he not only gave his entire approbation, but shewed great satisfaction in having it in his power to oblige the Colonel, and in the deference which was shewn to his inclination and wishes on the occasion. The Colonel set out for Delhi yesterday, with a proper escort to secure him from all apprehension of danger or insult, and attended by a confidential person from Sindia to facilitate his journey,

and to mark the approbation with which it is undertaken. As the Colonel's object is merely curiosity, he will make no visits in the place, nor remain there longer than two or three days, as may be required for viewing it.

Paper of Intelligence Relative to Timur Shah.

Received at Calcutta, 19th December 1788.

Two *qasids*, who left Peshawar the 22nd Safar (22 Nov.), have brought advices that Timur Shah on the 10th Safar (10 Nov.) marched from Peshawar and arrived at the Attock on the 14th, crossed over with a large army, and continued by daily marches towards Multan. His army is about 1,20,000 cavalry. The vakeel on the part of the Latti-walah arrived and commenced a negotiation to pay 30 lacs of Rupees as a fine, and his guilt to be forgiven. Timur Shah did not agree to this proposal. He sent *Sazawals* to Zafar Khan, Subadar of Multan, to prepare grain and pieces of chintz, without any delay to collect the grain, and send the chintz to the Presence. Two *qasids* arrived with *arzis* from the Rajah Bejay Sing of Jodhpoor, requesting the King will without delay march to arrange the affairs of Hindostan, that they will join his Majesty's standard.

239. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Camp, 15th December 1788.

In my last conversation with Sindia, he acquainted me that he had been informed by Nana Farnavees of the state of Mr. Malet's negotiations for a new treaty of alliance between your Lordship's Government and the Maratha State, for the assistance of the latter in the event of the Company being forced into a war with Tippoo, and of the obstacle which prevented its completion, which was an engagement not to make peace without mutual consent. Nana observed that our late peace with Tippoo was precipitately concluded and left him the leisure and the means to attack the Marathas, and he blamed Sindia for omitting in his treaty with us to provide against such a contingency.

To this intimation I remarked that an undefined and unconditional engagement against any peace but by mutual consent, was nearly impracticable and would be dangerous to both parties. But that an engagement to continue the war until the attainment of objects to be specified and agreed upon in the treaty, was equally practicable and necessary and might I supposed be easily adjusted for the interests and security of the contracting parties. Sindia admitted the justness and propriety of this point being previously and clearly ascertained, and promised to recommend it to the Maratha minister.

Sindia was at the same time very particular in his enquiries respecting the late increase of our European force, and the objects for which it was designed. I answered him as to both truly and without reserve, but I am not sure that he was persuaded by the assurances which I gave him of the latter being merely our own security. And, indeed, no native Prince can reconcile to his belief a moderation of conduct with superiority of strength. Sindia asked if we had no recent cause of quarrel with Tippoo, and when I answered in the negative except the slight suspicion of his having abetted the proceedings of the Rajah of Cherikal,* he enquired whether instructions had not been sent to your Lordship from England to make a peremptory demand of the restitution of all British subjects still detained in his country. I answered that I had neither heard of such instructions nor thought it probable that they had been sent.

Our increase of force had been greatly exaggerated to Sindia, with the additional report of very formidable military preparations at Bombay. He appeared to be undeceived by my account of our situation on the other side of India, but the general tenor of his discourse indicated a belief that we meditated a blow against Tippoo, to be struck on some future favourable occasion. And that both himself and the Poona Durbar wished as well as believed that we had such a design.

I endeavoured to draw from him some express opinion or declaration of the sentiments and intentions which he himself or the Court of Poona might entertain on this subject, by observing that if the Company in defence of their rights or honour should be forced by Tippoo from that system of general peace which they had adopted, your Lordship would rely on the Maratha State and on him in particular for such assistance as you might require towards success in a just and necessary war, and from which your allies might derive greater advantages than you proposed or desired to attain for the Company. He answered this observation only by general professions of attachment and desire to improve the alliance and to promote the interests of both States. I am however convinced that whatever reserve may at present be maintained either here or at Poona, proceeds only from a cautious and interested policy, calculated to obtain better terms in proportion to the appearance which they put on of indifference or distrust, whilst they are secretly determined, by a conviction of their true interests, to come fully into your Lordship's proposals.

From the confidential communication which appears to subsist between Nana Farnavees and Sindia, and from other circumstances, the latter seems to have recovered his influence with the minister, and, from the situation of affairs at Poona and in Indostan, to be likely to retain it, and as he is fully sensible of the weight and advantage in the Maratha State which he derives from his particular relation to the Company, it can scarcely be doubted that he will always be solicitous

* The Nair Rajah of Cherikal (in Malabar), after making submission to Tipu and setting out to carry out his policy, was killed by order of the Sultan. [Wilks, ii. Ch. 37.]

to preserve and to improve the alliance of his Government with ours, and so long as the Marathas are convinced that we have no design to extend our possessions, I think we may rely on their assistance in a war with any Power whatsoever.

The administration of the royal authority and disposal of the revenue annexed to it, will probably in a few days revert to Sindia in as complete a manner as he formerly held them. But it will require a length of time and a speedy and vigorous government to reduce into proper subjection the turbulent and powerful zamindars and jageerdars within the provinces, and to provide against the designs of his dangerous and inveterate enemies the Rajpoots; and until these points are effected, the acquisition of Indostan will very little augment the wealth or strength of the Maratha State. Sindia is not insensible to the advantages which he derived from our forbearance in all his pursuits for power in this country. It is therefore not likely that any success will encourage him to risk our future interference, but [he] will on the contrary observe the most guarded and friendly conduct to prevent it. Nor is it probable that the Maratha Government will ever offer any serious injury or insult to ours, until they have totally annihilated the power of their tributary Chiefs, as the recent conduct of those of Jodhpore and Jaypoor have taught them what they have to apprehend from their defection.

No further intelligence is arrived from the westward of the motions of Timoor Shah. But I learn from Meer Ghulam Mohamad, who is arrived here from the Court of that Prince with letters for your Lordship, and who left him at Cabul 6 months since, that he declared his intention to march to his eastern frontier to adjust some disputes and quell some commotions that had arisen among his dependent Chiefs of the Province of Sind, and that he expressed at that time no design of proceeding to Indostan.

I understand that Sindia is prevented renewing the functions of Government in the name of Shah Alam only by the danger to which it would expose Mirza Akbar and the other Princes in the power of Ghulam Qadir.

240. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 20th Dec. 1788.

Various intelligence is arrived of the attack and defeat of the Rohila army by the Marathas on the 16th instant, but differing in report of the late Ghulam Qadir. One of the accounts is that in attempting to escape with 300 horses, he was pursued and overtaken by Raijee Bakhshy and cut off with the whole party. Another that he retired into the fort of Meerat, and a third that he effected his escape early in the action with 100 horses. The last account from all the circumstances I can yet collect appears to me the most probable.

P.S.—By a paper this instant received from Ghulam Qadir's camp I learn that he retreated from the field of battle into the town, where finding the Marathas ready to enter it, he immediately fled with a few horses, and was pursued by the enemy, since which no account of him had arrived. The Princes were in perfect safety under the protection of Maniar Sing, who had agreed to resign the charge of them to Rana Khan the next morning. 2 o'clock p.m.

241. W. PALMER TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

Agra, 21st Dec. 1788.

I have the honor to enclose the first certain intelligence which is arrived of the capture of Ghulam Qadir Khan. The safety of all the Princes is mentioned in the other papers.

Paper of Intelligence from the Camp of Aly Bahadur, dated 20th Rabi-ul-Awal (19th December 1788), received at Calcutta, 31st Dec. 1788.

Yesterday the zamindar of village Barnauli,* which is distant about 5 or 6 cos from the camp, came and called up Nawab Aly Bahadur about midnight and informed him that Ghulam Qadir Khan had fallen from his horse and was sitting in the village. The Nabob ordered the zamindar to take some horsemen with him and conduct Ghulam Qadir Khan to his presence. The zamindar agreed, and in the morning the horsemen brought Ghulam Qadir Khan into the Nawab's presence. The Nawab ordered a salute to be fired. He sent for Bilas Roy, Maniar Sing, the Nazir and Qanungoes of Meerat, and ordered them into confinement, and directed Ram Ratan Moody to attend the Princes.

242. E. O. H. IVES TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 22nd Dec. 1788.

Intelligence has this day been received that Ghulam Qadir Khan, reduced to the last extremity by the want of provisions and deserted by his principal officers, fled from Meerat with 300 horsemen towards Ghausgarh, that they were soon overtaken by a party of Marathas under the command of Rayjee Patil, and an engagement ensued in which two of the three hundred were left dead on the spot, and the rest returned to Meerat and got into the fort. Whether Ghulam Qadir Khan was among the former or latter number, was not known at the time the accounts came away. Mirza Akbar Shah and his brothers were with Maniar Sing, who had sent word to Rana Khan that he would deliver them in safety, in consequence of which Rana Khan has despatched a party to protect them and Maniar Sing from any of his troops that might attack them through ignorance.

* Barnauli, 3 miles south-west of Shamli, misspelt in the record as *Runnuty*.

243. E. O. H. IVES TO C. W. MALET.

Lucknow, 10th Jan. 1789.

Major Palmer having informed me that he regularly transmits you the papers of intelligence relative to public affairs in this part of India, I had begun to think it superfluous to trouble you with a sequel of my narrative ; but the receipt of your assistant's letter of the 1st of November, and of your own of the 9th ultimo, has determined me to continue a mode of communication which you tell me is of no use to you and which, perhaps by inducing me to commit to paper events, that a short time might otherwise erase from my memory, may be of some to myself.

My last letters of the 15th and 17th of August informed you of the deposition of Shah Alam and of the deprivation of his sight.

The day after I received private intelligence from Mr. Duncan, the Resident at Benares, that Meerza Haji *alias* Shigooftah Bakht (the eldest son of his late Royal Highness Jahandār Shah) had left Benares without giving the Resident notice, with the professed intention of proceeding to this place. He arrived here on the 29th of August ; and was received by the Vizier and myself with all due honors. Meerza Haji had declared to Mr. Grant, who was sent by Mr. Duncan to try to prevail on him to return, that he had received an invitation from the Vizier. This, however, as I wrote to Lord Cornwallis, " I look upon to have been merely an excuse dictated by the moment for a conduct which he was at a loss to account for to Mr. Grant's satisfaction, and I am convinced that the real cause of his departure from Benares was founded on the disgust arising from his not being made complete master over the household of his late father, and declared in all respects out of his minority ; at the same time, I am persuaded that the then situation of public affairs, and the certainty which there must have appeared to him to be of the Vizier's being obliged by the misapprehension of his trying his fortune elsewhere to receive him kindly, must have had considerable weight in overcoming the reluctance which he must have felt to taking such a step, without first consulting Lord Cornwallis."

However this may be, his Lordship thought it proper to show his sense of so very precipitate a step of his Royal Highness's by desiring me not to visit him during his residence at Lucknow ; an example, which the Vizier (with no small degree of inconsistency in my opinion) chose to follow, and notwithstanding Lord Cornwallis has repeatedly explained to him that it was very far from his wishes for him to observe such a line of conduct, has hitherto persevered in, though he has lately talked, in consequence of his Lordship's last letter on the subject, of paying him ere long a formal visit ; and as I have just received Lord Cornwallis's permission to pay him again my personal respects, there is now no doubt but he will carry it into execution. Meerza Haji has demeaned himself very quietly since

his arrival at Lucknow; he seems to be of an inoffensive disposition, and not to have been actuated by views of ambition, which if he ever entertained any, must now be at an end, since there is at present very little probability of his being set up (as I once thought not unlikely to happen) by any of the contending parties, as the pageant of the day.

That I may finish at once all that relates to the family of the late Prince Jahandar Shah, I must here add that the second brother, Muzaffar Bakht *alias* Meerza Jooma, has also separated himself from the Begam, and has with his father's maternal uncle Akbar Aly Khan (Muham-ud-dowlah) left Benares. He is going, as he gives out, to the Deccan, but to what part of it I know not. Lord Cornwallis on the news of Meerza Haji's elopement, directed Mr. Duncan to inform the remaining part of the family that he had not the smallest desire to retain any of them who might have an inclination to leave the asylum afforded them in the Company's dominions; but Shah Alam has, it is said, written to Akbar Ali Khan to express his disapprobation of Muzaffar Bakht's adventure. The Begam, widow of the late Prince, remains with her son Meerza Khurram at Benares, where (as she has enemies at Delhi) she will probably be happy to pass the remainder of her days.

I am now to advert to the transactions at the Capital. About the time I last wrote to you, Sindia sent a detachment under the command of Raoji Sindia and Thakur Bhai Sindia, who encamped at Tilpat, four *cos* from Delhi; and from thence, committed ravages even within the City, while the country on the eastern side of the river was exposed to the depredations of a part of the army under the command of Dallooji Koolia, another part of whose troops invaded Ghulam Qadir Khan's own possessions in the neighbourhood of Ghausgarh. Most of the Rohilas were so dissatisfied with Ghulam Qadir's pusillanimity in not facing his enemies in the field, that many of them deserted. The greatest loss, however, of this kind which he experienced was that of Ismail Beg; that Chief resented highly the ill-timed parsimony of his coadjutor in refusing him a competent share of the plunder which by a series of the most cruel, oppressive and insulting conduct towards the most respectable members of both the royal families (Shah Alam's and Bidar Shah's) had at last amounted in money, effects, and particularly jewels, to a very considerable value. He entered, therefore, into a negotiation with Sindia; and at length a treaty was concluded between them, by which Ismail Beg had considerable *jaidads* assigned him, part of which he has been since employed in acquiring possession of by force of arms from Najaf Quli Khan (a favourite *chela* of the late Najaf Khan's), and part of which he has not yet got into his hands.

At length Ghulam Qadir Khan found it necessary to evacuate the fort; and in spite of all that his opponents could or would do to prevent it, contrived not only to escape himself to his army across the river, but to

keep the passage free till he had transported his plunder, and almost the whole of the two royal families, with his King Bidar Shah at their head ; leaving, I believe, no male but the old blind King behind him. The ferocious brutality, which distinguished his character, continued to the last ; and it was credibly reported that the miscreant revenged with blows and kicks, the impotent upbraidings bestowed on him by the unfortunate Shah Alam. He was several times restrained only by the remonstrances and opposition of his followers from imbruing his hands in the blood of that family ; and it is believed that he would at last have carried his design into execution, but for the consideration of the impossibility of completing it, by the fortunate circumstance of three of them being with us. On the 10th of Muharram (or the 11th of October) he finally evacuated the fort ; and it was taken possession of by Rana Khan, who found the old King Shah Alam in a miserable situation, and treated him with every proper mark of respect.

Seven or eight days after Ghulam Qadir Khan had joined his army on this side of the Jamna, he thought it advisable, with the view of dividing his enemies, to depose Bidar Shah, and raise Akbar Shah, the favorite and eldest surviving son of Shah Alam, to the throne. Immediately on the receipt of the news, the poor old King gave orders for rejoicings, but Rana Khan declared that before he could fire a salute on the occasion, he must consult Sindia, who of course delayed acknowledging as King a person who was in the hands of his enemies.

After this, Rana Khan joined the Maratha army on this side of the river, and Ghulam Qadir having retreated, with his troops, as far in the road to Ghausgarh as the town of Meerat, he was there besieged, and being at length reduced to the last extremity by want of provisions and by the desertion of his principal officers, fled with three hundred horsemen towards Ghausgarh. He was pursued by Jivvaji Bakhshy ; and being overtaken, an engagement ensued, in which two or three hundred are said to have been left dead upon the spot ; Ghulam Qadir Khan escaped alone on horseback, but the night being dark, his horse fell into a pit, by which his rider hurt his leg, and was discovered by the noise he made in consequence. The zamindar of the village carried him, with fair promises, to his house, but sent immediate notice to Rana Khan, who dispatched a party and took him prisoner. Rana Khan made him over to the Nawab Aly Bahadur, who had lately joined him, and who has sent him in irons to Sindia. What Sindia will do with him is at present uncertain. Possibly, the discovery of any very considerable treasures may preserve his life.

Akbar Shah and the rest of the royal family were found in Meerat, and have since returned to Delhi. An interview however has not yet taken place between them and the old King ; His Majesty being desirous of postponing it till the arrival of Sindia who still continues at Muttra.

I am sorry to add that Shah Alam has loaded Bidar Shah with irons ; an insult surely undeserved by his inoffensive conduct during his short exaltation, especially when that exaltation could not have sat very easily upon him, while his own family and himself were nearly equal sufferers with his predecessor's and his dependants from the cruel insolence and aggressive conduct of Ghulam Qadir Khan.

It is as yet likewise uncertain how the Government will be settled. Shah Alam was said to wish that as soon as a proper provision shall have been made for the support of his own dignity, Akbar Shah may be immediately acknowledged as the reigning monarch. But by intelligence I have just received, it would seem that His Majesty is somewhat offended at Akbar Shah's behaviour since his return, and would perhaps be willing to defer his exaltation to the throne till after his own death. Sindia, it is thought, had rather continue Shah Alam in the nominal sovereignty, with Akbar Shah as the declared heir. What will be the event I cannot tell ; but it is not difficult to foresee that all real power will, for the present, continue in the hands of Sindia. In a private letter I lately received from Major Palmer, there is the following paragraph not inapplicable to this inclusion (*sic*) : " You will have observed by the papers that Aly Bahadur is a mere pageant. The power and influence of Sindia is as complete as ever, and he appears to be in a great credit at Poona. Holkar will not come into Hindostan, and I see no further prospect of opposition to his complete recovery of all that he possessed before he marched into Jaypoor."

The Rajah however of that district and others in the neighbourhood are making preparations, but whether they will act on the offensive or merely on the defensive is more than I can determine. Ismail Beg appears hurt at not having yet been able to get all that was assigned him. He sometimes talks big, but perhaps that may be with the view of disguising his real intentions. He is a soldier of fortune, and must possess great abilities and resources to have put himself at the head of an army and to dictate such advantageous terms so soon after his total defeat at Agra.

I have now described, to the best of my power, the present state of affairs in the Upper Provinces. I have only to add that reports have prevailed for these three or four months of an intended invasion of Hindostan from Kabul by Timoor Shah, who was said to bear the expense of an army he had raised to repel an invasion from Balkh by employing it on a foreign expedition. He crossed the Attock about the end of October. The alarms which Sindia felt on this intelligence have, Major Palmer writes me, subsided in consequence of later accounts which represent the frontier of Timoor Shah's country in commotion and his object being no other than to re-establish order and tranquillity, and collect his tribute from Sind etc. However that may be, the Vizier has within these few days received a *shookah* from Timoor Shah, requiring his assistance for restoring Shah Alam, or if he be not alive, his heir, to the throne. This

His Excellency was at first inclined to believe a forgery, but on comparing the signature and seals with those on a *shookah* received from His Majesty in Shujah-ud-dowlah's time, he is now convinced that it is genuine. There is another, doubtless to the same purport, for Lord Cornwallis. It is superfluous to add that Timoor Shah is the son of the famous Abdali, who was called in by Alamgir, the father of Shah Alam, to his assistance against his Vizier Ghazee-ud-deen, and who, on his return some years after, caused a general massacre of the inhabitants of Delhi.

It is now scarce necessary for me to mention that our Government has conducted itself in strict conformity to that system of neutrality which it is the object of Lord Cornwallis, and indeed the Parliament itself, to maintain. The Nawab Vizier would willingly have acted against Ghulam Qadir Khan, both for the sake of preventing any hostile incursions into his dominions, which he thought might be apprehended from the temerity of that Chief had he established his power, and for the preservation of his own dignity as Vizier; though with respect to the former apprehension, it cannot admit of a doubt that protected as His Excellency is by the Company's troops, it would have been the most impolitic step possible in Ghulam Qadir Khan to attack him; and with respect to the latter consideration, it must be acknowledged (to use Lord Cornwallis's words) that as an independant Prince, in close friendship and alliance with us, His Excellency's importance would be much more real and solid, than he could find it in the condition of a servant and dependant upon any Prince whatever that could be chosen for the throne.

**244. EXTRACT OF A NEWS-PAPER FROM SINDIA'S CAMP, RECEIVED
16th MARCH 1789.**

6 Janadi-ul-Sany (3rd March 1789).

Ghulam Qadir Khan sent for Bilas Ray and Hakeem Boo Aly Khan and said to them, "I some time ago told you, that I had committed so bad an act, that I should not be suffered to live. Today I shall be put to death, and have sent for you to take my last farewell." They said, "We shall be put to death in two or three days; we told you not to commit yourself by such an act, but you did not listen to us; you now meet with your deserts." Sindia sent for Hakeem Akmal and Meer Ghalib Aly and desired them in company with Baba Jayram, Vakeel to Raoji Sindhia, to take out the eyes and cut off the ears of Ghulam Qadir Khan, to put them in a wooden box, and send them to th. King. Then to take the rebel 6 or 7 cos from Muttra and put him to death. This order was executed. Sindia then sent five boxes containing the ears, eyes and nose of Ghulam Qadir Khan with an *arzi* to the King. Meer Ghalib Aly is the King's Head Moonshee, and Hakeem Akmal is also a person about the King; and both went to Sindia's camp to negotiate for the release of their jageers.

245. EARL CORNWALLIS TO E. O. IVES

Calcutta, 16th March, 1789.

I have received your letter of the 7th instant. You may acquaint the Vizier and his minister in answer to their reference concerning Sital Das that in my opinion he should either be sent under a guard to the confines of His Excellency's dominions, to be delivered over there to any person ordered by Shah Alam or Mahajee Sindia, to take charge of him upon notice previously given to them that such is the Nabob's intention, or the man should be sent under a guard to Delhi, if they prefer this mode of proceeding, and given up at that place.

SECTION 6

Embassy of William Palmer—Sindhia triumphant in the North (1789-1791)

246. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Sindhia's Camp, 23rd March 1789.

The situation of Aly Bahadur is exactly described in the newspapers. He has not the least shadow of authority except over the troops assigned to his command, and even for the subsistence of these he is dependent upon Sindia. How Sindia has provided for them you will be truly informed by the papers. You will easily 'magine that Aly Bahadur must be disappointed and disgusted. It appears to me that Sindia would not have ventured to mortify and disoblige him so far without connivance from Poona. I do not think he will execute his menace of separating. The junction of Holkar my now be certainly expected; the measure I think indicates a resolution to maintain the authority which in the name of the Peshwa, Sindia has established in Indostan and in the King's affairs and to maintain it with a high hand; for Sindia has already begun to treat the King and the several independent Chiefs of the Empire with very little management or consideration of their rights or stations. A proceeding which merely in point of policy cannot be justified without both the intention and the power to rule purely by force. I do not think however that joining in authority two Chiefs of such equal strength and discordant views as Sindia and Holkar, is well calculated to ensure such a system. It is probably the expectation of the Poona Durbar to preserve the influence of the State by the check which each Chief will be upon the other. But in my opinion, more will be lost by their dissensions than

can be gained by the mutual jealousys, and that the Maratha interests are exposed to be totally annihilated by such a delegation of them. The Maratha Government is exceedingly obnoxious to all the ancient zamindars of Indostan as well as to the Mogul interests and authority, and you will perceive that Sindia's conduct is by no means calculated to remove their disgusts. He seems to depend on their want of union and confidence in each other, and to expect that he shall crush them separately. But I think that he discovers his design too soon and unnecessarily, and may force them into a general combination too powerful for the whole Maratha strength to subdue. The Rajahs of Jodhpore and Jaynagar are persuaded that their preservation can only be effected by the depression of Sindia, and as he certainly meditates their ruin, he must be insecure until he can accomplish it, from their constant efforts to alarm and resist him. If he could resolve to relinquish his designs against them and convince them of his peaceable intentions, they would give him no disturbance in Indostan, but their mutual distrust is too deeply rooted to be eradicated by any other means than the guaranty of a power strong enough to enforce an observation of engagements. It requires great address to preserve the mean with Ismail Beg Khan of preventing his becoming too formidable by the total subjection of Najaf Quli Khan, or his becoming disaffected by secretly defeating his success. I have no doubt that Sindia is now occupied in the latter object, which will probably terminate in the second defection of Ismail Beg to the Rajpoots.

Rana Khan's operations are I believe only directed to the acquisition of a little ready money for the immediate subsistence of the troops. This he will probably obtain and return without any further consequences.

I am much concerned at the illiberal treatment which the poor old King receives by the orders of Sindia. I believe there is more of personal resentment in it for the Shah's refusal to admit him into Delhi after his retreat from Jaypore, than any real suspicion of intrigue or even any motive of policy or parsimony. The King indeed is not likely to be depended upon; but nothing would be risked by a little generosity towards him in the establishment of his household and the external forms and observances of royalty.

The flight of Mirza Sulaiman Shiko was the cause of much alarm to Sindia and distrust of the King either real or affected. The route was for a considerable time surprisingly secret; it is at last known that he is in the Vizier's dominions. His Excellency will not see him until he knows the opinion of Lord Cornwallis on the propriety of affording him an asylum. Sindia is well pleased to find that the Prince is where he has nothing to apprehend, instead of having sought the protection of Timoor Shah or the Rajpoots, who might have been induced by the pretext of supporting him to have excited serious disturbances in Indostan.

The visit of the Row Raja to Sindia under pretence of purification in the Ganges has something mysterious in it. I have little doubt that some plan of future operation in concert was adjusted between them, besides the ostensible ones ; probably Najaf Quli Khan's peace was made and a system of attack upon the Rajputs settled.

In the last conversation which I had with Sindia on the mutual interests and relative connection and situation of the Company and the Maratha State, it appeared that he was in full confidence and free communication with the minister on the subject of your negotiation and of Nana's views and intentions ; he accurately described to me the state of the former perfectly coinciding with your relations of it, and tho' he was cautious of entering into particulars respecting the latter, he gave me sufficiently to understand that they were ultimately as favourable as we could wish, and evidently desired that I should believe that he had been instrumental in disposing the minister to adopt our proposals. He declared his own sentiments in favour of the closest alliance with us, without hesitation or reserve, and on the principle of mutual interest and security, professing to be convinced that the French and Tippoo would sooner or later unite their most strenuous efforts for the destruction of both the Maratha and English dominions. At the same time he gave me the strongest assurances of a sincere desire to co-operate with our Government, either as a member of the State or separately with his own force, for defeating their designs. I can easily credit professions so apparently consistent with his interests, but whether he is or will be in a situation to assist us either with his influence at Poona or his troops in the field, I cannot determine. The appearance of strong prepossession in our favour would probably disappoint the first, and his embarrassment in this quarter appears to me sufficient to preclude the latter.

Admitting the Maratha power to be firmly established in Indostan, it may become a subject of curious and not uninteresting speculation to consider how we may be affected by it. I am inclined to think that it must be productive of new arrangements between their Government and ours ; their vicinity, the relation in which we stand to the King, and a variety of other circumstances would soon require a permanent adjustment, or create jealousies and misunderstandings of serious consequence. If we should acknowledge their authority in the King's affairs, it will be necessary to define the limits of it as far as respects the Government and possessions of the Company and the Vizier, or rather to obtain a renunciation of all claims upon either, which I have little doubt the Marathas would accede to for the secure and undisturbed possession of all the rest.

Timoor Shah is still at Bahawalpur, but by the best intelligence preparing to return to Kabul. The object of his expedition did not I believe extend beyond the collection of the arrears of *peshkash* (tribute)

in the province of Sind. In this he has been considerably disappointed by the resistance of some principal sardars. He has however exacted about 60 lacs of Rupees.

Enclosed is the form of my passports for the Maratha pilgrims to Gaya etc. I grant them indiscriminately to any number of persons, as their resort to those places of worship is of material benefit to our provinces. The application to me always comes through Sindia. And to persons of distinction, I give letters of introduction to our Residents, besides the passports.

Form of Passport for Pilgrims to Gaya &c.

.....intending to proceed on a pilgrimage to Allahabad, Benares and Gaya, I beg leave at the request of Mahadjee Sindia to recommend him and his retinue consisting of horses carriages and persons to the protection of the English Chief and Residents at the different Stations thro' which he may have occasion to pass.

(Signed) W. P.

Resident to Mahadjee Sindia.

247. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 7th April 1789.

I am informed by Appa Bhyronath, the agent stationed with me under Bhow Bakshy, that Sindia has determined to proceed with his family lately arrived from Ujjain to Ramghat* on the western bank of the Ganges and in the dominions of the Vizier, to perform the customary ablutions and other religious ceremonies. I cannot suppose that Sindia will enter the Vizier's territories on any occasion without previous permission, nor approach them without giving intimation of his design. I have however judged it proper to give the earliest information of the report to the Resident at Lucknow and to the officers commanding at Anupshahar and Fathgarh, to prevent any unnecessary alarm or trouble to the troops or to the country that might be occasioned by Sindia's unexpected appearance in the Doab.

Since I had the honor to address your Lordship last, I have had much general conversation with Sindia on the relative situation, views and interests of the Company and the Maratha State. He professed to think their security and prosperity inseparable from the apparent connection and designs of the French and Tippoo, and repeated the promise which he has invariably made to me of applying his influence in the Government

*Ramghat, 18 miles south-east of Anupshahar and almost due north of Khurja.

and his separate force for such a combination of our strength as your Lordship may propose, to defeat and punish any attempts of our common enemy to injure us. He appears to be in the most confidential communication with Nana Farnavis, as he detailed to me with remarkable precision the present state of the negotiation between that minister and Mr. Malet in consequence of your Lordship's late instructions, and assured me that you might rely on their being finally concluded to your entire satisfaction, although motives of prudence and caution might delay it until the necessity should arise of carrying it into immediate effect.

The sentiments and disposition professed by Sindia for himself and the Maratha minister appear to me such as the present interest of the State and their particular situations naturally dictate, to say nothing of their apprehensions from Tippoo. The new interests of their Government and the authority of Sindia in Indostan must suggest the closest alliance with the Company, and obtain for the latter such conditions in it as they may propose for their own advantage and security, in exchange for their neutrality in the affairs of the Mogul Empire.

Intelligence which I have received this day leaves it no longer doubtful in my opinion what policy Sindia and the Poona Durbar have finally adopted respecting the stability of their power in Indostan. Sindia having, by the agency of Ismail Beg, brought Najaf Quli Khan to the verge of ruin, has secretly concluded a treaty with the last under the mediation of the Row Raja, in which it is stipulated that as soon as Rana Khan shall be disengaged from the present expedition the army under his command shall join the troops of Row Raja and Najaf Quli, for the extirpation of Ismail Beg. This measure seems to have been the real object of the mysterious visit lately made by the Row Raja to Sindia. It is doubtless the view of Sindia to destroy or to reduce below the power of resistance all the existing independent Chiefs of Indostan, whether Moguls or Hindoos; and in this design he has been able to employ them against each other, notwithstanding their apprehensions of it and the apparent necessity of their uniting to avert it. Ismael Beg will probably gain intelligence of the league formed for his destruction in time to avoid it by flight. I do not think he is in sufficient force or has confidence enough in his own strength and resources to oppose it in arms. Should this measure succeed, Sindia will be tempted to renew his designs against the Rajpoots. I do not know whether he is actuated most by pride or policy in his conduct towards those Rajas; but he is, I believe, determined to humble or reduce them or to perish in the attempt. The enterprize appears to be above his present strength, nor do I see much probability of [his] being joined in it by Holkar, who is by all accounts averse to Sindia's views and desirous of adjusting the Rajpoot tribute with the Maratha Government and of affording to them its protection, and indeed the general opposition of interests and the constant rivalry subsisting between these chiefs, if they are continued together in Hindostan must

render the Maratha administration in it weak and precarious. It is however probable that the superior influence of Sindia at Poona will obtain the recall of Holkar as soon as there is an appearance of tranquillity in the country by the return of Rana Khan's army and the humiliation of Ismael Beg and Najaf Quli Khan.

The struggle of Aly Bahadur for a share of the power with Sindia seems to be entirely at an end; he has acquiesced in the proposals made to him of an assignment in *jaidad* for the payment of his troops, and is only superior to other sardars in the service of Sindia by a few marks of external respect.

Sindia seems to have made his final arrangement of Shah Alam's establishment in the appointment of Shah Nizamuddin to reside at his Majesty's Durbar and the allotment of a stipend of six lacs of Rupees per annum for his household and personal expense.

248. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 17th May, 1789.

I have very little information to add to that which you will obtain from the country newspapers. There is one subject but slightly mentioned in them, which is a source of considerable uneasiness and vexation to Sindia and of trouble to me. I mean the protection afforded by the Vizier to Sital Das and other servants of the King, who have certainly embezzled the revenue and betrayed their master. Sindia's principal object in procuring the Shah's requisition for these people being delivered up is no doubt to obtain the wealth they have secreted, and in truth he has the best title to it, since all the charge of Government is upon him. Besides this consideration, it will be impossible for him to exercise his authority with effect, if such notorious delinquents as Sital Das are so powerfully sheltered whenever they may chuse to elude it, and so marked an indisposition towards it is shown by the Vizier's Government. Lord Cornwallis has viewed the matter in the same light, and strongly and repeatedly advised the surrendering of Sital Das, both in justice to the Shah, and in consideration of the friendship and connection subsisting with Sindia and the Maratha State. But His Lordship's recommendation has hitherto been ineffectual, and even the decency of an answer to His Majesty's requisition has not been observed, though made four months ago.

I must do Sindia the justice to declare that his conduct towards the Vizier, ever since my Residence, has been full of good faith, and perfectly conciliating even at the moments he experienced a very different procedure from the Lucknow Durbar. I am not without apprehension of disagreeable consequences from the obstinacy and unkindness of the Vizier on these points. Sindia will certainly retaliate if no redress is

afforded, and the Poona Government may take an opportunity to resent a conduct so inimicable to their interests in Indostan, when it might be very distressing to the Company's affairs. I say nothing of the palpable inconsistency of the Vizier's opposition to the Shah's authority, from which he derives his own. Having strongly represented these circumstances to His Excellency without any kind of notice being taken of them, I think it my indispensable duty to state them and my apprehensions of the result to our Government and to request such an interposition of its influence with the Vizier as may effectually remedy the present complaints and prevent them in future. I think on this subject you may assure the Poona Durbar, that nothing will be omitted by Lord Cornwallis that a regard to justice and the maintenance of harmony and confidence can require. He has indeed so clearly expressed his sentiments on the subject of asylum to fugitives in general and to these in particular, that I am astonished His Excellency or rather his minister hesitates for a moment to give complete satisfaction. When I tell you that whilst Sital Das is thus tenaciously protected, the Prince Sulaiman Shiko is barely suffered to remain at Lucknow until he can receive answers to his applications to Lord Cornwallis, you will not be at a loss to ascribe the motive by which the minister is actuated. Sindia does not require that the Prince should be sent back, or driven from the Vizier's dominions, nor that His Excellency should adopt any measure rigorous to the Prince or discreditable to himself; all he demands is that he may not be countenanced in giving disturbance to the King's Government. You will probably hear of these subjects at Poona, which has induced me to trouble you with so particular a detail of them.

Nizam Aly Khan has written to the King and to Sindia, for their direction how to proceed respecting Mirza Juma. I believe they will both be well contented that the young Prince should remain under his protection.

Sindia continues to profess the same attachment as formerly to our Government and the same sense of the necessity for the closest union between it and the Maratha State for their mutual preservation and prosperity.

Nothing would be so likely to prove fatal to his authority in Indostan as the appearance of coldness or misunderstanding with our Government. He has little or no obstruction to apprehend for the future from his late opponents, his superiority over Ismael Beg is decided, and he has had the address to set him against those with whom in union he might have become formidable. There can be no doubt of his intention to suppress entirely the power of that chief, and but little that by stratagem or force he will effect it. Indeed, this country can never be productive to Sindia or the Maratha State whilst there are so many independent establishments in it with armies to maintain them.

The discontent of Aly Bahadur does not seem to be of much consequence to Sindia, nor do I think he has all the reason for them he pretends. But if these were abetted and supported by the presence of Holkar, they might considerably shake the authority of the Patel, and possibly force him from Indostan. It appears to me that his interests are much better promoted by Tukojee's operations in Jaypoor than it would be by a junction of their forces in this country; and I cannot believe that Sindia seriously desires it.

The appointment of Shah Nizam-ud-din to the King's Durbar is I understand at last fixed. He is not so acceptable to his Majesty as Ronojee Sindia, but I believe more capable of managing and more likely to advance the views and interests of Sindia.

I have written to my agent in Camp to solicit in my name the restitution of Syad Nur-ud-din's jagir and I have no doubt of Sindia's ready compliance, as far as depends upon him. But I cannot give much encouragement to hope for the acquiescence of Ismael Beg, whose troops are so scantily provided for, that he has hardly the power to relinquish any place of which they have once taken possession. I will however write to him also on behalf of your vakeel. It would afford me real satisfaction to be of service on this occasion, as well on account of the deserts of Nur-ud-din, as the sincere desire I have to oblige you.

249. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 12th June, 1789.

I have the pleasure to forward duplicate of a dispatch to you from the Governor General with our country newspapers to this date. From these last you will perceive the obstacles which impede and are likely to impede the quiet establishment of the Maratha authority in Indostan. And indeed I doubt whether in the most tranquil settlement of the country it would be an object to the Poona Government, as it seems incapable of producing a revenue adequate to the unavoidable expence of maintaining it. Both the power and the pretensions to reimbursement which Sindia has, will effectually prevent Indostan from being productive to the State, and it seems probable to me that a conviction of this situation has induced the minister to embarrass Sindia with Aly Bahadur and Holkar, and by their presence to check his course and prevent his becoming too formidable and independent. It cannot, I think, be intended to promote the general interest of the State that these persons of equal rank and authority are appointed to the charge of its affairs at the same time. Their views and pretensions clash too much to admit of any united efforts for the common service. But whatever may be the design of the Poona Durbar in the mission of Holkar to Indostan, I do not think it probable that a junction will take place between him and Sindia. He seems to think himself

more profitably employed in Jaypore, and tho' Sindia is very adverse to his interference with the Rajpoots, I believe he would rather relinquish his claims upon them, than admit Holkar to a participation of his acquisitions in the King's domains. These various objects and pretensions of the Maratha State and its leading members, with the hostile dispositions of the Hindoo and Mahomadan Chiefs to its influence in Indostan, the annual incursions of the Sikhs, and the constant apprehensions of the designs of the Rajpoots, must make their Government feeble and precarious, and force them to seek support from the English and the Vizier, if they mean to establish a permanent Empire in these new possessions. Of such a situation great advantages might be made by your negotiations for the security and prosperity of all the British interests in India; but as I have observed above, there is little appearance of the Poona Durbar entertaining views of a solid national establishment in Indostan.

The indisposition of Sindia has, I believe, suspended the resolution he may have formed in consequence of the protection afforded to Sital Das and others against his authority by the Vizier. I know that he regards this conduct as highly offensive and injurious to himself, and to the Maratha Government, and will make a serious and solemn appeal to Lord Cornwallis as a common friend to obtain redress and to prevent future cause of complaint; and if he cannot obtain satisfaction in this way, I apprehend he will have recourse to methods which may prove very detrimental to the Vizier's interests, and interrupt the general harmony subsisting between them. I have submitted to His Lordship the expediency of his friendly but effectual mediation to prevent these consequences, and I have no doubt but he will afford it.

It is very discreditable to Sindia to leave the Shah and his family so long without any settled provision, or any person in proper authority to transact the cash business of the Durbar and the City. You can hardly conceive how indigent and degrading the King's situation is.

Amidst the difficulties and dangers which present themselves to Sindia in his pursuit of unrivalled power to Indostan, I think he will first apply himself to remove those which most threaten him from the vicinity and strength of Ismael Beg Khan, and to effect his purpose he will probably engage as his instruments, Najaf Quli Khan and the Row Rajah. But should the Rajpoots support Ismail Beg, as it is evidently for their interest and security to do, his suppression will hardly be effected by any force the Marathas can bring against him. He is certainly aware of his danger and exerting himself to provide against it. Should he be subdued, the next object of Sindia's jealousy and vengeance would be the Rajah of

Jaypore, against whom he seems to be actuated by both these passions to such a degree as to determine [him] to gratify them or perish in the attempt. His success however would be very doubtful in the undertaking, as the Rajah of Jodhpore will never abandon an interest with which his own is inseparably connected, and their united force seems to be an overmatch for that of the Marathas. It would be prudent in Sindia to come to a reasonable accommodation with these Rajahs, if he intends to settle Indostan as a permanent and productive Government, unless he could obtain the assistance of ours in support of his views.

250. E. O. H. IVES TO C. W. MALET.

Lucknow, 5th July 1789.

I have very little to inform you respecting the affairs of this part of Hindostan. The poor old King remains in the nominal possession of the throne, but with scarce the common necessities of life. Sindia is still at Muttra, his sepoys clamorous for their pay, Jivvaji and Aly Bahadur discontented, and he himself dangerously ill.

The Prince Mirza Sulaiman Shiko, who absconded from Delhi, is at Lucknow, but has been taken no notice of by the Vizir or myself, except by my unsuccessful endeavours to persuade him to return to the Capital, or at least to take his departure from the Vizier's territories.

251. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 7th July 1789.

Sindia is still confined by the painful eruptions which are mentioned in the newspapers, but I have no idea that they are dangerous. Nor does he seem to entertain any apprehensions for himself. He has declined Mr. Cochrane's offer of assistance as unnecessary, and the Bhow writes to me that only two boils remain and these will be removed in a few days. I proposed visiting him in order to ascertain his real situation, and to be present at the arrival of Holkar; but he has requested of me to defer it until his recovery, and says that it may be a considerable time before an interview takes place between him and that Chief, altho' they are so near; and perhaps both parties will endeavour to know what will be the result of their meeting before they come to it. I do not think that Sindia will cede any part of the acquisitions he has made in Indostan, unless Holkar will engage to assist in securing them by the reduction of Ismail Beg, and in the conquest of Jaypore or the submission of its Rajah to such a tribute as Sindia shall think proper to impose. Holkar does not appear to be in a condition to provide for himself independently, but he may be sufficiently powerful to thwart Sindia's progress and to disturb his authority. Thus it seems for their mutual interest to unite, but distrust and rivalry will probably supersede all other considerations.

Aly Bahadur is of little or no consequence in the eyes of the people of Indostan, and of no use to Sindia, since as you will observe he is not able to defend the district transferred to him for the maintenance of his troops. He is however able to vex and embarrass the Patil, which was I imagine the principal purpose of his appointment.

252. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 29th July 1789.

Sindia will suffer considerably both in his reputation and authority by his attempt to seize Himmat Bahadur and the effectual protection which that Gosain has found from Aly Bahadur under the standard of the Peshwa. By this injudicious effort, the superiority of the latter, which was regarded as merely nominal, has been proved to be real and substantial ; and as this transaction has brought Holkar to Muttra sooner than he intended, avowedly to support Aly Bahadur, their united opposition to Sindia if continued threatens the entire loss of his power and influence in Hindostan, and will probably induce him to proceed to Poona for the recovery of them.

The report in the Delhi newspapers of Shah Nizam-ud-din having required of the King to resign in favour of his eldest son Mirza Akbar, is confirmed to me by my agent at the King's Durbar. Sindia I believe finds that the presence of the King in his Camp or wherever he may be, is expedient to give sanction to his measures, and thinks that Shah Alam's age and blindness disqualify him for a situation so liable to fatigue. But I doubt whether he will proceed further than to obtain His Majesty's consent, before he knows your Lordship's sentiments upon the proposed change.

Dhan Sing, the vakeel from Jaypore, passed this place a few days since. On my application to Sindia for a passport for him to proceed thro' his dominions with letters and presents for your Lordship, he took occasion to observe that the Raja of Jaynagar availed himself of the complimentary intercourse subsisting between our Government and him, to circulate reports of our affording him military aid, which encouraged resistance to the Maratha authority, that he was perfectly satisfied your Lordship did not wish nor apprehend that such an effect would be produced, and hoped that you would obviate it in future, by discouraging as far as might be consistent with the interests and dignity of your Government, the passing and repassing of vakeels between you and his enemies. I think it my duty to remark to your Lordship in this place that the vakeels whom I have known to obtrude themselves upon our Government, with applications to convey letters in person, have generally

been men of little weight or consideration at the Courts from which they produced their credentials, but have obtained them by purchasing the solicitation of persons of interest for the purpose of trading exempt from duties under sanction of the passports granted them as public ministers.

253. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 3rd August 1789.

You will perceive by the country news the critical situation in which Sindia is placed, by his dispute with Aly Bahadur on account of the asylum afforded to Rajah Himmat Bahadur, and the decided approbation and support which Holkar gives to the former. This injudicious attempt of Sindia to seize the person of Himmat has given a consequence and respect to Aly Bahadur which he might never have attained without the extent of his authority being ascertained by this accidental exertion of it, and if he and Holkar steadily unite and pursue the advantage they have gained over the influence and reputation of Sindia by this event, they may secure an equal participation of the power and revenue in Indostan. It is however probable that Sindia by his address and the superior advantages which he can hold out to Holkar will detach him from the interests of Aly Bahadur; and if he should effect this point he will soon be in a condition to dictate to the former by means of the formidable body of infantry which he is raising under De Boigne and towards which he furnishes the supplies with unusual spirit and liberality. It appears to me that the Poona Government will not have much weight or interference in the competition of these Chiefs, but wait to make the most it can from the successful competitor. It is of some importance to retain the nominal authority of the Peshwa in the administration of these provinces, as it may at a convenient season be executed to the benefit of the State; but more will be expended in the struggle than can be obtained from the acquisition for many years to come, and indeed I do not suppose that Aly Bahadur or Holkar have a view to permanent settlement, but immediate booty. Sindia is actuated by ambition and the natural perseverance of his character in all his pursuits.

I am at a loss to assign any solid reasons for the proposal which Sindia has instructed Shah Nizam-ud-din to make to Shah Alam of resigning the *masnad* to Akbar Shah. It seems to me that his delegated power may be exercised with less restraint under a King whose blindness is supposed to disqualify him from the necessary functions of his office, than under a Prince with all his faculties and naturally capable of transacting his own affairs; and that the establishment of the last must unavoidably be more expensive than the first. It is possible, but not very likely, that Sindia

may respect the custom in Mahomedan Governments of setting aside a monarch who is deprived of sight, or may find the prejudice in favour of that custom so strong as to impede business. Whatever may be the motive, the old King is very unwilling to part with the shadow of royalty, nor do I believe that Sindia would proceed further than to obtain his consent before he obtains the approbation of our Government to the elevation of Mirza Akbar.

The discontent occasioned to Sindia by the protection afforded to Sital Das and others at Lucknow, is not removed, and as no answer can be obtained from the Vizier, the Patel has at length applied or rather appealed to Lord Cornwallis and stated in very forcible terms the disagreeable consequences, which must ensue from His Excellency's refusing satisfaction for the repeated injuries complained of, unless His Lordship's friendly offices should be interposed to prevent them. I am concerned to add that the Vizier shows so little inclination to attend to the remonstrances already made to him on these subjects, that at this time the troops, arms and effects of Himmat Bahadur are received in his dominions, notwithstanding a previous request against it, and altho' a proclamation is still in force by His Excellency for apprehending Himmat Bahadur and his adherents for their abuse of the protection formerly afforded them against Sindia and violating the neutrality of the Vizier's Government. I am very apprehensive that these practices will be productive of very troublesome consequences, and embarrass and obstruct our views at the Poona Durbar. For unless Lord Cornwallis will *insist* upon His Excellency's refraining from proceedings which he has explicitly disapproved, the recommendation to do so will be little attended to, whilst the interests of the Nabob's advisers are promoted in continuing them.

I hope to be soon able to inform you of the result of the conferences between Sindia and Holkar, as the former writes to me that he shall request my attendance as soon as matters are arranged for my reception. He also assures me that the Peshwa and his minister very highly disapprove of the behaviour of Aly Bahadur in declining the usual ceremonious interview with me, and that it would in consequence take place when I next come to Camp. But the proposal must now come from Aly Bahadur to me before I consent to meet him.

Bhou Bakshy has not yet performed his promise of sending me the sanads for your Moonshy's taluq. Indeed, Sindia's occupations have left him neither time nor temper of late to attend to matters of that nature, and the Bhou himself is not only remarkably slow, but has been employed in his own object of recovering Ferozabad on the delinquency of Himmat. I have however no doubt that the sanads will be granted, and shall take care to secure them when I go to Camp.

253 A. *Presents paid to Mahajee Sindia and his musahibs on 27th December 1787, on William Palmer's first interview with Sindia.*

<i>Rajah.</i>				<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
A Pearl <i>har</i> (Necklace)	700 0 0	
1 <i>Sarpech</i> and 1 <i>Kalgi</i>	800 0 0	
2 Pairs <i>shawls</i>	350 0 0	
2 Pieces <i>Kinkhab</i> (brocade)	180 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Bhagalpur</i> Cloth	16 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Satin</i>	120 0 0	
1 Piece <i>ganz</i>	50 0 0	
1 Benares <i>dopatta</i>	50 0 0	
1 Piece <i>pelong</i>	16 0 0	
2 Pieces <i>Chandully</i> cloth	24 0 0	
A Set broad cloth	48 0 0	
1 Gun	200 0 0	
A Pair Pistols 4 Barrels	600 0 0	
A Europe <i>talwar</i> (sword)	100 0 0	
1 Reflecting Telescope	350 0 0	
1 Clock	275 0 0	
1 Elephant	1,600 0 0	
1 Horse	500 0 0	
					5,979 0 0

Bapu Eetal Row.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>	175 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	90 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Satin</i>	120 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Pelong</i>	16 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Cossimbazar</i> Silk	30 0 0	
1 Do. Benares <i>phulwar</i>	16 0 0	
2 Pieces <i>Chandully</i> bootadar	40 0 0	
1 Horse	400 0 0	
					887 0 0

Naro Shankar.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>	175 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	90 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Pelong</i>	16 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Chandully</i> bootadar	20 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Bhagalpur</i> Cloth	16 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Guzrat mashru</i>	25 0 0	
1 Turband	20 0 0	
					362 0 0

Rana Khan.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>	175 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	90 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Pelong</i>	16 0 0	
1 Set Broad Cloth	48 0 0	
1 Turband	20 0 0	
					349 0 0

Mirza Rahim Beg Khan.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>	175 0 0	
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	90 0 0	
1 Do. <i>Pelong</i>	16 0 0	
1 Turband	20 0 0	
1 Set Broad Cloth	48 0 0	
					349 0 0

Presents paid to Mahajee Sindia, etc.—contd.

				Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
<i>Krishna Chitnavis.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
1 Do. Pelong	16	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
							266	0	0

Munshi Jashr Singh.

1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0
1 Do. Pelong	16	0	0
1 Turband	20	0	0
					266	0 0

Tatya Farnavis.

1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0
1 Do. Pelong	16	0	0
1 Do. Chandully bootadar	20	0	0
1 Turband	20	0	0
					286	0 0

Ambaji.

1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0
1 Do. Pelong	16	0	0
1 Do. Chandully Cloth	12	0	0
1 Turband	20	0	0
					278	0 0

Dhar Rao.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>	150	0	0
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	80	0	0
1 Do. <i>Pelong</i>	16	0	0
1 Do. <i>Chandully</i> Cloth	12	0	0
1 Turband	}	20	0	0
					278	0 0

Jivaji Bakhshi.

1 Pair <i>Shawls</i>				150	0	0
1 Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	80	0	0
1 Do. <i>Peleng</i>	16	0	0
1 Do. <i>Chandully</i> Cloth	12	0	0
1 Turband	20	0	0
					278	0 0

Krishna Rao Mujamdar.

1	Pair <i>Shawls</i>	150	0	0
1	Piece <i>Kinkhab</i>	80	0	0
1	Do. Benares phulon	16	0	0
1	Turban	20	0	0
					266	0	0

Presents paid to Mahajee Sindia, etc.—contd.

				Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
<i>Apa Rao Farnavis.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
1 Do. Chandully Cloth	12	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
				—			262	0	0
<i>Bapoo Vakeel.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
1 Do. Chandully Cloth	12	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
				—			262	0	0
<i>Bapoo Vakeel 2nd.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
1 Do. Chandully Cloth	12	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
				—			262	0	0
<i>Krishna Pawar.</i>									
Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
Do. Pelong	16	0	0			
Do. Guzerat Mashru	25	0	0			
Do. Chandully Cloth	12	0	0			
Do. Bhagalpur Cloth	16	0	0			
Turband	20	0	0			
				—			319	0	0
<i>Bapu Eetal Row's Son.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
2 Pieces Chandully Cloth	24	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
				—			274	0	0
<i>Apaji Bhairo Nath.</i>									
1 Pair Shawls	150	0	0			
1 Piece Kinkhab	80	0	0			
1 Turband	20	0	0			
1 Benares Dopatta	50	0	0			
				—			300	0	0
Zitafat to Apaji Bhairo Nath	50	0	0			
Bakshish to Rajah's servants	300	0	0			
1 Pair Shawls for Darogah	75	0	0			
1 Do. for Mahcots	50	0	0			
				—			475	0	0
Sicca Rupees							11,998	0	0

254. EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G., TO MAJOR PALMER.

Calcutta, 17th Aug. 1789.

Sindia's recovery from his late indisposition has given me great pleasure; and considering him in the light of an old friend of the Company, I wish you to offer him on this event my warmest congratulations.

Candour obliges me to acknowledge that the Vizier's general conduct towards Sindia for several years past, must have been considered by the latter as unaccommodating and to a certain degree provoking; but at the same time great allowance should be made for the feelings of a Prince of His Excellency's rank and dignity at having been witness for a train of successive years of the perseverance with which Sindia has pursued schemes of unbounded ambition and avarice in Hindostan.

I cannot therefore admit upon the most impartial consideration of their relative situations that Sindia's complaints against the Vizier are founded upon such solid grounds, as to justify his throwing out threats of public resentment.

For tho' I do not approve of His Excellency's showing countenance or furnishing shelter to Sindia's professed political enemies; yet as those men have only become his enemies in consequence of his own ambition and a systematic plan of encroachment, the protection which may have been afforded to some of them by the Vizier cannot be viewed by any means in as offensive a light as if they had been native Marathas, or had been for a considerable time in a state of submission to the Maratha Government.

It will be proper that you should take an early opportunity to discuss this subject fully with Sindia, and after claiming the credit to which we have so just a title for the sincerity with which I have adhered to my professions to him since my arrival in India, and which he has experienced in the most substantial manner by the strict neutrality which this Government has observed during several delicate and critical turns in his affairs, you will convey to him the substance of what I have stated in the most friendly and conciliatory language.

I should wish you at the same time to be at pains to explain to him that, although the general principles of his own political conduct ought in my opinion to render him cautious in preferring public complaints against the Vizier of the nature of those that have been lately under discussion, yet that I am ready to allow that His Excellency's behaviour to him on several occasions has not been entirely blameless; and you may assure him that from that consideration, as well as from my personal regard for him, and my respect for the Maratha State, I shall always be ready to interpose my good offices with the Vizier to obtain his acquiescence to all Sindia's reasonable requests. But you will also endeavour to make Sindia sensible that should His Excellency's aversion to such compliances

as I may from time to time recommend prove invincible by means of persuasion, it would not only be indelicate, but highly unjustifiable in me to employ any other mode to induce an ally with whom we are connected by the strictest ties of friendship and mutual interest, to comply with requisitions, which even in my own opinion cannot in strict justice be demanded from him.

I do not expect that Sindia will have candour enough to see the full force of the arguments to be made use of in the above explanation, tho' I depend upon your conducting the conference with the utmost civility and address.

I trust however that they will at least have the effect of convincing him of the sincerity of my professions of a friendly disposition towards him, and of inducing him to be satisfied with such acts of complaisance from the Vizier, and the degree of forbearance on his part from interfering in the affairs in which Sindia is engaged, as I may be able to obtain from His Excellency by friendly and conciliatory representations.

At the same time should Sindia, contrary to my expectations, declare that he will not overlook, or depend entirely upon my interference to endeavour to procure redress for any future similar grounds of complaint that may be furnished by the conduct of the Vizier, and should he think proper to express a resolution to show his resentment by any public act, you are to recommend to him in civil but in the most explicit terms to weigh very maturely the consequences that may follow his executing such a determination, and notify to him in a manner that cannot be misapprehended that I shall consider any act of injury or insult to the Vizier or his subjects precisely in the same light as if it had been offered to any of the immediate subjects or dominions of the Company.

Sindia must upon the smallest recollection be sensible that he has no kind of right to make representations on the subject of my maintaining an intercourse of civility with any of the independant Princes in Hindostan, although by his political projects they may be engaged in occasional hostilities with him. He cannot suppose that I will consider myself responsible for the reports that any of those Princes or their agents may think proper to propagate of assistance or countenance that they expect to receive from this Government. But when he reflects that if I had had the inclination, it was always in my power to have interfered with efficiency in the royal affairs, and that for several years nothing has tempted me to deviate from the line of strict neutrality which I have uniformly declared to be our system, I am persuaded that he must admit that I have a right to claim his confidence and full credit with him for the fairness of my conduct and the sincerity of my professions.

Should Ali Bahadur and Tukojee Holkar conduct themselves towards you with those ceremonial marks of attention and respect which are due to the Resident of this Government, I have no objection to your

maintaining an intercourse of the common forms of civility with them, but you will carefully avoid all appearance of particular connection with either of them; and in order to prevent effectually all kinds of jealousy on that head, on the part of Sindia, you will take no step whatever, even in the intercourse of common civilities with the other Chiefs, without his previous knowledge and approbation.

The particular circumstance of Sindia's having become a principal on the side of the Marathas, in the late treaty of peace and the long connection which has now subsisted between him and this Government, has hitherto rendered it expedient to station a Resident with him, though I must confess that it is somewhat problematical whether the measure is necessary or advantageous to the Company.

From the authority which seems to have been delegated by the Peshwa's Government to Ali Bahadur and Tukojee Holkar to interfere with Sindia in the management of the Maratha interests in Hindostan, it appears to be more than probable that he may resolve to relinquish that scene altogether, and either return to his own territories or repair to Poona to endeavour to recover any credit that he may have lost with the principal members of the Peshwa's administration.

Should he come to either determination, you are not to accede to any proposition for your remaining with both, or with either of the other Maratha Chiefs; but when Sindia shall be ready to depart, you are to take leave of him with every possible public mark and demonstration of cordiality and friendship and to proceed with your assistant and escort and suite with all convenient despatch to Benares, where you will receive such further instructions as may be judged proper by this Government.

255. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Camp, 25th September 1789.

Sindia's first and great object is, I believe, to recover the reputation which he lost in his attempt against Jaypore, which he cannot effect if Holkar is in opposition to him; and I believe he is willing to make that Chief ample compensation for relinquishing his claim to interference in the adjustment of the Rajpoot concerns. He is highly exasperated with Aly Bahadur for the shock which he has given to his consequence and authority, in interposing the sanction of the Peshwa's standard against his attempt to seize Himmat, and I believe would have paid little regard to the rights or dignity of the State, if he could have obtained the forbearance of Holkar in recovering the fugitive by force. The attempt to seize that unfortunate Gosain appears to me to have been as unjust as it has been disgraceful, and I wish Sindia may get clear of it by any honorable compromise.

The Maratha Government can hardly expect to derive any advantages to the State from the progress of their army in Indostan by the appointment of such discordant powers and authorities as are held by the three Chiefs to whom they have entrusted their interests. I am doubtful whether they could, without the obstructions thus impolitically thrown in the way of their own progress, have ever acquired that degree of strength and security as would have encouraged them to give us any disturbance; and if they are to retain the administration of the King's affairs, it might be better for us that their establishment should be sufficiently firm and vigorous to preserve the country in perfect quiet and subjection, and to prevent the intrusion of Powers more likely to be hostile to us.

I am apprehensive that the character and dispositions towards each other of the several Chiefs to whom you wish to see the peace and prosperity of Indostan entrusted, is an insurmountable obstacle to such a distribution of the country as you have suggested. Nothing could induce them to confide in each other or to observe good faith, but the guaranty of our Government to compel it; and that will never be engaged I believe, nor its interposition in any shape given, to men of such description.

The cordial and honourable reception given by the Peshwa to Mirza Juma, appears to me in the same spirit of policy which guides their other measures in Indostan and probably everywhere else, to restrain the progress of any member of the State towards independence, rather than trust the aggrandizement of the State itself to his success; and indeed their constitution does not seem at all adapted to foreign conquest for the purpose of establishment and I am persuaded that they cannot long retain the acquisitions which Sindia has made if they continue their usual mode of divided authority.

I have no doubt that the Sikhs will renew their invasion to compel the payment of the contributions which they regularly received from the districts lately subdued by Sindia, and these people are likely to give sufficient employment to the Marathas, even if they should compose their differences with Rajpoots and entirely subject the Muhammadan interest. The King, too feeble as he is, will if he is discontented find means by private intrigue to disturb and embarrass the Maratha authority in his affairs. Good policy therefore, as well as justice and humanity, should dictate to Sindia a more liberal treatment than has yet been shown to His Majesty. But I see no indication of any favourable change of conduct towards him.

The situation of Ismael Beg is very critical for himself and Sindia. Separately he is not formidable either by his force, his character or his influence; but united with the Rajpoots, the Maratha power in Indostan would be very precarious. He can scarcely be so blind to his own preservation as to join the latter for the destruction of the former, or even

to remain an idle spectator of it. I am therefore induced to think that Sindia's first object will be to reduce him, and (*sic*) if he can fall upon him unexpectedly upon pretext of marching against Jaypore.

I have had no intercourse with Holkar, nor shall I make any advances towards it. He has conveyed through other channels his applications to the Vizier and our Government. These I believe have been upon no other subject than permission for Ahalya Bai to perform her pilgrimage to Allahabad, Benares and Gaya.

I have not had any discourse with Sindia upon business since my arrival in Camp; he appears desirous of deferring it until he has accommodated his difference with Aly Bahadur.

Bhow Bakhshy has been indisposed for some days past, and he tells me that, this is the sole cause of the delay in the sanad for the restitution of your Moonshy's jagir.

256. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 19th December 1789.

You will observe from the country intelligence, and it is confirmed by Sindia's proceedings, that he has gained a complete ascendancy in the Peshwa's councils over Aly Bahadur, who is evidently so much at his mercy that he must submit to such terms of reconciliation as Sindia may think proper to dictate. And as the latter is not inclined to precipitate measures against Ismael Beg or the Rajpoots, and is quietly collecting the revenues of his actual possessions and saves his money, by protracting the disputes with Aly Bahadur, their differences are not likely to be soon composed without the most implicit submission on the part of the latter. Holkar has unequivocally entered into all the views of Sindia and submitted entirely to his guidance, so that there is every appearance that their operations will be conducted with concert and effect. In what quarter their operations will commence seems to be yet undetermined, but I think it probable that they will for this season be defensive, as the Sikhs are making preparation, in league with the mother and brother of Ghulam Qadir, to re-establish the Rohilas in the dominions from which they have just been expelled in the Doab, and Sindia will endeavour to break the connection which is forming between the Rajpoots and Ismael Beg before he ventures to attack either of those Powers,—a scheme which it is very probable he will effect, by his perseverance and address working upon the necessities and mutual distrust of the other parties and the treachery of their counsellors and commanders. The Rajpoots would without scruple sacrifice Ismael Beg to their own tranquillity upon reasonable concessions being accepted by the Marathas and peace firmly secured to them. And as it is evident that Sindia will never permit, if he can prevent it, the independence of Ismael Beg, his destruction seems

inevitable, as he wants the talents and weight of character essential to support singly any degree of rivalry with the Maratha Power, and can find no ally on whom to depend. His army, numerous undisciplined and improvident, require a much larger territory for their subsistence than they can conquer, and must soon literally eat him up. Whether Sindia will find an opportunity of attacking him unsupported by the Rajpoots, or must purchase their forbearance by relinquishing his most favourite object, the recovery of Ajmere, is uncertain. But he is, in the emphatical expression of the country *watching the wind*, and will take the advantage of its turn. If this does not happen, he will I think sacrifice every other view to the extirpation of the Mahomadan influence and adjust his claims on the Rajpoots to their satisfaction. In the latter event, the Maratha authority in the King's nominal dominions will meet with but little future interruption, so long as they preserve their friendship and alliance with us, unless they weaken themselves by internal dissensions or misconduct. A vigorous and economical Government would be able to support itself from the revenue of the country against every effort of such invaders as it has to apprehend, that is the Sikhs; for I see no other quarter from whence they have the least cause of alarm, supposing Ismail Beg subdued and the Rajpoots conciliated,—both of which circumstances are likely to take place as I have shown above. It is not an improbable conjecture that in such a situation, Sindia and Holkar might entertain more aspiring views and connecting their ancient possessions with their new acquisitions form a counterpoise to the Brahmin influence at Poona, and even erect a new dominion independent of the Maratha State. But whether they may seek to throw off their subjection, or the Poona administration may be able to retain them in it, I think the struggle must afford the most perfect assurance of tranquillity to our western dependencies from the establishment of the Marathas on their confine, and even hold out perpetual opportunities of obtaining advantage either in security or extension. In a word, it is my opinion that the establishment of the Maratha authority in Indostan, to whatever hands it may be committed, will lead them to a necessary dependence upon us to a degree that must give us the ascendancy in future negotiations with them.

I think that Sindia's conduct towards Himmat Bahadur has been ungenerous, unjust and impolitic. But he has now gone too far to recede with safety, and the death or perpetual confinement of that unhappy man seems inevitable.

The art and duplicity of the Poona Durbar must frequently give you great trouble and vexation, which I hope will be considerably diminished by the consequence (*sic*) they have experienced in the Janjira business. However, it is some consolation that your reputation will be in proportion to the difficulties which you have to surmount; my situation has been perfectly smooth and easy, not only from its unimportance, but from the

good sense, moderation and candour which I have invariably experienced in Sindia. The exercise of these qualities may indeed be attributed to his discernment of his true interest, and that I believe is the only tie upon which we may safely rely in all political professions from the native Princes.

I attended Sindia in his excursion to the Ganges at Ramghat, and he was much gratified by the attention and respect paid to him by the Vizier's amils in his route, in consequence of orders from Lucknow. I hope that this instance of the Vizier's goodwill towards him will remove the suspicion from his mind of a fixed indisposition towards him and his interests at the Court of Oudh, with which some unfavourable occurrences had impressed him, and smooth the way to an amicable adjustment of the few disagreeable subjects still under discussion. With respect to Sital Das, Sindia has not stood forth in his name or person, but the demands for delivering him up have been always made by *shukka* from the King. The affair is at present dormant, but will I fear be revived unless Lord Cornwallis should repeat his advice to the Vizier. His Excellency ought not to have given protection to a man who had so infamously betrayed and defrauded the King, but having done it, his credit and his feelings must be materially hurt by being compelled to withdraw it. The guns carried off by Jahangir Khan from Sindia's service have been restored by the Vizier, which has been highly acceptable to the Patil. I must, while mentioning these transactions, do justice to Sindia by declaring that his conduct in whatever respects the Vizier, has been uniformly kind and conciliating, and has not afforded a single instance of complaint.

You will see that the usual ceremonious visits have passed between Tookajee and myself. I am much pleased with the plainness and simplicity of his demeanour, and shall be glad to improve our acquaintance, of which he seems equally desirous.

Although Aly Bahadur and I have not had an interview, he has sought a private intercourse, which as you will suppose I have declined, but expressed a willingness towards open and reciprocal civilities, whenever he may intimate a desire to establish it by the previous and customary forms of meeting.

I believe that no objection would be made to conveying our correspondence by Sindia's *dak*; but I doubt the utility of it, as I understand it is neither regular nor free from interruption. Your despatch of the 4th October was brought to me by it and was six weeks on the way. I will however ascertain the point with precision and advise you of it in my next.

Upon application to the brother of Syad Nur-ud-din Khan at Delhi for the original grants of the jagirs in his family, in order to obtain Sindia's confirmation and new sanads, he told Syad Raza Khan, that they had no property at Meerat, and as to that in Rohtak, it was now in the hands of

Ismail Beg and assigned in subsistence to his troops ; and even admitting that he would restore it, the villages have been so harassed and depopulated that they would not compensate the trouble and expense of reassumption. Thus the matter rests. Bhow Bakhshy is ready to perform his promise. The suspension however is no immediate loss to the family, as Ismail Beg would pay no kind of regard to the sanads from Sindia, though they may be useful as a reserve against a change of authority in those districts.

By the latest accounts from Kabul, Timoor Shah continued occupied in guarding against the designs of his enemies on the northward and the revolt of his tributaries in Multan. From all that I can learn of the state of his country and Government, it is not likely he will ever be in a condition to give disturbance to Indostan.

The principal Sikh Chieftains are fighting with one another in Lahore, but may and probably will give the Marathas much trouble when their intestine broils are composed.

257. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 28th Jan. 1790.

It may be proper to inform your Lordship that the Vizier's amil on the western frontier in the Doab has desired me to communicate to Sindia His Excellency's intention to reduce the fort of Sarsny* and to expel the zamindar, and his wish that Sindia would co-operate in this design as he is equally interested in its success.

Sindia has declared to me his readiness to join in this undertaking, and wishes it to be prosecuted without delay, and I have acquainted the Resident at Lucknow of this answer.

The zamindar of Sarsny holds his country subject to the authority of the King and the Vizier for separate portions of it, and under the engagement of a specific annual tribute to each, but which he discharges only when his superior is in a condition to compel him.

I apprehend there is little hazard or difficulty in the proposed enterprize, if the officers of the Vizier and Sindia who may have the conduct of it act with mutual good faith and cordiality ; but as this circumstance cannot be strongly relied on, I have suggested to Mr. Ives the expediency of securing it if possible by a previous arrangement of the necessary operations between the principals.

I do not however think it probable that this business will conclude in any concerted plan or combination of force, but that the parties will separately either accept of compromise or attack the districts on which they respectively have claim.

*Sarsni, 14 miles south of Aligarh town.

There can be no doubt that the expulsion of this zamindar would tend considerably to the security of the Vizier's collections in his neighbourhood.

The present aspect of Sindia's affairs is by no means favourable to the views which he is supposed to entertain of the exclusive possession of the King's authority and revenue, humbling the Rajpoots, securing the dependency of Ismael Beg, and checking the future incursions of the Sikhs. Tukojee Holkar has formed recent pretensions on the first of these objects, and the others are likely to be defeated or at least opposed by a combination of the Powers to whom they are hostile. The perseverance and address of Sindia may finally surmount those obstacles, but this is uncertain, and at any rate his success will be slow and progressive. He appears to be taking measures calculated for some decisive effort, having restored Rana Khan to his former confidence and ascendancy in his councils, and being on the point of reconciliation with Aly Bahadur, which he probably expects will induce Holkar to recede from his demands, or preclude the necessity of any longer preserving terms with him. But I think the difference more likely to terminate in mutual concession.

But perhaps Sindia's principal reliance for the ultimate success of his schemes, is upon the corps formed by and under the command of Mr. De Boigne and as nearly as could be effected upon the footing of the Company's native troops. It consists of near 5,000 sepoys, chiefly clothed armed and disciplined in the manner of ours, 80 pieces of artillery served by European gunners, and 350 Indostany horse. A number of European officers are attached to this corps, and several who have gained experience and reputation in the country service; these are all foreigners. But I am sorry to observe that several British subjects have found their way into it, some of whom are worthy of better service and others are a disgrace to any service.

Although it appears to me that the Corps thus formed by the Princes of India are necessarily so defective in their institution, economy, discipline and equipment that they can never become really formidable to the British Power, I presume it may not be agreeable to your Lordship that they should come into any apparent competition with it in military establishment, or that English officers should engage in their service. It is for these considerations that I have given the information above stated upon this subject, that your Lordship may if you should deem it expedient discourage it by preventing the further emigration of British subjects, or in such other manner as you shall judge most effectual.

258. FROM RAJAH BIJAY SINGH TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Received 1st March 1790.

Your Lordship's two friendly letters which arrived nearly at the same time and afforded me very great happiness and pleasure, have been replied

to, and the contents of my answers have doubtless been perused. My friend, since the day of the arrival of the English nation in the Eastern countries, the fame of their disposition, so adverse to the least injury or inconvenience to the Powers and zamindars of those countries and so repugnant to the desire of expelling any one from their residence, is as public as the sun and moon, and known to the world. By virtue of this disposition, their prosperity increases daily, and the knowledge of it has regenerated the minds of the Princes and zamindars of Hindostan, who are in their hearts sensible that the Sultanat of Hindostan—which has been burnt up by the scorching winds of oppressors, and has experienced the passing injurious hand of every new comer, and where the tyrannical Marathas, from the designs of extending their power over the whole country and so to spread their mischiefs, intend that no one shall be able to oppose them,—will, if they enter into league and alliance with the Rajahs, by their mutual aid become again flourishing, in a manner that it will never hereafter decline and the foundation of their own success be so firmly laid, as never to be undermined. But by unalterable decrees of Providence, the fate of Hind was involved in destruction and the ruin of many large and noble families was determined, for Sindia suddenly made his appearance, betrayed every Hindostany, and destroyed their families. He was false with whomsoever he entered into agreement. In the first instance, he attacked the English troops, deceived the Commander of the troops by treaties and engagements, until he got possession of the fort of Gwalior. In the next instance he invited the Amir-ul-umara Nawab Afrasiab Khan by strong professions of friendship and by many and various oaths and engagements of the religion and tenets of Hindoos and by the *bel bhandar* (which is the most sacred of all oaths among the Marathas), united himself with him. Immediately that the connection was formed, without the delay of a moment, he traitorously murdered him. The conduct he has pursued towards his descendants is not a secret. It is known to the world. His whole conduct is known to your Lordship. At present the design uppermost in the hearts of the Marathas is to deceive and become inimical towards the English, and by any means to light the torch of war in that quarter. But so long as the mind of Sindia is not easy in regard to these two Rajes, and affairs do not begin to wear the face of adjustment, he will continue to make professions of friendship and good understanding with that quarter with all possible deceit. To-day, if matters with me were to come to an amicable and peaceable adjustment, that instant would he stir up the dust of warfare in that quarter. But these Rajes have not the smallest dependance on the words and engagements of this race. By God's help and kindness, your Lordship possesses a thorough knowledge of affairs and is versed in the nature of the times, well knowing how to discriminate truth from evil. Doubtless your Lordship will thoroughly weigh and consider every affair in negotiation with the Marathas. It is

heard that several agents, induced by self-interested views, report deceitful and officious meddling stories to your Lordship. Nevertheless, your Lordship will not give ear to their tales nor fall into snares of their deceit. We are the zamindars of Hindostan from the day of the creation, and the prosperity and adversity of this country, its success, good or bad, rests with us; and we are induced to wish and pray for your prosperity and success by your faith to engagements and by your adherence to your treaties. If your Lordship will enter warmly into connection with us, by the help of Providence, it will be the source of many advantages. No deviation will ever happen from the tenor of our professions and engagements. With this view I have despatched Sankar [or Sahukar] Ram Sing to your Lordship to make known my innermost secrets, and require your Lordship will consider what he may represent as sincere and without disguise. By God's help, your Lordship is firmly fixed on the throne of Government in such a country as that to the eastward. If a firm alliance and friendship is established between the English and these Rajes, by the aid of Providence, when any affair of importance and necessity shall occur to your Lordship, the Rajpoots will join your Lordship, and your Lordship will assist them. Your Lordship's Government will be fixed for ever, and we will jointly labor to the arrangement of the affairs of Hindostan, to the very borders of it on all sides, and the desires of the English will be accomplished. Should the Marathas prevail, some day or other the English will feel the bad effect of their superior power. I have written this for your Lordship's information.

259. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Sindia's Camp, 21st Feby. 1790.

In obedience to your commands, I took the earliest opportunity of communicating to Sindia the intelligence which your Lordship had received of Tippoo Naik's having without provocation violated the treaty of peace subsisting between the Company and him, by an attack on the Rajah of Travancore, a party in the treaty, and whose country is under that and other solemn engagements guaranteed and protected by the British Government in India.

Having fully explained to Sindia the nature of the connection and ancient alliance between the Company and Ram Rajah, and the motive alone which could induce your Lordship to engage in war, an inviolable regard to the faith of treaties, and having added that you hoped the justice and moderation which you had observed towards all the Princes of India, would obtain you the support of the friends and allies of your Government, and in particular that Sindia would exert his influence in the Maratha State for its co-operation towards obtaining a just and adequate reparation for this perfidious breach of public faith,—I had the satisfaction to hear him declare that he was fully convinced of the probity and honor—

in protecting your ally and in punishing the insult and injury which had been offered to him, and that he was no less sensible of the security and advantage which your Lordship's requisition held out to the Maratha nation. These sentiments, he assured, he would without hesitation or delay communicate to the Administration at Poona, and support them there with all his weight and influence. He did not however appear to be very sanguine of immediate success, but rather apprehends difficulty and delay from some remaining jealousy in the Peshwa's councils of our Power and designs, and some remaining resentment at our neutrality during their late war with Tippoo ; but these he hoped Mr. Malet would be able to remove by explaining the restrictions which were at that time imposed upon our Government by treaty and by the public engagements which your Lordship has now empowered him to enter into. He at the same time informed me that Tippoo had lately made valuable presents to the Peshwa and to Nizam Aly Khan, but with what view or with what effect, he had not learned. He thought however that Tippoo had sufficient confidence in his own strength, abilities and resources to undertake a war against us without auxiliary support.

Sindia also voluntarily proposed to urge the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan to espouse our cause, and seemed to place great dependance on his connection and influence with that Prince.

He advised me not to confer with Tukoji Holkar on the subject of a war with Tippoo, as they are in constant and confidential communication, but to postpone it until I could ascertain that it would not be attended with any prejudice to our affairs. I thought it proper to acquiesce in this advice, as it is probably a jealousy of the Subahdar's interference which has prompted Sindia to give it, and the zeal and ardor which he professes might be damped by Holkar's participation in promoting your Lordship's views.

I have little doubt of the sincerity of Sindia's declarations in favour of the proposed connection between the two Governments, as he has already experienced very solid advantages from the weight and importance which the lead he assumed in the transactions of the State with the Company gave him, and is certainly desirous to preserve and improve this ascendancy ; perhaps he is not without expectation that the present conjecture may furnish him the means of creditable retreat and compensation in the event of misfortune in Indostan. This conjecture is warranted by the present critical appearance of his affairs, it being almost certain that the Rajpoots and Ismail Beg have at length formed a confederacy against him, and that they will not wait his attack. Ismail Beg has already invaded the country of the Row Rajah, the firmest and most useful of Sindia's allies, and whom he must unavoidably assist. It was Sindia's object to have preserved measures with Ismail Beg until he could have reduced the Rajah of Jaypoor ; but either the precipitation of Holkar in seizing some of his villages or his sense of the danger of suffering

the Rajpoots to, be crushed, have induced him to unite with them, and Sindia must now provide to oppose their accumu'ated force.

The Sikhs are assembled on the western frontier of Sindia's possessions, ready to take advantage of any favourable circumstance to invade them. These alarming appearances will probably compel Sindia to accommodate his differences with Aly Bahadur upon the terms which he has hitherto resisted as disadvantageous and humiliat'ng, but no reconciliation is likely to be lasting between Chiefs independan' in authority and rivals in pursuits.

Having at Sindia's request delayed to despatch my letter until he should make some further communications for your Lordship's information, he yesterday desired that my agent might attend Bhow Bakhshy for that purpose, to whom the Bhow imparted that his master had deliberated with his most confidential servants upon the measures which it might be expedient for him to recommend to the Peshwa's ministers in the present conjuncture of the Company's affairs, and that the result had been a determination to offer his services to both Governments in forming and maintaining the alliance and co-operation proposed by your Lordship ; in other words to become the mediator and guarantee between them as in the Treaty of Salby.

As I do not know what effect his interposition might produce upon Mr. Malet's negotiations, if introduced under the sanction of your Lordship's concurrence, I have given the Bhow to understand, although he did not intimate a desire that the interference of his master should be so introduced, that I believe your Lordship would have no objection to Sindia's again standing in that relation to the Company, if the Peshwa's Government should desire it on their part, but that you required no additional security for their engagements.

Your Lordship will I think perceive in this offer of mediation, that it is a real and important object of Sindia's policy to be useful to the English nation and Government in India ; and possibly your views might be accelerated by gratifying him in it, if it can be done without exciting distrust at Poona.

Bhow Bakhshy added on this subject professions of his own zeal and attachment for your Lordships's Government, and hinted that it would not be impossible to prevail on Sindia to engage in person in our cause and to lead an army of his own troops into Tippoo's Dominions, intimating that if he should perform so essential a service as that of engaging his master in the measure he should expect a suitable reward from the Company. Whether the Bhow knows that Sindia has such a contingency in prospect, or only seeks to gain a little credit with your Lordship, I cannot pretend to determine ; but I encouraged him so far as to say that our Government never left important services unrecompensed,

Sindia wished your Lordship to be informed of his own situation and intentions at this time. He says that he has acted with kindness and good faith towards Ismail Beg since their late pacification, in the hope of securing his fidelity and assistance, and that he has made great cessions from the just demands which he has upon the Rajpoots in order to effect an amicable termination of their disputes ; but notwithstanding his equitable and conciliating conduct towards these Powers, they have entered into a hostile combination against him and the Maratha Power in Indostan, and have actually invaded the country of the Row Rajah, his best friend and ally, with whose interest and security his own are inseparably connected ; that in these circumstances war is become inevitable, and that he is making every preparation for carrying it into the enemies' country and with success ; that to facilitate this design, he and his colleagues have sacrificed their personal contentions, to the common safety and interest of the State, towards which they and their troops will vigorously co-operate ; that they have formed three distinct armies from their joint force, the most considerable to be opposed to the Rajpoots and Ismail Beg in the field, another to ravage their countries, and a third to guard against the incursions of the Sikhs. The three Chiefs remain at this place to concert and direct the plans to be executed by the Sardais entrusted with the commands of their army.

The contest wears a formidable appearance and the issue will be very doubtful if the confederates remain firmly united ; but it is thought the Rajpoots will be tempted by the mediation of Holkar to obtain favourable terms for them, to desert Ismail Beg.

This state of the Maratha interests in Indostan is I think a pledge for their neutrality at least in our dispute with Tippoo, and, if the security and improvement of them be a determined object at Poona, will probably be a strong inducement to declare in our favour.

260. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 23rd June 1790.

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Late last night I received from the Maratha camp the intelligence which goes to Mr. Cherry by this post, of the attack and defeat of the Indostany and Rajpoot forces under Ismael Beg Khan. I have been in expectation of receiving this day such further accounts of the action and its consequences, as would have shewn whether any further opposition might be expected to the complete establishment of the Maratha power. But neither a letter which I have received from Bhow Bakhshy to inform me of the victory, nor the news-paper from Sindia's Durbar, ascertain whether the battle has been decisive, nor determine whether Ismael Beg has fled, or has made a stand under the walls of Patan. I believe the success of the Marathas may be chiefly attributed to the defection

of a large body of infantry lately in the service of Ismael Beg, whom Sindia had corrupted to remain inactive during the engagement.

P.S.—By an express this instant arrived from my news-writer at Jaynagar, I am informed that two horsemen from Ismael Beg's camp had brought intelligence to the Rajah of the defeat of his troops and the flight of Ismael Beg, attended by about 20 horse, with whom he was last seen within twelve cos of Jaynagar.

EXTRACT OF A NEWSPAPER FROM SINDHIA'S CAMP, DATED 21st JUNE 1790.

Received at Calcutta, 5th July 1790.

By a news-paper from the camp of Gopal Row Bhow, advice is received that on the 6th Shawal (19 June), about 6 in the morning, Gopal Row Bhow, Jivvaji Bakhshy, with the whole of Mons. De Boigne's battalion, the troops under Bapoo Holkar, and Krishna Holkar, Row Rajah, and Najaf Quli Khan, Ambajee etc., marched to the attack of the enemy, who were commanded by Ismael Beg Khan, the Rathor Chiefs, Najaf Aly Khan etc., and met the attack. Artillery firing commenced the attack on both sides. As the battalions belonging to Ismael Beg Khan's army, who are displeased, and have for this month past encamped at a distance from Ismael Beg Khan, kept aloof during the engagement, and secretly have carried on a correspondence with the Marathas, and even gave the Marathas a passage thro' their encampment when the Marathas commenced the attack; Ismael Beg Khan and the Rathor Chiefs were totally defeated; all their baggage, their artillery and camp fell into the hands of the victors, who have met with very great plunder. A small detachment of the Rathor army is now surrounded on the Patan hill by the Maratha troops. It is unknown what is become of Ismael Beg Khan, who fled, but unknown where. Ambajee and other commanders are gone in pursuit of the Rathor troops. Hereafter the particulars of the killed and wounded of the enemy will be written; about 3,000 of the Maratha army are killed and wounded.

PAPER OF THE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE RAJAH OF JAYNAGAR,
DATED 7th SHAWAL (20th JUNE).

Received at Calcutta, 5th July 1790.

In the evening of the same day, an express camel arrived from the army of Ismael Beg Khan, with the news that on the 6th (19th June), the preceding day, an engagement had taken place between Ismael Beg Khan and the Marathas. During the engagement, the commandants of the battalions and Mirza Matlab Khan and other chiefs, who were inimical to Ismael Beg Khan, joined the Marathas. In consequence Ismael Beg Khan was totally defeated. About 8 at night, on the 7th Shawal,

Mirza Ismael Beg Khan, Najaf Aly Khan and others arrived at Jaypoor (Jaynagar). The army had dispersed. After the flight of Ismael Beg Khan, the Marathas entered his camp and great slaughter ensued.

261. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 26th June 1790.

I have forwarded to Mr. Cherry the answer of Tookojee Holkar to the representations which I made to him by your command and in the terms you prescribed, of the impressions which had been made on your mind by intelligence of his corresponding with Tippoo and endeavouring to support his cause with the Peshwa's ministers in the war against the Company.

I do not clearly understand the object of the Subahdar's reference to the Peshwa, but as he promises to communicate the answer, I suppose it is to refute the charge of using his influence in favor of Tippoo and, as ~~in~~ the meantime he professes an entire acquiescence in the views of the Marathas Government, I think your Lordship may be satisfied that he will refrain from any further interference that can give you cause of apprehension or displeasure.

I previously communicated to Sindia your Lordship's dissatisfaction at the conduct of Holkar, which he admitted was unjustifiable in the relation which that Chief stands to both Governments, and ought to be checked, although he did not believe it would have any consequences at Poona. He was probably not sorry to learn that the Subahdar had rendered himself suspected by and consequently injured his credit with your Lordship; and I hear that the latter suspects him to have conveyed the information to you for those purposes.

The victory obtained by the Maratha army over Ismael Beg and the Rajpoots seems to have been complete and decisive; all the artillery has fallen into their hands and ten corps of infantry have been compelled to surrender and deliver up their arms.

No effectual resistance to the Maratha power in Indostan can now be expected; and it is probable from the character of Sindia that he will push his success to the utmost extremity of ambition and revenge against the Rajahs of Jaypore and Jodhpore, and either utterly exterminate them, or reduce them to a state of total imbecility. But should he effect these points, I should not yet think his situation would be such as to tempt him to disturb the tranquillity of the Vizier's or the Company's possessions, and he seems in fact to be convinced that peace and friendship with both Governments is indispensable to his security in his new acquisitions of territory and authority in the Mogul Empire.

I have not yet received the sanads for the niabat of Surat. Sindia charges the delay on Shah Nizam-ud-din, who indeed received early

ostensible orders to expedite them, but I suspect has been privately instructed to wait the receipt of their nazarana.

262. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Agra, 11th July 1790.

I have the honor to forward a letter from Mahajee Sindia to acquaint your Lordship with the victory obtained by the Maratha army on the 20th ultimo over the combined forces of the Rajahs of Jodhpore and Jaynagar and Mirza Ismael Beg Khan.

I made immediate communication to Sindia of the advice which I received from Mr. Malet of the signing the Treaty of Alliance between the Company and the Peshwa, at which he has expressed great satisfaction.

My vakeel at the King's Durbar informs me that by the direction of Shah Nizam-ud-din, the naib of Sindia, he had presented to the King a petition in the name of Nizam-ud-din Khan, son of the late hakim (governor) of Surat to succeed his father in that office, which his Majesty had granted and countersigned with an order to the proper officers to prepare the accustomary *sanads*, which will be transmitted to me in a few days.

The king has intimated to my vakeel that his eldest son Mirza Akbar Shah having been declared his successor and formally invested with the insignia and authority pertaining to that station, it will be proper to present to him in that capacity a small *nazar* from your Lordship and the Vizier, on the stated occasions of those compliments to the King himself.

As a compliance with the Shah's wishes in this point would involve an acknowledgment of the right of Mirza Akbar to the succession, which your Lordship may not be disposed to admit, or to discuss, and might cause future embarrassment, I have declined giving any answer, but should be glad of your Lordship's instructions in case the subject should be repeated and pressed upon me, which is not improbable, as it appears to me to have been mentioned for the purpose of obtaining that declaration which you may at present wish to avoid. I shall only take the liberty of observing to your Lordship, that by the custom of the Empire the reigning King has an incontestable right to name his successor, and the practice has been very general, the heir thus nominated being associated in all the formal acts and authority of Government.

263. MAHADJEE SINDIA TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Received, 23rd July 1790.

As the hand of Heaven always assists the experienced in war, the kindness of Providence has at this time displayed the standard of victory. The

particulars are these :—as an army well-equipped was appointed to punish Ismail Beg Khan and the Rajpoots when they drew near, those unskilful commanders, notwithstanding their large force and artillery, could not keep their ground at Narnol, but, like their Fortune, gave way, and took shelter in the fort of Patan* on the mountains of difficult access, where they engaged in a defensive battle. Some time elapsed in this engagement, when Gangaram Bhandary, who commanded 10 or 12,000 Rathor troops and in whom they placed the greatest confidence, arrived and assisted them. Their pride and confidence was raised by his junction. But as the decrees of Heaven are superior to the intentions of men, and the assistance of mortals useless, on the 6 Shawal (19 June) in the morning, death took charge of them and they came with all their artillery from the ghats to engage. My victorious commanders, who anxiously waited for this event, attacked them. The battle lasted until in the afternoon. The conquering warriors came hand to hand with them and put thousands of them to death. In the evening they were totally defeated. Ismail and the unskilful commanders of the Rathor and Kachhwa troops, leaving their army to be cut to pieces, fled towards Jaypoor, and all the plunder fell into the hands of the conquerors. May the victory be glorious to all my friends. Further particulars your Lordship will learn from Major Palmer's letter.

264. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

Sindia's Camp, 11th August 1790.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's commands of the 27th ultimo, and have delivered to Mahajee Sindia your letters which accompanied them, in answer to his communication of his late successes, and his application in favor of the heirs of Visram Sing, with both of which he expressed particular satisfaction, and also appeared to be highly gratified by your Lordship's considering him as the founder of an alliance between the two States which promises the most important and lasting advantages to both.

Sindia has already written to your Lordship on the subject of the new duties on pilgrims established by the Vizier, and as he declared to me that he thought them very light and indulgent, I gave him no intimation that he might in any case expect remissions on his application, which I shall totally discourage if possible, knowing how difficult it is to set limits to them when once admitted.

The *sanads* for the *nābat* of Surat are still withheld without any reason assigned, and under promises invariably given on every application to deliver them. I have rather mentioned the expediting of them, as a matter of course and form, than pressed for them as indispensable to the exercise of the office ; and as I am persuaded that the desire of previously

*Patan, 60 miles North of Jaipur, and 18 miles S. W. of Narnol.

obtaining the *nazarana* is the true motive of delay, I have told Bhow Bakhshy that this is more likely to be hastened than retarded by the delivery of the sanads.

Sindia has obtained from the King a confirmation of the office of Vakeel-ul-Mutlak to the Peshwa and his successors in perpetuity, and on the 8th instant performed by commission from His Majesty the public ceremonies of Investiture, previous to which on the same day, he desired me to explain to your Lordship and the Vizier that neither the rights nor dignity of the latter were meant to be invaded, that a scrupulous respect to them would be observed as well by the Peshwa as himself, and that his real object in securing this high office in the name of the Peshwa, was to give the greater consequence and effect to his own administration of the Empire.

I observed on this explanation that your Lordship and the Vizier, having long and cautiously refrained from any interference in the King's affairs and tacitly acquiesced in the original appointment of the Peshwa to the Vakalat-ul-Mutlak, I did not apprehend that you would have any objection to the confirmation of it; and since His Majesty was avowedly incompetent to the administration of his own authority you would be pleased to see it delegated to a friend and ally, whose interests were intimately blended with those of your own Government and the Vizier's, instead of falling into hands that might be hostile or inimical to them.

The Patel informed me, that Nana Farnaweas had prevailed over the faction at Poona which supported the cause of Tippoo, and he appeared to be much rejoiced at the event.

The Rajpoots have hitherto made little or no resistance to the invasion of the Marathas. It seems to be the determination of Sindia to make a complete reduction of the countries of Jaypore and Jodhpore and to expel the Rajahs. Bejay Sing is reported to be dangerously ill, to which circumstance it is perhaps chiefly owing that the Marathas have made so unmolested a progress in Ajmere.

I have not received any further application on the subject of treating Mirza Akbar Shah with the ceremonials of successor. The arguments which your Lordship has prescribed to obviate a reference to yourself, I have urged on other occasions in which an appeal to you has been requested, and which I knew you would wish to decline, deciding when I shall repeat them in the present case—if the requisition should be renewed.

265. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

C. 10th October 1790.

I am honored with your commands of the 22nd ultimo, to which I shall pay the utmost attention.

The caution and delicacy which your Lordship has prescribed in the communications it may be proper to make to Mahajee Sindia, appear to me equally necessary for obviating any insidious use which he would make of a pretence to interfere in the Treaty of Poona, as for preventing the distrust which an appeal to him would create in the Peshwa's administration. It is not improbable that he feels some degree of mortification as having had no share in forming or concluding the alliance, and would rather promote than remove the delays and evasions of the Poona Durbar in it, for the purpose of bringing both Governments into a dependance upon him for its completion and thereby securing his own views,—although I am persuaded that he approves the measure, and would impede its success only in the hope of becoming the director of it. In some conversations with Bhow Bakhshy I have observed that his assurance of the good faith and alacrity which we should experience from the minister, were overstrained, as if intended to convey an insinuation to the contrary, and to blame our want of prudence in not confiding the Treaty to the mediation and guaranty of his master; but as I considered this as merely designed to enhance Sindia's importance in our opinion, it made no impression upon me, and I affected to understand it literally; and I still think it may be inferred from the minister's having concluded the Treaty without Sindia's participation that he will allow him no weight or influence in the conduct of it, whilst he is so entirely occupied by his pursuits in Indostan. It is only by his presence attended with his principal force, that he can materially serve our cause in the Deccan, but if future circumstances should induce your Lordship to have recourse to his assistance, though I believe he would be ready enough to afford it, I am apprehensive that he would make the security of his acquisitions on this side an indispensable condition of it.

I have hitherto acquainted Sindia with the progress of General Medows and the state of our preparations for invading Tippoo's Dominions above the Ghats, for the purposes of marking to him your Lordship's confidence of the interest he takes in the success of our arms, and of leading him to form a contrast between the zeal with which your Lordship has commenced the performance of your engagements, and the procrastination of the allies, and as he knows the stipulations of the Treaty he cannot but acquiesce in the justice of your Lordship's pursuing such measures as may become necessary for exacting the execution of them, or guarding against the consequences of the neglect or defection of the other parties.

I shall exert my best endeavours to obtain such information of the views and influence of Nana Furnavees and the faction opposed to him as your Lordship requires, but I am not very sanguine of success. The few persons in the Maratha camp qualified to give authentic intelligence on the state and designs of parties at the Peshwa's Durbar, are those to whom neither myself nor my agents can gain access, or establish an intercourse with, but at the risk of alarming the jealousy of Sindia. I will

however leave no means untried to effect a point which your Lordship deems so material to the success of your measures, that may be attempted without hazarding consequences of more importance to avoid.

Sindia himself has invariably asserted and continues to assert, that the minister will certainly fulfil his engagements, and from the candour which I have experienced in all Sindia's declarations to me, I believe this to be sincerely his opinion; and such is also the opinion generally entertained amongst the other Maratha Chiefs who do not seem to doubt either the power or inclination of Nana Farnavees to execute the conditions of the Treaty.

The dissensions between Sindia and his colleagues are at a greater height than ever; the latter have proceeded so far as to recall their troops on service with his, whilst he to make them appear more culpable to the Peshwa's Government has taken the field and encamped a few cos from his cantonments, pretending that he is prevented only by their disaffection from marching in person against their common enemy. But wide as the difference is between their demands and his offers, I think it will be adjusted, as both parties are sensible that it is not for their interests to separate. The accommodation if it takes place, will not be lasting, new disputes will arise as circumstances occur to encourage either party to extort advantages from the other, and a continual contest will be maintained so long as there remains any independence of power and authority amongst them.

266. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 28th April 1791.

Recd. 17th May.

I have been favoured with yours of the 6th ultimo accompanying copies of your correspondence with Lord Cornwallis continued to the 4th. It is with the truest satisfaction I can now congratulate you on the rapid success of his Lordship's operations against the enemy in penetrating Balaghat and reducing such a fortress as Bangalore, after a few days open trenches and in sight of Tippoo and his whole army. This, with the fortunate progress of General Abercromby above the passes on the Malabar side, the approach of the Peshwa's troops under Hary Pant Farkia and of the Nizam's cavalry, cannot fail, I think, to give us a speedy and glorious termination of the war; and as I have just heard from Sindia's Camp of advices received by him from Poona of the surrender of Dharwar [on 4th April], I hope that the labour and anxiety to which you have lately been subjected will now be mitigated and removed. I give credit to this report, because it is accompanied by that of the fall of Bangalore and some other events which I know to be true.

I observe from a letter of yours to Lord Cornwallis that you entertain some apprehension of the future designs of the Maratha State in

maintaining so large a force on this side of India and conciliating Sindia who has the conduct of it; but I think these will be removed on an attentive consideration to the present condition of that force, the dissensions of the great leaders, and the disposition of every Power in Indoostan to drive the Marathas out of it. I do not know the nature of that friendly connexion and confidence which at present subsists between the Peshwa's principal minister and Sindia, but I think it probable the object of it with both is preservation of their power and influence in their respective stations, as any views in Indoostan beyond their present establishment would require a complete union of their strength and counsels, and of course this would either be effected or Aly Bahadur and Holkar recalled to obviate the dangers of disunion and a divided authority. To judge from present appearances, these discords are fomented at Poona to check the growing greatness of Sindia, which is perhaps already too formidable for open opposition and threatens to become independent of the State, although it may be useful to the personal views of the minister and is therefore for the present ostensibly supported. You, however, must possess means greatly superior to mine of knowing the true character and designs of the Maratha Government; and, be they what they may, we have I think little to fear from them, whilst we are on our guard, even though Sindia should become the instrument of their execution, which I think he will not in any circumstances conceive it his interest to be.

You will observe by the papers the little prospect of reconciliation between Sindia and his colleagues, particularly Aly Bahadur, whose distress for money will in my opinion soon compel him to quit Indoostan.

I do not think that Sindia will make any attempt against the Sikhs this season, or at most more than a feint of attacking them to prevent their incursions into the Doab. I am privately informed that he is resolved on a visit to Ujjain, but his present situation makes such an excursion appear to me impracticable.

I know not what to think of the unexpected adventurer from Nepal, of whose progress to the westward you will see accounts in the country intelligence. [See No. 272.] A vakeel from him to Sindia is arrived in Camp, under the patronage of Chait Sing, but the purport of his mission has not yet transpired.

267. E. O. IVES TO C. W. MALET.

Lucknow, 12 May 1791.

I return you many thanks for your favour of the [blank] which contained the first authentic accounts I had received of the surrender of Dharwar, which in addition to the capture of Bangalore will, I trust, tend greatly to bring the war to a speedy and prosperous issue.

There is hardly any news in this part of India worth troubling you with; Sindia's operations you must have been made fully acquainted with by Major Palmer.

The Nepal or Goorka Rajah has lately been talked of as having extended his territories in the hills by the expulsion of the Almora or Kumaon Rajah, and it is said he has proceeded into the adjacent country of Sinagar. I have not been able to get any very particular intelligence on the subject; but I do not apprehend his object extends below the hills. There has been for these two or three years some little dispute between him and the Vizier's people about some villages near the bottom of the hills, but I do not imagine it to be of any consequence.

I dare say you have heard from Major Palmer of the untoward circumstance of Lieut.-Colonel Stuart who commanded the detachment at Anupshahar having, as he was riding out in the morning, the beginning of January last, been taken prisoner by a body of Sikhs, who had been some time in the neighbourhood on their return from a predatory incursion against Sindia's possessions in the Doab. As we are not at war with this race of freebooters (though they sometimes plunder such parts of His Excellency's territories as lie in their way), we were in hopes at first that they would have released the Colonel as soon as they knew who he was. But Bhanga Sing, the petty Chief who has him in his possession, though applied to by the Honourable Mr. Stuart and the Vizier, has refused to enlarge him without a ransom which our Government cannot think of consenting to. The poor Colonel is shut up in the fort of Thaneshwar and has lately been very ill. It is a most awkward circumstance on all account, and I fear the only way of the Colonel's recovering his freedom is by paying his own ransom,* if Bhanga Sing can be brought to accept of anything reasonable.

268. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 21st June 1791.

Since my last to you of the 23rd I have been favoured with your dispatch of the 25th ultimo.

I am rather concerned than surprised to observe by your correspondence with Lord Cornwallis the frequent occasion which you have to remonstrate with the Poona Court on their shifts, evasions and delays in executing the stipulations of the Treaty. I never supposed they would be restrained by any regard to good faith or honor, from any advantage they could take of us in the alliance with impunity; I trusted, however, to the superior benefits which it holds out to them, above any offer which

* Lt.-Col. Stuart was kidnapped by Bhanga Singh in Jan. 1791, detained at Thaneshwar, and released on 24 Oct. 1791 after Begam Samru had paid his ransom of Rs 15,000. [*Dilliyethil M. Rajkarane*, ii. 28 and *Parb.* 20, corrected from B. Banerji's *Begam Samru*, 73-75.]

Tippoo can make them, for their not betraying or actually abandoning us ; and I knew that they must keep up such appearances as would secure their claims regulated by the Treaty, which would at least make a favourable diversion in support of our more earnest and vigorous exertions ; and I confess that they have in this rather exceeded my expectations. They will hardly show less zeal in the cause, since it has proceeded so successfully, and we may promise ourselves the full and speedy completion of all our objects in this just and necessary war.

You will see by the country newspapers that some expressions have escaped Sindia strongly indicative of his indisposition to the rapid progress of our army against Tipoo. My conjecture on the cause is his apprehension that a successful termination of the war will afford leisure to the Poona Government to check his ambitious views and to circumscribe his power and influence. Yet I cannot suppose he would expose himself to the resentment of our Government by any advice or attempt to draw off the Peshwa from the alliance or force us into a premature and inadequate peace. It is, however, by no means impossible that the impediments which he meets with to a permanent and profitable establishment into Indoostan may have determined him to turn his attention another way and to regain his station and influence in the general concerns of the Empire. His earnest discourse of an intention to visit Ujjain and preparations for such a journey, give some colour to the scheme ; but the obstacles to its accomplishment appear to me so numerous and his design in holding it out so obviously to be the intimidating the Rajahs of Udipore and Chitore etc. into his demands, that I do not think it probable. Should I, however, be mistaken and see his back fairly turned upon Indoostan, I shall conclude that he will never return to it, but will leave it to be struggled for by the Poona Government or Aly Bahadur and Holkar.

Even in this event I should think his plan has been concerted with and secured by Nana Farnaweess. The object of it must be highly important to our interests, and I hope you will be able to obtain the earliest information of them, if there should be any foundation for these surmises. But this will probably be best discovered at Poona.

Upon the whole, I think Sindia will make some effort to get clear of Holkar and Aly Bahadur, and a march into Mewar may serve to sound the disposition of your Durbar as to his quitting Indostan ; at the same time it will overawe the refractory Rajahs of that province.

Bhow Bakhshy seems to decline in credit with his master. He has been dispossessed of the farm of Baroach, and I believe not without good reason, for mismanagement and oppression. He is at present employed with Ambajee in Mewar, which I believe has served only as a pretext for removing him from Sindia's presence without discredit. He is supplanted by Appa Chitnaweess, who is much his superior in talents and knowledge

of business ; I shall not be sorry if he also supplants the Bhow in the agency of English affairs, for the latter is insufferably tedious and indecisive.

If Ismail Beg Khan can penetrate into Guzerat he will give considerable disturbance to the Maratha Govt., but I am of opinion he will perish in the attempt to get through.

269. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 8th July 1791.

I had the pleasure to write to you on the 21st ultimo and to acquaint you with the reports and appearances of Sindia's moving to the southward ; as he has actually commenced and steadily pursues that route, I have no doubt left of his proceeding to Ujjain as he professes in his letter to the Governor General.

I am still of the opinion which I gave to the Board that he will speedily return to Muttra as he declares in his letter to his Lordship, and am rather confirmed in it, by the tranquil appearance of the country since his absence and the superiority of the force which he has left to maintain it, although I at first thought the risque too great for any object I could discover in such an excursion as he has now undertaken.

Holkar and Aly Bahadur seem to be but little in condition to give disturbance to Sindia's affairs were they so disposed ; the Rajpoots are reduced to utter imbecility ; the Sikhs are divided and at war amongst themselves and the season does not admit of distant or difficult military operations.

In this state of things Sindia's absence appears to me much less hazardous to his interests here than I at first conceived it, and his purposes to the southward, if they are such as he avows, may be executed securely during the rains.

It is still affirmed by people of intelligence that he will proceed to Poona, but for my own part I cannot believe that he will relinquish the splendid establishment he has made here for the chance of obtaining the lead of the army or councils of the Peshwa in the Deccan. All the knowledge which I have of his situation either positively or relatively makes such a scheme incredible.

270. W. PALMER TO THE HON'BLE CHARLES STUART.

Agra, 12 July 1791.

I have the honor to forward an answer from Mahajee Sindia to your letter advising him of the victory obtained by Lord Cornwallis over Tippoo Sultan on the 15th of May last.

I cannot discover any solid grounds for the reports and surmises of his intention to proceed to Poona. I believe they are chiefly built on his own public declarations, which I regard as calculated to deceive in order to effect the purposes mentioned in my last address to the Governor-General in Council.

The removal of Aly Bahadur and Holkar from Indostan, is certainly a measure of great importance to him, but I cannot preceive that a journey to Poona is necessary to effect it, and it would inevitably expose to considerable risk his possessions and authority on this side of the Chambal, and these I am persuaded are and will ever continue to be his principal concern.

271. MAHADJI SINDHIA TO THE CALCUTTA COUNCIL.

Received 24 July 1791.

By the grace of God, and the influence of a laudable design, the present war will be terminated in the wished-for manner, and the enemy meet the reward of his actions. As the Rajahs of Jaypoor and Jodhpoor have become tributary and submitted to the yoke, that contest is brought to a conclusion. I have now therefore detached the greater part of my troops under the command of experienced officers towards the metropolis and Agra, and myself, with a flying army, shall move towards Mewar and Chitor for the purpose of chastizing the Rana of Udipoor. By the favour of God, the true giver of victory, this expedition also will shortly be brought to the wished-for conclusion. I write this for your information.

272. E. O. IVES TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Lucknow, 22nd July 1791.

Two *harkarahs*, whom I directed my news-writer at Rampoor to send off for the purpose of obtaining intelligence respecting the Goorkha or Nepal Rajah's army, are just returned to that place and the following are the particulars which they have brought back.

That it is three years since Ran Bahadur, the Rajah of Nepal, had deputed his Dewan Jagjeet Pandey with an army to conquer the hills; that in this space he has taken near 50 places and has now gotten possession of [Dehra] Doon, Almorah, and other places in this quarter of them; that Amar Sing Thapa and Jag Mal, and other Sardars are with the Dewan; that Jag Mal has been appointed by the Rajah to be Subadar of Almorah, where he resides; that near 3 or 400 people are with him and the whole of the Rajah's army in these parts with Jagjeet Pandey amounts to near 20,000 *piadahs*, of whom 10 or 12,000 are armed with firelocks and the rest with matchlocks and bows; that Harakh Deo Joshi (the person who had taken refuge in the Vizier's country on being worsted by Lal Sing, the Rajah of Almorah) is with Jagjeet Pandey; that by his councils they have also acquired possession of the Srinagar hills, which

was achieved without striking a blow ; for when Jagjeet Pandey and other Nepal Sardars, accompanied by Harakh Deo, marched towards the hills of Srinagar, which are three days' journey from Almorah, Pritam Sing, the Rajah of Srinagar, though he had before made preparations for war, yet immediately on hearing of the news fled to the hill of Nahan, so that Jagjeet Pandey, Amar Singh Thapa and the Joshi took quiet possession of Srinagar ; that the Goorkha or Nepal Sardars are now encamped on the banks of the river under Srinagar and are meditating an expedition against Nahan ; that Harakh Deo Joshi commands their van and is the person by whose councils they are guided ; that at the station of Ghatah Kotah which is twenty cos from Kashipur (a place in the Vizier's country), there are people belonging to Jag Mal and Harakh Deo Joshi ; and that the nephew of the deceased Motee Chand (viz., Rajah Lal Sing who was lately in possession of the Raj of Almorah), is in Goolpoory, which is situated in a plain at the foot of the hills ; that no strangers are permitted to enter the Nepal army, but they do not obstruct the *beparis* (tradesmen) who carry cloth from this quarter for sale.

My harkarahs had been seized and kept in confinement for a month and a half, on suspicion of being spies of Lal Sing, and very narrowly escaped being put to death. From the accounts they have brought it appears that the Rajah of Nepal has possession of the whole range of hills except Nahan, on which the Sardars are meditating an attack. It has not yet appeared that they have any hostile designs on the low countries. The minister, however, observed to me the other day that they still kept possession of the villages belonging to His Excellency alluded to in my letter of the 24th April last as seized by them on account of the disputes, of which the minister's explanation (given in consequence of the *arzi* presented to your Lordship by the Nepal vakeel) was enclosed in my letter of the 2nd February.

273. E. O. IVES TO C. W. MALET.

Lucknow, 24th July 1791.

I have received your favour of the 29th ultimo. The report of Ghazi-ud-din's joining the Nepal people was a mistake. The last that was heard of him was his having gotten with the Shahzada Meerza Ahsan Bakht as far as Kangra in the Panjab, where it was reported the Prince was to marry a daughter of Mahommad Amin Khan's, who has some territories in that quarter ; it is said that they had sent from thence letters to Timoor Shah and meant to wait for his answer. The enclosed copy of a letter I have lately written to the Governor-General in Council will give you all the information I have yet been able to obtain relative to the Nepal people.

No threats have been made use of, at least by Government, to obtain Colonel Stuart's release. The distant Sikhs, therefore, must have been

very ill informed if they assigned any such reason for advising Bhanga Sing not to deliver him up. None of the Sikh Sardars being now in the neighbourhood of the Vizier's territories, the plan you have suggested could not be executed. There are Sikh merchants both in the Vizier's country and ours, but I should fear their Government is too relaxed to care much what becomes of the merchants ; but at any rate no one would venture to undertake such a business without the sanction of our Government.

It seems now generally believed that the army is returned to Bangalore to prepare for the next campaign, which I trust will put an end to the war. Give me leave to congratulate you on the high degree of approbation which appears to have been given at Home to your negotiations.,

274. W. PALMER TO C. W. MALET.

Agra, 29th July 1791.

Recd. 26 Aug. 1791.

I am favoured with yours of the 29th ultimo accompanied with your correspondence with Lord Cornwallis to that time.

The junction of the Maratha army with his Lordship, though not so critical as could have been wished, was still fortunate in the small supply of provisions which it contributed and thereby enabling us to keep our ground in the vicinity of the enemy's army and Capital.

Our allies will not act with the zeal and good faith evinced by our Government, but it is prudent to connive at these omissions so long as we reap any services from them at all.

Sindia, as you will see, is advanced into the district of Mewar. He writes to me from thence that he is not yet able to determine whether he shall proceed to Ujjain or return to Muttra. I think the latter, and have less suspicion than ever that he will repair to Poona.

Holkar's having recovered possession of the fort of Rampoor in Jaypore, which I understand to be of considerable strength, will augment his influence in that quarter and give some jealousy to Sindia which, added to other circumstances of distrust from the apparent connexion and views of the Subadar with Ranjeet Sing, may and probably will operate to bring him speedily back, although it is not easy to discover what his ultimate resolution respecting Indoostan will be if the possessions and authority in it are to be shared with his rivals. This will probably depend upon the state of his influence in the Government and the importance of the character which he would be able to assume in the conduct of affairs by his personal presence at the Durbar, and the weight of his strength and resources directed to obtaining an ascendancy in the State. Yet I think it may be expected from his spirit of perseverance in every pursuit when once

commenced, and the magnitude of the present object, that he will persist in his efforts to obtain a permanent and exclusive establishment on this side of India.

The application of Ramjee Patel for your recommendation of Meer Mahomad Amjad was totally useless, as Lord Cornwallis had long ago declined Sindia's solicitations for his Lordship's interposition with the Vizier to restore Mahommad Amjad's jageer upon a principle of delicacy, although he wished much to oblige Sindia, if it could have been done without interfering with the Vizier's authority, and he was much pleased with and would have been glad to reward the attention shown by Mahomad Amjad to Eetal Row and other Maratha pilgrims of distinction whom he had been frequently appointed to conduct to the places of worship in His Excellency's dominions.

275. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

*Agra, 20th September 1791.
Received, 26th October.*

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's commands of the 9th ultimo on the 16th instant, and in obedience thereto have left the Maratha Camp and shall immediately proceed into the Vizier's dominions, and there wait the return of Sindia to Indoostan, or join him to the southward, as your Lordship directs in case he should expressly desire it.

An interview had taken place before I received your Lordship's instructions between the deputies of Sindia, Gopal Bhow and Jivvaji Bakhshy and myself, in consequence of the Patel's particular request and the invitation of those Sardars, and which indeed I should not have thought myself authorized to decline by the spirit of your orders, as it might have created in Sindia that uneasiness and distrust which your Lordship is desirous to avoid.

The Sardars are entirely reconciled to my temporary absence on the pretext which your Lordship suggested, and I assured them in full confidence of your friendly disposition towards their principal, whose cheerful acquiescence in my departure will, I hope, be also obtained by their and my advices of the causes.

I have not been able to obtain from the deputies precise information of Sindia's designs in his excursion to the southward, but I gather from the tenor of their conversation that they expect his absence will be long, an opinion which is corroborated by the provision he has made of an ample force for the protection of Indoostan against any probable attempts by the united strength of his enemies, and by an undertaking of time and difficulty in which he has engaged to reduce the revolted zamindars of Mewar to the obedience of their ancient Sovereign, the Rana of Udiopore,

This province, which yields an annual revenue of a crore of Rupees, has been dismembered gradually by the powerful members of the State, in the same manner as the Empire of Indoostan, and Sindia's motive for reducing them to the nominal authority of the Rana may be supposed much the same as actuated his conduct towards Shah Alam.

I have troubled your Lordship with this brief account of the State of Mewar and Sindia's views upon it, to show the improbability of his interfering at this time in any shape with the politic of the Deccan, much less his assuming a part inimical to the interests of the Company or exciting in your Lordship suspicion which would induce you to defeat his projects or disturb his possessions in this quarter which are evidently the first object of his care and concern.

Some present symptoms which appear of serious disturbances in Indoostan [are] I think likely to occasion Sindia's speedy return.

Ismael Beg Khan has suddenly and rapidly returned from the south-west extremity of Jaypore to within 20 cos of Jaynagar, either to support the Rajah of that district against Tookojee Holkar, or to recover his possessions in Rewary and to contend for those which the death of Najaf Quli Khan have left in competition between him, the Marathas and Rajpoots. It is probable that the latter will cede their pretensions to Ismael Beg in consideration of his assisting them to reject the Maratha tribute and other exactions. Sindia's officers, however, affect to despise such a confederacy and say that it will make no alteration in his plans, and indeed there seems but little cause for apprehension from it.

SECTION 7

Mahadji Sindhia's visit to Poona and last days (1792-1794).

276. W. PALMER TO THE HON'BLE CHARLES STUART.

Camp at Bhilsa, 30th March, 1792.

I have received a letter from Mahajee Sindia acquainting me that he shall defer his visit to Poona until after the rains, and that having performed his pilgrimage to the shrine of Shah Mansur and to his tutelary Hindoo deity in the Deccan,* he shall repair to Jambgaon, a select jagir of his, within 30 cos of the capital, and canton there during the wet season, where he requests I will join him.

If such is his real intention, I trust it will remove in a great degree the apprehensions which I fear have been excited in the minds of the members of Government, by the suggestion of Sir Chas. Malet & Lieut. Stewart of his designs at Poona, in their late correspondence with Lord Cornwallis, since the postponing his personal attendance at the Peshwa's Durbar to so distant a period, is a strong presumption that he did not entertain the design of interfering in the contest between the allies and Tippoo, the only one from which I can perceive that he could hope to derive any advantage ; and although such interference is now happily precluded by the termination

*Shah Mansur, a *darvesh*, had foretold Mahadji's future greatness, when the young Sindhia was roaming through the streets of Puna in poverty and unemployment. Sindhia made this *darvesh* his spiritual guide and lavished gifts on his family. Shah Mansur lies buried at Bir (in the Nizam's territory), which Mahadji visited 5th—12th April, 1792, and then he marched to Tuljapur (arrival 7th May), where he married. Then, giving up the idea of making a pilgrimage to Pandharpur, he went to Jambgaon (18th May), and thence to Puna.

of the war, it may afford some security to Government as to his real disposition towards the Company, that there is such an appearance of his not having intended it.

I am not furnished with copies of Lieut. Stewart's correspondence on the subject of the dangers which he has suggested from Sindia, and I will not trouble you with any remarks on the speculations and conjectures of Sir Chas. Malet on the causes and consequence of Sindia's visit and my attending him, as the principal are obviated by the change in affairs, and the others will have already produced the determination of Government. But for their satisfaction and assurance, I beg leave to repeat my firm persuasion, strengthened by additional observation and experience of the conduct and situation of Sindia, that he is convinced it is neither for his interest to engage separately in nor within his ability to execute any measure or enterprize hostile to the Company; but on the contrary [he] relies principally upon his connection with the British nation for his security against the power and authority of the Maratha State and the jealousy and envy of his rival chieftains.

I shall continue to pursue my route leisurely and by way of Ujjain that time may be given for the resolution of Government as to my further progress, before I am too far advanced.

277. W. PALMER TO THE HON'BLE CHARLES STUART.

Ujjain, 16th April, 1792.

I take the liberty to acquaint you with my arrival at this place yesterday. I found Bhow Bakhshy here waiting for me, as he says, in order to accompany me on the remainder of my journey to join Sindia. But having reason to believe that the return of his master towards Indostan, will be very speedy, he has written to know his wishes respecting my further progress, and as he expects an answer in the course of 6 or 8 days, requests me to wait for it. And with this request I shall comply, unless instructions from Government or an application from Sindia should make it proper for me to proceed sooner.

The Bhow assures me that although it was highly probable that Sindia would have been personally engaged, on his repairing to Poona, in the contest with Tippoo Sultan, it would have been in consequence of the Peshwa's demanding his services, rather than any design or inclination of his own, and that had he been so employed, he would have given additional proofs of his inviolable attachment to the Company and nation, and of his sincere desire to preserve and improve the ties subsisting between them, the Peshwa and himself.

I can easily believe the Bhow's assertion of his master's wish to return to Indostan, for his power and possessions in this Province and south

of the Narbada will bear no comparison with the former ; and although the revenue arising from his various jagirs held under the Peshwa may amount to 80 lacs of Rupees annually, they are so scattered and intermixed with the territories of the State of Tukojee Holkar and other Sardars, that he has not through the whole extent a connected collection to the amount of ten lacs, and on this side of the Narbada, he is totally exposed and defenceless, at least in every part of his territories through which I have passed, and I believe he is equally so everywhere else.

From my observation of his situation in Malwa, I am confirmed in the opinion which I have long entertained from experience of his situation and conduct in Indostan, that his security must depend upon his maintaining a perfect good understanding with us, so long as it is his object to retain these countries. I repeat this opinion, because I understand that much argument has lately been employed, and rather officiously though doubtless with good intention, to impress different sentiments on the minds of administration. I am by no means partial to Sindia, nor think him so to our nation and Government in India, on any other motive than his firm conviction of his interest and importance being promoted by his political connection and apparent cordiality with them ; but as both a regard to public faith and an opinion of expediency induce our Government to preserve the harmony established between them and him, I think it my indispensable duty to guard them against ill-founded distrust or alarms, which may tend to interrupt it and to compel Sindia to seek alliance and support where it might eventually be prejudicial to our interests.

Bhow Bakhshy who continues in charge of his master's transactions with the Company, repeats his protestations of his sincere desire and earnest endeavors to contribute to the cementing and improving their connection and mutual honor and advantage. It is but justice to him to declare my experience of his having hitherto acted in conformity to these professions, and he appears at present to have a stronger inducement for meriting our approbation, by having relinquished all the farms which he held of Sindia, and retaining no other employment except that of Diwan, and which I believe is merely nominal, being superseded both in the influence and functions of the office by Appa Chitnavis.

Sindia, having altered his resolution of going first to Jambgoan and determined to proceed to Poona direct from the dargah of Shah Mansur, corroborates other appearances of his wish to return to the northward as soon as possible.

278. INTELLIGENCE FROM SINDIA'S CAMP, 12th AUGUST 1792.

Received at Calcutta, 12th September 1792.

It was reported in the paper of intelligence from the Camp that Bapoo Holkar, pursuant to the letters of Tukojee Holkar, had desired

the Chiefs belonging to the Rajah of Jaypoor to place their troops with some strong place in their rear, and oppose Gopal Bhow and Jivvaji Bakhshy, and told them that he should detach his baggage and after the Deccany fashion would ravage the country belonging to Sindia and the Row Rajah. The Row Rajah, on hearing this, observed to his Chiefs that he saw no prosperity for himself whether Sindia or Holkar were master of the country; but he should escape for sometime from the reach of Tukoji Holkar and the Rajah of Jaypoor, by joining Sindia. Tukoji Holkar wrote to Aly Bahadur that if Gopal Bhow and Jivvaji Bakhshy submitted to terms, very well; if not, that he (Holkar) would raise disturbances in the country on his side the Chambal and Aly Bahadur should commence hostilities in Gwalior. Some time was past in consultation on this intelligence with his confidants, when Sindia remarked that this conduct could not be free of the treachery of the Poona ministry, who to please him wrote in one style and carried on negotiations of another tendency. He asked what remedy to apply to the evil. Appa Chitnavis replied that no disturbances could arise in that country during the rains, that the Dasahara drew near; should the Poona administration in the meantime, by dint of correspondence and verbal negotiation settle affairs and give Sindia his dismissal, it would be well; otherwise that Sindia should demand his dismissal. Sindia replied, you transact business with them (the minister of Poona); the effect of intrigues on my temper is well-known to you both. Notwithstanding that at my request they have written to Aly Bahadur to send Himmat Bahadur and are ready to write to Tukoji Holkar to act according to my will and not to raise any disturbance against the Row Rajah, yet I do not expect that once writing will bring Himmat Bahadur here, nor reconcile Tukojee Holkar, and a long period will elapse. Unless I persevere in my present measures, I shall not extricate myself quickly. This debate lasted for a long time. The Row Rajah in consequence of the letters from the Jaypoor Rajah, Khush-hali Ram and Bapoo Holkar, keeps both parties in suspense.

279. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Ujjain, 29th September, 1792.

I learn from the enquiries of my agent at the King's Durbar, that a letter was actually written, as your Lordship has been informed, by His Majesty to Sindia, and was obtained by Shah Nizam-ud-din, but whether by the direction of his principal, or at his own instance, I have not discovered. I have however no doubt that Sindia will disavow all participation in it, when he answers the remonstrances which I lately made to him in your Lordship's name on this and other subjects.

Shah Nizam-ud-din is a man of an intriguing and assuming character, who makes what use he pleases of the King's name and authority. But

I think he would be cautious of applying them to any measure, which he did not know would be agreeable to Sindia.

All report concurs in the determination of Sindia to take leave of the Peshwa after the Dasahara. And I have private intelligence from good authority, that he has been both disappointed and deceived by the minister, whom he has reproached with duplicity in secret by encouraging his rivals in Indostan to oppose him whilst he gave him assurances to the contrary. That he had intercepted a letter from Nana Farnavees to Aly Bahadur, promising him the Peshwa's authority and support in resisting him, and upon this had declared to the minister that he could place no further confidence in him and would immediately return to Indostan, and maintain his authority there by his own power.

This resolution indeed he appears already to have taken in the bold and decided measures of commencing hostilities against Tukoji Holkar, of pursuing them beyond the immediate object of the contest, and proceeding to dispossess him of all his dependencies in Indostan. If he has obtained the sanction of the Peshwa to this conduct, it manifests the extent of his influence in the Government, if not his spirit of independence on it.

I hope and believe that the division between the Maratha State and so powerful a member of it, will conduce to the general tranquillity of India.

280. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Ujjain, 9th October 1792.

I have the honor to enclose an answer from Mahajee Sindia to the representation which I made to him by your Lordship's commands of the various causes of complaint which have been given to your Government by the conduct of persons in authority under him or dependent upon him.

I think this answer will prove satisfactory to your Lordship, as disavowing any knowledge or sanction of those offensive transactions and promising ample redress and future prevention. And I make no doubt that, if you have not already acquiesced in the reparation accepted by the Government of Bombay, for the outrages committed at Bharoach, that Sindia will comply with those specific demands to that effect which I preferred from your Lordship.

It appears to me from the result of such enquiries as I have had frequent occasion to make into the irregular proceedings of Sindia or his officers with respect to our Government, that they have generally arisen from misunderstanding or inadvertence, and that he himself was sincerely disposed to remedy or prevent them and to maintain the most conciliatory and friendly intercourse and connection with the Company and nation. And it is probable that he was never more intent upon adhering to this conduct than at present, when his affairs are so critically situated both in Hindostan and the Deccan.

If the information which I have received through a very respectable person of Sindia's household is true, the opposition to his power and views at Poona is likely to be productive either of his total depression or a change in the Peshwa's administration. He has, it is asserted, found opportunity at the times of their military exercises to gain the confidence and goodwill of the Peshwa by offers of large pecuniary assistance and of relieving him from the pupilage in which he is held by Nana Farnaweas. The minister and Hary Pant Farkea are said to have taken alarm at the ascendancy which Sindia has thus acquired and to be taking every precaution in their power against the consequences to be apprehended from it. And in fact, from all public appearances, the ultimate views of both parties are tending fast to a disclosure.

Tookjee Holkar is wholly unable to maintain a war alone against Sindia in Hindoostan, and no support seems to be moving towards him. He must soon retire, and I think with little prospect of renewing the struggle successfully.

281. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Ujjain, 11th November 1792.

Tukojee Holkar ever since his rout has been encamped on the southern bank of the Chambal, about fourteen cos from Kotah, where he has not been pursued by Gopal Bhow. He does not appear to be making any efforts at Indor to recover his station, or to make further resistance in Indostan. Probably he is aware that the Poona Durbar intend to make him an instrument of their designs against Sindia, at his own expence, and already wishes for a reconciliation, which I understand he may obtain on returning to the situation in which Sindia parted with him.

The inhabitants of this defenceless town have been much alarmed, lest Holkar should revenge himself upon it for the loss and disgrace which he has suffered from Gopal Bhow. But whether he has been afraid of retaliation on his own possessions in the province, or by whatever other motives he may have been restrained, no attempt has been made, or appears to be intended. Indeed, I hear that Ahalya Bai has strictly enjoined her people to refrain from all injury or offence to those of Sindia.

The present situation of Sindia and his opponents at Poona appears to be critical and on the point of decision. But in whatever mode the contest may be conducted, I have that opinion of his power and his policy as to think he will ultimately prevail. I learn from a person who was present at his last interview with the Peshwa and his minister, that he enumerated his faithful attachment and important services to the Peshwa and his House, declared that he had no object but the augmentation of the power and possessions of the State, and if the Peshwa wished that his rivals should triumph over him, he was ready to resign his authority and possessions, into his hands, and would desire no other favor

than the choice of a retreat in which he might pass the remainder of his days in tranquillity. This artful speech it is said made a visible impression on the mind of the young Peshwa, and even caused him to shed tears. If Sindia has gained that ascendancy in the opinion of the latter, which it is asserted he has, the Brahmin ministers will not venture upon open opposition. And even with the advantage of the Peshwa's authority on their side, I do not think they will try the strength against him. At the same time he is by no means desirous of coming to extremities ; but such is the vindictiveness of his temper, that I doubt whether he will depart without attempting to reduce Hary Pant to a condition which will leave him nothing to fear from his enmity. At the same time, I am confident from the reflections which my information and knowledge of circumstances enable me to make on this subject, that your Lordship's Government will be little affected by any event of the dispute.

Sindhia has rejected the constant importunity of his most confidential servants to desire my attendance, which is probably more the effect of his moderation and discernment, than of the reason he assigns, his expectation of soon returning to the northward.

282. INTELLIGENCE FROM THE CAMP OF GOPAL BHAU.

Kakur near Rampur, 1st May 1793.*

On the march to this ground, the *harharahs* reported that Eetal Row, Pant vakeel to Tukojee Holkar, had visited Jivvaji Bakhshree to negotiate a peace, and had requested that Gopal Bhow would halt his army on the spot. Jivvaji Bakhshree accompanied by the vakeel came to Gopal Bhow. He proceeded however on his march, and came to his tents at Kakoor. Eetal Row delivered his letters from Tukoji Holkar relative to peace, and observed that some time ago Gopal Bhow had made forced marches with hostile intentions and had destroyed property to the amount of lacs of Rupees, and had plundered the country ; that he was now returning with hostile intentions, but that Tukoji Holkar was not desirous of war, and only wanted his usual *chouth* from Hindustan. To this Gopal Bhow replied that Sindhia had conquered the country by force of arms, that if Tukoji Holkar would reimburse Sindhia's expenses, he should have the *chouth*, that if Tukoji Holkar is desirous of peace, as a distance of 5 cos remains between the two armies, Gopal Bhow would march 3 cos tomorrow, and Tukoji Holkar should march the remaining two cos, and then peace could be negotiated and Tukoji Holkar could then go to the country belonging to the Sikhs at Sarhind ; that Gopal Bhow was prepared for war or peace. Nothing was determined, and the vakeel represented that he should return the next day to Camp, and he requested to know the determination. The vakeel left the Durbar. Gopal Bhow, Lakwajee Pandit and Jivvaji Bakhshree with other Chiefs continued to deliberate on this subject, and Gopal Bhow observed that Sindhia could only

* There is a *Kakur*, 12 m. s. e. of Tonk.

determine on the division of the country. Eetal Row, the vakeel was again called into the Council, and was told that if his master was desirous of peace both armies should remain, and that Gopal Bhow would halt on this ground three days and wait the vakeel's return ; when if he returned to make peace, it would be well ; otherwise at the end of three days Gopal Bhow would proceed to the attack. The vakeel took leave under a limited time of three days.

283. W. PALMER TO EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Fathgarh, 21st July 1793.

I learn by particular intelligence from Poona, that at an interview lately held between Mahaji Sindia, Nana Farnavees and Hary Pant Farke, by the express appointment and in the presence of the Peshwa, the three Chiefs entered into mutual engagements to reconcile their differences to support the Peshwa's Government, to confirm the authority of Sindia in Hindoostan, to accommodate the disputes between him and Tukoji Holkar, and to enforce the claims of the Maratha State upon the Nabob Nizam Aly Khan. And that these engagements, in order to render them sacred and inviolable, were taken in a temple and sworn to under the most solemn forms of their religion.

This information is probably founded on the known views of the parties, rather than any positive communication of the engagements actually taken at the meeting. But I have thought it of sufficient credibility to convey it to your Lordship, especially as more authentic advices may not perhaps be obtained, and it may afford foundation for probable conjecture of the measures which will occupy the attention of the principal powers in the Deccan after the rainy season.

Sindia must feel the necessity of his speedy return to Hindoostan, if his concerns in that quarter are still the chief object of his ambition. His revenues have so rapidly declined in his absence, that they are become greatly inadequate to the maintenance of his army ; and to make certain provision for the payment of the Corps under Mr. De Boigne, he has been obliged to transfer to that officer in *jaidad*, a district estimated at 27 lacs of Rupees yearly collection, a measure of such dangerous tendency to his authority and security, that nothing but the total want of other resources could have compelled him to adopt it.

The district thus assigned is upon the Vizier's frontier to the south-west in the Doab, and if it should ever be occupied by the whole Corps whose subsistence is to be drawn from it, might be a dangerous neighbour, but of that circumstance, there is not the smallest probability unless in case of its defection from Sindia ; and in that event it would be more likely to conciliate than to provoke the Vizier, at least until it should have perfectly secured its independence.

Bhow Bakhshy is returned to Ujjain from an interview with Tukoji Holkar at Indor for the purpose of mediating a reconciliation between his

master and the subadar. The only immediate effects of the Bhow's negotiations will probably be to restrain the mutual depredations of the armies in Malwa.

284. C. W. MALET TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

Poona, 5th February 1794.

Exclusive of the grand object of this Court's political attention in the negotiations with the Nazim [Nizam] in which the interests of the Bhonsla family of Nagpore are also involved, it is engaged in prosecuting its tributary collections in Bundelkhand, by an army under Aly Bahadur, whose brilliant successes in that quarter have been viewed with a jealous eye by Mahadjee Sindia, and who I have reason to think is using all his influence here to procure his (Aly Bahadur's) recall, and will probably enforce it by the movements of a considerable body of troops that he has ordered into that quarter under Gopal Bhow, who by my last account had reached Datia.

* * * * *

Mahadjee Sindhia, who is attended here by about 8,000 horse, foot and artillery, has an army, commanded by Jivvaji Baxy, employed in taking every possible advantage of the disputed succession to the Rajaship of Marwar, vacated by the death of the late Raja Bijay Sing. An army, employed under Ambajee, in settling the country of Mewar in Mahadjee Sindhia's character of Diwan, which office was lately conferred on him by the Rana of Udiopore. An army under Gopal Bhow, is lately employed against Holkar, but now ordered towards Bundelcand, for the purpose of collecting the tributes of the Rajas of that quarter, and for embarrassing (it is conjectured) Aly Bahadur's measures; a force, under Behroo Pant Tattya, in the quarter of Panipat; another, under Bappoo Malhar, in the quarter of Saharanpore; another, in the quarter of Haryana, under Appa Khandé. Beside which, Mr. De Boigne is employed, with part of one of his two brigades, in settling his jageer of 35 lacks of Rupees per annum, situated partly in Mewat, and partly in the Doab. Mr. De Boigne's whole party, I am informed, consists of two regular brigades, constructed on the plan of ours in Bengal, but with a larger proportion of cavalry and artillery, and a large body of Rohila irregulars to act as light infantry. To these two, I understand, a third has been lately added, on local principles, called *sebandi*, meant for the service and defence of his jageer.

The House of Holkar having been reluctantly forced to succumb to this mighty force of its rival Sindhia, Tukokjee is now said to be endeavouring to collect his scattered and brow-beaten followers, and (at the instigations of this Durbar, to revert him from the renewal of a fruitless pursuit of his pretensions, at least equal to those of Sindia in the north) to be preparing for a mulk-giri or collecting expedition, in the N. W. of Gujerat, which, if carried into execution, will expose him to a serious difference with the power of the Gaikwar family.

285. MAHADJI SINDHIA'S GENERAL COL. DE BOIGNE'S TROOPS, 1793.

ARTILLERY.

100 Field pieces, at the rate of 5 guns to each battalion, including 12 Caronades and Howitzers of the 12 Musquet Battalions—

Great Park of Artillery with establishment of men .. 1,000
4 Gallopers, 3 pounders, attached to a Regiment of Cavalry.

The Field pieces are 3, and 6, pounders, and as well as the Howitzers, Caronades and Gallopers, all brass.

I cannot find the paper which contains the number of guns in the Great Park, with their dimensions, also those of the Caronades and Howitzers.

Each battalion has 2 long 3 pounders, and 2 six pounders, with Caronade in the center—45 rounds grape, and 12 shells—400 rounds for the 3 pounders, and 300 rounds for the 6 pounders. 1 tumbril to each gun, drawn by 12 bullocks, with only 3 drivers—8 bullocks per gun with only 2 drivers. The Gallopers are drawn each by 2 horses, one before the other, the shaft horse drove by a gunner seated on the gun, and the fore horse rode by a gunner—are never unlimbered. Including these 2 driver gunners 8 are attached to each Galloper, whose horses, in action, are made fast to 4 camels, each carrying 60 rounds for each Galloper.

ESTABLISHMENT OF GOLANDAZES TO EACH BATTALION.

INFANTRY.

		Rs.
1 Subadar Golandaz at per month	..	35
1 Havildar Major	..	15
1 Court Havildar	..	12
2 Havildars at 10 each	..	20
3 Naiks at 9 each	..	27
5 European Gunners at 40 each..	..	200
32 Golandazes at 6, 7 and 8 each..	..	222
<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	45	
1 Bheesti		

ESTABLISHMENT OF KHALASIS TO THE GUNS OF EACH BATTALION.

		Rs.
1 Serang at monthly pay	..	9
5 Tindals, each 6/8 as.	..	32/8
1 Bheesti	..	4
35 Khalasis, 5 and 4/8 as.	..	166/8
<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	47	

BELDARS.

			Rs.
1	Jamadar Beldar, monthly pay	5
15	Beldars, each 4 Rs.	60
<hr/>			<hr/>
Total	16		

WORKMEN.

5	Blacksmiths at 6 Rs. each per month	30
5	Carpenters at 6 Rs. each per month	30
4	Tabaldars at 4 Rs. each per month	16
1	Bheesti	4
31	Bullock drivers, each 4 Rs.	124
<hr/>			<hr/>
Total	46		

CAVALRY.

One Regiment of Regular Cavalry, the horses of which are the property of Colonel De Boigne, composed of 4 Resalas, each of 4 Platoons.

Strength of One Platoon.

1	Jamadar with monthly pay of Rs.	18
1	Dafadar	12
16	Privates, each 8 Rs.	128

18

4 Platoons.

72

1	Resaladar, monthly pay	60
1	Naib, monthly pay	30
1	Kettle drum	7

75 Complement of one Resala.
4 Resalas.

300 Men and horses.

75 Skirmishing and irregular horse.

32 Gunners and Golandazes for 4 Gallopers.

407 Men and same number of horses, all the property of
De Boigne.

The skirmishing horses are the fleetest, and hardiest, of the whole, and mounted by the bravest and most active horsemen, who are not disciplined as those of the Resalas are.

In the 75 men to each Resala there are 8 more than the complement of formation for manœuvre, to replace the sick men or horses—32 files being only to mount, with two officers, and kettledrum.

1 Syce to every 2 horses	}	each 4 Rs. per month.
1 Grasscutter to do.		

Each Brigade of Infantry has 2 Resalas of regular Horse, of the same strength as in the Regiment of Cavalry with 50 Irregulars composed of the bravest and best mounted men, for skirmishing, reconnoitring, etc., 200 to each Brigade, with the following monthly pay, in consequence of providing and feeding their own horses, viz. :—

				Rs.
1 Resaladar	80
1 Jamadar	40
1 Dafadar	30
1 Kettle drum	24
1 Trooper	24

INFANTRY.

Two Brigades, each of regular Telang, or Musquet

Battalions	6
Ditto Matchlock	do.	..	4

			10 Battns.
One Brigade more	10

Total of Regular Infantry .. 20 Battns.

each of 577 men, staff inclusive—28 recruits with officers are not included.

Strength of one Company of Infantry.

1 Subadar, with monthly pay of Rs.	..	40
2 Jamadars, each 20 Rs.	..	40
1 Court Havildar	..	12/8
4 Havildars, each 10/8 as.	..	42
4 Naiques, each 8/8 as.	..	34
1 Drummer	..	12
1 Fifer	..	12
2 Bheesties, each Rs. 4	..	8
52 Privates, each Rs. 6	..	312

68 Total of one Company.

8 Companies in each Battalion,

Total 544, with the following Staff—

1 Captain	Rs.
1 Commandant, with Milrs. pay (if no European officer) of Rs. ..	150
but only Rs. 75 when under command of an European officer.	
1 Adjutant Jamadar	30
2 Havildars Major, each 15 Rs.	30
1 Serjeant Major (European)	60
4 Colour bearers, each Rs. 12	48
1 Surgeon	10
2 Writers : one at 30 Rs. and the other at Rs. 20.	50
3 Harkarahs, each 5 Rs.	15
1 Bheestee Major	5
5 Musquet stock makers, at each 7 Rs. ..	35
1 Pandit, yearly Rs. 700.	--
23 Staff	

577 Total of one Battalion.

Recruits to each Battalion— 1 Jamadar.
 1 Havildar.
 2 Naiques.
 24 Recruits at 2 as. pay per day until incorporated.

The sepoy of Battalion Companies have only Rs. 5-8 monthly, and the Grenadiers 6 Rs. monthly. The Court Havildar takes charge of all the arms, accoutrements etc. of his Company.

Each Battalion has 2 camels, to carry 8 large bell tents, which can contain 15, or 20, men each, principally intended for the sick of each Company. 2 camels for the tents of the Golandazes, Khalasis etc. attached to the Guns, and 16 camels to carry the sepoy's baggage. Total camels to each battalion 20, at 6 Rs. each monthly. 2 Hackerries to carry the arms of the sick of each Battalion, Beldars' and Tabaldars' tools, foraging ropes etc.

Each Company fires by platoons, independently—Fire of the Matchlock Battalions so much heavier than that of the Musquet Battalions, that De Boigne has given a Caronade, or Howitzer, to each Battalion Musqueteers—Once had two Battalions armed with halberds, and small blunderbusses, for the front rank, intended to cover his flanks, or rear, had also Chevaux de Frize, for the same purpose.

Each Brigade has 1,000 Rohelabs .. Officers inclusive, at Rs. 5-8 per month to save the regular troops in hill attacks, fortified villages, etc

Each Brigade has	400 Mewatees	To defend foragers, escort the Tabaldars, or wood cutters etc. Rs. 4-8 each per month.
	1,000 Men	Attached to the great Park of Artillery—But am not certain whether this is for one, or both Brigades.
	400 Camels	Uncertain whether to each or both Brigades.
		Rs.
Pay of an Ensign per month		150
Pay of a Lieutenant ..		200
Pay of a Lieutenant ..		250
Pay of a Captain ..		400
		Which may be obtained in 2 or 3 years.
Pay of Brigade Major ..		500
Commanding Officer of Brigade		2,000

ORDER of BATTLE De Boigne's Army.


First Line



Reserve



No particular station for the Cavalry.

Encampment of De Boigne's Army.

The number of each Infantry Battalion is given within its square.

The Musquet and Matchlock Battalions interspersed. Infantry are all clothed in scarlet-black leather accoutrements. Coxcombs in their blue turbans. Regiment of Cavalry dressed in green, with red turbans and kamar-bands. Annual expenses reckoned, 18 lacks of Rupees. De Boigne has a jagir, in the Doab, of 12,000 Rs. per annum, exclusive of the collection of Districts on both sides the Jamna, reckoned 25 lacks.

286. C. W. MALET'S DESPATCH TO DIRECTORS.

Poona, 5th Feb. 1794.

Mahadjee Sindia has been troubled for some days with a feverish complaint, which has recurred frequently within the last six months, and will probably hasten his departure from hence.

287. C. W. MALET TO GOVERNOR GENERAL, SIR JOHN SHORE.

Poona, 12th Feb. 1794.

I am much concerned to add to the account of Mahadjee Sindia's indisposition conveyed in my last despatch of the 7th instant, that

he departed this life at 8 o'clock this evening. P.S.—Daulat Rao, Sindia's adopted son, who is about 14 years of age, has been some days absent at Tuljapore with one of Sindia's wives....He is hourly expected here.

288. C. W. MALET TO GOVR. GENL. SHORE.

Poona, 14th Feb. 1794.

Since my last address of the 12th instant, advising the death of Mahadjee Sindia, nothing extraordinary has occurred. The ministers and chieftains of the deceased seem from what has hitherto passed, unanimous in their disposition to receive Daulat Rao as successor to their late master, and in the prosecution of it, letters in his name, have been dispatched to the officers of provinces, forts, districts, and those commanding armies informing the [un-]interrupted pursuit of the objects in which they had been employed, and giving them every assurance of the same support and protection from Daulat Rao, that they enjoyed under their late master.

An *arzee* has likewise been dispatched to the King and letters to Shah Nizam-ud-din in Daulat Rao's name, soliciting a continuation in his person the titles and honours enjoyed by his late adoptive father.

It seems fortunate for Daulat Rao, that the fidelity and attachment of the ministers and chiefs to their late much loved master, should thus, by their adherence to his adopted heir, have obviated the possible evils that might have arisen by his absence at so very critical a period. In fact I believe few masters or princes have better deserved the affection and attachment of their subjects and servants than this extraordinary man, under whose arbitrary authority, all ranks of his followers seem to have enjoyed the utmost latitude of the most liberal indulgence.

Though the same amiable traits of personal character must undoubtedly have impressed the Peshwa and the ministers of this Court with sentiments of individual concern and regret on the loss of so great and so eminent a servant of the State, yet I query, whether, on considerations of political convenience, they will be much grieved by the removal of a member of the empire, whose power, claims, and pretensions, must have been in some degree irksome and obnoxious; all which objectionable circumstances will now be succeeded by the much more desirable ones of becoming, as arbiter of the hope and fortunes of his successor, directors of the force of the family of Sindhia and receivers of the ample benefits invariably arising from the exercise of the lucrative branch of investiture annexed to the Peshwa's supremacy, the advantages of which will be entirely at the command of this Court by the fortunate circumstance of the Patel's having ended his career here, and thereby placed his successor (whose rights are not so indisputable as to relieve him entirely from the arts by which this Court, should it find occasion, may embarrass them) completely within the influence of the Power paramount.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to surmise with any degree of precision the consequences that may be produced by the death of this extraordinary man, in the general system or on the present extent, of this empire : for while we may reasonably conclude that the great instruments employed by Mahadjee Sindia in the command of distant armies, and in the Government of foreign provinces, will lose part of their energy and vigour, by the source of all their movements falling under a new and perhaps discordant influence : it is but fair to presume, that new life will be given to the views and designs of Tookojee Holkar and Aly Bahadur, the operations of the former having been completely stopped and of the latter long checked, by the ascendancy of the deceased Chieftain.

Nor can we suppose but that the northern Rajas and chieftains, nay the blind King himself, who have so long felt and yielded to the personal genius of Mahadjee Sindia, will on its removal feel and perhaps struggle to gratify the natural impulse of emancipation ; in the pursuit of which recourse will be industriously had to arms and intrigues ; and as Shah Alam has the credit of being a considerable adept in the latter, it is not improbable but that he may by his influence on Mr. De Boigne and Samroo's widow, the force of whose Brigade might if collected and critically directed, at this eventful period, be productive of the most important consequences. . . .

289. SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.'s MINUTE ON THE DEATH OF MAHADJI SINDHIA.

Calcutta, 7th April 1794.

Whilst the attention of Hindustan has been arrested, by the important event of the death of Mahadjee Sindia, and expectation looks forward with anxiety to its consequences, this Government, to whose conduct observation is more immediately directed, has cautiously avoided every act that could indicate a wish or appearance of interrupting the peace of India, with a view to derive advantage, from the cessation of that authority, which was beheld with submission, awe and alarm.

It cannot be doubted, that under our countenance and suggestion, an opposition might have been excited to the establishment of the authority possessed by Sindia, in the person of his successor, that the King Shah Alam would have been happy to avail himself of the opportunity afforded him, of escaping from the thralldom imposed upon him by the Marathas, under an assurance of protection from us, and that many of the States subjected by Sindia would attempt the recovery of their independency, if we were disposed to avow a disposition to promote it. Mirza Akbar Shah the King's eldest son had made preparations for his escape from Delhy, which but for his indecision would have been effected. On the notice of this attempt by Shah Nizam-ud-din the agent of Sindia at Delhy to Gopaul Bhau, a force was immediately detached by the latter to the capital for the security of the Maratha influence there. The Rajah of Jaypore has made an

indirect application for the appointment of a Resident to his Court with a proposition to furnish 50,000 cavalry in case they should be wanted, in return for the grant of our protection against the Marathas.

But although I am perfectly sensible of the dangerous tendency, arising from the establishment of the Maratha influence, in the north of Hindustan, that the diminution of it is of course a most desirable event, and that circumstances appear favourable for effecting this object, I know no justifiable mode, by which it could be attempted. Unprovoked hostilities are equally prohibited by the Legislature and sound policy, and the restriction must be understood to apply to the adoption of any measures, necessarily or naturally leading to war; and admitting even the possibility of exciting a resistance to the Maratha Power, without any actual implication of this Government, in the consequences, or without risking its good faith. I should object to the policy of the attempt as improper and unjust.

That the Marathas, Nizam or Tippoo, would in the same circumstances act with similar forbearance, I much doubt, and upon this supposition, our moderation ought to make a favourable impression upon them.

The influence of the Peshwa in the north of Hindustan was almost annihilated by the independancy assumed by Sindia, who whilst he personally acknowledged the authority of the paramount Government of Poona, directed its weight with efficacy to the extension of his own power, without admitting the actual control of the Peshwa over his own affairs, or allowing him any participation of his acquisitions. In Sindia's character, the ruling principle was ambition, whilst sagacity, perseverance, and intrepidity in the accomplishment of its objects marked the general tenor of his conduct, and insured success. The provinces of Gohad, Agra and Delhy, with part of Meerat, and the possessions of Ghulam Qadir Khan in the Doab, have been annexed by Sindia within very few years to his original dominions. The Rajahs of Jaypore and Jodhpoor paid him contributions, and by force and artifice as opportunity occurred, he effected the dissolution of the Mogul interest in India, which Najaf Khan and his successors for some time supported. The connection of the Nabob Vizier with the Company alone saved him.

Whilst Sindia was ever attentive to admit no control in the Poona Government, but as he could employ it for his own benefit, the Peshwa and his ministry reviewed his assumption of independancy with jealousy but with a constant expectation of a favourable opportunity for establishing their claim to a participation of his conquests. A principal object of Sindia's last journey to Poona was evidently to secure the permanency and independancy of his conquests, by an adjustment of all claims with the Peshwa, and by establishing such an influence in the councils of his Government as might prevent a renewal of them, or interruption to the projects which his ambition meditated. This object he appears to have accomplished in a very considerable degree.

The death of Sindia afforded the Peshwa an opportunity for re-establishing that influence which he had lost by the superior abilities and energy of Sindia's character, and combining the information which we have received, with conclusions from known principles, he appears to have endeavoured to avail himself of it. Daulat Rao, whom Sindia designed for his successor, has it is true received the nomination of the Peshwa, but with ceremonial limitations which mark a reserve dictated probably by the object which I impute to him; whether any and what concessions have been claimed or made, we are not apprized, but it is probable, that the attachment of the principal officers of the late Chieftain to the cause of his family and successor, and the apprehension of commotions in the States of Sindia during an undeclared succession, may have operated upon the timidity of Balajee Pandit, and have procured the acknowledgment of Daulat Rao with a decision inconsistent with his usual habits of procrastination.

If my delineation of Sindia's character be just, the Company have little reason to regret his death. Many motives conspired to support the connections which subsisted between him and this Government. He was fully apprized of our disavowal of ambitious conquests, and knew that he might implicitly rely upon our good faith, and he saw the importance which our friendship gave him both with the Poona Government, and the Northern potentates; but ambition has no friendship and altho' for the more unlimited promotion of its designs, he might not have ventured upon a contest with the English Power, I do not think honor or delicacy would have prevented insidious attempts on his part to undermine it. The intelligence from Poona, communicated through the suspicious channel of the Nizam, a short interval before Sindia's death, imputes motives of this nature to him, which I cannot but deem conformable to the general character of his policy.

The Nizam, whatever sorrow his minister may think it expedient to profess for the death of Sindia, has even less cause for regret than this Government. He appears to have been made an instrument by Sindia in the accomplishment of his views at Poona, to have supplied him with very considerable sums from motives which have never been explained, whilst his attachment seems only to have excited the rapacity of that Chieftain, who shortly before his death made new demands upon him in the name and authority of the Court of Delhy. This connection of the Nizam with Sindia would appear surprising, if the whole tenor of his minister's politics were not irreconcilable to any motives of sound policy. The most probable cause of the Nizam's payments to Sindia as far as I can conjecture is that they were made either as loans (which he affects to consider them) or under some promises which Sindia never meant to fulfill, and that the latter introduced pecuniary demands in the King's name by way of acquittal, supported at the same time with territorial claims for the purposes of intimidation. Yet, since the death of Sindia,

it is asserted, that money has been remitted by the Nizam to Daulat Rao, for which no plausible suggestion has been advanced.

It is certainly much to be wished that the administration of the Nizam's Government were conducted upon principles calculated to establish its security and independancy, and it is to be lamented, that the conduct of his minister Azeemul Omrah has as little tendency to promote the internal prosperity of the Nizam's Dominions as to gain the respect of foreign Powers.

The Board cannot have failed to observe, that although the minister Azeemul Omrah, who in fact exercises uncontrolled the power of the Nizam's Government, is ever ready and earnest in his applications for our assistance to extricate himself and his master from the embarrassments in which they are so frequently involved, he seldom consults us on the previous measures before their adoption, and still more rarely exposes his conduct with fairness and candour. His politics discover subterfuge and a want of veracity which enhances the difficulty of affording him the support so necessary to his independancy. The object of his negotiations with Sindia has never been explained by him, and there is strong reason to suspect that at the moment when he expressed his acquiescence to the return of the hostage princes, he was endeavouring to persuade the Poona Court to concur with him in opposing it.

The imbecility of the Nizam's Government certainly holds out a strong temptation to his ambitious neighbours to take advantage of it. With respect to Tippoo Sultan, he is indeed protected by the confederacy to which he is a party, but he has no defence against the usurpations of the Court of Poona, which his late connection with Sindia is more likely to provoke than impede, and the death of the Nizam, the period of which in all probability cannot be long retarded, may open a contest for the succession, of which the Marathas will attempt to take an advantage.

The death of Sindia and youth of Dawlat Rao cannot fail to augment in some degree the Power and influence of the Poona Government, and they will probably have in view the recovery of that control in the northern parts of Hindustan, which was absorbed in the ascendancy acquired and maintained by Sindia.

I shall not enter into speculations upon the mode by which this object which is in itself conjectural, may be pursued. To disunite the principal officers and adherents of the late Mahadjee Sindia, by disseminating suspicion amongst them, or to seduce their attachment by promises and expectations, with a view to render Daulat Rao dependent upon the Peshwa, are acts not unlikely to be tried if necessary. But a speculation which regards the augmentation of the Maratha Power and more particularly the absorption of the authority held by Sindia in that of the Poona administration, cannot be uninteresting to this Government.

In this partial review of the politics of India, which has been suggested by the death of Sindia, it will not be improper to notice the forces under Colonel De Boigne, or the territory assigned to him by Sindia in the Duab. Of the former I lay before the Board for record, a statement [No. 285] which has already been communicated to them individually; it was not delivered to me officially, and although it may be defective, I have no reason from the enquiries which I have been able to make, to distrust its general accuracy.

Nothing can display in a stronger light the superiority of Sindhia's mind, than the confidence which he reposed in Mr. De Boigne, who repaid it by his exertions and attachment, and it is fortunate perhaps for the Company, that Sindhia's selection of an European General to whom he intrusted a force equal or superior to all that he retained, and to whom he assigned an extensive tract of improveable country was made with so much judgment. But the situation and actual force of Colonel De Boigne's army cannot be reviewed without some alarm; and I should esteem it a fortunate circumstance if by amicable negotiation that part of the Duab which Colonel De Boigne holds in assignment from the Ujjain Government could be annexed to the Vizier's territories. I confess at the same time that I see no probable means of effecting it; for admitting what is not apparent, a disposition on the other side to the desired accommodation, it is not in the power of the Vizier to offer a sufficient compensation.

This detail, as the Board will readily conclude, points to no specific propositions, for I see nothing that we can or ought to attempt in consequence of the death of Sindhia. Whatever commotions may ensue from it, if any should arise, I have no apprehension that they can affect our present tranquillity.

It remains however to be decided, whether it will be eligible to continue a Resident with Sindhia's successor, premising that I deem it proper that the offer should not be gratuitous on our part, but that a previous intimation should be made by Daulat Rao Sindhia. I have agreeably to the established forms of intercourse addressed a letter of condolence to him, and Sir Charles Malet has been instructed in his conferences with the members of the Poona Administration, to express our inclination to maintain the same system of friendship, which has so long been established between this Government and that of Sindhia. The instructions to Major Palmer, which I have retained for record, at this time are to the same general import, with a reserve as to the question of continuing his diplomatic functions.

In favour of the affirmative, the following considerations occur. That the situation of a Resident at Ujjain, affords us an opportunity of acquiring authentic intelligence, on the designs of the Marathas in the north of Hindoostan, and of the degree of connection and correspondence between the Courts of Ujjain and Poona, considerations of great and increasing importance. That the influence of a Resident may be occasionally

employed to impede or dissolve a combination unfavourable to the British interests, and that it will generally tend to a disunion of the Maratha interests, by diverting the political connections of Daulat Row to two objects, and by diminishing the necessity of his dependence on the Court of Poona.

By the mediation of the Resident at Ujjain, we still continue some connection with the Court of Delhy, which I do not think it would be politic to renounce altogether. The Marathas, whose political foresight extends to all possible modes of amplifying their enormous possessions, from this motive consider the name and countenance of the royal authority of importance; and circumstances may, in the course of events, arise, which may render them useful to us. Nazarana on public festivals, small indeed in amount, is offered by the Resident to Shah Alarfi in the name of the Governor General.

Against the proposition I know but two objections, the expense and apprehension of adding to the influence of the Marathas by the avowed appearance of a close connection. The first though really great, is comparatively of little importance to the objects which I have stated, and as to the second, although Sindhia certainly derived consequence and even success from the notoriety of our established connection with him, the advantage on the whole may be deemed mutual and nearly equal. If during the war with Tippoo he had been our enemy instead of friend, our embarrassments would have been greatly enhanced.

I am therefore inclined to admit in a superior degree the reasons for continuing the Residency at Sindhia's Court, and think we should not throw any difficulties in meeting the advances which Daulat Rao may make upon this subject. This disposition is sufficiently apparent from the letters written by him and Appa Chitnavis to Major Palmer and one which I yesterday received addressed to myself, translations of which I now record.

With respect to the Nizam, notwithstanding the obstacles imposed by the conduct of his minister, I think we should neglect no fair opportunity of assisting him to maintain the independence of his Government, as far as it can be done without implicating ourselves in the consequences of an improvident interference, and under a caution, that his minister be not encouraged by the expectation of our support, to engage in measures from which our interference cannot extricate him. If the Nizam be too severely pressed by the Marathas, and is neglected by this Government, he must be weakened by the extortions of the former or may be led to enter into negotiations with Tippoo.

As parties to the confederacy for the object of mutual defence against Tippoo Sultan, the principle of the alliance is not fairly observed if either of the contracting parties attempt to invade each other's rights, and this is an assumable ground for our interposition in favour of the Nizam, against

the usurpations of the Marathas. The position however must not be extended too far, nor too rigorously maintained, but I see no objection to make it the ground of an amicable and conciliatory expostulation, under the preceding cautions and limitations with the Court of Puna, if it should push matters to extremity with the Nizam, and that instructions should accordingly be given to the Resident at Poona and information to Captain Kirkpatrick.

This was the substantial ground of the remonstrance which the Resident at Hyderabad was directed by Marquis Cornwallis to make to the Nizam's minister, upon indication that he meant to espouse the cause of Sindia against Balajee Pandit; and although we have since assumed a more cautious tone upon the Nizam's suggested apprehensions of meditated attempts by Sindia, I think we may revert to the principle above laid down, for our interposition.

I cannot observe without regret, the employment assigned by the Nizam, to the detachment stationed with him, which consists principally in reducing refractory zamindars. I could wish every favourable opportunity were taken to impress upon the Nizam the propriety of considering the attendance of the detachment as evidence of the friendship subsisting between him and the Company, rather than as for the purpose of enforcing the payment of the collections from his disobedient subjects. I am well aware, that the detachment was sent to the Nizam upon a requisition made by him in consequence of the same treaty, by which we claimed the Guntoor Sarcar, and that the only restrictions respecting the employment of it were that it should not act against any States in friendship or alliance with the English. The object of my present proposition should of course be urged with delicacy without the formality of a specific representation.

The indirect mode in which the application has been made from the Raja of Jaypoor requires in my opinion no answer, and I recommend that none be made to it.

I shall conclude with some observations which in point of connection ought to have been introduced in a former part of this minute.

The title of *Vakeel-ul-Mutlak* has been conferred by Shah Alam upon the Peshwa and has been assumed by him. It is equivalent in meaning to Vicegerent, and may in fact be deemed a complete delegation of the royal authority to the Peshwa.

The grant and its assumption have not yet been acknowledged by this Government, and Sir Charles W. Malet, if my recollection be accurate, in some part of his correspondence which I cannot readily refer to, in stating the solicitude of the Peshwa for our acknowledgment of the title, proposes that we should wait the example of the Nizam and be guided by it.

At present the matter lies dormant and I see an impropriety in reviving it without necessity. The Peshwa may probably think it most wise to be

satisfied with our silence, rather than by a direct claim run the risque of a formal disavowal, an example which he might suppose prejudicial to his interests.

If ever the claim should be brought forward in such a manner as to require disavowal or acknowledgment, it will then be time to determine upon it, but whatever the resolution may then be, this Government can have no hesitation to reject the exercise of any authority over it or any demands upon it in virtue of the title assumed by the Peshwa.

To claims of this kind I should at once concisely reply, that as the Company do not admit the immediate operation of the authority of the Court of Delhi over their possessions, they of course will not allow the exercise of it by delegation; that the claims profess an inadmissible assumption of superiority in the Maratha State, which we will not hear and which a sense of its impropriety ought to have suppressed.

Our connection with the Court of Delhi is merely complimentary, and although we have long in fact disavowed the interference of the royal authority we still preserve the same respectful forms of address which were adopted in the infancy of the English Power, and I should feel a reluctance to add to the mortification of the unfortunate monarch by any alteration of them.

The title conferred upon the Peshwa can only be deemed extorted, and upon the widest ground of right could only be construed to extend to the possessions which the King held at the time of the grant. But it would be ridiculous to allow any weight to a consideration of right in this question; for upon this principle the Marathas ought to allow the King a participation of that power which they profess to exercise in his name and authority as well as of the advantages derived from it.

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